The United States and Regionalism in Central Asia

This article examines the record of American policy towards regional cooperation in Central Asia. It begins with the determinants of regionalism and the role of external states therein. It then considers the nature of American interests in Central Asia. This is followed by a historical account of the three stages of American policy towards the region. The article argues that regional cooperation has not been a significant aspect of US policy. Instead US policy-makers have preferred bilateral relations or multilateral structures (e.g. the Partnership for Peace, the GUUAM [Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova] group) which draw the region's states beyond its boundaries. US policy tends to reduce incentives for regional actors to develop multilateral cooperation. It may also encourage competitive regionalist agendas on the part of other interested major powers (Russia and China).     

Iran and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Ideology and Realpolitik in Iranian Foreign Policy

The Islamic Republic of Iran has pursued full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). In doing so, Iran has appeared to be unfazed by the prospect of allying with Russia and China, two countries which have systematically suppressed their Muslim minorities for decades. Similarly, the SCO's Central Asian member states are led by individual leaders who are generally believed to rule in spite of their populations. As a result, Iran's eagerness to join the SCO may appear to contradict its self-promoted image as the champion of Muslim interests, but in reality it sits nicely within its overarching enmity for the USA. Indeed, the SCO is seen as a geopolitical counterweight to the USA. For Iran, this geopolitical opportunity overrides ideological imperatives, with the gap between ideology and geopolitics most evident under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.     

Towards Asian regional functional futures: bringing Mitrany back in?

In the early years of the twenty-first century, Asian regionalism is at a crossroads. While the region is home to a broad array of multilateral organisations, the record of these bodies in fostering effective and legitimate cooperation has been decidedly weak. Drawing on insights from the work of David Mitrany on international cooperation, this article contends that the key problem facing Asian regionalism is a predilection for ‘top-down’ rather than ‘bottom-up’ regionalism strategies. These top-down strategies have involved efforts to find a single institutional design for regional cooperation (similar to the experience of Europe), which has been hindered by geopolitical rivalries and a lack of shared consensus around what constitutes the ‘Asian region’. By considering the contours of interstate competition in Asia, the track record of its existing regionalism efforts and insights from comparative regional studies, it is instead argued that Asia's future is one of regions rather than a single region. As Mitrany suggests, the unique geopolitical context in Asia means that functionally discrete and variegated strategies are likely to provide a more effective basis for regional cooperation. Indeed, trends towards such a functional approach to regionalism are already becoming evident in Asia today.     

Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia

The security dimension of regionalism and regional structures in Central Asia and Azerbaijan has been limited by Russia's influence as a regional hegemon, aswell as by various other constraints specific to the region and the local states. Moreover, as a peripheral zone in the world system, Central Eurasia has not shown much evidence of regionalization as a process. But in response to the proximity of hegemonic power the smaller states have tried to adopt bandwagoning and balancing strategies in regional formats. Although their fixation on 'regime security' has encouraged them to accommodate Russia through CIS structures, this is changing as new bilateral security relationships develop with the United States. The Russian-sponsored Collective Security Treaty Organization is unable to address the most serious challenges for regional security management in Central Asia. Yet the local states have been unable on their own to establish a regional security consensus and to institutionalize cooperation on that basis. The diffuse GUUAM grouping (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) has not offered a basis for selfsustaining regional security cooperation. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has created a venue to engage China in the security dialogue on Central Asia, particularly over counterterrorism, but has otherwise failed to tackle security challenges among and within the Central Asian states. Overall, the current focus of these states and their sponsors on bilateral relations to provide security assistance continues to displace security-related regionalism.     

Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order

Behind the rhetoric of regional cooperation, the Central Asian states have been embroiled with increasing frequency in conflicts among themselves, including trade wars, border disputes and disagreements over the management and use of water and energy resources. Far from engendering a new regional order in Central Asia, the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent basing of US troops in the region have served to entrench pre-existing patterns of regional cooperation, while highlighting the obstacles that have beset the regionalization process there since the mid-1990s. While all five Central Asian states have been attempting to use the renewed rivalry between Russia and the United States, which is being played out in the Central Asian region, to maximize their strategic and economic benefits, the formation of the United States–Uzbekistan strategic partnership has increased the resolve of the other Central Asian states (Turkmenistan excepted) to balance Uzbekistan's preponderance by enthusiastically pursuing regional projects involving Russia and, to a lesser extent, China. This regional dynamic has resulted in the steady gravitation of the centre of regionalism in Central Asia to the north from a nominal Tashkent–Astana axis to a more stable Astana–Moscow one, with possible repercussions for the poorer states of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The article examines the major constraints on regionalism in Central Asia, considering in particular the ways in which the personalist, non-democratic regimes of Central Asia have obstructed state–centric 'top–down' regionalism as well as informal regionalist processes 'from below'.     

美国对华地缘战略与中国和平发展

美国对华地缘战略具有遏制加利用的两面性。在传统层面,美国主要把中国看作战略对手,进行地缘政治围堵,对中国发展构成显著的制约性。但是,从现实利益出发,美国又利用中国,在反恐、防扩散等方面谋求与中国的地缘战略合作,为中国和平发展提供契机。     

Central Asian and Russian perspectives on China's strategic emergence

This article employs fieldwork research and literature analysis to examine contemporary perceptions of China's emergence in popular and elite opinion in Russia and the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan. It initially establishes a framework for understanding China's emergence, emphasizing a trilateral dynamic between the hegemonic position of the US in Asia, the evolution of the strategic choices of China's neighbours and the development of strategic regionalism as a mechanism for managing regional spaces. Choosing to take the Commonwealth of Independent States as a particular case of this framework, it argues that the interaction between Russia, China and the US remains highly fluid, particularly under the conditions ‘of re‐setting’ the US‐Russian relationship. This means that regional contexts are highly significant; and it establishes Central Asia as an important new strategic region for working out relations between Russia, China, and the US through their interactions with regional states. The second part of the article examines Russian and Central Asian responses to China's emergence. It looks at three categories of motivation in China's regionalism: its system for accumulative growth; its problems with weak constitutionality and transnational security in its western regions; and its concern with US/NATO encroachment on its western frontier and the US attempt to turn Central Asian elites away from their traditional alignments. The third part looks at China's promotion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as its mechanism for strategic regionalism in Central Asia. The article questions the SCO's significance in terms of its capacity for governance and functionalism, and points to the problem of institutional competition, notably with Moscow's preferred structure of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The article concludes that China will be an unconventional superpower that presents different facets of itself in different regional contexts. There will not be a single model of China's emergence and it will continue to develop its international role through a mix of adaptation and experimentation. However, China's strategy will pose a problem for Russia and Central Asia since it seeks to create a strategic space that does not challenge the West, but exists substantially outside the West. Russia, in particular, has to decide whether it will be able to maintain its current stance of independence between Europe and Asia as China's rise shifts the frontiers between East and West.     

Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy

President Putin has presided over a proactive, hard-headed and relatively effective Russian policy in Central Asia and the Caspian region since at least the summer of 2002, which aims both to support Russia's revival as an economic and military power and to help tackle at source new security challenges from the volatile south. In line with rising domestic nationalist thinking and the growing influence of officials with a security service or military background, Moscow has been searching for a rationale to support a more assertive policy in the region. Meanwhile, Russian and American views on the scope and conduct of the war on terrorism have diverged in important respects. Russia lacks an overall regional strategy for Central Asia, but is seeking to mesh together geopolitical, security and energy policy goals. It is seeking to reinvigorate its military–security influence in Central Asia under the banner of counterterrorism and at the same time has achieved long-term agreements for energy transit and purchases that make Central Asian states increasingly dependent on Russia in energy policy. Overall, a dynamic of competition is displacing the potential for cooperation between Russia and western states, especially the United States, in Central Asia. The prospects for a fully-fledged strategic partnership in the region are fading but the reality of security threats from Afghanistan and within Central Asia might eventually reconcile Moscow to a lower profile but long-term western strategic presence in the region.     

‘One Belt,One Road’ and China’s emerging Afghanistan dilemma

This article argues that China’s approach to Afghanistan since the end of the Cold War has been shaped by the desire both for security in Xinjiang and for geopolitical advantage in Central Asia. While Beijing’s Xinjiang calculus was ascendant from 1991 to 2001, since 2001 a broader geopolitical calculus has emerged. This latter factor has been encapsulated in President Xi Jinping’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy, which, at its core, is an outgrowth of Beijing’s decades-long agenda to integrate Xinjiang and utilise this region’s unique geopolitical position to facilitate a China-centric Eurasian geo-economic system. While China’s Xinjiang calculus determines that it shares an interest with the USA in combating radical Islamism in Afghanistan (and Central Asia more broadly), the geopolitical calculus of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy points to a fundamental incompatibility between US and Chinese interests.     

Geopolitics of landlocked states in South Asia: a comparative analysis of Afghanistan and Nepal

ABSTRACT

Foreign policies of landlocked states have been a topic of interest for scholarship on international relations but the landlocked states in South Asia have received negligible attention. Due to their geographical realities, South Asian landlocked states that include Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal, depend on their neighbours for trade with the outside world. A range of factors place landlocked states in an unequal relationship with their coastal neighbours. While these factors include the superiority of coastal neighbours in terms of economy, population size, and military strength, we argue that their landlockedness plays a crucial role. To further investigate the role of landlockedness, this study compares the foreign policy decisions that guide India-Nepal and Afghanistan–Pakistan relations. Based on the assessment of historical, economic and geopolitical factors, we argue that India and Pakistan exploit their landlocked neighbours to achieve their national interests. Frustrated by the treatment of their coastal neighbours and the presence of new trade opportunities have compelled Afghanistan to use its closeness with India to counter over-dependence on Pakistan and Nepal has enhanced cooperation with China to overcome its reliance on India, thereby creating a new geopolitical dynamic within South Asia.     

中日实现经贸合作战略升级的区域环境

尽管中日两国关系内部的经贸合作关系与政治协作关系,在发展上长期处于不平衡、不协调的亚健康状态,但是中国从双边经贸合作的大局出发,一直在积极促进两国经贸关系与政治关系协调发展。这不仅是中国经济发展的内在需要,而且也是区域性外在作用的促进结果。值得一提的是,中日两国在亚太经济合作组织、东亚“10 3”合作机制、中日韩三国合作框架、中日俄三国利益关系的推进上,都有着广泛的合作基础与广阔的合作前景,从而在外部形成了中日两国经贸合作实现战略升级目标的区域促进环境,有利于双方在2008￣2010年间达到2 000亿美圆的经贸合作额度。     

The Islamic Republic of Iran and the South Caucasus Republics

Deep geopolitical changes in the South Caucasus have considerably influenced the relationships of Iran and the three republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Geographical location and strategic significance have made this region one of the most important in the world. Because of its historical affinities and socio-cultural links with the region's peoples, the Islamic Republic of Iran has expanded political-economic cooperation with them. The active presence of regional and trans-regional actors has directly affected this relation. This article mainly seeks to examine Iran's relations with the South Caucasus republics, considering the opportunities created since their independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union.     

Paths ahead for East Asia and Asia–Pacific regionalism

East Asia and the Asia–Pacific are core components of the global economy, and there have been important recent developments in the regionalism of both regions. After the 1997–1998 financial crisis, East Asian countries initiated more exclusive regional cooperation and integration ventures mainly through ASEAN Plus Three, but lately this process has stumbled. The Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum has also failed to make substantial progress. Attention has instead increasingly turned to free trade agreements (FTAs), yet these have hitherto been overwhelmingly bilateral in nature. There are still only a few truly regional FTAs in East Asia and the Asia–Pacific—and these are on a sub‐regional scale. However, various frustrations over the messy and fractious pattern of heterogeneous bilateral agreements led to the recent initiation of ‘grand regional’ FTA talks. The Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP) is an Asia–Pacific‐based, United States‐led project while the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is an East Asia‐centred project. Each contains highly diverse memberships and the successful conclusion of TPP and RCEP talks is not assured. It is argued that, if negotiated, the RCEP is more likely to advance meaningful and effective regionalism than the TPP due to the former ascribing more importance to regional community‐building. Furthermore, bilateral FTAs already in force may over the long term transform into more comprehensive economic agreements that address new regional and global challenges such as energy security and climate change.     

The Ob' will enter the Caspian: the Yenisey-Ob'-Aral-Caspian Water Connection and the Energy Problem

An early 1949 version of Davydov's grandiose scheme for diverting water from the Yenisey and Ob' Rivers to Kazakhstan and Central Asia via the Turgay Gates and the Aral and Caspian Seas in order to stabilize the level of the Caspian, expand the irrigated acreage of Kazakhstan and Central Asia, generate abundant hydro-electric power, provide a cheap water transport route between Siberia and Central Asia, eliminate sukhovei (dry winds) at their source, and ameliorate the continental climate of Western Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia. The plan reflects the anthropocentric “transformation of nature” and the large-scale “great projects of communism” drives of the late Stalinist period. The translation was prepared by James R. Gibson of York University, Toronto.     

The rise of Islamic finance: post‐colonial market‐building in central Asia and Russia

Islamic finance signifies more than a projection of religious affiliation. The importance of Islamic finance is increasing in central Asia, both as a source of capital and as a form of post‐colonial market‐building. In central Asia, it is an important facet of the new phenomena of ‘nation‐branding’ and a means of reinvigorating the economy. In identity politics, Islamic finance projects an attitude of religious tolerance allowing states in the region to reposition their geopolitical identity relative to the Islamic community. This creates a ‘performance’ of Islamic finance that facilitates the creation of legitimacy for the state. Adopting Islamic finance projects images of the state's religious tolerance and diversity without changing the underlying structures; it suggests an ‘Islamicness’ that is useful to the development and post‐colonial goals of the state. As such, it creates opportunities for geopolitical alliances with Muslim countries. Economically, it appeals to rising financial‐industrial elites seeking new investment‐opportunities, which reduces pressure on the state to democratize. Meanwhile, in Russia, Islamic finance is an alternative source of capital for the sanctions‐hit state and a useful identity marker with which to connect to the increasingly wary Caucuses and Commonwealth of Independent States countries, lending it a wider significance across Eurasia.     

Turkey's Emergence as a Geopolitical Power Broker

In a framing essay commenting on a symposium devoted to Turkey's role in a dynamic geopolitical world system, a prominent American political geographer presents the case for Turkey's evolution from regional power within that system to a key geopolitical balancing agent, reflecting its pivotal location within Eurasia. After first exploring the implications of the collapse of the USSR for U.S.-Turkey relations, he critically assesses the ruling Turkish political party's (AKP) recent foreign policy formulation of Turkey as a leader/role model of its own "civilizational basin" (Middle Eastern and Central Eurasian countries). Citing a range of linguistic, cultural, ethnic, and religious differences between Turkey and the Arab lands, he argues that Turkey's true civilizational basin is limited to Central Asia, where Russia holds geopolitical primacy, and advocates a broader framing of Turkey's geopolitical orientation as reflecting location, economics, oil, water, and natural interests. Such a conceptualization suggests that Turkey's pivotal role as balancing power may not be broadly defined as a bridge between Europe and Eurasia, but rather as a bridge between the EU and Russia. Also, the country's status as a role model may be more applicable for regional powers sandwiched between great powers than for emerging Islamic democracies per se.     

Italian regionalism or ‘Padanian’ nationalism — the political project of the Lega Nord in Italian politics

The resurgence of regionalist political parties has had a considerable, though variable, impact on contemporary European politics in recent decades and there are numerous examples of such parties across Europe. In Italy, there are several regionalist parties, however, it is the emergence in the last 15 years or so, of the Northern League (Lega Nord) (LN) political party, in the North of Italy, which has given a new impetus to debates about the significance of regionalism in Italy as well as across Europe. This paper discusses the different approaches to defining regionalism as well as the common features and driving forces of contemporary political regionalist projects. It then focuses upon the political discourses of the LN in order to discuss the ways in which the party resembles other regionalist projects, while having certain key, distinct and rather unique differences. This is because the LN's political project is not based in an area that has historic claims to nationhood. Instead, the LN has attempted to invent an ethnicity for the North of Italy (or ‘Padania’) in order to justify its political claims for the protection of the economic interests of the region. ‘Padania’ (which is the Latin term which refers to the basin of the River Po), has never ‘existed’ as an administrative or political unit but the LN has attempted to construct (and invent) a geography and a history in order to justify its territorial and political claims.     

The reshaping of Ibero-American cultural diplomacy in the beginning of the XXI century: the declining of the Spanish historical hegemony?

ABSTRACT

Francoist cultural policy in Latin America – itself based on Hispanist philosophy – and the Spanish activity in the Organization of Ibero-American States (1949) promoted the emergence of Ibero-American cultural diplomacy. The return of democracy to Spain in 1978 turned these projects into more horizontal instruments of cultural cooperation. After a process of institutionalization that led to the creation of SEGIB and the establishment of the Ibero-American Cultural Letter in 2006, this multilateral diplomatic system was called into question due to its economic asymmetries and its ideological basis. However, the relative influence of this process in reformulating the system and in creating a shared identitarian discourse within Ibero-America has never been properly weighted, nor has the importance of each actor within this process. This article analyses the multilateral Ibero-American cultural diplomacy in order to understand its recent transformations in terms of the importance of both national power and symbolic hegemony.     

China's Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia and the Middle East

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims at connecting the continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa through a combination of infrastructure projects and soft‐power programs. All of the six land bridges and maritime routes under the BRI extend westward, mostly passing through Central Asia and the Middle East on land or by sea. Cooperation with countries in these regions will, according to China's design, meet its domestic energy needs, and grow the country's economy. China recognizes, however, that in Central Asia and the Middle East, the risks posed by what it calls the “Three Evils” — terrorism, extremism, and separatism can impact the success of the BRI. They can also impact stability in its own adjacent areas, including Xinjiang. Therefore, in concert with the BRI, China is also identifying and deploying bilateral and multilateral diplomatic mechanisms aimed at security coordination with BRI countries in these two volatile regions. This article provides an overview of BRI developments in the two regions and examines some of the diplomatic mechanisms China is using to coordinate security and reduce risks.     

改革开放以来中国国际影响力的提升及其空间拓展机制

采用全球媒体报道事件大数据，依据空间相互作用理论和距离衰减理论，构建国家影响力评价模型，揭示中国在全球国家体系中的地位和作用，刻画其国家影响力的演变轨迹和影响空间拓展的过程，并挖掘海量事件背后隐藏的宏观格局形成的微观驱动机制。结果表明：①1980—2015年，世界大国影响力指数呈现良好的时空惯性，欧亚大陆的边缘地带是国家影响力指数高值的分布区域。②中国国家影响力指数的提升主要依靠其经济实力的增强，提升过程表现出“先平稳后快速”的阶段特征，不同阶段呈现出不同的对外开放和外交政策特征。③与中国发生事件联系的国家（地区）基本实现全球覆盖，2015年体现为对“一带一路”沿线国家影响作用的大幅上升。④经济发展的推动作用是宏观因素，与发达大国的耦合关系、主动的对外联系、政府主导的国际合作是中国国家影响力提升的微观事件驱动因素。