Africa's Next Debt Crisis: A Relational Comparison of Chinese and Western Lending to Zambia

Africa faces a new debt crisis fuelled by Chinese and Western lending. At the forefront is Zambia, which defaulted on Eurobond payments in 2020. The article sets the developing Africa-wide crisis within a relational comparison that draws the current Zambian moment together with the financial collapse of the 1980s. By placing Chinese lending within a comparative global frame, we make three contributions. First, Zambia provides a “spatial fix” for capital, but such African borrowing is not passive and shapes hegemonic struggles between China and the US. Thus secondly, Africa's relationship with debt is co-constituent in the remaking of the global economy, as signalled by the contested execution and interpretation of development-as-modernisation. Finally, a relational comparison of the two debt crises demonstrates that global capitalist hegemony is, partly, engineered by the consent and coercion of African governments, yet the human costs of borrowing are fully borne by the world's poorest.     

Ukraine's Financial Crisis, 2009

A prominent specialist in the economic affairs of the former Soviet Union relates and analyzes the state of Ukraine's economy in light of a series of discussions and interviews with the country's Prime Minister and leading economic officials in Kyiv in 2008 and April 2009. The author, a former economic advisor to the country's government and co-chair of the UN's Blue Ribbon Commission for Ukraine, devotes this paper to a penetrating analysis of the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 on Ukraine's budget, banks, exchange rates, money supply, industrial sectors (particularly energy and steel), GDP, and inflationary pressures. Due attention is given to economic relations with the EU and Russia as well as to financial assistance from the IMF.Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: E500, E600, O520, P200. 1 table, 4 figures, 38 references.     

Nationalism,economic crisis and ‘realistic revolution’ in 1980s Mexico*

ABSTRACT. This article examines how the Mexican state drew upon nationalist discourse for legitimacy following the 1982 debt crisis. The analytical framework situates Mexico within the context of Latin American nationalism and explores the structural and conjunctural factors that contributed to the endurance and effectiveness of Mexican revolutionary nationalism as a hegemonic nationalist discourse. Historical commemorations during the Miguel de la Madrid administration (1982–88) are then examined to show how the state evoked nationalist motifs as it dealt with economic crisis, pressure from the USA, domestic political opposition and the implementation of neoliberal reforms. The relative effectiveness of sometimes counterintuitive appeals to nationalist legitimacy is found to be neither wholly ‘rational’ nor ‘irrational’, in this case having its basis in a history of elite and popular negotiation through the revolutionary nationalist framework, the continuity of the post‐revolutionary Partido de la Revolución Institutional (PRI) state model and the lack of a viable competing paradigm.     

Political and institutional constraints on structural reforms: interpreting the Italian experience

During 2011 Italy reached the verge of a financial default because of its huge public debt. Neither the centre-right nor the centre-left governments that alternated in power in the 2000s were able to introduce the reforms necessary for reducing the debt and promoting growth. The impotence of the government became incompatible with the requirements of the country's continued presence in the eurozone. In November 2011, under the pressure of financial markets and eurozone institutions and leaders, the incumbent centre-right government was obliged to resign, and was substituted by a government composed of technocrats and experts, the Monti government. This lasted until December 2012 and was supported in parliament by a cross-partisan coalition; it was able to introduce some of the structural reforms required, because of the threat of default but also because it did not need to seek the electoral support of powerful constituencies. This article advances an interpretation of the Italian crisis of November 2011, identifying the political and institutional structures and the specific political conditions that fostered a policy stalemate in the country in the 2000s and whose persistence makes the continuation of reforms after the February 2013 elections uncertain.     

The International Monetary Fund and its New Economics

This article focuses on a key element of the IMF's agenda for change: the repackaging of its economics of crisis around inflation targeting. It examines how this new policy regime redefines the political economy of the IMF's policy advice, and contextualizes it by focusing on Eastern Europe, the region worst affected by the global financial crisis which began in 2007. The article compares the conditionalities designed under the new and old policy regimes and argues that the mainstreaming of inflation targeting reproduces the IMF's function within a neoliberal political economy. It shows how, depending on the role of the IMF in the policy process, the models that inform policy are employed differently. During ‘normal’ times, models engender a contractionary bias that favours speculative capital. When acting as ‘lender of last resort’, the IMF retains the traditional emphasis on fiscal contractions, paying only lip service to its new economics of crisis while further ignoring crucial questions of macroeconomic policy coordination or the destabilizing potential of short‐term capital inflows.     

Financial Inclusion or Subordination? The Monetary Politics of Debt in Cambodia

Financial inclusion is a leading driver of household debt across the global South. Although critical geographers have analysed this debt through the lens of financialisation, few have examined it in terms of monetary politics. This is a salient issue, because poorer nations often have limited control over their monetary policy due to their dependence on foreign currencies, which can adversely affect the structure of their financial markets. Building on the concept of monetary dependency from scholarship on financial subordination, I analyse the monetary politics of debt in Cambodia. Drawing on elite interviews and ethnographic research, I argue that Cambodia's extreme monetary dependence on the US dollar has shaped monetary and fiscal policies that compel poorer households to take on private debt to pay for their basic needs. This paper advances critical geographies of debt and development by studying financial subordination and its impact on financial inclusion in the global South.     

The Russian Steel Industry, 1990-2009

A noted specialist on Russia's industries surveys the restructuring of Russia's steel industry in response to the challenging conditions of the 1990s (collapsing domestic markets, the nonpayments crisis, and insider privatization) and its subsequent stabilization during the early years of the 21^st century due to effective implementation of a "survival model" at many plants. The author examines the major elements of that model, namely an export orientation made possible by relatively low labor and energy costs, reliable access to basic raw materials, a focus on crude (rather than specialty) steel, not inconsequential investment in process modernization, and effective control exercised by new private ownership. The paper's concluding section explores the new challenges faced by the industry due to the global financial crisis of late 2008-2009, and particularly the decline in world steel and company share prices, the extreme tightening of credit, the difficulties of servicing existing levels of debt, and provisions of a government assistance program that appear to preclude major capacity closures as a means of reducing costs. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: D290, L610, O140, P230. 3 figures, 1 table, 97 references.     

Remaking the architecture: the emerging powers,self‐insuring and regional insulation

This article examines the interaction between the emerging and traditional powers in global governance reform, and asks whether we are heading towards an international financial system that is more fragmented, where power is more diffused and national and regional arrangements play a more prominent role, at the expense of global multilateral institutions. It begins with a brief discussion of the global systemic and country‐specific factors that motivate Brazil, China and other emerging countries to accumulate large currency reserves. We find that national arrangements for managing financial and currency crises will continue to hold sway for emerging countries in the wake of the global crisis. However, the actual capacity of regional arrangements in managing future financial crises is uncertain, and the significance of regional alternatives in the emerging architecture should not be overstated. The real capacity of East Asian regional arrangements to manage financial crises, payments problems or currency attacks is still untested, and key thresholds in multilateralization still lie ahead. In South America, multilateral lender‐of‐last‐resort support inside the region is largely confined to the sub‐regional level and is limited by Brazil's reticence. Enduring reliance on bilateral measures for financial crisis management is noted. Where there has been progress in regional solutions, since the global crisis, has been in the role of regional development banks in providing financing for developing countries to enact counter‐cyclical policies. Such support also provides insulation for states in the region against the contagion effects of international financial crisis. We are in the midst of transitioning to a more diverse and multi‐tiered global financial and monetary system. A reformed IMF could have a role to play in addressing global imbalances and encouraging a shift from national reserves to collective insurance, however, it would be preconditioned by significant shifts in the policy, lending operations, and internal governance of the Fund, and willingness among the G20 to strike a new consensus on how to deal with imbalances, and new accommodation on acceptable reserve levels.     

Cosmos,chaos: finance,power and conflict

The article explores parallels between the fragility of globalization on the eve of the First World War, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 1907, and today's crisis of globalization following the post‐2007 recession. The fragility and interconnectedness of the international economy in both cases could provide a basis for an economic–military strategy. The temptation of using economic connectedness as a substitute for conventional and costly military strategy makes this course particularly attractive to a hegemon—the UK then, the US now—that is facing powerful competition from rising powers (Germany and the US then, China now). The challengers are likely to find their own alternative strategy, and the result breeds uncertainty. In consequence, rule‐based international orders are generally strained by transitions of power, even though all the parties see the desirability and need for a common system of rules.     

THE 2010 ANTIPODE RGS‐IBG LECTURE Wars of Interpretations

Abstract: Since 2006, when Mexico's President declared war against the drug trade, the people of the northern Mexican border city, Ciudad Juárez, have been living through a record‐breaking escalation of violence, the occupation of their city by federal troops and police forces, unprecedented human and civil rights violations, and a pervasive experience of fear in public space. These events have occurred simultaneous to a devastating economic crisis. This paper asks the question, how can a feminist and Marxist geographer contribute to an analysis of what is happening in Ciudad Juárez? To address this question, I create a dialogue among activists in northern Mexico and post‐structuralist feminist and Marxist positions regarding the meaning of public fear in this city for the city's residents, for Mexico's democracy and for the making of public knowledge about the Mexico–US border.     

Thinking about the World Bank’s “accordion” geography of financial globalization

Two “flagship” World Bank reports, entitled The Long March—A Reform Agenda for Latin America and the Caribbean In The Next Decade (1997) and the World Development Report, 1999–2000 (2000), are the subject of this paper. Both publications attempt to come to terms with the policy and practice of structural adjustment in the context of a new geography of global finance. This paper argues that the geographical imagination employed in both World Bank reports is the product of a dominant statist geographical imagination that struggles to explain contemporary developments in the geography of money. The paper starts with a brief discussion of the Mexican peso and debt crisis, and the World Bank’s practice of structural adjustment. Through an interrogation of both World Bank papers, thought is then given to the purchase of territorialized state-based mappings of the global economy. The paper wraps up with a brief conclusion concerning the explanatory salience of scale.

Internationally mobile capital is here to stay. Growing trade links, new communication technologies, and increasingly sophisticated financial products are making national borders more porous to financial flows. The challenge facing policymakers in developing countries is how to navigate through this financially integrating world (World Development Report 1999-2000, 2000: 85).

[W]hereas the horizons of the world of money and finance are global and deterritorialized, the political imagination seems wedded to territorialism and the borders of the nation state (Leyshon &Thrift, 1997: 290).

     

Continuity,Discontinuity and Incoherence in the Bretton Woods Order: A Hirschmanian Reading

This article examines the effects of the Asian crisis and especially the global financial crisis on developmental finance (that is, long‐term project finance and counter‐cyclical liquidity support) and the global financial architecture. In this connection three claims are advanced. The first is positive: that the crises occasioned meaningful although ad hoc, uneven discontinuities. The conjunction of discontinuities and continuities is imparting incoherence to the developmental and global financial architecture. The second claim is normative and controversial. Contrary to the common narrative, emergent incoherence is (on balance) productive of development and stability rather than debilitating. Actors in parts of the global South and East enjoy greater opportunities for institutional experimentation today in comparison with the limited space available in the coherent neoliberal era when the Bretton Woods institutions were monolithic. All of the experiments underway are not equally likely to survive, but even failures can provide lessons and networks that contribute to future successes. Emergent redundancy and new networks of institutional cooperation increase financial resilience. The article also explores the risks of incoherence and redundancy. The third claim is that productive incoherence can be understood within a ‘Hirschmanian mindset’ — an understanding of change and development informed by Albert Hirschman's theoretical and epistemic commitments.     

Transatlantic triage? European and UK ‘grand strategy’ after the US rebalance to Asia

Transition in the Middle East, the ongoing effects of the global financial crisis and the United States' rebalance to Asia are key trends that will have an impact on transatlantic relations and European defence. As US priorities shift, a common European ‘grand strategy’ could encourage the development of a shared vision to help Europe order its priorities and begin to respond to the new, post‐austerity context of world politics and shrinking defence budgets. Will these changes be enough to quicken Europe's currently shrivelled strategic thinking? In any scenario, given its relative weight and role as an interlocutor with the US, the United Kingdom will remain vital to any developing European security and strategy agenda, although its broader relations with the European Union will complicate this relationship. How it proceeds will also help to define the boundaries of this nascent European security order. This article charts these key global trends, relates them to current debates in European security and strategy and maps opportunities and constraints faced by Europe and the UK in developing a grand strategy in an increasingly ‘American‐lite’ European neighbourhood.     

Japan's response to China's rise: regional engagement, global containment, dangers of collision

Japan and China's ability to manage their bilateral relationship is crucial for the stability of the East Asian region. It also has a global impact on the security and economic development of other regions. For just as China's rise has inevitably involved an expansion of its global reach, so Japan's responses to the challenges posed by China have increasingly taken a global form, seeking to incorporate new partners and frameworks outside East Asia. Japan's preferred response to China's regional and global rise in the post‐Cold War period has remained one of default engagement. Japan is intent on promoting China's external engagement with the East Asia region and its internal domestic reform, through upgrading extant bilateral and Japan–China–US trilateral frameworks for dialogue and cooperation, and by emphasizing the importance of economic power to influence China. Japan is deliberately seeking to proliferate regional frameworks for cooperation in East Asia in order to dilute, constrain and ultimately engage China's rising power. However, Japan's engagement strategy also contains the potential to tilt towards default containment. Japan's domestic political basis for engagement is becoming increasingly precarious as China's rise stimulates Japanese revisionism and nationalism. Japan also appears increasingly to be looking to contain China on a global scale by forging new strategic links in Russia and Central Asia, with a ‘concert of democracies’ involving India, Australia and the US, by competing for resources with China in Africa and the Middle East, and by attempting to articulate a values‐based diplomacy to check the so‐called ‘Beijing consensus’. Nevertheless, Japan's perceived inability to channel China's rise either through regional engagement or through global containment carries a further risk of pushing Japan to resort to the strengthening of its military power in an attempt to guarantee its essential national interests. It is in this instance that Japan and China run the danger of a military collision.     

The second North Korean nuclear crisis

In 2002 the inclusion of North Korea by the Bush administration within the 'axis of evil' portended a break from the Clinton policy of engagement. Despite the apparent inconsistencies of this categorisation, North Korea's undoubted possession of some weapons of mass destruction capability seemed to make it a possible target for US containment if not preemption. However, Pyongyang's chief motive in such weapons development might actually be to guarantee regime survival. The revelation that North Korea had been developing a covert uranium enrichment program led US policymakers in the Bush administration to contemplate a policy of quarantine and containment. The wider policy community is divided on the question of whether Pyongyang was seeking a new bargain with the US, or whether this program was intended to produce a deterrent from possible US attack. These alternatives prescribe, respectively, a new negotiating approach or a strategy designed to dissuade. But the actual policy choice hinges on the outcome in Iraq.     

‘Forewarned Is Forearmed’: Intelligence,Japan's Siberian Intervention,and the Washington Conference

This article details the intelligence-gathering role of US railroad experts stationed in Siberia and Manchuria from 1917 to 1922. Beginning in April 1920, US railway officials began receiving intercepted correspondence between Japanese officials, passed to them from Japan's military headquarters in Harbin via a former Czechoslovak soldier. The intelligence shows that US officials were aware of highly detailed planning by Japanese expansionists. Whether or not US officials were completely cognisant of the intelligence's significance, these sources provide insight into why US diplomacy helped provide leverage to the moderates within Japan's government. In particular, the intercepted correspondence allows for a reinterpretation of Japanese Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya's role during the Siberian expedition. This paper provides evidence that Uchida was not a moderate ally as scholars have traditionally claimed, but a key facilitator of Japan's military expansionists. It argues that the success of the Washington Conference, combined with the military's repeated failures to produce a victory in the Russian Far East, pressured Uchida into withdrawing his support for the expansionist programme. In addition to demonstrating the impact of the Washington Conference and the Siberian intervention on US–Japanese relations, this article helps explain Uchida's later re-emergence in the 1930s as a militarist sympathiser.     

Sustainability as Empty Signifier: Its Rise,Fall, and Radical Potential

Until recently, the concept of “sustainability” appeared to occupy a central position in the politics of many Western democracies. Following the 2008 financial crisis, however, sustainability has been relegated to a position of secondary or tertiary significance. This article considers the rise and fall of sustainability through the theoretical lens of Ernesto Laclau, considering whether it may be seen as an example of an “empty signifier”. Through detailed engagement with Laclau's work, as well as both theoretical and empirical studies of the concept of sustainability, I argue that sustainability signifies the multiple failures of dominant discourses to recognise “the future” as a meaningful category. After examining the historical conditions under which sustainability was able to operate in this way, I go on to argue that the global financial crisis and neoliberalism more broadly have interrupted our capacity to think about the future, undermining the significance of sustainability, at least temporarily.     

Breaking the Silence: Mexican Children and Women's Confrontation of Bracero Family Separation, 1942–64

On 6 August 1942, the Mexican and US governments’ recruitment of Mexican men into the temporary contract labour programme known as the Bracero Program initiated a process that would deteriorate Mexican children and women's personal wellbeing and relationships to each other. The Bracero Program left children to endure the absence of their bracero fathers, while married women and caretakers transitioned into single motherhood under conditions and terms that drove an uncalculated number of these women into undocumented migration to the United States. Separation from their mothers further devastated children. The silence concerning the programme and the whereabouts and intentions of their immigrant parents alienated children from the mothers and caretakers left to care for them. Hence, mothers, caretakers and teachers came together to listen and talk to their children and each other about the dangerous realities of the programme in order to overcome the alienating silence driving them apart within the borders of Mexico. Using archival sources and the oral life‐histories of fifty Mexican children and women who endured the programme's separation of their families in San Martin de Hidalgo, Jalisco, Mexico, I argue that the anxiety and loss of Mexican children and women inspired mothers, caretakers and teachers to transition into instilling a gendered and transnational understanding of the dangers of the programme to their children and among themselves to prevent the onset of permanent alienation from each other.     

Global Horizons: Mexico,the Third World,and the Non-Aligned Movement at the Time of the 1961 Belgrade Conference

This paper analyses the autonomous streak that marked Mexico's foreign policy during the presidency of Adolfo López Mateos (1958–64). Throughout this period, Mexico showed reluctance to participate fully in the flagship Kennedy programme for Latin America, the Alliance for Progress. At the same time, the López Mateos government adopted a position of defence for Cuba's right to self-determination in spite of Washington's attempts to eradicate the Cuban Revolution from the Western Hemisphere. During López Mateos's term, Mexico tried for the first time in its history to elaborate a foreign policy with broader international outreach, an effort highlighted by the Mexican presidential trips to Latin America and Asia as well as other countries that belonged to the Non-Aligned Movement. While historiography has explored Mexico's attitude towards the Alliance for Progress and, more consistently, the country's Cuban policy, much less attention has been dedicated to López Mateos's engagement with the Non-Aligned Movement. Focusing on Mexico's failed participation at the First Conference of Heads of State of Non-Aligned Countries celebrated in Belgrade in 1961, this article aims to fill this research gap. Indeed, even if Mexico did not ultimately participate in the conference, Mexican diplomacy did show great interest in the gathering. For a country that had formally sided with the United States after the beginning of the cold war, Mexico's flirtation with the Non-Aligned Movement represented a detour from the diplomatic path it had adopted at the end of the Second World War. This work argues that Mexico's engagement with the Non-Aligned Movement presents a different dimension of the country's international strategy during the 1960s, reflecting Mexico's desire to loosen the bipolar constraints that limited its economic development and increase its leverage with Washington.