Leo Valiani and Enrico Cuccia: Iran in the 1950s

This essay details Leo Valiani's mission to Iran in 1952–53 on behalf of Mediobanca, in order to identify opportunities to promote investments for the development of both the country itself and Italian exports. The events are reconstructed through Valiani's correspondence with Enrico Cuccia (Mediobanca's CEO). A new picture of Valiani as banker emerges, effective on the ground, but also a subtle observer of local situations and prospects. The documents discussed herein highlight certain weaknesses in Mosaddeq's policies, mainly the weak relationship with the heads of finance. The oil dispute between Mosaddeq and the British and the coup orchestrated by the latter in collaboration with the Americans in order to bring down Mosaddeq's government complicated the picture so that every form of co-operation had to be postponed.     

The Overthrow of the Government of Mosaddeq Reconsidered

The overthrow of the government of Mosaddeq has received considerable attention, scholarly and otherwise. The scholarly explanations differ in emphasis, but not in the general contours, particularly regarding the significant role of the Anglo-American secret services. There have also long been attempts to portray the overthrow of Mosaddeq as an isolated event taking place on 19 August 1953 and representing a conflation of royalist and traditionalist sentiments among soldiers and civilians. More recently it has been contended that it was not the Anglo-American secret services but the clerical nexus—prompted by Ayatollah Borujerdi, the highest religious authority in the country—which played the crucial role. This paper argues against reducing the overthrow of Mosaddeq's government to the events of 19 August, and views it as a protracted process. It further argues that assertions regarding the crucial and active role of Borujerdi are, on the basis of available evidence, untenable.     

My Enemy’s Enemy: Consequences of the CIA Operation against Abulqasim Lahuti, 1953–54

In January 1954, the Iranian émigré poet living in the Soviet Union, Abulqasim Lahuti, was summoned before the Central Committee in Moscow to discuss the publication of a fraudulent Persian-language autobiography that reflected unfavorably on his experiences in the Soviet Union. This autobiography was the result of a 1953 CIA operation in Iran launched by Donald Wilber after he had become convinced that in case of a Soviet takeover Lahuti would be the one most likely put forward as leader. To preempt this threat, the CIA published the counterfeit autobiography. Unlike Mosaddeq and other CIA targets, however, Lahuti’s position as a cultural mediator between the Soviet Union, Soviet Tajikistan, and Iran made the consequences of this operation more complex than the CIA had imagined. This paper explores its aftermath using recently declassified Soviet archival documents and interviews. It argues that this operation transformed Lahuti’s professional and social standing in Moscow, empowered him to challenge his long-time enemy Bobojon Ghafurov on the issue of Tajik ethnogenesis, and helped change the official Stalinist line on Persian literary culture. Lastly, this operation politicized Lahuti’s biography in ways that are relevant to the present day.     

The Shah's détente with Khrushchev: Iran's 1962 missile base pledge to the Soviet Union

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran is commonly portrayed in Cold War historiography as a loyal client of the United States. Yet, the shah also pursued détente with Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, culminating in Iran's September 1962 pledge to the Soviet Union that no foreign missile bases would be permitted on Iranian territory. Drawing on American and British documentary sources, as well as the memoirs of several Iranian participants, this article suggests that the shah's 1962 pledge was not simply a ploy to leverage more arms from the United States. Rather, it represented the shah's first modest step towards a more independent foreign policy during the Cold War.     

The Kosovo—and Montenegro—effect

The post‐communist space continues to generate new internationally recognized states while incubating unrecognized but de facto states. Recent movement in the Balkans—the independence of Montenegro and the arduous deliberations over Kosovo's future —have variously encouraged other secessionist people and would‐be states, particularly in the former Soviet Union. This article analyses the impact of developments in Montenegro and Kosovo on several levels, including: their usage by de facto states; the reactions to them by central governments; Russian policy; and western and intergovernmental responses to these challenges. The article further argues that the Russian position on Kosovo and on the so‐called ‘frozen’ or unsettled conflicts neighbouring Russia could ultimately backfire on it. Western policy towards both Kosovo and on the post‐Soviet frozen conflicts will be best served by signalling to Russia, irrespective of the exact form of Kosovo's independence, that neither its own interests nor broader western‐Russian relations are served by using or reacting to any Kosovo ‘precedent’.     

Dismantling the Soviet Security System. Soviet–Finnish Negotiations on Ending Their Friendship Agreement, 1989–91.

The Soviet Union had tied Finland to its security system through the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) signed between the two in 1948. As the Soviet Union began to disintegrate at the end of the 1980s, Finland exited the Soviet sphere of influence – the region controlled through a system of bilateral and multilateral agreements. This article analyses the Soviet–Finnish negotiations to discard the FCMA treaty as a case study of the changing Soviet European neighbourhood policy. It gives important insights into the disintegration of the Soviet foreign policy mechanism during the Gorbachev era as it elaborates on both the intra-bureaucracy conflicts between the Kremlin and the Soviet foreign ministry, MID, and later between the Soviet central government and the Russian republic. As Finland was part of the Soviet security system, analysing Finland's exit from it sheds light onto the crucial change that took place in the Soviet foreign policy doctrine during the perestroika years. The Gorbachev leadership's decision not to defend its sphere of influence with force paved way for the upheavals of 1989 which led to the Cold War's end.     

Geographical Metanarratives in Russia and the European East: Contemporary Pan-Slavism

A specialist on Russian geopolitical metanarratives investigates the re-emergence of Pan-Slavism in the ideological landscape of contemporary Russia. Arguing that it is a heterogeneous assemblage of both mutually antagonistic and complementary narratives about the unity of Slavic peoples, the author posits that Pan-Slavism's durability lies not in its conceptual coherence but rather its emotional appeal to disparate Slavic peoples in the former Soviet Union as well as Eastern and Southeastern Europe. After briefly tracing the history of Pan-Slavism from its 17th-century roots through World War I into the Soviet period, he explores the metanarrative's capacity to take modern Russia's geopolitical thinking in new directions, including the potential to replace Russians' center-periphery worldview with a that of a cosmopolitan network of kindred nations affording Russia greater access to the European community.     

Book Review

In the absence of Soviet statistics on commuting it is estimated that, as of the late 1960's, at least 10 million people commuted to work or study in the Soviet Union, or about 12 percent of the number of public-sector workers and students. Sample surveys have shown that commuting is found not only in the suburban zones of large cities, but also around small towns, and that it involves as many as 3 million residents of rural areas who travel to work in urban places. The maximum commuting radius in the Soviet Union appears to be about 50 km, with the number of commuters dropping off sharply beyond that limit. In terms of social composition, commuters tend to be mainly young men of relatively low skills. An assessment of commuting, from the Soviet point of view, lists both positive features, such as the fuller use of labor resources around a large urban center, and negative features, such as the unproductive loss of time involved in commuting over long distances.     

Population Trends in a Contested Pseudo-State: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh

A U.S. population geographer specializing in the former Soviet Union surveys the results of an October 2005 census conducted in a contested pseudo-state known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). Data from the enumeration provide the first credible information about recent population characteristics, including nationality composition and migration from the war-torn republic. The data make it possible to ascertain the crude magnitudes of population losses in the republic's constituent rayons as well as changes resulting from deaths and expulsion of ethnic Armenians and/or Azerbaijanis. Changes documented since the last (1989) Soviet census in the region indicate that the current republic's population differs quite dramatically from that of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of Azerbaijan, complicating efforts to broker a lasting peace agreement between the pseudostate's two neighbors. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: J11, O18, R23, 1 figure, 1 table, 36 references.     

Imperial nationalism as the driver behind Russia's invasion of Ukraine

The roots of Russia's invasion of Ukraine are to be found in two areas. The first is the revival of Tsarist imperial nationalist and White Russian émigré nationalist denials of the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians. Russian imperial nationalists believe the eastern Slavs constitute a pan Russian nation of Great Russians, Little Russians and White Russian branches of one Russian nation. The second is the cult of the Great Patriotic War and Joseph Stalin and the revival of Soviet era discourse on Ukrainian Nazis (i.e., nationalists). A Ukrainian nationalist in the Soviet Union and Vladimir Putin's Russia is any Ukrainian who seeks a future for his/her country outside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Russian World and who upholds an ethnic Ukrainian (rather than a Little Russian) identity. The Russian World is the new core of the Eurasian Economic Union, Russian President Vladimir Putin's alternative to the EU's Eastern Partnership. In the contemporary domain, Ukrainian nationalists are Nazi's irrespective of their language preference or political beliefs and if they do not accept they are Little Russians. Putin's invasion goal of denazification is a genocidal goal to eradicate the ‘anti-Russia’ that has allegedly been nurtured by Ukrainian nationalists and the West.     

The Causes of Iran's 1953 Coup: A Critique of Darioush Bayandor's Iran and the CIA

This article presents a detailed criticism of Darioush Bayandor's book Iran and the CIA. Bayandor argues that certain Shi'a clerics, rather than the US Central Intelligence Agency, were the main actors responsible for overthrowing Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in August 1953. Bayandor presents no major new evidence to support this claim. He gives too much weight to certain statements, draws unwarranted inferences from others, and discounts or disregards a wealth of evidence that conflicts with his account. He overemphasizes the role of civilian crowds in the overthrow of Mosaddeq and underemphasizes the role of Iranian military units organized by the CIA. And he fails to acknowledge the importance of US and especially British efforts to foment opposition to Mosaddeq before the coup.     

苏联因素对毛泽东发动“大跃进”的影响

本文初步探讨了苏联因素对毛泽东发动"大跃进"的影响,认为苏联的建设成就使毛泽东坚信,只要真心实意学苏联,中国经济就能获得高速发展;通过借鉴苏联模式,毛泽东探索出了"大跃进"的发展方针;通过批判苏联领导人的"老子党"和大国沙文主义作风以及通过打破苏联模式在人们心目中的神圣地位,毛泽东使党和人民清除了民族自卑心理,振奋了民族精神,从而全面投身于"大跃进"运动.     

The global effects of nuclear winter: science and antinuclear protest in the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1980s

During the 1980s, Carl Sagan and other scientists used the theory of nuclear winter to criticize the arms race. Historians have largely dismissed nuclear winter as a political movement. In fact, nuclear winter influenced debate over nuclear weapons in the United States, despite contentious scientific and political arguments. In addition, an analysis of nuclear winter's reception in the Soviet Union reveals that the theory resonated on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The global debate over nuclear winter shows the potency of scientific arguments against nuclear weapons during the Cold War, and demonstrates the complex relationship between science and politics.     

THE SYSTEM OF PROTECTED NATURAL AREAS IN THE USSR AND PROSPECTS FOR ITS DEVELOPMENT

The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources has developed a 10-category system for classifying the world's protected natural areas. The present article by two Soviet biogeographers, presented at Unesco's “Man and the Biosphere” conference in Minsk in 1983, analyzes the way in which the Soviet Union's protected areas fall into the classification system devised by the International Union. The article also discusses the types of protected areas found in the USSR, and the functions assigned to each. (The translation is by Philip R. Pryde, San Diego State University.)     

From Ostpolitik to ‘frostpolitik’? Merkel,Putin and German foreign policy towards Russia

Germany's relationship with Russia has historically been one of the most crucial in shaping Europe's fate. Despite radical transformation in the nature of European Great Power politics, it continues to be pertinent from the perspective of today's world. Germany's willingness to establish good relations with the Soviet Union in the late 1960s—its emphasis on economic relations and cooperation instead of political disagreements—prepared the ground for the end of the Cold War and German unification twenty years later. Germany's basic policy towards Russia remained broadly unchanged despite German unification and changes in the domestic political coalitions and leadership, sometimes against political expectations. In the European context, Germany's attitude towards Russia created the backbone of EU–Russia relations. During 2012–13, however, the continuity in Germany's policy towards Russia was seen as having come to an end. Political twists came to the fore and the atmosphere was loaded with tensions, made worse by the Ukrainian crisis. This article reviews the recent, alleged changes in Germany's policy towards Russia during the Merkel era. It asks two basic questions: first, whether Germany's policy really has changed and if it has, what are the theoretical tools that give us the best potential understanding of these changes? The article argues that the policy has changed, but not as dramatically as made out by some headlines. Moreover, the article suggests that a key element in analysing the degree of change in Germany's policy towards Russia is neither the external power relations nor domestic politics and related changes in the prevailing interpretation of national interest, though these are important too, but the interaction between the leaders and foreign policy elites.     

God,not Caesar: Revisiting National Socialism as ‘political religion’

This article argues that use of the concept of ‘political religion’ to describe the radicalized political movements of the twentieth century has again gained currency in recent years as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as the global upsurge of religiously inspired violence and that research with respect to religion proper – what religion is, its role in public life, its evolving reception by ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ – can advance the discussion. The article subsequently offers the author's own research as evidence of the concept's applicability to the case of National Socialism. Analysis focuses, specifically, on a movement in nineteenth century Germany to develop a secular system of ethics, a project that eventually led, ironically and tragically, to the emergence of a new faith in a absolutized ‘collective will’ as the transcendent source of all moral values. The National Socialist movement subsequently co-opted this article of faith, the article argues, by transforming Hitler into a holy medium for the salvific dictates of what became, by the early 1930s, an unimpeachable ‘Volkswille.’     

Separatism redux: Crimea,Transnistria, and Eurasia's de facto states (Respond to this article at http://www.therai.org.uk/at/debate)

This article compares recent events in Crimea to Transnistria, another de facto, separatist state located in eastern Moldova. The article asks what Crimea and Transnistria, along with Eurasia's other unrecognized states, can tell us about statehood, sovereignty, and a ‘people’ in the 21st century. Though Eurasia's de facto states can be seen as entities that emerged with the backing of the Russian state, their continued existence reflects a wider uncertainty that emerged with the demise of the Soviet Union. More broadly, these de facto states problematize many of the fundamental terms of political existence.     

The Cold War in retrospect

The Cambridge history of the Cold War is a three‐volume work by 75 contributors, mostly from the United States and the United Kingdom, and is intended as ‘a substantial work of reference’ on the subject. The bulk of the text deals, in frequently overlapping chapters, with the main protagonists of the conflict—viz. the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China—and the areas in which they clashed. At the same time, it aims to go ‘far beyond the narrow boundaries of diplomatic affairs’, although it is not always successful in doing so. In analysing the origins of the Cold War, the contributors pay perhaps too much attention to ideology as opposed to geopolitics, a flaw which is made easier by the absence of sufficient historical background. On the other hand, the duration of the conflict and the failure of various attempts at détente is more successfully explained in terms of the zero‐sum game nature of the conflict and its progressive extension from Europe across the rest of the world. When it comes to the end of the Cold War, the overall conclusion is that this came about through both a shift in the international balance of power following the Sino‐Soviet split and the political and economic problems of the Soviet bloc. It is generally agreed that Mikhail Gorbachev's willingness to abandon old shibboleths both at home and abroad was a major factor in bringing about the end of the conflict. The three volumes, while not always an easy read, are the outcome of considerable research and expertise in both primary and secondary sources and will repay careful study.     

The Geography of Agriculture of Iowa

The following article on lowa's agriculture is of interest because the Soviet Union considers the highly efficient corn-based livestock economy of the state as an example to follow. Khrushchev's campaign to build up a similar Soviet farm economy based on corn, legumes and other high-yielding feed crops is based in part on observations of Soviet agricultural delegations in lowa. The statistical material in the article is based largely on the U.S. Census of Agriculture, 1954, Vol. I, Part 9, Washington, D. C., 1935.