Disguised anti-colonialism: Protest against the White Australia Policy in Malaya and Singapore, 1947–1962

A manifestation of the anti-colonialist sentiment in Malaya and Singapore during the post-war period of decolonisation was the vociferous protest against the White Australia Policy. Australia's restrictive immigration policy was seen as an offensive colour bar, similar to the various racial restrictions that British authorities placed on their colonial subjects, which symbolised white dominance. By protesting against the White Australia Policy, the colonial subjects of the British in Malaya and Singapore were indirectly attacking white colonial rule in Southeast Asia. Antagonism towards the White Australia Policy became less vocal as Malaya and Singapore proceeded towards self-government and independence, when many of the colonial colour bars were removed. However, low-key resentment against what was seen as a symbol of white colonialism still persisted in relations with Australia.     

America's Role in the Five Power Defence Arrangements: Anglo-American Power Transition in South-East Asia, 1967–1971

Prior to 1971, Britain played a key role in the security of Malaysia and Singapore, especially during the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) and Konfrontasi (1963–1966). Britain's military withdrawal from the east of Suez beginning from 1968 not only became a catalyst for post-colonial development of Malaysia and Singapore, but also pushed them towards America's security umbrella. Negotiations to replace the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement with a new defence arrangement were fraught with pussyfooting on the part of British, Australian and New Zealand leaders. The Malaysian and Singapore defence ministers were divided and contributed to further foot dragging. By the time the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) were signed by the five nations in November 1971, collective defence among the signatories had devolved to mere consultation. By analysing the obstacles encountered during the negotiations and American influence on the shape of the FPDA, this paper demonstrates that a power transition that had been set in motion after Second World War was completed by 1971 when British strategic influence in South-East Asia gave way to American dominance.     

Best Practice in Australia's Foreign Policy: 'Konfrontasi' (1963-66)

Australia's handling of Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia ('Konfrontasi') constitutes a case-study of best practice in crisis management. A strong minister of External Affairs, working closely with an effective department, persuaded Cabinet to set policy guidelines which would serve Australia's long-term regional interests. Bureaucratic skill and diplomatic flair helped to ensure the success-and so the continuance-of the policy, despite private and public criticism. An independent foreign policy, such as had also served Australia well in the late 1940s in facilitating the decolonisation of Indonesia, not only assisted Britain to decolonise successfully in Southeast Asia in the 1960s, but had lasting results in establishing Australia as a credible regional player and in defining the enduring importance of good working relations with its neighbour, Indonesia.     

Australian reactions to Britain's declining presence in Southeast Asia, 1955–63

This article examines Australia's long-held doubts about Britain's willingness and ability to maintain a significant military presence in Southeast Asia, where Australia's main strategic interests lay. The article argues that Australian concerns long predated the Wilson government's attempt to disengage from east of Suez in the mid-1960s. In doing so, it shows that the Menzies government had since the mid-1950s become increasingly concerned about Britain's resolve and capacity to station substantial forces in the region. In illustrating the extent to which policy-makers in Canberra became suspicious of British long-term strategic aims in Southeast Asia, this article reveals some interesting aspects of the changing nature of Anglo-Australian relations in the post-war period.     

In defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia's new strategic map

The 2013 Australian Defence White Paper categorically termed Australia's zone of strategic interest the Indo-Pacific, the first time any government has defined its region this way. This raises questions about what the Indo-Pacific means, whether it is a coherent strategic system, the provenance of the concept and its implications for Asian security as well as Australian policy. Indo-Pacific Asia can best be understood as an expansive definition of a maritime super-region centred on South-East Asia, arising principally from the emergence of China and India as outward-looking trading states and strategic actors. It is a strategic system insofar as it involves the intersecting interests of key powers such as China, India and the USA, although the Indo-Pacific subregions will retain their own dynamics too. It suits Australia's two-ocean geography and expanding links with Asia, including India. The concept is, however, not limited to an Australian perspective and increasingly reflects US, Indian, Japanese and Indonesian ways of seeing the region. It also reflects China's expanding interests in the Indian Ocean, suggesting that the Chinese debate may shift towards partial acceptance of Indo-Pacific constructs alongside Asia-Pacific and East Asian ones, despite suspicions about its association with the US rebalance to Asia. Questions about Australia's ability to implement an effective Indo-Pacific strategy must account for force posture, alliance ties and defence diplomacy, as well as constraints on force structure and spending.     

The alliance echoes and portents of Australia's longest war

Afghanistan was Australia's longest war, yet the consensus between Australia's major political parties on the commitment never wavered over 12 years. The bipartisan unity held even as the nature of the war changed and evolved, Australian casualties rose and popular support fell away. The enduring centrality of the US alliance explains much—probably almost all you need to know—about the unbroken consensus of the Australian polity. Afghanistan was an example of the Australian alliance addiction, similar to Vietnam. As with Vietnam, the Australian military left Afghanistan believing it won its bit of the war, even if the Afghanistan war is judged a disaster. As Australia heads home it finds the USA pivoting in its direction; with all the similarities that can be drawn between Vietnam and Afghanistan, this post-war alliance effect is a huge difference between the two conflicts.     

Dangerous Liaisons: Neoliberal Foreign Policy and Australia's Regional Engagement

Recent dramatic events in the Asia/Pacific region have prompted a reassessment within the Australian community of the prevailing analytical and policy orthodoxies associated with our contemporary regional engagements. This paper, written well before the serious upheavals in Indonesia and Malaysia, warns of the likelihood of such upheavals taking place and of the long-term dangers faced by Australian foreign policy in relation to them. In this context it concentrates primarily on Australia's explicit and enthusiastic commitment to a neoliberal global trade agenda and its less explicit but still solid commitment to a neo-Realist security agenda. It suggests that the tensions intrinsic to this policy matrix could provoke major problems for Australia in the future. More specifically, it argues that the pursuit of traditional (elite-centred) political stability and radical (market-driven) economic prosperity in the Asia/Pacific might well accelerate an opposite scenario, as people throughout the region resist the processes of rapid free-market development and ongoing political repression. It urges less fealty to the latest grand-theory of (Western) global power and a more serious empirical analysis of the implications of it for Australia's long term future in the Asia/Pacific.     

‘The Danger is Two-Fold’: Decolonisation and Cold War in Anti-Communist Asia, 1955–7

This article examines the intersection between the Cold War and decolonisation in anti-Communist Asia in the 1950s. Drawing on the papers of former South Korean President Syngman Rhee housed at Yonsei University, the article explores both the motivations behind as well as the constraints upon South Korea's efforts to cultivate a military alliance in what it called ‘Free Asia’. Articulating some of the concrete political differences between South Korea and its potential partners in Asia, the article argues that Rhee's hardline views of the Cold War were interwoven with his ambivalence about Japan's reintegration in the post-war world. As a result of this intersection between the Cold War and decolonisation, the South Korean President was unable to achieve consensus with the rest of anti-Communist Asia. In exploring this chapter of South Korean diplomacy, the article calls on Cold War diplomatic history to integrate non-Communist Asia and for the historiography of decolonisation to investigate the legacies of Japan's empire in post-war Asia. It also suggests that scholars ought to reflect more deeply on the interrelationship between the Cold War and decolonisation.     

Australian-African relations 2002: Another look

Various recent developments and events in Africa, including the involvement in 2002 of the Prime Minister of Australia in Commonwealth initiatives in relation to Zimbabwe, have made it timely to review the nature and extent of Australia's relations with African countries. This commentary describes current Australian policies on Africa, including trade relations and aid programs, against the background of the political and economic situation in Africa in the new millennium. In conclusion, the comment is made that Australia's dealings with African countries might have more significance to its own interests than is generally acknowledged. This is so particularly in respect of common standpoints on multilateral trade issues, and the future of the British Commonwealth.     

Professionalism and Australia's Security Intellectuals: Knowledge,Power, Responsibility

This article examines critically the systemic 'professionalism' which has overtaken Australia's defence and security community in the 1990s. It focuses on the unhealthy convergence of academic security studies at the Australian National University with an overriding foreign policy priority of the Australian Government: the formation of a new regional identity based on themes of 'engagement' and 'enmeshment' with Asia. It argues that the main consequence of this 'professionalist' trend is a mode of inquiry that expunges politics, ethics and responsibility from academic discourse on security. The article also addresses briefly an emerging postmodern politics of dissidence in the disciplines of security studies and political geography which has transformed our understanding of the role and social responsibility of security intellectuals.     

The Survival, Revival and Decline of British Economic Influence in Malaysia, 1957-70

Independence for Malaya in 1957 (and the enlargement of thefederation to form Malaysia in 1963) did not have an immediatelyadverse effect upon British economic interests there. Indeed,Britain retained, and even revived, its huge commercial, industrial,and financial presence in Commonwealth Southeast Asia well intothe 1960s. From the middle of that decade, however, Britisheconomic influence in Malaysia declined quite rapidly. The mainfocus of this article is to examine three possible causes ofthis downturn: declining competitiveness on the part of Britishmanufactures; UK government policy towards private investmentand public expenditure overseas; and entrepreneurial weaknessesamong the British agency houses in Malaysia.     

The ‘arc of instability’ and Australia's strategic policy

The proposition that Australia faces an ‘arc of instability’ to its north has been an important feature of the Australian strategic debate in the early twenty-first century. Prompted by worries in the late 1990s over Indonesia's future and East Timor's uncertain path to independence, the ‘arc’ metaphor also encapsulated growing Australian concerns about the political cohesiveness of Melanesian polities, including Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. While tending to overlook the divergent experiences of countries within its expanding boundaries, the ‘arc’ fed from Australia's historical requirement for a secure archipelagic screen. As such it has became an important weapon in the debate over whether the locus of Australia's strategic priorities should be increasingly global in the ‘war on terror’ period or remain closer to home in the immediate region. The ‘arc of instability’ metaphor was consequently adopted by leading Australian Labor Party politicians to argue that the Howard Coalition government was neglecting South Pacific security challenges. It became less prominent following the Howard government's greater activism in the South Pacific, signalled by Australia's leadership of the East Timor intervention in 2003. But its prominence returned in 2006 with the unrest in both Honiara and Dili. In overall terms, the ‘arc of instability’ discussion has helped direct Australian strategic and political attention to the immediate neighbourhood. But it has not provided specific policy guidance on what should be done to address the instabilities it includes.     

A continuing confusion? A comment on the appropriate dispersal of policy powers in the Australian federation

Dissatisfaction with Australia's federalist constitutional and administrative arrangements seems universal. The Labor Party has historically preferred a centralist thrust to the Australian federal compact. From the opposite, decentralist tack the Liberal‐National Coalition parties currently propose that the Commonwealth should hive‐off policy functions to the States. These attitudes are expressed in an intellectual climate that disparages the allocative efficiency of Australian federalism and debates these issues in terms of shifting power to or from the Commonwealth. A more sensible focus is on the usage that the citizenry has made of the federal system in obtaining satisfactory service delivery. Using this approach our federal system works efficiently (in a limited political‐administrative sense.

This is not an argument that Australia's federal system is good because it maximises fiscal efficiency or guarantees equity. It does not do the former'and varies in its attainment of the latter. The federal system is good because it maximises opportunities and avenues for citizens to obtain what they want from government. In that sense the Coalition parties are fundamentally confused both about their philosophy and that philosophy's relationship to the political nature of Australian federalism. Labor's slowly‐ebbing centralism equally ignores the political usage that citizens have made of the administrative and funding arenas provided by our federal system.     

One continent,two federalisms: rediscovering the original meanings of Australian federal ideas

Federalism is usually described in political science as a single body of ideas—in Australia's case arriving in the 1840s–50s and moving to constitutional reality in the 1890s. This article re‐examines the origins and diversity of federal ideas in Australia. It suggests that federal thought began influencing Australia's constitutional development significantly earlier than previously described. This first Australian federalism had a previously unappreciated level of support in British colonial policy and drew on Benjamin Franklin's American model of territorial change as a ‘commonwealth for increase’. The revised picture entrenches the notion of federalism's logic but also reveals a dynamic, decentralist style of federalism quite different from Australia's orthodox ‘classic’ or compact federal theory. In fact, Australian political thought contains two often‐conflicting ideas of federalism. The presence of these approaches helps explain longstanding dissent over the regional foundations of Australian constitutionalism.     

Losing the Blanket,Building a Fence: Australian Anxiety and the End of Military Colonialism in Malaysia

From 1955 to 1988, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) maintained a large airbase in Northern Malaysia. For the first 15 years of its existence, RAAF Butterworth had a modest and incomplete perimeter fence. With the end of British military colonialism in Malaysia and Singapore following the implementation of the ‘East of Suez’ policy, the Australians became preoccupied with their physical security and the role of the perimeter fence. By exploring the adoption of practices of exclusion via physical barriers in the wake of British withdrawal, this paper argues that the changing psychological outlook of Australian military officials reflected broader Australian anxieties about their own sense of ‘Britishness’ and the nation’s place in a decolonising Asia. As the Australians lost their British ‘blanket’ they built a fence.     

Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence: An International History

This article focuses on Australia's response to the joint Anglo-American effort to expand military facilities on the island of Diego Garcia in early 1970s. The primary emphasis will be on the Whitlam government's rationale behind its diplomatic manoeuvre towards great power rivalries in the Indian Ocean and its supportive position towards the concept of building the Indian Ocean as a peace zone. It argues that the Whitlam government's policy towards the international diplomacy around Diego Garcia contributed to the shaping of a unique Australian foreign policy, one free from attachment to British and American considerations, although still mindful of the need to factor the interests of the UK and the USA into Australia's calculations of its own best interests.     

Book reviews

International Relations theory Legitimacy in international society. By Ian Clark. International society and its critics. Edited by Alex J. Bellamy. Negotiated revolutions: the Czech Republic, South Africa and Chile. By George Lawson. International law and organization The impact of international law on international cooperation: theoretical perspectives. Edited by Eyal Benvenisti and Moshe Hirsch. Foreign relations Strategic partners: Russian‐Chinese relations in the post‐Soviet era. By Jeanne L. Wilson. Conflict, security and armed forces International governance of war‐torn territories: rule and reconstruction. By Richard Caplan. Enforcing the peace: learning from the imperial past. By Kimberly Zisk Marten. Politics, democracy and social affairs War and the American presidency. By Arthur M. Schlesinger. The accidental American: Tony Blair and the presidency. By James Naughtie. Al‐Jazeera: how Arab TV news challenged the world. By Hugh Miles. History Constructing the U.S. rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: from red menace to tacit ally. By Evelyn Goh. Histories of the hanged: Britain's dirty war in Kenya and the end of the empire. By David Anderson. The lion and the springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War. By Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw. Hindu rulers, Muslim subjects: Islam, rights and the history of Kashmir. By Mridu Rai. British documents on the end of empire. East of Suez and the Commonwealth, 1964–1971. Part I: East of Suez. Edited by S. R. Ashton and Wm. Roger Louis. British documents on the end of empire. East of Suez and the Commonwealth, 1964–1971. Part II: Europe, Rhodesia, Commonwealth. Edited by S. R. Ashton and Wm. Roger Louis. British documents on the end of empire. East of Suez and the Commonwealth, 1964–1971. Part III: Dependent territories, Africa, economics, race. Edited by S. R. Ashton and Wm. Roger Louis. Europe The EU, NATO and the integration of Europe: rules and rhetoric. By Frank Schimmelfennig. Theft of a nation: Romania since communism. By Tom Gallagher. Russia and the former Soviet republics Russia in the 21st century: the prodigal superpower. By Steven Rosefielde. Russian military reform: 1992–2002. Edited by Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McDermott. Central Asia and the Caucasus: transnationalism and diaspora. Edited by Touraj Atabaki and Sanjyot Mehendale. Middle East and North Africa International relations of the Middle East. Edited by Louise Fawcett. Iran, Iraq, and the legacies of war. Edited by Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick. Asia and Pacific Exit the dragon? Privatization and state control in China. Edited by Stephen Green and Guy S. Liu. North America The new American empire: a 21st‐century teach‐in on US foreign policy. Edited by Lloyd C. Gardner and Marilyn B. Young. Latin America and Caribbean Bananas and business: the United Fruit Company in Colombia, 1899–2000. By Marcelo Bucheli. The strategic dynamics of Latin American trade. Edited by Vinod K. Aggarwal, Ralph H. Espach and Joseph S. Tulchin. America's other war: terrorizing Colombia. By Doug Stokes.     

Stanner's War

The Pacific War and its aftermath were a turning point in William Edward Hanley Stanner's career. Until then, he had struggled to establish himself as a scholar and seemed destined to stay, like many other Australian scholars, within the orbit of British academia and its colonial empire. Almost immediately after war had been declared, Stanner returned to Australia, working in various capacities and, in May 1942, commanding the North Australia Observer Unit. In October 1943, he was transferred to the Australian Army's Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs (DORCA). Members of the Directorate saw themselves at the forefront of progressive reform in Australian colonial policy. Stanner opposed what he considered the grandiose plans for a post-war Papua New Guinea that were hatched by the DORCA ‘boys’, as they called themselves. By the end of the 1940s, however, control over policy was firmly in the hands of the civil bureaucracy and the new Minister for Territories, Paul Hasluck. Any influence that may have accrued to either Stanner or to the idealism of the ‘boys’ in the Directorate was lost.     

The British Parliamentary Labour Party and the Government of Ireland Act 1920

Immediately after the First World War the British Labour Party was forced to reconsider its relationship with an increasingly militant Irish nationalism. This reassessment occurred at the same time as it was becoming a major political and electoral force in post‐war Britain. The political imperative from the party's perspective was to portray itself as a responsible, moderate and patriotic alternative governing party. Thus it was fearful of the potential negative impact of too close an association with, and perceived sympathy for, extreme Irish nationalism. This explains the party's often bewildering changes in policy on Ireland at various party conferences in 1919 and 1920, ranging from support for home rule to federalism throughout the United Kingdom to ‘dominion home rule’ as part of a wider evolving British Commonwealth to adopting outright ‘ self‐determination’ for a completely independent Ireland outside both United Kingdom and empire. On one aspect of its Irish policy, however, the party was adamant and united – its opposition to the partition of Ireland, which was the fundamental principle of Lloyd George's Government of Ireland Bill of 1920 which established Northern Ireland. Curiously, that aspect of Labour's Irish policy was never discussed in the party at large. All the running was made by the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) in the house of commons in 1920. The PLP's outright opposition to the bill acted as balm throughout the wider party, binding together the confusing, and often contradictory, positions promulgated on the long‐term constitutional future of Ireland and its relationship with Britain.     

Explorers' Tales: Stanley Presumes – Again

In the early 1970s, Australia and Britain found themselves embroiled in an embarrassing diplomatic controversy over Australia's failure to provide an assisted passage to Jan Allen, a British citizen of Jamaican descent. Allen lodged a formal complaint with the British Race Relations Board, arguing he had been denied assistance on the grounds of his race. The Board was compelled to investigate the case, raising the possibility that British and Australian officials would face legal charges. This article outlines the complex diplomatic negotiations that surrounded the case and assesses its outcome. It argues that the controversy marked an important milestone in Australia-British relations, reinforcing the fact that British race patriotism could no longer mediate the self-identities and interrelations of the two countries. It contributed to Britain's decision to withdraw its support for the United Kingdom-Australia Assisted Passage Scheme and the eventual abolition of Australia's ‘White Australia’ policy