'International community' after Iraq

One frequently hears statements about the damage done to the 'international community' by disagreements about the invasion and occupation of Iraq. It is clear from the general nature and frequency of its use that the term 'inter‐national community' has an important political function in generating legiti‐macy for those who act in its name. It is also clear from its popular usage that 'international community' means very different, and often quite opposed, things to different people. Why is the strong term 'community' chosen when 'inter‐national society' might be more useful? Longstanding debates within political theory and the English school provide helpful insights into why people use this term in the ways that they do. This article will argue that international community implies a deep and robust sharing of identity, and that in relation to the Iraq war, the most important meaning of it equates broadly with the West. The authors look at the effect of the war on the western international com‐munity through its impact on NATO, the EU, the UN, the WTO and public opinion. They further argue that the evidence from these sources does not yet suggest that the western international community has been fatally damaged.     

From British mandate to post Anglo‐American invasion: Reproduction of ethno‐sectarian divides and the breakdown of social cohesion in Mosul

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 ushered in an era of great uncertainty and turbulence that left the country in an economically crippled, politically unstable, and socially desperate situation. While the built‐in ethno‐sectarian divides have been widely used as analytical categories to address the enduring violence in both Mosul and the rest of Iraq, little attention has been paid to the connection between the long‐term Anglo‐American invasion of Iraq and the ethno‐sectarian violence that currently characterizes Mosul. This study argues that while ethnic and sectarian loyalties have historically persisted in their social forms since the rule of the Ottoman Empire, the highly politicized and violent forms of ethno‐sectarian conflict are modern phenomena, produced and reproduced under the conditions of the decades‐long British and American interventions. The study retrospectively evaluates the current dynamics of ethno‐sectarian confrontations in Mosul through two stages in the long historiography of modern Iraq. The first section reveals how Britain’s mismanagement of colonial Iraq set the initial conditions for communal cleavages and instability in today’s Mosul. Later, the second section turns its attention toward the contemporary manifestation of ethno‐sectarian violence, particularly under the U.S.‐led occupation.     

Planning post‐conflict reconstruction in Iraq: what can we learn?

Efforts to improve national and international capabilities to plan and manage post-conflict reconstruction operations are underway in many countries and are high on the agenda of several multilateral institutions. The international community has learned lessons from the numerous post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building operations that it has engaged in since the end of the Cold War but Iraq represented the most difficult and ambitious operation undertaken to date. Although the coalition effort in Iraq had many unique features, we can nonetheless draw lessons from the tenure of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) both for the ongoing effort in Iraq and more broadly for future post-conflict reconstruction operations.
This article discusses the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction planning and mission management and assesses what happened under the CPA. It draws lessons for the future international effort in Iraq and for the international community as it considers how to plan and organize future such missions.     

Jean Renoir,The Rules of the Game,Reputation, and Revisionism

Jean Renoir's film La Règle du jeu (The Rules of the Game) was first shown in Paris, in 1939, and is now generally regarded as one of his masterpieces. But there is a strange side to the film. What most critics and reference books say concerning it—and they tend to say much the same thing—does not, to put it bluntly, square with the facts. What they say is that La Règle du jeu is about an aristocratic house-party that is a microcosm of the corruptness and exhaustion of French society on the eve of World War II. Far from perceiving in La Règle du jeu evidence of the “corruption” and “exhaustion” in French society that led to the country's defeat and occupation by the Germans during World War II, however, the author of this essay attempts to see the film for what it is—not for what historicist critics want it to be.     

The reformation of Iraq's foreign relations: new elites and enduring legacies

Iraq has not enjoyed regular foreign relations since 2003, and arguably for several years before. Looking ahead, Iraq is now in a position to develop its foreign relations fully, yet how these relations will be constructed remains unclear. As with all states, Iraq's foreign policy remains conditioned by geopolitical factors— and in particular control of resources, access to waterways, and its geographical location between the Arab world, Turkey, and Iran. There are also the legacies of the Ba'athist regime to consider—and especially the way foreign policy was constructed, and how ‘foreign’ was defined in terms of foreign to the regime, rather than to Iraq. Layered on top of these geopolitical determinants and legacies is the reality of the post‐2003 state. With the removal of the structures of the Ba'athist regime and the emergence of new political elites under the guidance of the US, Iraq's foreign relations are now clearly different, yet some of the patterns of the past still remain very much in place.     

The political parameters of post‐withdrawal Iraq

The withdrawal of US combat forces presents new challenges and opportunities for Iraqis over the coming months and years. This special issue of International Affairs seeks to provide an assessment and analysis of many of these challenges and opportunities from the perspective of Iraqi actors, while also considering the interests of the wider regional and international community. Iraq remains important, fundamentally so. The main challenges that now face Iraqi leaders are not of recent origin but have never been fully confronted—to some degree the US presence has acted to ameliorate tensions at difficult times and helped to find compromise solutions that have left situations calm but also put on hold. The articles in this special issue focus on a range of these challenges, questioning orthodox views on Iraqi political development and considering the possibilities that lie ahead. They present not only ‘post‐American Iraq’ but also ‘post‐Iraq America’. By facing these challenges successfully, political, economic and social opportunities clearly unfold. These opportunities, if exploited to the full, would see Iraq's security become normalized, its economy and social structures repaired, and the prominence of the country in international affairs as a constructive rather than destructive force increased. However, the reverse of this is also starkly apparent. The failure of Iraqi leaders to meet the challenges may present very serious problems in the near future—problems possibly made all the more severe due to the lack of a US military presence and the perceived weakening of US will to impose itself on the political direction of the country.     

The Polish contribution to protection of the archaeological heritage in central south Iraq,November 2003 to April 2005

Abstract

Iraq is the cradle of modern civilization, the land of ancient Mesopotamia, and thus unparalleled in its wealth of heritage sites. For years, with its strong Antiquities Law and its professional State Board of Antiquities and Heritage, Iraq protected its antiquities successfully. But since the beginning of the 1990s, many archaeological sites have been looted. Following the Second Gulf War (2003) the Polish government has attempted to assist Iraq. Since November 2003 the Polish Ministry of Culture has been delegating archaeologists for purposes of documentation, intervention and protection of the archaeological monuments located in the central southern part of Iraq, the core land of ancient Babylonia and Sumer. In close cooperation with Iraqi archaeologists, twenty-four projects valued at US$680,000 have been implemented between January 2004 and April 2005, involving aerial and ground reconnaissance and salvage recording of the most threatened archaeological sites. The Polish team has also conducted education and awareness training of the Coalition forces detachments to promote respect for heritage.     

Letter to the Movement: Antiwar Strategies on the Eve of Destruction and Occupation

Author's Intro: This is a two‐part essay on antiwar strategy and tactics. The first part was finished a few hours after George Bush's TV announcement that the US would invade and begin bombing Iraq. The second part was finished in mid‐May 2003, as the US occupation forces formally announced their colonization of Iraq, with cracker Tommy Franks goose‐stepping around Iraq as the latest jewel in the American empire. The question remains for the whole world, especially for those of us living in what is more appropriately named than ever “the belly of the beast”: What are we going to do about the United States?     

Rethinking Britain's Foreign Policy and the Occupation Zone in Germany 1945–1947: Questions of Structural and Functional Continuity in British Foreign Policy-Making

This article uses a detailed examination of British policy towards the occupation zone in Germany after World War II as a lens through which to illuminate enduring elements of structural and functional continuity in British foreign policy-making. Many of the problems facing British policy-makers in the post-World War II era replicated those relating to the occupation of the Rhineland and Ruhr in the early 1920s. Analysing the response of British policy-making to these resonances highlights underlying thematic trends in overall British foreign policy. The areas of continuity revealed challenge traditional historiographical views that foreign policy was shaped by elite group thinking in the Foreign Office. This article also evaluates British foreign policy in the light of recent developments in the historiography of the Cold War. Recent scholarship emphasises the multi-faceted and organic nature of the Cold War and highlights the difficulties involved in approaching issues such as ideology when the states involved were varied and had different infrastructures, cultures and foreign policy traditions and systems. By drawing out deeper resonances in foreign policy-making, this article contributes to a deeper understanding of the culture and tensions through which British policy was generated in the post-World War II period.     

REPLY TO J.T. SMITH'S SUGGESTED RE-INTERPRETATION OF BARNSLEY PARK VILLA

Summary. A different interpretation of the social significance of the excavation evidence from Barnsley Park has been advanced by Mr J. T. Smith, and the excavators now compare this with the conclusions at which they themselves arrived. They ask to what extent archaeological evidence is capable of settling a hypothesis about social structure, and proceed to re-examine the evidence for the house and for the paved and stone-walled area immediately surrounding it to see which alternative is less strained. Doubt is expressed about seeing many of the very minor nearby structures as other than animal pens. The house is re-examined for original occupation by more than one household, in response to Mr Smith's main point. Multiple occupation is perceived in its later history, but not at the commencement. The excavators conclude that their interpretation is clearer as a result of this very useful reconsideration, but essentially unchanged. Barnsley Park does not provide support for Mr Smith's suggestion of kin-groups in Romano-British villas.     

A war in search of a rationale

The recent publications of memoirs by former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet and former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith have reopened the debate over the origins of the Iraq War. Both men—who were widely blamed for the ‘intelligence failure’ on weapons of mass destruction and the exaggerated connection between Al‐Qaeda and Iraq—purport to set the record straight about what really happened inside the Bush administration during the run‐up to the war. Yet, both men have actually produced books marked by a strange combination of self‐pity and disingenuousness. This article looks at their attempts at self‐justification in light of the growing evidence that the decision to invade was made in mid‐2002; if true, their arguments that they were participating in a genuine policy debate rather than a search for a rationale become problematic. Rather than exculpating themselves, their memoirs instead serve as damning indictments of both men, showing how Tenet and Feith enabled the President's decision to wage war on Iraq as a matter of choice rather than necessity.     

How al Qaeda lost Iraq

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has suffered a grave setback in the context of its ongoing campaign there. Since late 2006 Sunni tribal militias working in conjunction with Coalition forces have decimated AQI's ranks, and the organisation has been largely expelled from its former sanctuaries in western Iraq. This article seeks to explain the causes of al Qaeda's defeat with a view towards drawing out their broader implications for the ongoing struggle against jihadist terrorism. I argue that AQI's defeat can be ascribed to its ideological inflexibility, its penchant for indiscriminate violence, and its absolute unwillingness to accommodate the sensitivities and political interests of its host communities. Furthermore, I argue that, far from being exceptional, al Qaeda's mishandling of its local allies in Iraq represents merely the latest instance of a tendency to alienate host communities that has long been evident in its involvement in conflicts in the Islamic world. My analysis confirms that al Qaeda's ideological extremism constitutes a vital point of vulnerability, and that it remains possible to pry global jihadists away from their host communities even in the context of ongoing high-intensity conflicts.     

Going 'tribal': Notes on pacification in the 21st century

Few anthropologists today would consider using the term 'tribe' as an analytical category, yet it has become a focal point for military commanders and other leaders prosecuting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically, US-led occupation forces in both countries have begun pursuing 'tribal' strategies in which they have attempted to forge alliances with 'sheiks' and local power brokers. This article examines the reasons for the rapid rise of 'tribal' discourses, the role of social scientists in their propagation and the possible consequences for Iraqis and Afghans. It concludes by comparing these processes to ethnographically-informed pacification efforts initiated in the late 1800s and early 1900s by the European powers, and by suggesting that anthropologists can potentially play a critical role by challenging persistent, damaging assumptions.     

The formation process of a paleoindian open-air site in Central Brazil: integrating lithic analysis,radiocarbon and luminescence dating

Lithic analysis, radiocarbon dating and luminescence dating are applied to a stratified open-air Paleoindian site in Central Brazil, lending some balance to a published record dominated by rock shelter sites. Most lithics are found in two discrete occupation layers. Lithics found outside these layers are attributed to post-depositional movement of small flakes mainly upwards. Single-grain luminescence dating on quartz grains also suggest post-depositional movement. Both wind and bioturbation are suspected mechanisms. The luminescence analysis does not provide precise depositional dates in this situation but does support such dates suggested by radiocarbon.     

The Phoenician City-states of Tyre and Sidon in Ancient Jewish Texts

Abstract

Interpreted against the historical situation in the Levant of the first millennium BCE, ancient Jewish texts reflect the historical situation of the time in which they were written. Based on this assumption, we propose in this article that ancient Jewish materials speak of the city-states of Tyre and Sidon in three divergent ways that reflect three distinct socio-historical situations. The first grouping, represented primarily by the books of Amos and Hosea, reflects the pre-Persian or late Persian historical situation. These books speak of Tyre as the dominant economic polity in the Levant, whereas an economically weaker Sidon receives little coverage, if any. The second large grouping, represented primarily by the DtrH, addresses the Persian-period historical situation. We propose the DtrH materials coincide with the Persian-period compositional date when placed against the historical situation of the mid-6th4th centuries BCE. The third category of ancient Jewish texts does not differentiate between the cities of Tyre and Sidon. Reflecting the post-Achaemenid period, when the city-states of Tyre and Sidon were no longer able to maintain their independent economic and political positions, these texts refer to Tyre and Sidon as the collective “Tyrians and Sidonians.”     

Was Iraq an unjust war? A debate on the Iraq war and reflections on Libya*

This article is based on a debate held on 22 March 2011 at Chatham House on ‘Was Iraq an unjust war?’ David Fisher argues that the war fully failed to meet any of the just war criteria. The war was undertaken to disarm Iraq of its WMD but the evidence that it had such weapons was inadequate. There were concerns about the justice of the cause, reinforced by doubts that those initiating military action avowedly on behalf of the UN had the requisite competent authority to do so, given the absence of any international consensus in favour of military action. The doubts were further reinforced by concern that action was being undertaken too soon and not as a last resort. Crucially, no adequate assessment was undertaken before military action was authorized to seek to ensure that the harm likely to result would not outweigh the good achieved. The individual failures mutually reinforced each other, so building up cumulatively to support the conclusion that the war was undertaken without sufficient just cause and without adequate planning how to achieve a just outcome following military action to impose regime change. It thus failed the two key tests that have to be met before a war can be justly undertaken, designed to ensure that military action is only initiated if more good than harm is likely to result. By contrast, current coalition operations in Libya are, so far, just. This is a humanitarian operation undertaken to halt a humanitarian catastrophe that is taking place, with wide international support, including authorization by the UN Security Council. Nigel Biggar argues that the fact that the invasion and occupation of Iraq suffered from grave errors, some of them morally culpable, does not yet establish its overall injustice. All wars are morally flawed, even just ones. Further, even if the invasion were illegal, that need not make it immoral. The authority of moral law trumps that of international law, and where the politics of the Security Council prevent the UN from enforcing the law, unauthorized enforcement could be morally justified. Further still, massive civilian casualties do not by themselves make an unjust war. The decisive considerations are those of just cause, last resort and right intention. Proportionality is not among them, because estimating it is far too uncertain. The persistently atrocious nature of the Saddam Hussein regime satisfies just cause; evidence of collapsing containment grounds last resort; and the Coalition's costly correction of early errors proved the seriousness of its good intentions. In sum the invasion and occupation of Iraq was, despite grave errors, justified. Regarding Libya, Biggar notes the recurrence of conflict over the interpretation of international law. He wonders how those who distinguish sharply between protecting civilians and regime change imagine that dissident civilians are to be ‘kept’ safe while Qadhafi remains in power. Against those who clamour for a clear exit‐strategy, he counsels agility, while urging sensitivity to the limits of our power. What was right to begin may become imprudent to continue.     

从"伊拉克门"到"情报门"——美国对萨达姆政权政策探析

美国当代有两次所谓"伊拉克门"丑闻:一次发生在海湾战前,以美国纵容伊拉克发展大规模杀伤性武器借以改善美伊关系为特征;另一次又称"情报门",发生在2003年伊拉克战争前,以美国政府夸大伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器的威胁度和紧迫性,为发动伊战寻求借口为特征。两次"伊拉克门"特征迥异,却都与大规模杀伤性武器紧密相关。大规模杀伤性武器成为美国处理对伊关系、制定对伊政策的核心因素。两次"伊拉克门"期间,随着国际环境以及战略重心的改变,美国的伊拉克政策也发生了巨大的转变,美国对伊外交政策的务实主义本质在两次"伊拉克门"丑闻中得到了充分的体现。     

The New South Wales Election of 22 March 2003

Well before polling day, public commentators and political insiders thought the outcome of the March 2003 NSW election was clear: Labor would win. Seventy per cent of the polled public agreed, according to the Newspoll of 7–10 March (Newspoll 2003), as did those putting their money where their mouths were: Centrebet offered odds of 10:1 against for the Coalition $10.00 and 50:1 on for Labor (Daily Telegraph 13 March 2003). Even Prime Minister Howard, lending his support to NSW Liberal Leader John Brogden, did not predict a Liberal win (Australian Financial Review 12 March 2003). The main question of interest in the election was whether the Coalition would win enough seats to pose a threat to Labor in 2007. Secondary interest lay in whether the Greens would add to their recent series of strong election results. The election campaign was overshadowed by the war in Iraq. The outcome was decided far more by the politics of the preceding four years than by the short official campaign. Consequently, this commentary focuses on understanding the election in the context of NSW politics from 1999.     

Oil and the question of federalism in Iraq

The ‘oil question’ in Iraq has traditionally been viewed almost exclusively through the prism of ethno‐sectarianism. Disputes over the management and licensing of the hydrocarbon sector and over revenue distribution have been seen as a battle for power between Iraq's ethnic and sectarian communities, as if these were monolithic entities. This has led to a conviction—especially among US policy‐makers in post‐war Iraq—that solving the problem lies in a simple formula of apportioning control of the sector to decentralized authorities and dividing revenue proportionally. This view ignores the fact that disagreements over management of the sector and over revenue distribution reflect a deeper dispute that cuts across ethno‐sectarian lines. In reality, disputes are driven far more by the as‐yet‐unresolved issue of whether ultimate sovereign authority in Iraq lies with the central government or should be decentralized to regional and provincial governments. As the main source of revenue in Iraq, control over the oil and gas sector is critical to the success of these rival agendas. Consequently, compromise has been impossible to achieve, and neither side is willing to make concessions for fear of threatening their long‐term ambitions. Tactical maneuvering by different parties in the aftermath of the recent elections may provide some temporary respite to the oil and gas dispute, as Arab leaders in Baghdad seek to co‐opt the support of Kurdish parties to form a new coalition government. But an accommodation over the federalism question in Iraq still seems out of reach. This will not only hamper the legislative process and effective government in the coming years, but could also threaten stability, particularly along the fragile border that separates the Kurdistan Region from the rest of Iraq.