The Judicial Bookshelf

“The good that Presidents do is often interred with their Administrations. It is their choice of Supreme Court Justices that lives after them.” ¹ This was the assessment offered by one leading opinion journal more than seven decades ago, after President Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated Professor Felix Frankfurter to the Supreme Court to fill the opening occasioned by the death of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo. Because vacancies on the Court not only are infrequent but also occur at irregular intervals, the comment illustrates the reality that selection of Justices is among the most important and consequential responsibilities that fall to any chief executive.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

"In law, also, men make a difference," ¹ counseled Felix Frankfurter the year before his appointment to the Supreme Court. Frankfurter highlighted one of the three critical components of judicial decision-making in constitutional law: alongside the text of the Constitution itself and the cases that pose various questions for decision are the women and men who answer those questions. Those answers, as Frankfurter believed, are invariably influenced by the values Justices bring with them to the Bench. Yet he was expressing no newfound truth, but an awareness that had been apparent for a long time. "Impressed with a conviction that the true administration of justice is the firmest pillar of good government," President George Washington wrote future Attorney General Edmund Randolph in 1789, "I have considered the first arrangement of the judicial department as essential to the happiness of our country and the stability of its political system." To be sure, the Court's role in the political system was unclear, but Washington realized the impact the Court might have in the young Republic. This required, he told Randolph, "the selection of the fittest characters to expound the laws and dispense justice." ² And as he filled the six seats Congress had authorized for the Supreme Court, the first President made sure that each nominee was a strong supporter of the new Constitution.     

The Supreme Court in the Nineteenth Century

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, we find a Court which has not yet found its role, and whose principal impact is deciding which litigant wins in a particular lawsuit. Chief Justice John Marshall, appointed in 1801, changes that; he and his successor, Roger B. Taney, are the dominant figures in the Courts over which they preside. From 1801 until 1864-sixty-three years-the nation had only two Chief Justices; during the same time, it had fifteen presidents. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Chief Justices are less dominant and influential, sharing their authority with several notable Associate Justices. By the end of the century, the Court is beginning to wrestle with the many problems facing the nation after a little more than a century of existence.     

(Re)introducing Wiley Rutledge

With the rarest of exceptions, when Supreme Court Justices leave the Court, they are soon all but forgotten. ¹ Constitutional law is unrelentingly presentist, so closely intertwined with politics and society that sitting (or recently departed) Justices necessarily speak to the issues more directly than those from another era. If that were not enough, being forgotten is virtually inevitable for those whose careers are short. One of those men was Wiley Rutledge who served from February 1943 until his death at age 55 from a cerebral hemorrhage, six and a half years later. Until John M. Ferren's recently published and marvelously researched Salt of the Earth, Conscience of the Court , ² Rutledge even lacked a true biography. ³ That has been a shame, because the two dominant themes of Ferren's book show that Rutledge is worth knowing: He was a good man and a good judge. Indeed, on what probably was the most fractious Court in American history, ⁴ Rutledge was the sole member both personally liked and intellectually respected by every other member. ⁵     

The Arlington Cemetery Case: A Court and a Nation Divided

Seventeen years after the Confederate general Robert E. Lee surrendered at Appomattox, his eldest son won a sweeping victory over the federal government in the United States Supreme Court. On December 4, 1882, the Supreme Court upheld a federal trial court's ruling that the United States government's claim of title to Arlington National Cemetery rested on an invalid tax sale. The Justices thus affirmed the lower court's verdict that George Washington Custis Lee (“Custis Lee”), eldest son of Mary and Robert E. Lee, held legal title to Arlington. The Supreme Court also upheld the lower court's decision to permit Custis Lee to bring suit against the government officers who occupied Arlington. On the latter point, the Justices split 5 to 4, with a majority ruling for Custis Lee. The outcome of United States v. Lee, commonly known as the Arlington case, made it clear that the Lee family, and not the United States government, owned Arlington.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

Laments about federal judges, Supreme Court Justices in particular, are nearly as old as the Republic. Those who say otherwise perhaps have either poor memories or a need to read more history. True, the Court has not been continuously caught up in strife, but controversies have occurred often enough to make Court-bashing a routine part of American political life.     

David Souter: A Clerk's View

Many former Supreme Court clerks describe their clerkship as the best job of their lives. David Souter's former clerks do too, though with what I believe is a greater than normal frequency. (As a former Souter clerk I confess to partiality.) But while Souter resembles other Justices in the devoted affection he inspires, he was in many other ways a very unusual presence at the Supreme Court.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

A well‐established fact of American government is the unpredictability of vacancies on the U.S. Supreme Court. Representatives and Senators face voters every two and six years, respectively. A President serves for four years and may be reelected only once. Justices, however, do not sit for fixed terms and in effect enjoy life tenure. After his inauguration as the forty‐third president in January 2001, George W. Bush had no opportunity to make a High Court appointment until he was well into his second term when, on July 1, 2005, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor announced her intention to leave the Bench. ¹ By contrast, the forty‐fourth President encountered his first High Court vacancy much sooner, and in his first term, as Justice David Hackett Souter notified the Obama White House on May 1, 2009, of his intention to retire from “regular active service as a Justice” when the Court recessed for the summer. ²     

The Judicial Bookshelf

Change at the Supreme Court may be most visible and frequent in the progression of statutory and constitutional questions the Justices resolve collectively, but it may also be equally highlighted by an individual Justice's decision. This reality became plainly apparent in a letter that Justice John Paul Stevens sent to the White House on April 9, 2010, just eleven days shy of his 90^th birthday: “My dear Mr. President: Having concluded that it would be in the best interests of the Court to have my successor appointed and confirmed well in advance of the commencement of the Court's next Term, I shall retire from regular active service as an Associate Justice … effective the next day after the Court rises for the summer recess this year.” ¹ His statement was dated almost a year after Justice David Souter dispatched a similar notice to President Obama on May 1, 2009, announcing his intention to leave the Bench. Thus, for the fifth time in as many years, the machinery of executive nomination and senatorial advice and consent for the High Court churned again.     

Supreme Court Declinations

Recently the nation has been awash in matters relating to the complex and sometimes mysterious processes governing the nomination and confirmation of Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. But as our history abundantly shows, by no means every person offered a seat on the Court has decided to accept it.     

The Battle over Brown's Legitimacy

Constitutional scholars have given few Supreme Court rulings the attention that they have lavished upon the celebrated decision in Brown v. Board of Education . Yet the literature of public law is surprisingly unedifying with regard to the process by which the desegregation decision achieved iconic status in American legal culture. Scholarly inattentiveness to the history of Brown's reputation is startling, given that southern politicians were not the only persons in 1954 to characterize the decision as a manifest instance of judicial legislation. Even persons sympathetic to desegregation conceded that the Justices had circumvented traditional legal constraints in rendering Brown . In the years immediately following the ruling, some scholars appealed to the notion of a "living Constitution" to defend Brown against charges that it conflicted with the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment and with the "separate but equal" doctrine that the Court had established in Plessy v. Ferguson . But critics, some of whom even accepted the concept of the "living Constitution," also challenged the Court's reading of social fact—that is, its claims regarding the inherent inequality of segregated schools—which supposedly justified judicial recognition of a right that conflicted with precedent and with the intentions of the Framers of the Equal Protection Clause.     

Public Diplomacy in the U.S. Supreme Court: The Warren Years—Part I

The Prime Minister of the Republic of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, and his daughter, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, wandered down the hallway adorned with portraits of Justices in the U.S. Supreme Court building before entering the East Conference Room. There, they were warmly greeted by Chief Justice Earl Warren and his wife, Nina, who had been the Prime Minister's guests in New Delhi only four months earlier. In Washington, Nehru was the special guest of the Warrens, the first ruling head of state to be honored with a formal dinner at the Supreme Court. In attendance were a small but powerful delegation of Indian diplomats and most of the Justices and their wives. In the crisp evening of December 16, 1956, the temperature had dropped to 39 degrees, and the Prime Minister wore a black achkan, the South Asian coat that Americans came to call “a Nehru jacket,” adorned with his trademark red rose in the breast pocket and a white Congress cap. The Indian ladies dressed in striking saris, while the Western women wore long formal gowns.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

Americans were reminded last January 20, as they are every four years, of the central moment at the Inauguration: the swearing in of the president. In this republican rite, the new or continuing chief executive publicly subordinates himself to the fundamental law of the land. As the Constitution dictates, "[b]efore he enters on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: 'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.'" ¹ Justices of the Supreme Court, other federal judges, legislators and officials, as well as state officeholders, likewise govern only upon making a similar pledge. "Senators and Representatives … , and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution." ² And for added emphasis, protection, and insurance, the Constitution crowns itself, national statutes, and treaties as "the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." ³ Parallel drama unfolds in other venues too. In the half century since all nominees to the Supreme Court have routinely appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee, it would be difficult to find an example of a would-be Justice who, through one combination of words or another, did not promise senators that she or he would faithfully interpret and apply the Constitution.     

The Case of William Dick: Ransom County, North Dakota

In May 2009, a decision of the United States Supreme Court with North Dakota roots turned fifty years old. A case unique in the annals of the law, Dick v. New York Life Insurance Company ¹ still fascinates lawyers today. Factually, the case presented a strange question: could an experienced hunter accidentally shoot himself not once, but twice? Some of North Dakota's finest lawyers, including Philip Vogel, Donald Holand, and Norman Tenneson, aimed to get to the bottom of that matter. The judges were equally impressive: Judge Ronald Davies of the federal district court; Judge John Sanborn of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; and Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Felix Frankfurter. Finally, as a matter of Supreme Court jurisprudence, Dick may have been the last time the High Court granted a petition for certiorari in a case that turned almost exclusively on questions of fact. In honor of its golden anniversary, this article recounts the captivating story of Dick v. New York Life.     

The “Good Old #3 Club” Gets a New Member

It has been said that serving on the U.S. Supreme Court is like being a member of an exclusive club. Yet within this club, there are even more exclusive clubs that only a small number of Justices are permitted to join. These shadowy associations are unseen by the public, receive no publicity, and are not even known to the Justices who are excluded. The existence of these secretive organizations has recently been revealed through the release of Justice Harry Blackmun's papers at the Library of Congress. This article is the first serious attempt to research the existence, membership, and practices of these clandestine alliances. Ultimately, as with many High Court practices, these newly uncovered connections may be in need of reform, and I offer a number of solutions to define membership criteria and improve their functioning.     

Tribute to Justice Souter

When the U.S. Supreme Court Justices took their seats at the beginning of the 2009 Term, the Bench looked different. Gone from the Bench, after nineteen years, was David H. Souter. He returned to his home in New Hampshire, a state he likes enormously. Justice Souter will be missed by his former colleagues and by advocates before the Court, by legal scholars nationwide and by all who follow the Court's work and activities.     

The Life and Career of Justice Robert H. Jackson

Robert H. Jackson was one of the most influential Justices of the Supreme Court in the twentieth century. His tenure on the Court ran from 1941 to his death in 1954, and during that time he participated in landmark cases involving the programs implemented by Roosevelt's New Deal to rescue the country from Depression, having previously served the administration in other roles. He authored a memorable dissent in United States v. Korematsu, the notorious Japanese internment case. ¹ He is also remembered for the role he served as the chief American prosecutor before the International Military Tribunal that tried Nazi leaders after World War II. In some ways, Jackson's fierce independence and the lessons he learned growing up in a small town were the ideal training for the demands and competitiveness of the nation's highest Court. That Jackson's words and beliefs still have relevance in the twenty‐first century is evidenced by the fact that both recent Supreme Court appointees quoted him during the confirmation hearings. ² In this essay, I will examine how Jackson's life experiences influenced his legal career and informed his jurisprudence, and to what extent Jackson lived up to his own vision of the role of a Supreme Court Justice.     

Herbert Brownell,Jr.: The “Hidden Hand”1 in the Selection of Earl Warren and the Government's Role in Brown v. Board of Education

There are, of course, many heroes behind the Supreme Court's most famous and, some would argue, most significant case of the 20^th Century: Brown v. Board of Education. ² Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the decision and is credited with convincing the other Justices to make it unanimous. Thurgood Marshall and Robert L. Carter argued important aspects of the case for the NAACP and championed a legal strategy that brought it to the High Court. Few, however, would readily name Herbert Brownell, Jr. as one of the heroes. Yet, as Attorney General, Brownell was President Eisenhower's chief adviser on judicial appointments when he put Warren on the Court, and Brownell led the Justice Department in supporting the notion that segregation of public schools violated the Constitution.     

The Voting Rights of Incarcerated Australian Citizens

Drawing on and combining political science and legal frameworks, this article explores the validity of disenfranchising Australian prisoners. The authors examine and critically assess the various arguments used in Australia by both legislators and High Court Justices to defend the practice of disenfranchisement. Such arguments are assessed against liberal democratic principles as well as jurisprudence arising from cases in settings that provide protection for electoral rights in formal charters of rights. The authors show that in settings that entrench voting rights in the Constitution, any infringement attracts strict scrutiny from the courts. Courts insist that any abridgement of voting rights should serve a legitimate government purpose and be proportionate to that purpose. The arguments made for prisoner disenfranchisement by legislators in the Australian context invariably fail both parts of this test.     

Justices Seeking the Presidency

The separation of powers in the Constitution of the United States has never been absolute in either theory or practice. This is especially true in the quest for public office. At least one President, William Howard Taft, aspired to be a Supreme Court Justice. Several Supreme Court Justices seriously considered becoming President. These are a few stories about those ambitions.