Shared rivers and conflict – A reconsideration

Neomalthusians have regularly predicted "water wars" while cornucopians have argued that there is no inherent water scarcity and liberal institutionalists have seen cooperation as a more likely outcome of competition for limited water resources than violent conflict. Three earlier studies have found a positive statistical relationship between shared rivers and low-level interstate conflict. Based on a more comprehensive dataset, an improved model of conflict, and a more appropriate control for geographical opportunity, we argue that these results are spurious and that we cannot establish a conflict-inducing effect of shared rivers over and beyond contiguity itself. In fact, the new dataset presented here makes it clear that nearly all neighbors in the international system share at least one river. This calls for a different approach to investigating interaction in shared river basins. This notwithstanding, freshwater and other shared resources may still provide a mechanism to explain why contiguity is robustly associated with conflict, so the water-conflict scenario cannot be dismissed. Indeed, our results show that among river-sharing states, basins with an upstream/downstream configuration increase the risk of conflict. The article finally discusses how river interaction should be further investigated based on these results and what new data are needed to enable such research.     

Shared rivers and interstate conflict

“The previous war in the Middle East was about oil, the next war will be about water.” Such predictions have been made regularly, and particularly with reference to the possibility of upstream–downstream conflicts in major rivers which cross interstate boundaries. A good case can be made that competition over water resources may exacerbate conflict and contribute to interstate violence. More than 200 river systems are shared by two or more countries. Many rivers run between countries with a history of conflict, where water plays an important part in the economic life of the country. The dramatic statements about ‘water wars’, however, have a weaker foundation. As resource optimists have pointed out, there is an abundance of water where it is not subject to wasteful uses, human ingenuity can overcome water shortages, and nations can cooperate rather than fight to resolve international water issues. This study is built on newly generated data on boundary-crossing rivers, which have been added to the Correlates of War contiguity dataset. Our results indicate that a joint river does indeed increase the probability of militarized disputes and armed conflict over and above mere contiguity. This risk factor is comparable in size to standard control variables, but much smaller than the effect of contiguity itself. Water scarcity is also associated with conflict, and the upstream/downstream relationship appears to be the form of shared river most frequently associated with conflict. But these results are not very strong and we do not have any systematic data on the issues involved in the shared-river conflicts.     

国际贸易与环境协调发展的难点和出路

本文分析了国际贸易与环境冲突的现状、原因,探讨了解决贸易与环境冲突面临的困难,在此基础上提出了协调贸易与环境出路的5个方面,即建立国际贸易环境成本内化核算体系;建立可持续性的补偿基金;建立以贸易与环境协定为准则的多边合作机制;建立各国"环境标志制度"的统一标准化管理体系;建构环境与贸易协调的全球法律和价值伦理体系。     

中国—中亚合作冲突关系及时空热点分析

中亚地处欧亚大陆中心，是“一带一路”倡议建设的重要区域。本文基于GDELT新闻媒体数据库，构建了事件影响度和双边关系度，定量分析了中国与中亚国家之间的合作、冲突关系演变，采用时空热点分析识别了中国在中亚城市尺度的合作、冲突热点模式。结果表明：①中国与中亚国家的合作日趋紧密。“一带一路”倡议提出之后，中国与中亚国家的合作趋势显著上升，与哈萨克斯坦的合作关系最为紧密。②中国在中亚地区的合作区域集中在中亚国家首都、战略要地、重要能源基地等，在乌兹别克斯坦安集延地区和塔吉克斯坦哈特隆州形成集中连片的合作区域。冲突区域集中在中亚国家首都和战略要地，与合作区域在空间上高度重合，但影响力显著低于合作事件。③中国在中亚城市的影响力以合作关系占主导，冲突关系大于合作关系的城市主要分布在吉尔吉斯斯坦。64%的中亚城市为低合作—低冲突状态，中亚国家首都、阿拉木图、安集延属于显著的高合作—高冲突城市。④时间尺度上，中国与中亚地区的合作热点以持续型为主，冲突热点以振荡型为主，哈萨克斯坦纳伦市、阿特劳州为新增冲突热点，应引起重视。     

The Atlantic burden‐sharing debate—widening or fragmenting?

The Atlantic burden‐sharing debate during the early part of the twenty‐first century is shaping up to be very different from those of NATO’s first fifty years. The resources needed for direct defence of western Europe have fallen sharply, and further cuts are possible. The gradual strengthening of European cooperation means that the EU is becoming an actor in its own right in many international regimes. Debates about which countries are pulling their weight internationally are also taking into account contributions to non‐military international public goods–financing EU enlargement, aiding the Third World, reducing emissions of climate‐damaging pollutants. In this new multidimensional debate, it becomes more apparent that states that contribute more to one regime often do less than most in another. Germany, for example, is concerned about its excessive contribution to the costs of EU enlargement, but it spends considerably less than France and the UK on defence. European countries contribute three times as much as the United States to Third World aid, and will soon pay almost twice as much into the UN budget. Yet they were dependent on the US to provide most of the military forces in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, and would be even more dependent in the event of a future Gulf war. This widening of the burden‐sharing debate contains both dangers and opportunities. It could lead to a fragmentation of the Atlantic dialogue, with each side talking past the other on an increasing number of issues, ranging from global warming to Balkan peacekeeping. In order to avoid such a dangerous situation, the US and European states should maintain the principle that all must make a contribution to efforts to tackle common problems, whether it be through troops in Kosovo or commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Yet there should also be some flexibility in defining who does how much. The preparedness of some countries to lead, by doing more, will be essential if international cooperation is to have a chance to work.     

Assessing side-payment and cost-sharing patterns in international water agreements: The geographic and economic connection

To a large degree, conflicts over transboundary freshwater resources arise because property rights have not been clearly defined. International water law provides only hints and suggestions as to how states should resolve their water disputes, since legal principles and clauses are ambiguous and contradictory. But conflict often creates a need for cooperation, which is achieved by means of negotiations, and the specific outcome of negotiations is almost always codified in an international treaty. This article considers bilateral water agreements for rivers with particular geographical configurations and aims to answer a fundamental question: how and why do bilateral treaties vary in their design? Further, it examines international freshwater treaties to deduce the nature of treaty remedies, particularly the side-payment and cost-sharing arrangements, used for resolving conflict over rivers shared by two countries. The theory and testable hypotheses consider geography and economics in order to explore treaty design. In essence, the ‘willingness to pay’ of one of the states reflects on the property rights solution and can be explained by geography and economics. Three geographical configurations are investigated here. The findings affirm that side-payments frequently occur to offset an asymmetric geographical relationship between upstream and downstream states, and are commonly regarded as an appropriate instrumentality for solving a property rights dispute. Side-payments are non-existent when the geographic relationship among the riparians is symmetric and costs for the joint project are most always equally shared. As expected, in this latter case, the geography of the river acts as a focal point for equal participation. When economic differences are taken into account, especially when the upstream state is richer, the side-payment outcome is reversed. As expected, richer states internalize the costs of taking action in favor of poorer downstream states. When the geographical relationship between the riparians is of a symmetrical nature, while the economic relationship between the states is of an asymmetrical nature, the richer state often assumes the bulk of the cost burden. In this way, it provides a side-payment to the poorer state. Such patterns reveal how property rights disputes over issues such as water quantity, hydropower, pollution abatement, and flood control have been concluded. They suggest how ongoing disputes may be resolved.     

Economic interdependence and international interactions: the impact of country size on political conflict and cooperation

The trade–conflict model claims that one state, designated as the ‘actor’, is deterred from initiating conflict against a trading partner, designated as the ‘target’, for fear of losing the welfare gains associated with trade. This article extends the trade–conflict model to examine the effect of country size on the trade gains among countries. We derive three propositions with regard to international interactions that pertain to the links between trade, conflict and country size. These hypotheses all imply that a country with an improvement in its terms of trade with a large country will decrease conflict more than it would with an improvement in its terms of trade with a small country. A 30‐country sample from the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) is used for empirical tests. The empirical analyses support the derived hypotheses. The model predicts that a country's ability to influence domestic consumption in a trading partner is an important determinant of international interactions.     

The benefit-sharing principle: Implementing sovereignty bargains on water

A global water crisis is emerging that may challenge states' existing and future water availability. With countries already heavily reliant on international rivers, the issue of managing water scarcity in these basins is mounting. An already complex issue due to climatic change and the politics of access, the management of water resources is complicated further by sovereignty. In a context shaped by political boundaries and a concomitant territorial exclusivity, nation-states seek to guarantee their societies' water by exerting control through physical and institutional infrastructure. Yet, the basin's hydrological interdependency implies co-riparian countries remain vulnerable to each other's use of the shared river, suggesting ecological rather than just political limits to sovereignty. The continued vulnerability, as envisaged within the greening of sovereignty, suggests international cooperation is necessary. Explained as sovereignty bargains, in which states trade reduced autonomy for future benefits, international cooperation is, we suggest, bi-directional and can stem from or create international institutions. We examine an instance of international cooperation that exemplifies an alternative approach to international river management. The benefit-sharing principle focuses on allocating the outputs from water use, rather than the water itself; and was used by the Senegal basin riparians to access key services such as electricity despite a context of poverty, climatic change and intra-basin politics. What emerges is a strong narrative of cooperation sustained, over decades, by the states' willingness to engage in sovereignty bargains.     

Rethinking transboundary waters: A critical hydropolitics of the Mekong basin

Efforts to understand the geographical and political complexities of transboundary river basins—both within national jurisdictions and at international levels—must embrace critical interdisciplinary perspectives. In this paper, we focus attention on underdeveloped aspects of transboundary water conflicts and cooperation—e.g., how ecological understandings of river basins are transformed within transboundary institutional arrangements; the way multiple actors in transboundary basins construct geographical scales; and how control over water is represented and exercised within governance and management institutions. We advance the notion of critical hydropolitics as a way of explicating these processes. We draw on a case study of conflict over and within the transboundary waters of the Mekong River basin to illustrate this approach. Our aim is to complement and extend ongoing research and policy debates concerning transboundary waters.     

Partnership Networks for Urban Development: How Structure is Shaped by Risk

In delivering public policy, governments worldwide increasingly partner with diverse sets of stakeholders. This spreads commercial risk, but particularly where agendas diverge, introduces new risks related to trust in relationships. The “risk hypothesis” distinguishes between networks for “cooperation” problems, where partners have high individual payoffs for uncooperative behaviors, and “coordination” problems, where partners subscribe to a common goal and uncooperative behaviors are less rewarding. We used mixed‐methods to study networks of local and state government, developers, and consultants that center on joint‐venture partnerships for developing new urban, residential projects. Statistical network methods showed that within the mix of partners involved in development projects, only state governments displayed structural patterns associated with solving “cooperation” problems (rather than coordination). In other words, the patterns of state government interactions showed they are most exposed to risky relationships. In contrast to the state governments’ apparent exposure to risk, qualitative data showed they are not only well trusted but also overall the partnership networks reported very low levels of conflict. By exploring the distribution of “cooperation” and “coordination,” we identified which stakeholders perceived most risk. In our case, how the state governments’ structure interactions in response to risky relationships leads to an overall network characterized by trust.     

Conflicts over shared rivers: Resource scarcity or fuzzy boundaries?

Countries that share rivers have a higher risk of military disputes, even when controlling for a range of standard variables from studies of interstate conflict. A study incorporating the length of the land boundary showed that the shared river variable is not just a proxy for a higher degree of interaction opportunity. A weakness of earlier work is that the existing shared rivers data do not distinguish properly between dyads where the rivers run mainly across the boundary and dyads where the shared river runs along the boundary. Dyads with rivers running across the boundary would be expected to give rise to resource scarcity-related conflict, while in dyads where the river forms the boundary conflict may arise because river boundaries are fluid and fuzzy. Using a new dataset on shared water basins and two measures of water scarcity, we test for the relevance of these two scenarios. Shared basins do predict an increased propensity for conflict in a multivariate analysis. However, we find little support for the fuzzy boundary scenario. Support for a scarcity theory of water conflict is somewhat ambiguous. Neither the number of river crossings nor the share of the basin upstream is significant. Dry countries have more conflict, but less so when the basin is large. Drought has no influence. The size of the basin, however, is significantly associated with conflict. Modernization theory receives some support in that development interacted with basin size predicts less conflict, and we find some evidence here for an environmental Kuznets curve. The importance of basin size suggests a possible ‘resource curse’ effect for water resources.     

Hidden theories,troubled waters: International relations,the ‘territorial trap’, and the Southern African Development Community's transboundary waters

Much of the literature examining transboundary watercourses employs an implicit international relations framework. This literature, while helpful in understanding aspects of transboundary watercourses, routinely obfuscates many crucial factors. Specifically, such analyses are marked by: (i) a mis-theorization of the hegemonic structures at work, (ii) undue pessimism regarding the propensity for multi-lateral cooperation, (iii) an assumption that conflict and cooperation exist along a progressive continuum, (iv) a tenet that conflict is restricted to state competition, and thus a neglect of state collusion in violence against certain citizens, and (v) a depoliticization of ecological conditions. Bringing a geographical critique to bear on the IR framed literature illuminates such deficiencies and leads to a more grounded and holistic analysis of the politics of shared watercourses. A case study of the management of shared water resources in the Southern African Development Community is used to demonstrate, in a concrete way, what is obfuscated in the implicit IR approach and how a geographical critique is able to provide an analysis that is both more critical, and more insightful.     

Population size, concentration, and civil war. A geographically disaggregated analysis

Why do larger countries have more armed conflict? This paper surveys three sets of hypotheses put forward in the conflict literature regarding the relationship between the size and location of population groups. These hypotheses are based on population mass and concentrations, distances, and some residual state-level characteristics. The hypotheses are tested with a new dataset – ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset) – that disaggregates internal conflicts into individual events. The analysis covers 14 countries in Central Africa. The conflict event data are juxtaposed with geographically disaggregated data on populations, distance to capitals, borders, and road networks. The paper develops a statistical method to analyze these types of data. The analysis shows that the risk of conflict events increases with local population size, and is particularly large in highly populous locations within a country. We find only a moderate difference in conflict-proneness between areas located close to or far from a country's capital, except when combined with population concentration: Conflict events cluster particularly strongly in larger population concentrations that are distant from the capital, such as the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo.     

Back to BASICs? The Rejuvenation of Non‐traditional Donors’ Development Cooperation with Africa

The world economy is in a state of flux. While most OECD countries struggle to minimize the damage of the global financial crisis, a few countries maintain positive economic growth rates and are thus changing global power configurations. Among the most important emerging economies for international development are the BASIC countries: Brazil, South Africa, India and China. This article analyses why these countries have rejuvenated development cooperation, what they actually do in Africa, and how they do it. It argues that the most important aspect of the rejuvenation of non‐traditional donors’ development cooperation with African economies is not the direct effects on these economies, be they positive or negative, but the potential gains that may accrue to African economies in terms of larger room for manoeuvre due to increased competition and the challenge to traditional donors’ development hegemony.     

Transboundary conservation and militarized interstate disputes

Advocates of transboundary conservation argue that borderlands can be a source of cooperation between neighboring states that previously engaged in conflict. It has been stated that, by opening negotiation channels based on environmental issues, jointly managed cross-border protected areas can promote and reinforce harmonious relations between contiguous states. We explore this assertion by empirically testing how transboundary protected areas (TBPAs) are related to militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between contiguous states. Through the use of global data on protected areas and MIDs, we find that TBPAs tend to be established between countries that have previously been engaged in MIDs. We also find some evidence that TBPAs can be related to a more peaceful co-existence between neighboring countries in Africa, Middle East, and Asia.     

Human rights,domestic politics,and informal agreements: parliamentary challenges to international cooperation on migration management

ABSTRACT

Developed and developing countries are increasingly cooperating on migration management, and human rights NGOs have harshly criticised these instruments for cooperation. This article asks how and to what extent parliaments are challenging policies for international cooperation on migration management. On the one hand parliaments have traditionally been described as ‘moral tribunes’ in international relations, due to their principled support for human rights. On the other hand, parliaments are increasingly operating in political systems marked by anti-immigrant sentiment and increased support for right-wing populist parties. How do parliaments navigate between these two poles when it comes to international cooperation on migration management? Based on examples from Australia, the EU and Israel, this article shows that the use of non-legally binding instruments for cooperation limits the formal role of parliaments, but also and more importantly that there is a lack of political will to scrutinise these instruments and hold executives to account (notwithstanding attempts by some members of parliament or some political groupings to challenge policies through informal means). The lack of political contestation implies that, as far as migration management is concerned, ‘politics stop at the water's edge’.     

全球化时代国际劳务移民治理析论

论文基于联合国、国际劳工组织、国际移民组织等机构的数据,重点从国家、地区及多边三个层面,对国际社会有关劳务移民的国际合作以及移民工人权益保护的治理实践进行考察,并对于未来全球劳务移民治理发展趋向加以展望。在国家层面,各国政府通过建立有关劳务移民的法律框架,推动国家间协议以及参与多边体系治理合作等方式维护移民工人权益。在地区层面,在区域一体化进程中,正式区域性组织和非正式机制,积极推动区域内有关劳务移民问题的对话、协商和合作。在全球层面,国际上有关劳务移民的国际公约及法律文书代表着多边倡议,国际劳工组织也致力于政策制定以实现所有移民工人利益的最大化。全球劳动力的流动是全球化未完成的事业。随着当今国际迁移的性质和组成日益复杂,移民治理过程中的国际合作与移民工人的保护有待进一步加强。     

Towards Free Trade in the Pacific? The Genesis of the ‘Kava‐Biscuit War’ between Fiji and Vanuatu

Contemporary movements towards trade liberalisation have influenced economic development in Pacific island states, where opportunities for growth have always been restricted. The new free trade, centred on comparative advantage, is especially challenging for countries producing sugar, where diversification is difficult, and for the smallest states where trade options have always been limited. New regional trade agreements have been introduced in the Pacific as a step towards global free trade, but have emphasised trade rivalry and conflict, characterised by the ‘kava‐biscuit war’ between Fiji and Vanuatu, rather than complementary trade and cooperation. Movement towards free trade poses acute problems for island states, yet international agreements have not recognised their particular disadvantages, and continue to stress benefits that are nowhere apparent in the Pacific.     

THE OPTIMAL DISTANCE TO PORT FOR EXPORTING FIRMS*

ABSTRACT Success in international trade depends, among other things, on distance from markets. Most new economic geography models focus on the distance between countries. In contrast, much less theorizing and empirical analysis have focused on how distances within a country—for instance, due to the location behavior of exporting firms—matter to international trade. In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the latter by offering a theoretical model to explain the optimal distance that an export‐oriented firm would locate from a port. We present empirical evidence in support of the model.     

Race,space, and agency in the international introduction industry: how American men perceive women’s agency in Colombia,Ukraine and the Philippines

The international introduction industry, more commonly known as the ‘mail order bride’ industry, is often portrayed in American media as a conduit of human trafficking or a ploy by women from ‘third world’ countries to gain access to American citizenship. This study addresses how men participating in the international introduction industry perceived the industry and the agency/sincerity of women who participate in it across three different geographic spaces, namely Ukraine, Colombia and the Philippines, and how these perceptions often adopt racialized discourses that portrays white Ukrainian women as sexy ‘scammers’, while women of color are more likely to be portrayed as victims of poverty and patriarchy. Based on empirical data collected on romance tours within all geographic spaces with male participants, I suggest that men’s racialized assumptions regarding women’s intentions within the industry, as well as what type of agency they possess, are heavily based on tropes of the third world as backwards, traditional, and static.