Frankish military duty and the fate of Roman taxation

Frankish kings exacted unpaid military service from their subjects in both Merovingian and Carolingian times. The basis for this right has long been uncertain. A study of the term ‘manse’ as a Carolingian measure of assets brings to light the ostensibly hidden property on whose basis Franks went to war. This military duty reached back to the origins of the Frankish kingdom, when a large share of Roman taxes was awarded in individual allotments to soldiers obligated to serve, otherwise unpaid, when summoned, and heavily fined if they did not. Both demesne and tributary manses – contributory units – were the main part of state resources applied to military costs. They cannot be simply envisaged as components of an agricultural scheme (grand domaine). A tax‐like military obligation was one among several institutions actively surviving from the fifth century to the ninth, and it suggests that Frankish government was more law‐based and administrative than is often allowed.     

Replacing a Father: civilian aspects of the Swedish military, 1600–1800

Early modern society was characterized by severe conflicts, but not all were caused by antagonistic relations between military (combatants) and civilian (noncombatants) persons. The civil–military relations were blurred. The separation and differentiation of civil and military functions in society was a process that occurred mainly in the 19th century. This process coincided with a conceptual change of the nature of gender: ‘civil’ became feminine and ‘military’ became masculine. Civil–military relations in early modern societies have recently been the focus of novel and productive research, and this article falls into that category. How civilian aspects of society were subordinated to military demands while still being a part of the military is examined in this article from a different angle; namely, to what extent the military was in charge of civilian aspects within its own organization. This is discussed from a gender perspective and scrutinized through the role of children in a series of issues connected with the creation of boundaries between civilian and military spheres in society. To put it simply, what did children do within the Swedish military in the 17th and 18th centuries? And who were the children? The answers are based on data from garrisons and the Swedish Ship’s Boys’ Corps, together with data from previous research on military history in Scandinavia. The article is part of a project that aims to make visible the role of children in the military prior to the era of child soldiers.     

General Roatta's war against the partisans in Yugoslavia: 1942

During General Mario Roatta's tenure as commander of the Italian 2nd Army in Yugoslavia, he faced a mounting Communist insurgency. To defeat the partisan forces of Tito, he resorted to proactive politics and a strategy of counter-insurgency. Owing to Italian military weakness and his army's lack of training in guerrilla warfare, Roatta was not averse to enlisting the services of Orthodox Serbs in Croatia, who the previous year had asked for Italian protection after a fearful massacre had been unleashed against them by Mussolini's handpicked ruler in Zagreb, the Croatian Usta?a leader Ante Paveli?. Against the wishes of the Fascist government in Rome, Roatta armed Serbs (called ?etniks) because they agreed to assist the Italian legions in fighting the partisans, their common ideological foe. But as Yugoslavia descended into civil war – one triggered by the Axis invasion – Roatta paid a price for his freelance pro-Serb politicking by alienating Zagreb, irritating the Germans, and dismaying his superiors in Rome. Italian policy was reduced to a tug-of-war between the Fascist empire-builders surrounding Mussolini and the military command in Yugoslavia, and Roatta became enmeshed in a cobweb of intrigues involving Croats, ?etniks and Germans. Apart from political manoeuvring, Roatta, in the ineluctable necessity of defeating the partisans, devised a detailed strategy of counter-insurgency. On 1 March 1942, he circulated a pamphlet entitled ‘3C’ among his commanders that spelled out military reform and draconian measures to intimidate the Slav populations into silence by means of summary executions, hostage-taking, reprisals, internments and the burning of houses and villages. By his reckoning, military necessity knew no choice, and law required only lip service. Roatta's merciless suppression of partisan insurgency was not mitigated by his having saved the lives of both Serbs and Jews from the persecution of Italy's allies Germany and Croatia. Under his watch, the 2nd Army's record of violence against the Yugoslav population easily matched the German. Tantamount to a declaration of war on civilians, Roatta's ‘3C’ pamphlet involved him in war crimes.     

“Peace is Our Only Shelter”: Questioning Domesticities of Militarization and White Privilege

Abstract: This paper traces how Los Angeles peace activists tried to make visible the grave domestic effects of Cold War militarization. Women Strike for Peace went beyond a focus on the productive relations between the state, military and industry captured by the term “military–industrial complex” to analyze how reproductive spaces were part of this complex. In opposing war, they challenged what I am calling militarized domesticities: how war‐making shapes the ‘home front’ and home as the spaces national security states claim to protect. I build on feminist antiracist intersectionality theories to situate the military–industrial complex per se within broader processes of the militarization of society and daily life. The questions become how do gendered processes of militarization—that work in conjunction with relations of white privilege—produce and connect differently situated “private” spaces or home places? How might strategies for dismantling the military–industrial complex emerge from the contradictions of these processes?     

抗日战争时期中国佛教界抗敌思想研究

抗日战争不仅仅是中国人民反抗日本军阀侵略的战争,它还是一场中日两国全面敌对的战争,中日各阶层民众都深陷其中,两国佛教人士也不例外。战争伊始,佛界爱国人士就对日本侵华原因进行了分析,并揭破其侵华理论。为解除教内人士的顾虑,他们还引证佛经,说明杀敌护国并不违背佛教戒律。对于战时日本佛教界为虎作伥、助纣为虐的行为,他们还进行了抨击。较之同期国、共两党的抗日理论,佛界爱国人士的抗敌思想虽在经济、军事等方面存在明显的不足,但其意义仍是积极而深远的。     

Speakers at War in the Late 14th and 15th Centuries

The significance of war in the development of the medieval English parliament is well known. The origins of the speakership are located in the context of the Hundred Years War, which began in 1337 and in which the English were still embroiled at the time of the Good Parliament of 1376. It was at this parliament that the Commons first chose a spokesperson, Sir Peter de la Mare, knight of the shire for Herefordshire. This article considers the military careers of de la Mare and his successors to the end of the Hundred Years War in 1453. Did the war have an impact on the choice of Speaker? Was a military man chosen for parliaments where military matters were to be discussed? We know the identity of the Speaker in 53 of the 64 parliaments between 1376 and 1453. Several served more than once, so that we are left with a group of 33 individuals to analyse. An overall trend is discernable. Up to 1407 all known Speakers were belted knights, and most had extensive military experience before they took up office. Only five of the 19 parliaments between 1422 and 1453 had Speakers of knightly rank: otherwise, Speakers with legal and administrative, rather than military, experience were chosen. In the years from 1407 to 1422 the speakership was occupied by a mixture of soldiers and administrators many of whom were closely connected to the royal duchy of Lancaster and to revival of English aggression towards France from 1415 onwards.     

Napoleon,Jefferson, and the Louisiana Purchase

Why did Napoleon sell Louisiana to the United States? Unfortunately, he left very few written traces of his Louisiana policy and, therefore, historians disagree. Their explanations tend to emphasise one of three factors: the diplomacy of President Thomas Jefferson; France's coming war with Britain; or the impact of the black rebels of the French colony of Saint-Domingue (present-day Haiti). The most heated disagreements revolve around the differing assessments of the role played by Jefferson. This article argues that Jefferson played no role in Napoleon's decision to sell the colony. It acknowledges that the British were crucial, because war with Britain meant that Louisiana would be lost to France. But why was Louisiana undefended? The troops Napoleon wanted to send there never arrived. They went instead to Haiti. And they remained there. If black resistance in Haiti had collapsed quickly, as Napoleon expected, there would have been thousands of French soldiers in Louisiana by the spring of 1803, when the French war with Britain began. By defeating Napoleon, the men whom Jefferson deemed ‘cannibals’ made it possible for him to acquire Louisiana and achieve what an eminent US historian has called his ‘greatest triumph’.     

Mission Impossible: UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring and His Quest for Peace in the Middle East

On 23 November 1967, Gunnar Jarring, a Swedish diplomat, was appointed the United Nations Special Representative to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Security Council had decided to launch a peace effort in the Middle East following the Six-Day War in June 1967. Israel had won a sweeping victory, and the Arab states had suffered a devastating loss. After the war, Israel controlled a territory almost three and a half times the size of the country itself. But what should be done with these newly conquered territories? Should Israel be allowed to keep them? Over the course of some three and a quarter years, Jarring shuttled between the representatives from the three countries involved in the peace endeavour: Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. (Syria refused to participate.) Despite his arduous efforts, he failed miserably to produce viable progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict.     

The Eighth Argument. Identity,Ethnicity and Political Culture in Sixteenth-Century Scandinavia

What was a Swede in the 16th century? How did people identify themselves and others, and what political role did collective identities play before the coming of modern nationalism? One would perhaps expect that there exist many works proposing answers to such questions. Within the humanities, there has been a steadily increasing interest in culture and identities in the last few decades. Nevertheless, few have asked such questions. When dealing with medieval and early modern Europe, historians have put the questions rather in this way: Was the Swede of the 16th century Swedish in the modern sense? Did nations and/or nationalism exist before the end of the 18th century? The discussion of medieval and early modern identities has been severely limited by "the nationalicistic trap". Identities before the late 18th century have been studied in order to look for the roots of modern national identity, to find out where nations originate, or to argue that nationalism is a purely modern phenomenon. I intend to fall into that trap myself later in this article, discussing why nationalism and national identity are less fitting concepts when dealing with the 16th century. But basically, I seek to uncover and conceptualize the identities of the time in their own right.     

No Taxation Without Negotiation

The article aims at assessing the impact of extra taxes on the Swedish peasantry in the early 16th century in qualitative terms, as reflected in contemporary correspondence letters. While the total tax pressure without doubt rose in the period, the resilience of Swedish peasants was remarkably high. Despite harvest failures, they managed to endure the hardships, largely thanks to their diligent use of the instrument of negotiations over terms and levels of extra taxes and the delicacy with which the Crown exacted them. This can be seen as a reflection of adjustments within the framework of the prevalent medieval system, and an acceptance on both sides of the principle of mutuality.     

‘Just and lawful war’ as genocidal war in the (United States) Northwest Ordinance and Northwest Territory, 1787–1832

This article focuses on the United States Northwest Ordinance of 1787's profession of ‘utmost good faith’ towards Indians and its provision for ‘just and lawful wars’ against them. As interpreted by US officials as they authorized and practised war against native communities in the Northwest Territory from 1787 to 1832, the ‘just and lawful wars’ clause legalized wars of ‘extirpation’ or ‘extermination’, terms synonymous with genocide by most definitions, against native people who resisted US demands that they cede their lands. Although US military operations seldom achieved extirpation, this was due to their ineptness and the success of indigenous strategies rather than an absence of intention. When US military forces did succeed in achieving their objective, the result was massacre, as revealed in the Black Hawk War of 1832. US policy did not call for genocide in the first instance, preferring that Indians embrace the gift of civilization in exchange for their lands. Should Indians reject this display of ‘utmost good faith’, however, US policy legalized genocidal war against them.     

Homespun manhood and the war against masculinity: community leisure on the US home front, 1917–19

Between the Civil War and World War I, America saw a return to militarised, heroic, warrior forms of masculinity. When the United States entered the war in 1917, however, the demands for belligerent forms of military manhood subsided, and were replaced by a desire to reattach manhood to the domestic realm. In this article, I examine a set of government programmes designed to manage soldiers' leisure time while they were stationed in training camps across the US. I argue that these home front activities betray an anxiety about sending American soldiers to fight in an overseas war for the first time in national history. The US was a young nation state fighting its first international war against other equally statist nations. In this context, it was no longer strategically useful for military manhood to be severed from the idea of home. Rather, as soldiers would be fighting for long periods in an alien territory, it behoved the military and government to temper traditional configurations of warrior manhood, and focus instead on exposing soldiers to as much home and family as they could safely arrange.     

European Ukrainians and their fight against Russian invasion

Is there evidence of significant ethno-linguistic/ethno-national rallying around the nation in Ukraine—as social science would have us expect in times of conflict? And, if so, might we expect this ethno-linguistic/ethno-national identity to rise with the prolongation of war? Or instead, is Ukrainian “civic-ness” the primary rally call that shaped and shapes collective identity in Ukraine? And if this collective identity is not ethno-linguistic in orientation then what values and political dispositions are bringing Ukrainians together in a time of crisis and war? Whilst political science might suggest that violence and extended periods of war can produce rallying to ethno-linguistic/ethno-national identity—original panel survey data collected among the Ukrainian population in March/April 2019, January/February 2021, and 2 December 2021/16 February 2022 coupled with a cross-sectional nationally representative survey collected 19–24 May 2022 provide evidence that ongoing regional war, crises, and now all-out invasion by Russia have shored up civic and not ethno-linguistic/ethno-national identities. Moreover, this civic identity is bounded to pro-European pro-democratic orientations.     

Canadian Diplomacy and the 1982 Falklands War

As a case study, Canadian diplomacy during the Falklands War is emblematic of the confused, and at times contradictory, components of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's utopic and idealistic foreign policy. Canada's diplomatic actions during the war were based on four principles. The first, and most significant, was the safeguarding of what were deemed to be Canada's economic interests: chiefly nuclear exports. The second was Trudeau's ‘Third Option’ policy and the belief of ‘the vital importance of the North-South dynamic to Canada’. Third was the desire to distance Canadian foreign policy, economics, and military commitments from those of both the United States and Great Britain. Trudeau had mixed feelings about the Commonwealth and disliked both President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Lastly, during the war Canadian politicians and diplomats took the position of an ambiguous neutrality to protect and promote what they perceived to be Canadian interests. Many of the political and economic decisions made by Canada during the Falklands War were met by harsh criticism nationally and internationally in both public and political spheres.     

Soft balancing among weak states? Evidence from Africa

Recent literature on the use of soft balancing to counter the hegemony of the United States has focused primarily on middle powers in Europe and rising powers such as China. But what about weak states? Do they simply go along with the hegemon, or do they challenge its policies despite the odds? And to what extent does the soft balancing argument explain their behaviour? In recent years, several historically friendly African countries have used non‐military means to undermine the unilateral policies of the United States. Leaders in South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Mali, Namibia and Niger especially have resisted US demands in areas such as the ‘war on terror’, the International Criminal Court and the US Africa Command. This article seeks to explain the strategies of opposition that some African countries have pursued. It finds that the behaviour is driven both by regional power concerns and by domestic political considerations. Interestingly, public opinion in these relatively democratic countries is motivated by disagreements with US policy and by resentment of the predominance of American power. Thus, the evidence both confirms and challenges the notion of soft balancing. On one hand, the behaviour of African states is driven at least in part by the global balance of power—directly, as leaders respond to power concerns within the continent, and indirectly, as citizens pressure leaders to resist the hegemon. On the other hand, these findings challenge the underlying premise that state behaviour is determined solely by structural concerns. Instead, the oppositional behaviour of African states has both systemic and domestic explanations.     

Pope Clement V and the crusades of 1309–10

There were three crusading expeditions in 1309– 1310: against the Muslims in the eastern Mediterranean, the Moors in Granada, and the Venetian soldiers occupying the papal city of Ferrara. The campaigns illustrate the continuing vitality of the crusading movement despite the setbacks of the previous decades; but they also reveal the consequences of extending the crusade to various ‘fronts’, both outside and within the frontiers of Christendom. For Clement V's original intention of concentrating the crusading energy of the West on his project for a Hospitaller passagium particulare was frustrated first by insistent Aragonese and Castilian demands for crusade privileges and taxes for the Granada campaign, and later by the draining-off of papal funds to the Ferrara war. It was the crusade against Venice which proved most successful, and the lesson was clear to the papal court: in a period of soaring military costs and growing suspicion about the real motives of crusading kings and princes, the papacy could best promote the cause of Christ by concentrating on the ‘home front’, the policy pursued by Clement's successor, John XXII.