Explorers' Tales: Stanley Presumes – Again

In the early 1970s, Australia and Britain found themselves embroiled in an embarrassing diplomatic controversy over Australia's failure to provide an assisted passage to Jan Allen, a British citizen of Jamaican descent. Allen lodged a formal complaint with the British Race Relations Board, arguing he had been denied assistance on the grounds of his race. The Board was compelled to investigate the case, raising the possibility that British and Australian officials would face legal charges. This article outlines the complex diplomatic negotiations that surrounded the case and assesses its outcome. It argues that the controversy marked an important milestone in Australia-British relations, reinforcing the fact that British race patriotism could no longer mediate the self-identities and interrelations of the two countries. It contributed to Britain's decision to withdraw its support for the United Kingdom-Australia Assisted Passage Scheme and the eventual abolition of Australia's ‘White Australia’ policy     

Denmark,Scandinavia and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in the early Cold War

This article analyses the role of the Danish and Scandinavian labour movements in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in 1950–1955. First, it is demonstrated that although the Scandinavians were critical towards the communist regimes in eastern Europe and supported the Marshall Plan, they only joined the ICFTU as a result of the British break-up of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Next, the Scandinavians, on the one hand, allied with the British and other west Europeans and rejected the ‘negative’ anticommunism of the Americans, while, on the other hand, they supported the establishment of an intelligence network behind the Iron Curtain, gave financial aid to the campaign against communists in west European unions, and supported victims of the East German uprising in 1953. In short, the Scandinavians closely followed the British, remained critical towards the Americans, and challenged the Soviets.     

Britain's Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf: A Pattern Not a Puzzle

The reasons for the British decision to withdraw from the Gulf are highly contentious. While some scholars have focused on short-term considerations, especially the devaluation of sterling towards the end of 1967, in the British determination to quit the Gulf, others have concentrated on longer-term trends in British policy-making for the region. This article sides with the latter. Britain's Gulf role came under increasing scrutiny following the 1956 Suez crisis as part of an ongoing debate about the costs and benefits of Britain's Gulf presence. In this sense, British withdrawal fitted into a wider pattern of British decolonisation. By the 1960s, the Treasury, in particular, strongly questioned the necessity and cost-effectiveness of the maintenance of empire in the Gulf to safeguard British economic interests there. Recent interpretations which seek to disaggregate the British decision to leave Southeast Asia from the decision to depart from the Gulf are also questionable. By mid-1967, it had already been determined that Britain would leave both regions by the mid-1970s, the only difference being that this decision was formally announced with respect to Southeast Asia, but not with regard to the Gulf. The devaluation of sterling in November 1967, therefore, merely hastened and facilitated decisions which had already been taken. Despite the end of formal empire in the Gulf, Britain did seek, not always successfully, to preserve its interests into the 1970s and beyond.     

The Extreme Right in Interwar France: The Faisceau and the Croix de Feu

While most discussions of the international efforts at post-war exploitation of German science and technology by the Allied occupation powers assume similar methods and aims across the nations involved, the French case diverges in important ways because of a fundamentally different understanding of technology transfer. The Americans and British hoped to enlist the French in exploitation programmes similar to their own, and to an extent succeeded, but persistent distrust of French motives largely prevented this co-operation from forging similarities beyond the surface level. French policy-makers’ alternate conception of science and technology as socially embedded led to very different strategies for exploiting German advances, and despite post-war antagonism, led to Franco-German research collaboration that would prove valuable building relationships between these nations.     

‘No protection against the H-bomb’: press and popular reactions to the Coventry civil defence controversy, 1954

This article examines British popular and media reactions to America's Bravo test shot in April 1954 and Coventry City Council's subsequent decision to abandon civil defence. The article finds that three key motifs emerged which relate to Britain's broader sense of national identity in the 1950s. First, the controversy formed part of a cultural battle for national identity between a conservative and potentially militaristic culture, and one which was more progressive and opposed war and nuclear armaments. Second, opponents labelled the councillors as Moscow stooges and this revealed underlying anti-communism. Third, reactions engaged with a secular strain of Cold War apocalypticism.     

Zionist identity and the British Mandate: Palestine's internment camps and the making of the Western native

This paper examines the relationship between British police officers, Jewish guards, and German internees in Palestine's internment camps during World War II. Using the reports of the Jewish guards, the paper investigates the role of Western‐identified actors in the Zionist identity‐making project. The reports evince a surprising rapport between the British and their German prisoners and the mistreatment of the Jewish guards by their British superiors. The paper analyses these Jewish accounts in the context of identity‐ and ethnic boundary‐making and argues that they illustrate Zionism's intent to construct itself as a Western but noncolonial movement and Zionists in Palestine as natives but not “Orientals.” The reports also reveal a breach between the formal hierarchy—British officers, Jewish guards, German internees—and the ethnic order, which situated British and Germans at the apex and the Jews at the bottom. The paper highlights the utility of researching group‐making interactions in different contexts to develop a more nuanced understanding of identity‐making processes.     

Stalin and Togliatti: Italy and the Origins of the Cold War/Tito: A Biography

The 1956 Suez Crisis has attracted enormous attention and been widely seen as marking a sea change in Britain's position in the Middle East and within the Anglo-American special relationship. Yet in September 1951 the Attlee government had already signalled waning British power in pulling back from major unilateral military action to defend Britain's single most important overseas asset: the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and its huge operations in Iran. What this crisis revealed of British aspirations in the Middle East and within the special relationship has not received the attention it deserves. This article examines the Attlee government's decision to ‘scuttle’ from Abadan in September 1951. It first places the decision in the context of Anglo-American relations and great cumulative pressure in favour of British military action. It then weighs various considerations claimed in the extant literature to explain the British decision. In doing so it disagrees with suggestions that British military intervention was precluded by an understanding between Truman and Attlee that such action was acceptable only in a narrow range of circumstances for fear of retaliatory Soviet intervention in Iran. It also argues that accounts that correctly emphasise US opposition to the use of force as the key restraint on the Attlee government could and should have gone further. Specifically, it needs to be better appreciated just how the Truman administration actively undermined potential British recourse to military intervention, infused other potential constraints with extra weight and helped delay a Cabinet decision until a point when armed intervention was least likely to achieve British ends.     

Beyond Recall: Searching for the Remains of a British Secret Weapon of World War I

This article discusses the development of the Livens Large Gallery Flame Projector, a massive British flamethrower that was used against German trenches in the Battle of the Somme in 1916. Built underground within tunnels below No Man’s Land, this secret weapon was an attempt to use technology to break through German defences and reduce British casualties. The flame projector was the most effective flamethrower developed in WWI, but proved to be too inflexible and expensive to be widely used.     

‘Ambushed by Victory’: British,French and American Military Plans to Defeat Germany in 1919

The United States, Britain, and France’s discussions on how to achieve victory over the enemy reveal how widespread was the notion that the war would have to be carried into 1919 in order to ensure a military victory over the German army. With the British, political pressure to maintain a sizable army combined with the over-estimation of the abilities of the enemy meant that many considered victory only possible in 1919. The Americans were determined to expand their army substantially to play a leading role in the 1919 campaign; however, they had to negotiate what constituted a realistic contribution. Behind these deliberations stood the French who were promoting the idea of a decisive 1919 campaign and pressuring their co-belligerents to make the greatest possible commitment to ensure a victorious outcome.     

POLICY ISSUES IN AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY AND POLICY-MAKING USING AND CONTROLLING NEW WEAPONS

NATO may be confronting a crisis over the cruise missiles. Some allies may seek longer-range, nuclear-armed missile which could enable them to strike at Soviet MR/IRBMs and at other targets inside the USSR; others (along with many Americans) aim at restricting both the range and the missions of cruise missiles. The first option could jeopardize detente, inhibit further progress in SALT and conceivably weaken American control over the uses of nuclear weapons in time of war. The second could cause strains between the United States and its European allies. The best policy would seem to be to (1) delay any decision on cruise missile development and deployment in Europe; (2) seek a two-year freeze on all deployment of new nuclear delivery vehicles in Central Europe and of additional Soviet SS-20 IRBMs; (3) use this “breathing space” to seek agreement on the limitation of cruise missiles, MR/IRBMs and other “gray area” weapons in the region “from the Atlantic to the Urals.”     

Vico: Past and present

In 1935, the British scholar Eliza M. Butler published The Tyranny of Greece Over Germany, in which she explored the appeal of Greek art and poetry to modern German writers. She argued that Hellenism had exerted a baleful influence on German literature and culture, and that Germans were especially—even dangerously—susceptible to the power of ideas. In her view, the most dangerous Hellenic concept to German culture and society was the daimon, which had reached Germany via the work of Winckelmann. Butler's thesis and methods may be problematic, as some reviewers of Tyranny pointed out, but her work is noteworthy as the product of a scholar who had lived in Germany and was a witness to history, familiar with German language, literature, and culture, writing on Germany during difficult times. As a British scholar who began studying German just before World War I and ended her career after World War II, Butler had an ambivalent relationship with Germany and Germans. But in addition to political factors, she was also influenced by her family, her educational and research experiences in Germany, and her preference for 18th- and 19th-century over 20th-century Germans. Moreover, her perception of Germans and Germanness was consistently posed against her perception of England and Englishness, and she defined the two cultural identities in terms of their relation to each other. Writing Tyranny as the National Socialists came to power in Germany, Butler judged Germans and their relationship to the daimon harshly. In 1956, Butler reconsidered the daimonic in a study of Byron and Goethe, and in this work it received a more sympathetic and nuanced analysis. A comparison of these two works is useful for understanding the evolution of Butler's thought in the 20-year interval between their publication.     

How not to build a world wireless network: German–British rivalry and visions of global communications in the early twentieth century

Abstract

Edward Snowden’s revelations laid bare an unprecedented scale of state influence on communications technology. But government elites have frequently shaped technological development through their beliefs about potentially nefarious uses of communications. This article argues that beliefs about how other states or groups might use a technology can shape innovation. In particular, German visions about the British use of cables spurred German investment in developing wireless telegraphy. Germans imagined that the British were using cable technology to damage Germany’s reputation, spy on Germany and ‘poison’ neutral countries against the Central Powers. The German government and military at first created a colonial wireless network to bypass British cables. In World War I, however, they sought to establish a world wireless network. In the end, innovation was significantly shaped by how Germans imagined their enemies’ uses of communications technology.     

British Conservative Opinion and the Problem of Germany after the First World War

This work examines British conservative attitudes towards the Weimar Republic through the lens of several specific issues from the armistice up to the Ruhr Crisis of 1923. The author argues that a curious feature of British conservative opinion following the First World War was the consistent hostility British conservatives demonstrated towards the new German democratic state. To be sure, Great Britain had just fought a long and costly war against Germany, and there had been little time for the passions generated by the war to cool. Still, from the early days of the political changes in October and November of 1918, the German government was firmly committed to democratic principles. This was a development that the British nation claimed to favour, but the war left many British conservatives ill disposed to consider that the ‘inner change’ in Germany might be genuine or that a stable German democracy was possible. During its formative years, the Weimar Republic faced enormous challenges that would have tested any nation. Yet, even as political and economic conditions within Germany undermined prospects for democracy to succeed in that country, many British conservatives declined to take these developments seriously. Indeed, the attitudes of British conservatives substantially added to the difficulties the German government faced in dealing with the problems of the post-war world.     

The Politics of Provisioning: Feeding South Asian Prisoners During the First World War

During the First World War, the German and British Governments supplied culturally appropriate rations and secured special facilities for food preparation and consumption for South Asian prisoners of war whose loyalty both governments sought. The food provided in POW camps to South Asians serves as an index of the political status of colonial subjects at a moment when the future of European empires was far from certain. The British Government’s approach to feeding its South Asian servicemen held by the enemy thus reveals this population’s place within Britain’s wartime national and imperial imaginary and in its post-war planning.     

Fiction and memoir of Britain’s Great War: disillusioned or disparate?

Historical and literary critical orthodoxies hold that unfavourable British literary responses to the First World War did not materialise until Journey’s End and the war-books controversy of 1930. What appears to have happened is that an initial and largely factitious 1930 newspaper controversy has been conflated artificially with artefacts of popular culture from the 1960s to create a linear historical narrative of popular misrepresentation. A review of war fiction and memoir in English published prior to 1929 shows this narrative to be entirely unhistorical: considerable numbers of unfavourable responses to the First World War exist in British writing from this earlier period. The argument that there was a spell of post-war optimism before the general public changed its mind in 1929 is impossible to sustain. There never was a unitary British narrative of the First World War, and if the general perception of it by the British people since 1929 has been negative, the explanation does not lie in Depression-era war books but in whatever caused readers and reviewers of the time to respond favourably to individual accounts of the war rather than to a patriotic gloss.     

The British Empire and the American Atlantic on Tristan da Cunha, 1811–16

The first permanent settlement on Tristan da Cunha was established in 1811 by the American Jonathan Lambert. News of Lambert's claim, which followed ceremonies of possession recognised by both British and American observers, spread throughout the Atlantic. Doubts soon emerged, however, as to Lambert's nationality and as to whether he claimed the island for himself, for the United States or for Britain. This article considers Lambert's settlement, the promulgation of his claim and the re-casting of both Lambert and his claim as British, an act which implicitly recognised the strength of Lambert's claim while appropriating that claim for imperial ends. Because Britons and Americans claimed sovereignty and ownership in the Atlantic in similar ways, the competition between British and American claims to Tristan sheds light on those ways' common British roots.     

British Perceptions and Responses to Sultan Ali Dinar of Darfur, 1915–16

This article illustrates how British perceptions of Sultan Ali Dinar of Darfur, in the context of the First World War, led to the downfall of his sultanate in 1916. It shows how the paranoia of the ‘imperial mind’ amplified the threat of militant Islam, personified by Ali Dinar, through the conviction that he was involved with outside enemy forces. British certainty of Ottoman and German complicity in the sultan's belligerence was presented with great intensity by officials, a conviction which formed a central justification for this extension of British rule in Saharan Africa. British officials actively propagated the idea of outside forces having a pernicious influence on Ali Dinar's bellicosity. Through their dogged insistence on this interpretative trope, the British elided other complex factors that informed the sultan's defiance, and misunderstood the internal divisions and stresses in Darfuri society that limited the effectiveness of his jihad. This article goes beyond existing studies by presenting a close analysis of the colonial record to examine in greater detail these two perceptions of Ali Dinar as ‘Muslim fanatic’ and ‘Turco-German co-conspirator’. In a new departure from existing works, this article analyses British views of Ali Dinar after Darfur was occupied, explores the sultan's motivations for his declaration of jihad against the British, and sheds light on the responses of ordinary Darfuris to their sultan‘s doomed defiance of the region's dominant power.     

The politics of donating technological artifacts: techno-nationalism and the donations of the world’s first jet engines

The Smithsonian Institution’s aviation collection includes two early jet engines, both of which were given to the museum by foreign donors. The first, a prototype of Britain’s first jet engine, which flew during World War II, was donated by the British state in 1949. The second, a replica of Germany’s first jet engine, which flew in late August 1939, was donated by Germany’s leading museum, the Deutsches Museum, in 1980. The two are today presented as equivalent artifacts, yet the paths followed by the two objects to the American museum were anything but equivalent. Recovering the political and historical contexts that informed each of these two donations shows how what was apparently the same action fulfilled two very different agendas. Unlike the British donation, which was calculated to support Britain’s (at that time solitary) claim to having invented the jet engine, the German donation supported a narrative of dual invention, which had become the internationally agreed standard story between 1949 and 1980. This dual-inventor narrative allowed the German museum to forward a more subtle goal than promoting a national inventor; that of depoliticizing and normalizing Germany’s aerospace tradition internationally despite the fact that German aviation had been a locus for German nationalism and National Socialist largess. Reflecting on these two donations raises questions about how technology – particular historical claims about technology made in museums – have contributed to the construction of national identities.     

Chronicle for 1999

Abstract

Two German maps of southern Africa, one official, the other private, came to the attention of the British government in the 1890s and raised questions of boundary delineation. In both instances, they provoked a response—diplomatic dispute and internal policy decision—but in neither case did the maps do more. They actively initiated contention but were passive devices thereafter.