Napoleon,Jefferson, and the Louisiana Purchase

Why did Napoleon sell Louisiana to the United States? Unfortunately, he left very few written traces of his Louisiana policy and, therefore, historians disagree. Their explanations tend to emphasise one of three factors: the diplomacy of President Thomas Jefferson; France's coming war with Britain; or the impact of the black rebels of the French colony of Saint-Domingue (present-day Haiti). The most heated disagreements revolve around the differing assessments of the role played by Jefferson. This article argues that Jefferson played no role in Napoleon's decision to sell the colony. It acknowledges that the British were crucial, because war with Britain meant that Louisiana would be lost to France. But why was Louisiana undefended? The troops Napoleon wanted to send there never arrived. They went instead to Haiti. And they remained there. If black resistance in Haiti had collapsed quickly, as Napoleon expected, there would have been thousands of French soldiers in Louisiana by the spring of 1803, when the French war with Britain began. By defeating Napoleon, the men whom Jefferson deemed ‘cannibals’ made it possible for him to acquire Louisiana and achieve what an eminent US historian has called his ‘greatest triumph’.     

The French regiment in the Latin East, 1254–91

When St. Louis returned to France in 1254 at the end of his first crusade, he left behind him a force of 100 knights and other soldiers as a contribution to the defence of the Latin Kingdom. This force, which has become known as the French regiment, was maintained by St. Louis and his successors throughout most of the period leading up to the fall of Acre in 1291. The number of troops fluctuated, as did the level of support provided by the French crown. However, the regiment was a useful addition to the kingdom's armies. Its soldiers were involved in much of the military activity during the second half of the thirteenth century. Its leaders, men like Geoffrey of Sergines and John of Grailly, became important figures in the political life of the kingdom.     

How the News was brought from Byzantium to Angoulême; or,The Pursuit of a Hare in an Ox Cart

Abstract

Adémar of Chabannes (988-1034) of noble family, a-monk in the monastery of St. Cybard (Eparchus) at Angoulême, compiled a Chronicon in three books. The first begins with the origins of the Franks and ends with the death of Pepin the Short in 768; the second deals with the reign of Charlemagne; the third covers the years 814 to 1030. The first two books and the first fifteen chapters of the third (down to the year 877) are wholly derivative from identifiable sources. But from chapter sixteen onward the third book provides valuable information chiefly on the period 877-1030 in Aquitaine, presumably drawn from local written sources and from the memories of Adémar's associates. These included notably his two uncles, who were attached to the monastery of St. Martial at Limoges, as was Adémar himself in his youth. It was at St. Martial that on a stormy night in 1010 Adémar had a vision in the heavens of a fiery Cross with Christ upon it weeping a great river of tears: an experience that rendered him so thunderstruck (attonitus) that he kept it secret in his heart until many years later when he was nearing the end of his Chronicon. Then he wrote it down. From St. Martial he returned at the age of twenty-two to St. Cybard, took orders, and spent his life in writing. The‘original’chapters of his Chronicon only occasionally evince any interest in or knowledge of events in France north of Loire.     

The Russian navy as Chartmaker in the eighteenth century

Abstract

The modern period of chart making in Russia began in the reign of Peter the Great. Peter created the country's navy, which became the main focus for cartography in the eighteenth century. In this paper the multi‐faceted duties of naval officers in the charting and mapping of seas, rivers, forest resources and other features important for ship building and the development of navigation, and essential to Russia's geo‐political interests, are considered. The history of the early stages of specialized naval education and the training of surveyors at the Moscow Mathematical‐Navigational School (from 1701) and the St Petersburg Naval Academy (from 1715) are outlined, and the first surveys in the Baltic and Caspian seas are described. Finally, special attention is paid to the hydrographical surveys and charting of the Aegean Sea during the Russian‐Turkish war of 1768–1774, the sources and methods involved, and the little‐known Atlas of the Archipelago (1788) which was created from the surveys.     

James Buchanan's normative theory of the state

This paper examines James Buchanan's normative theory of the state and in particular his attempt to establish a legitimating linkage between the individual and the state. It begins by outlining Buchanan's consent‐based theory of the state and the distinction he draws between the explanatory and justificatory roles of his theory. It proceeds to examine the role of his conceptual contract as a justificatory argument for existing and proposed political institutions. It finds that while the conceptual contract may provide an account of the contingent rationality of the state, it fails to have normative significance in terms of Buchanan's value individualism and subjectivism. Buchanan has also failed to address some of the problems associated with securing and enforcing contractual agreement. These conclusions point to wider problems with rational choice theories of the emergence of the state.     

Constantius,St Germanus and fifth‐century Britain

The two visits of Germanus to Britain that Constantius included in his Life of the saint were long a staple of insular history. Recently, however, they have come under close scrutiny, leading to the second visit in particular being considered unhistorical. This essay re‐examines the two visits in the context of the whole work, concluding that Constantius had access to good‐quality information for Germanus's activities. Focusing on two episodes of the first visit, Germanus's journey to the cult site of St Alban and the ‘Alleluia Victory’, allows us to explore what the bishop achieved in Britain. Recent suggestions that Germanus effectively ‘invented’ the cult of St Alban arguably go beyond the evidence available, but the bishop's interaction with the cult was an important, planned part of his anti‐Pelagian strategy. The passages describing the two visits are also explored in terms of Constantius's wider purposes in writing the Life. In those terms his investment in stories regarding Germanus in Britain enabled him to develop his hero in ways which accord with his overall vision of an exemplary bishop. Germanus's deeds in Britain, therefore, need to be read both in terms of what they can offer in terms of British history and in the context of this author's wider agenda.     

General Roatta's war against the partisans in Yugoslavia: 1942

During General Mario Roatta's tenure as commander of the Italian 2nd Army in Yugoslavia, he faced a mounting Communist insurgency. To defeat the partisan forces of Tito, he resorted to proactive politics and a strategy of counter-insurgency. Owing to Italian military weakness and his army's lack of training in guerrilla warfare, Roatta was not averse to enlisting the services of Orthodox Serbs in Croatia, who the previous year had asked for Italian protection after a fearful massacre had been unleashed against them by Mussolini's handpicked ruler in Zagreb, the Croatian Usta?a leader Ante Paveli?. Against the wishes of the Fascist government in Rome, Roatta armed Serbs (called ?etniks) because they agreed to assist the Italian legions in fighting the partisans, their common ideological foe. But as Yugoslavia descended into civil war – one triggered by the Axis invasion – Roatta paid a price for his freelance pro-Serb politicking by alienating Zagreb, irritating the Germans, and dismaying his superiors in Rome. Italian policy was reduced to a tug-of-war between the Fascist empire-builders surrounding Mussolini and the military command in Yugoslavia, and Roatta became enmeshed in a cobweb of intrigues involving Croats, ?etniks and Germans. Apart from political manoeuvring, Roatta, in the ineluctable necessity of defeating the partisans, devised a detailed strategy of counter-insurgency. On 1 March 1942, he circulated a pamphlet entitled ‘3C’ among his commanders that spelled out military reform and draconian measures to intimidate the Slav populations into silence by means of summary executions, hostage-taking, reprisals, internments and the burning of houses and villages. By his reckoning, military necessity knew no choice, and law required only lip service. Roatta's merciless suppression of partisan insurgency was not mitigated by his having saved the lives of both Serbs and Jews from the persecution of Italy's allies Germany and Croatia. Under his watch, the 2nd Army's record of violence against the Yugoslav population easily matched the German. Tantamount to a declaration of war on civilians, Roatta's ‘3C’ pamphlet involved him in war crimes.     

“Tearing Down the Burning House”: James Buchanan's use of Edmund Burke

The 1854 Ostend Manifesto has long been scorned as an expansionist treatise, a leading indicator of “Young America's” hold on the antebellum Democratic Party, and a signal of Franklin Pierce's failed presidency. Unnoticed is the genesis of the document's most famous metaphor, of Cuba representing a neighbor's “burning house” that could cause American intervention. The primary author of the Manifesto was minister to Great Britain and future president James Buchanan, and he attempted to smooth over the rough suggestion of an American takeover of the island by borrowing imagery from Edmund Burke's 1791 Reflections on the Revolution in France. Buchanan's use of Burke, the anti‐revolutionary English philosopher of prudence and critic of ideology, demonstrates the wide but underappreciated popularity of Burke with American politicians of all parties. Not just Whigs and Southern planters, but also Northern Doughface Democrats such as Buchanan, especially in the 1850s, used Burke to preach calm, moderation, and political prudence. As his use in the Manifesto makes clear, a larger study of Edmund Burke's appeal to Americans is badly needed to plot his broad influence on American politics leading up to the Civil War.     

Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief

Abstract

Abraham Lincoln's presidency was defined and dominated by war, yet Lincoln himself had very little direct experience with warfare; nor had the American presidency been truly tested by war when he took office. Lincoln had to negotiate very difficult political and constitutional terrain as he waged the Civil War: issues of executive authority, constitutional powers and their limitations, and the nature of civil liberties during war constantly bedeviled him. His guiding principle in all these matters, and the greatest lesson we can learn from him today, was his flexibility and his pragmatism.     

Edward Lhwyd (c.1660–1709): Folklorist

Edward Lhwyd's ambitious Archaeologia Britannica project, for which he undertook an extensive tour of the Celtic-speaking regions of Britain and Brittany from 1697 to 1701, was to include “A Comparison of the Customes and Traditions of the Britains with those of other Nations.” Though this part of the Archaeologia was not written, some of the data that were collected survive. Lhwyd's comments on the material reveal that as an antiquary his primary interests were historical and lay in customs and rites as survivals, rather than in narrative; as an experimental scientist he was consistently sceptical of traditional or popular explanations of phenomena. Edward Lhwyd was the first systematically to record Welsh folklore, and the geographical breadth of his collecting, his structured approach, and his critical responses make him the foremost pioneer in the field.     

Race,polygenesis and equality: John Crawfurd and nineteenth-century resistance to evolution

The nineteenth-century Orientalist and ethnologist, John Crawfurd, publicly rejected Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution in 1868. Crawfurd was a leading advocate of polygenesis but also a supporter of racial equality. In 1820 he published his History of the Indian Archipelago, where he advocated granting household suffrage to all races in the British colonies. After finishing a career in the East India Company in 1828 he became the foremost expert on South-East Asia in Britain. Crawfurd became a regular writer on ethnology and Asian affairs for the Examiner newspaper and in the 1860s he was President of the Ethnological Society of London. Accounts of nineteenth-century anthropology in Britain characterise debate around race as falling into two camps: advocates of monogenesis and advocates of polygenesis. In the United States of America, advocates of polygenesis were often associated with advocates of slavery and racial inequality. Recent research has demonstrated that Charles Darwin’s hatred of slavery drove him to write Origin of the Species to demonstrate the unity of the human species and reject the polygenesis position. This paper explores Crawfurd’s ideas and demonstrates that a belief in polygenesis in the nineteenth century did not necessarily equate with a belief in racial inequality.     

论二战后期中英美围绕香港战后地位问题的交涉与斗争

在第二次世界大战后期,美国、英国和中国围绕香港的战后地位问题展开激烈斗争。美国政府支持战后由中国收回香港主权。罗斯福总统为此作出许多外交努力。英国拒绝战后将香港主权交还中国。这样,蒋介石将希望完全寄予美国的支持上。但是在战争结束前夕,美国与苏联开始进行冷战,美国需要英国的支持,因此放弃了原来的政策。其结果是英国在战争结束时重新占领香港。     

Grey and the Russian Threat to India, 1892–1915

ABSTRACT

As Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Liberal Government from August 1892 to June 1895, Sir Edward Grey was exposed to the damage that an anti-British, Franco-Russian Alliance could do to the interests of the British Empire. The experience of those years left an enduring impression upon him. Between June 1895 and December 1905 Grey espoused the cause of agreement with the Russian Empire wherever possible. As Foreign Secretary, he advanced this cause through the Anglo-Russian Conventions of August 1907, whose objectives were to achieve what he described as ‘repose’ on the North West Frontier of India, and the reduction of Russian pressure on Persia in particular. So far as the outbreak of war in 1914 is concerned, Grey's known propensity to maintain good terms with Russia gave the latter a degree of leverage which they exploited to the full in insisting on British support in standing up to Germany and Austria-Hungary following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Grey's position within the Liberal Government, and his clear determination to resign unless Russian demands were met, swung the British government from a neutralist stance to one of full participation in the Great War.     

Sir Edward Grey,Germany, and the Outbreak of the First World War: A Re-Evaluation

ABSTRACT

Historians have variously condemned British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey for contributing to the escalation of the July Crisis of 1914, and praised him as an heroic advocate of peace. Addressing this conundrum, this article first assesses historiographical debates around the significance of Grey's policy towards Germany in the events that led to the outbreak of the First World War. It then traces Grey's foreign policy vis-à-vis Germany on the one hand, and the Entente on the other. Finally, it provides an innovative analysis of Grey's policy from the vantage point of Berlin, arguing that in July 1914 decisions taken by the governments of other countries escalated the crisis and were taken regardless of Grey's position. The article concludes that current historiography overestimates British agency in July 1914 and that Grey was not as important to the outcome of the crisis as both his critics and his defenders have claimed. His actions could not change the minds of those on the continent who were bent on war.     

Stewart,Kant, and the Reworking of Common Sense

Summary

Dugald Stewart was the first metaphysician of any significance in Britain who attempted to take account of Kantian philosophy, although his analysis appears generally dismissive. Traditionally this has been imputed to Stewart's poor understanding of Kant and to his efforts to defend the orthodoxy of common sense. This paper argues that, notwithstanding Stewart's reading, Kant's philosophy helped him in a reconsideration and reassessment of common sense philosophy. In his mature works—the Philosophical Essays (1810), the second volume of the Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1814), and the second part of his historical ‘Dissertation? (1815–1821)—Stewart's analysis of Kantian philosophy is far from being uniform. In the first two works, he takes a cautious approach to transcendentalism, showing some interest in the challenge it might represent for common sense; in the last, he turns to rash criticism. This change may appear confusing and inconsistent unless considered in the light of a precise ‘nationalistic’ strategy. In fact, once Stewart had taken from Kantian philosophy what he deemed useful for his own aims, he eventually dismissed it in order to show that his reworked version of common sense was the most original and most consistent outcome of the whole Anglo-Scottish philosophical tradition.     

The Crimean War and its lessons for today

Orlando Figes's book The Crimean War: a history, based on English, Russian, French and Turkish sources, throws a new light on the Crimean War in a number of ways. It shows that the conflict was far from being a small war, but a landmark event. It was the only example of a war between Britain and Russia—and it led to enormous casualties. It also represented a stage in medical history, since most of the casualties were caused by disease. In Britain, it marked a new advance in the power of the press, which did much to fuel anti‐Russian sentiment. The war was also fuelled, on both sides, by religious and nationalist sentiment—but its most important cause related to the fate of the Ottoman Empire, then in decline, and fears that its collapse could result in a dangerous power vacuum. The war still has a significance for the present day because the collapse of communism has failed to resolve the antagonism between Russia and the West. Here, the book throws an important light on the development of British and western attitudes towards Russia, many of which were shaped in the nineteenth century. The book deserves attention, both here and in Russia.     

Sir Edward Grey and Austria-Hungary

ABSTRACT

Although in terms of their bilateral relations the ‘traditional friendship’ between Great Britain and Austria-Hungary was no mere phrase, in general political terms British policy in the last decade before the War was characterised by Grey's determination to cultivate the ententes with France and Russia and to do nothing to upset that division of Europe into two balancing groups (with Austria-Hungary firmly in the German camp) which he saw as the best guarantee of peace. Even though the Austrians gradually recovered from the shock of the Bosnian Crisis, in which Grey had come forward against them as Russia's chief supporter, and though the British for their part came to see in Austria-Hungary a useful element of stability in the Near East, Grey's attempts to uphold the unity of the Concert in the Balkan Wars were in the end vitiated by his overriding concern to avoid offending his Entente partners. Indeed, as the crisis deepened in the last year of peace, he took refuge in an increasingly abstentionist attitude, the objective effect of which - and herein, it is here argued, lies Grey's responsibility - was to intensify Vienna's desperation and loss of faith in the Concert that soon proved fatal to peace.     

The biography of Ignatios the Deacon: a reassessment of the evidence

Abstract

The recently published critical editions of three of Ignatios the Deacon's works, his correspondence and two of his hagiographical texts, may have enhanced our familiarity with an important scholarly figure, but have apparently not established a consensus as regards his educational curriculum and ecclesiastical career. This is not surprising in view of the lack of explicit information on crucial periods of his life and the wide diversity of the literature associated with his name. However, the discussion has become all the more confused as some of Ign.'s autobiographical references have been called into question (to my mind, not reasonably) or not taken into account in their entirety. Setting aside the divergences between the biography sketched by Cyril Mango and that by myself, which mainly concern the tentative period of Ign.'s episcopate and the period he became skevophylax, a very different interpretation of Ign.'s biographical data has been offered by Georgios Makris, the editor of the Life of St. Gregory the Decapolite. And a more recent reconsideration of his biography, presented in the Berliner Prosopographie der mittelalterlichen Zeit and published in full length by Thomas Pratsch in this journal, without radically disputing the basic chronological framework of Ign.'s lifetime as proposed by Mango, has tried to rearrange the scattered pieces of his puzzling career. Several hypotheses regarding Ign.'s ecclesiastical career were also put forward by Michel Kaplan in his inquiry into Ign.'s letters dateable to his period as metropolitan of Nicaea. Finally, in his posthumously published History of Byzantine Literature, Alexander Kazhdan, demonstrating excessive skepticism, distinguished the author of the anonymously preserved correspondence from Ignatios the Deacon, as well as denied him the composition of other works that have been assigned to him. The purpose of the present note is to re-assess the biographical evidence provided in Ign.'s own work.     

The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System

Abstract

Among the colourful characters that populate eighteenth-century military history, the French-born comte de Bonneval (1675–1747) has been kept alive in historical memory longer than most. His surprising conversion to Islam and contribution to Ottoman military reform long made him a popular subject for biography in his own right. Nowadays, he mainly features in biographies of Prince Eugene of Savoy. Both were commanders in the Habsburg army, and for nineteen years they were close companions in war and peace.¹ The circumstances that turned Bonneval's friendship with Eugene to enmity also led him in 1729 to offer his services to the Ottoman Empire. For most scholars, this is the moment when his actions became of lasting historical significance. The Ottomans, who suffered in the eighteenth century a series of military defeats, employed foreigners to help them reform their army. After converting to Islam and renaming himself Ahmed Pasha, Bonneval became the first of these when the grand vizier, Topal Osman, invited him in 1731 to reform the Ottoman artillery corps. He moved to Constantinople, added the sobriquet ‘Humbaracl’ (bombardier), and became a noted figure at the court of Sultan Mahmud I. Until Bonneval's death in 1747, Europeans having dealings with the Ottoman regime looked to him for assistance in navigating its internal politics.²