From forward defence to self‐reliance: Changes and continuities in Australian defence policy 1965–90

This paper shows that the focus of Australia's ‘declared’ defence policy has oscillated between local and regional defence, whereas its ‘operational’ policy—the views contained in internal planning and guidance documents—has taken a mid‐course, focusing on defending Australia's northern approaches. Australia's two policy domains coincided briefly in the mid‐1980s but have since diverged as we have again begun to emphasise regional defence. This shift could signal the end of ‘defence self‐reliance’. While representing a setback for the Hawke government, such a result is necessary as Australia's ‘operational’ policy is flawed and in need of replacement The danger is that, as in the past, Australian governments and their advisers will continue to adjust their rhetoric rather than their real policies to our changing circumstances.     

Australia and the South Pacific nuclear free zone treaty: a reinterpretation

A number of analysts have identified the 1986 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty as one of Australia's major achievements in the area of arms control diplomacy. This article challenges the orthodox view in the secondary literature that Australia's pursuit of a SPNFZ Treaty was motivated exclusively by a desire to protect the nuclear dimension of its alliance relationship with the United States from more ‘radical’ proposals in the region. Drawing on previously unreleased documents made available to the author by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade under the Commonwealth's Freedom of Information Act, this article argues that the Hawke government's pursuit of a nuclear‐free zone in the South Pacific was motivated primarily by what it perceived as an opportunity to promote Australia's image as an activist middle power committed to bolstering the coherence of the global non‐proliferation regime.     

Between Jakarta and Geneva: why Abbott needs to view Africa as a great opportunity

Australia's engagement with Africa during the Rudd and Gillard governments was primarily driven by the national interest, which revolved around three issues: humanitarianism, support for mining corporations, and the United Nations Security Council seat. This article argues that there is a need for the Abbott government to retain the same depth and breadth of relationships with Africa. It is in the interest of both Australia and African states for the Australian government to remain committed to humanitarian objectives and to help African countries meet some of their Millennium Development Goal targets. Moreover, the continued support of Australian mining corporations operating in Africa, especially through the training of African policy makers in mining governance, is good for both Africa and Australia. Finally, Australia's continued success in multilateral diplomacy will depend on support from all parts of the world, including Africa. Australia's success at the multilateral level will, in turn, result in bilateral benefits in other regions, including the Asia-Pacific.     

The ‘arc of instability’ and Australia's strategic policy

The proposition that Australia faces an ‘arc of instability’ to its north has been an important feature of the Australian strategic debate in the early twenty-first century. Prompted by worries in the late 1990s over Indonesia's future and East Timor's uncertain path to independence, the ‘arc’ metaphor also encapsulated growing Australian concerns about the political cohesiveness of Melanesian polities, including Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. While tending to overlook the divergent experiences of countries within its expanding boundaries, the ‘arc’ fed from Australia's historical requirement for a secure archipelagic screen. As such it has became an important weapon in the debate over whether the locus of Australia's strategic priorities should be increasingly global in the ‘war on terror’ period or remain closer to home in the immediate region. The ‘arc of instability’ metaphor was consequently adopted by leading Australian Labor Party politicians to argue that the Howard Coalition government was neglecting South Pacific security challenges. It became less prominent following the Howard government's greater activism in the South Pacific, signalled by Australia's leadership of the East Timor intervention in 2003. But its prominence returned in 2006 with the unrest in both Honiara and Dili. In overall terms, the ‘arc of instability’ discussion has helped direct Australian strategic and political attention to the immediate neighbourhood. But it has not provided specific policy guidance on what should be done to address the instabilities it includes.     

The Politics of Broadband: Labor and New Information Technology from Hawke to Gillard

Labor's broadband policy influenced key regional independents to support the formation of the minority Gillard government. However, analysing information technology policy doesn't only demonstrate continuing differences between Labor and the Coalition. It also demonstrates changing Labor attitudes on issues ranging from neoliberalism, globalisation and social inclusion to conceptions of market failure and the rising power of Asia. In particular, this article compares and contrasts the attitudes of the Rudd government to those of the Hawke and Keating governments, arguing that the Rudd government placed much more emphasis on the role that market failure had played in contributing to Australia's poor broadband provision. The resulting policy involved an increased role for government in rolling out broadband not only to the cities but also to regional Australia. That approach benefitted Gillard. It also reflected ideological differences between not just Labor and the Liberals, but also between Rudd and his Labor predecessors.     

Resource nationalism or resource liberalism? Explaining Australia's approach to Chinese investment in its minerals sector

Since 2005, a burgeoning wave of Chinese investments has set off a new ‘minerals boom’ in the Australian iron ore and coal mining sectors. While normally a welcome development, the state-owned and strategic nature of the investors has raised concerns in Australia about how these should be regulated. As a result, in February 2008 the Australian government declared an intention to more closely screen foreign direct investment (FDI) from state-owned sources, which both supporters and detractors alike have claimed is evidence of ‘resource nationalism’ in Australia's approach towards its trade and investment relationships with China. This article challenges this understanding through an examination of the characteristics of Chinese mining FDI, the dilemmas these present to the Australian government, and the relatively restrained nature of its response. Through this, Australia's FDI policy is explained as a defensive move against the potential for strategic behaviour by Chinese investors resulting from their state ownership, rather than any national program to subject minerals trade and investment to political control. On this basis, the article argues that Australian government policy instead evidences a ‘resource liberalism’ approach, which intends to ensure that the governance of Australia's minerals trade and investment with China remain market-based processes.     

Expanding the Australian Empire?: The Australian Council for the World Council of Churches,the Menzies Government and the New Hebrides in the late 1950s

In the late 1950s the Australian Council for the World Council of Churches (AC‐WCC) inspired primarily by the Presbyterian Church, undertook a concerted campaign to pressure the Australian government to assume a greater role in the affairs of the New Hebrides. The AC‐WCC wanted the Australian government to take over the United Kingdom's role in the administration of the Anglo‐French Condominium. It was motivated to undertake this campaign by the dismal social and economic conditions in the islands, the neglect of the British and French colonial authorities, and their failure to offer the indigenous people a way forward to self‐government. The high point of the campaign was a meeting between Robert Menzies, the Australian prime minister and a delegation from the AC‐WCC in early 1958. As a result of this meeting Australian ministers and officials, for the final time, gave extended consideration to expanding Australia's empire in the South Pacific to include the New Hebrides. This article examines the AC‐WCC's campaign, explores the Australian government's response, and analyses the outcome of this important episode in Australia's involvement in the colonial territories of the South Pacific.     

Australia's Antarctic agenda

Australia has had a long connection with, and significant national interests in, the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. The Australian Antarctic Territory comprises 42 per cent of Antarctica's landmass. Australia is not only a claimant state and original signatory to the Antarctic Treaty but has played a significant role in the development of what is termed the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). This article aims to provide an overview of Australia's key policy interests and government policy goals towards Antarctica, including its commitment to the ATS. In examining key policy objectives we note that despite continuity and development of these objectives, significant changes and challenges have arisen in the period 1984–2006. It is these challenges that will help frame Australia's Antarctic agenda over the next 20 years and beyond.     

Australia's Actions towards Accepting Indonesian Control of Netherlands New Guinea

In the 1950s and early 1960s the Indonesian–Dutch dispute over the sovereignty of West New Guinea was of great concern to the Australian government. Canberra pursued policies to deny Indonesia control of the territory and encourage the Netherlands to retain its presence there. However, in mid-January 1962, the Australian Cabinet realised the disadvantages of continuing to resist Indonesian claims and gave de facto approval for annexation by Indonesia. This paper examines the reasons for Canberra's policy reversal, arguing that the primary factor was Australia's desire to avoid an Indonesian–Dutch war and prevent the possible Communisation of Indonesia.     

Howard's way? Public opinion as an influence on Australia's engagement with Asia, 1996–2007

Using the typology developed by Douglas Foyle, this article argues that John Howard behaved as a ‘pragmatist’ in dealing with situations where public opinion was relevant to Australia's engagement with Asia. Howard adhered to his own views on the relevant issues while attempting to lead public opinion in the direction he believed desirable. During the 1996–2007 period the most relevant issues relating to the impact of public opinion on Australia's Asian engagement were Australia's relations with Indonesia and Asian immigration. In the case of Australian–Indonesian relations the Howard government had to deal with various situations where an activated public opinion threatened to undermine the long term Australian approach that gave primacy to Indonesian concerns. Political leadership entailed developing a response that the government believed to be appropriate to Australia's long term objectives, while also attempting to persuade the public that this was the case. In the second instance policy developed in a more ‘deliberative’ context: Howard modified his earlier stance that was critical of Asian immigration, but continued to adhere to a strongly ‘integrationist’ position. This position was consistent with both his own views and his perception of public attitudes on the matter.     

Unintended consequences: an examination of Australia's ‘historic policy shift’ on East Timor

The Howard government's foreign policy objectives concerning East Timor remain the subject of intense historical debate. Given that some Indonesians harbour suspicions about Australia's role in East Timor's independence, it is important to reflect on Australia's diplomacy throughout this period. This article draws on 15 interviews with former politicians and officials—including Prime Minister John Howard and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer—to argue that in 1998, Australia's foreign policy was focused on supporting Indonesia's democratisation process and maintaining the bilateral relationship. It was only when Indonesia moved towards a ‘special status’ of autonomy for East Timor that Australia reconsidered its own position. Although rarely acknowledged, Australia's policy shift actually precipitated outcomes that it had sought to avoid. As such, Habibie's decision to allow self-determination in East Timor can only be viewed as an unintended consequence of Australian diplomacy—independence was never the objective of Australian foreign policy.     

Accordism and the environment: The resource assessment commission and national environmental policy‐making

This paper explores the reform of environmental policy‐making by the Hawke government through its creation of the Resource Assessment Commission (RAC). The paper pursues two themes. First, it argues that this reform must be seen within the broader context of the Hawke government's approach to public policy generally. The paper argues that the Australian Labor Party (ALP) has instituted a model for policy politics based on key strategic and normative approaches—a model this paper refers to as ‘Accordism’. Secondly, this paper looks at the RAC and in so doing argues that, on the basis of the norms that underpinned the reform of environmental policy‐making based on this body, the Commission may be placed squarely within the ‘Accordist’ paradigm.     

In defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia's new strategic map

The 2013 Australian Defence White Paper categorically termed Australia's zone of strategic interest the Indo-Pacific, the first time any government has defined its region this way. This raises questions about what the Indo-Pacific means, whether it is a coherent strategic system, the provenance of the concept and its implications for Asian security as well as Australian policy. Indo-Pacific Asia can best be understood as an expansive definition of a maritime super-region centred on South-East Asia, arising principally from the emergence of China and India as outward-looking trading states and strategic actors. It is a strategic system insofar as it involves the intersecting interests of key powers such as China, India and the USA, although the Indo-Pacific subregions will retain their own dynamics too. It suits Australia's two-ocean geography and expanding links with Asia, including India. The concept is, however, not limited to an Australian perspective and increasingly reflects US, Indian, Japanese and Indonesian ways of seeing the region. It also reflects China's expanding interests in the Indian Ocean, suggesting that the Chinese debate may shift towards partial acceptance of Indo-Pacific constructs alongside Asia-Pacific and East Asian ones, despite suspicions about its association with the US rebalance to Asia. Questions about Australia's ability to implement an effective Indo-Pacific strategy must account for force posture, alliance ties and defence diplomacy, as well as constraints on force structure and spending.     

The politics of Antarctic minerals: The Greening of white Australia

On 22 May 1989 the Australian Government announced that it would not sign the Antarctic Minerals Convention that had been concluded in June 1988. Australia had been a strong supporter of the minerals treaty approach to regulating Antarctic mineral development. This case study in Australian foreign policy examines four well known approaches to foreign policy making in order to explain Australia's volte face on the minerals treaty. It is concluded that domestic politics best explains Australia's decision and that students of Australian foreign policy need to pay more attention to the domestic determinants of the policy making process.     

Can Australia save the world? The limits and possibilities of middle power diplomacy

Australian policymakers have always harboured a desire to ‘punch above their weight’. On occasions they have succeeded. At a time when Australia's strategic, economic and environmental future is inextricably bound up with that of its immediate neighbours and the wider world, there are compelling reasons for hoping that they still can. This paper explores some of the most important aspects of Australian foreign policy during the Rudd era and asks whether the Australian government can play a constructive—even an exemplary—role in finding solutions for some of the planet's most pressing problems.     

Perspectives on Australian foreign policy, 2005

The year 2005 was notable for the Howard government's embrace of China. Spectacular resource deals were accompanied by the government's optimistic public declarations that China's rise could be accommodated in the current Asia–Pacific power structure. Alliance relations, which were the cornerstone of the Howard government's foreign policy, were boosted further by the decision to strengthen the Australian Defence Force's capacity to contribute to future US operations. The central challenge for this government arising from its decision-making in 2005 was to manage both major power relations in tandem. This was a year where the connection between international policy and domestic issues stood in stark relief. Terrorism concerns provided the context for the government's foreign policy but it also drove stringent domestic legislation. Australia's relationship with Indonesia improved but the commitment to Iraq remained problematic. Not the least of these difficulties stemmed from the exposure of the Australian Wheat Board's corporate dealings in Iraq which had operated counter to the government's international policy.     

Australia's diplomatic asylum initiative at the United Nations: comparing international law rhetoric with foreign policy practice

In 1974, Australia took the initiative to have an item on diplomatic asylum inscribed on the UN General Assembly's agenda for that year. Its original ambition was to procure an international treaty on the subject. This article traces the history of that initiative from its inception to the acknowledgement seven years later that it had come to nothing. It also investigates the impact that Australia's initiative at the UN had on its foreign policy practice in relation to diplomatic asylum through two administrations: the Whitlam government (5 December 1972–11 November 1975) and the Fraser government (11 November 1975–11 March 1983). It demonstrates that, while the initiative generated a great deal of bureaucratic work, it wrought no real change in Australia's practice on the ground.     

One continent,two federalisms: rediscovering the original meanings of Australian federal ideas

Federalism is usually described in political science as a single body of ideas—in Australia's case arriving in the 1840s–50s and moving to constitutional reality in the 1890s. This article re‐examines the origins and diversity of federal ideas in Australia. It suggests that federal thought began influencing Australia's constitutional development significantly earlier than previously described. This first Australian federalism had a previously unappreciated level of support in British colonial policy and drew on Benjamin Franklin's American model of territorial change as a ‘commonwealth for increase’. The revised picture entrenches the notion of federalism's logic but also reveals a dynamic, decentralist style of federalism quite different from Australia's orthodox ‘classic’ or compact federal theory. In fact, Australian political thought contains two often‐conflicting ideas of federalism. The presence of these approaches helps explain longstanding dissent over the regional foundations of Australian constitutionalism.     

Australian and People's Republic of China government conceptions of the international order

Through qualitative comparative analysis of policy documents and official statements over the last 10 years (2008–2018), this paper examines Australian and PRC government conceptions of the international order and the associated policy implications. Their understandings of the international order are informed by their self-defined national role conceptions and perceptions of other states, and are manifested in discussions of institutional reform, international law and human rights. Australia's self-conception as a middle power informs its emphasis on maintenance and US leadership of the existing order, while the PRC's self-conceptions as both a developing and established power enable it to frame itself as either an upholder or reformer of the order. Both governments highlight the ‘rules-based’ mechanisms of the WTO, and are more likely to agree on trade and economic issues than on other matters. Their responses to the 2016 South China Sea arbitration tribunal decision and discussions of the role of human rights in the international order suggest less agreement is likely on international law and human rights norms. While Australia considers the PRC a potential challenger to the existing order, Australia does not feature in PRC discussions of international order, suggesting its limited ability to affect PRC foreign policy decisions.     

Industry policy under the accord: Reform vs traditionalism in economic management

During the emergence and implementation of the ALP‐ACTU Accord, commentators havé paid comparatively little attention to its industry‐policy aspect. But the Accord itself rests on important changes in Australian unionism, its new priority in employment policy and ambition to participate in policymaking in general. These changes have now crystallised in a more penetrating analysis of manufacturing decline and demands for industry‐policy reform within the framework of the Accord. The Hawke government, however, has fallen under the influence of an older, institutionalised tradition of Australian economic management that is frustrating the attempt to use industry policy to return to maintainable full employment and assert the labour movement's social priorities. The present conflict over industry policy thus represents a major threat to the Accord.