Financial crises and the balance of power in international finance, 1890–2010

Has the centre of gravity of international finance irreversibly started to shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific since the financial debacle of 2007-2008? This article discusses this highly topical question in a historical perspective, by considering previous changes in the balance of power in international finance and the role played by global financial in these changes. Particular attention is paid to the Baring Crisis of 1890, the American Panic of 1907, the financial crisis of July -August 1914, the banking crises of the Great Depression of the 1930s, the financial instability of the early 1970s and the ensuing banking failures, the International Debt Crisis of 1982, and the Japanese Banking Crisis of 1997-8. The article concludes that financial crisis, perhaps surprisingly, did not lead to clear changes in the balance of power in international finance; and that the financial debacle of 2007-8 is unlikely, in the medium-term, to fundamentally alter the current order.     

Hugh,Lothar and Berengar: the balance of power in Italy 945–50

ABSTRACT

The return of Berengar of Ivrea to Italy in 945 was a point of great change for the political networks of the kingdom of Italy. Berengar is typically presented assuming control, first ruling in practice with the Bosonids Hugh and Lothar as puppets, then openly taking the crown following Lothar’s death in 950. Berengar, we are told, installed those who supported his insurrection in key positions, and marginalised or suborned those who had supported the Bosonids. This account is based almost exclusively on the narrative of the Antapodosis of Liutprand of Cremona. Liutprand’s work had complex personal and political motivations which led him to construct carefully an image of Hugh, Lothar, Berengar and of Italy as a whole. Moreover, Liutprand’s narrative conflicts with contemporary accounts of the period, as well as the charter record. This article demonstrates these inconsistencies and describes more nuanced changes in political structures in 945–50.     

Psychoanalyzing Iran: Kennedy's Iran Task Force and the Modernization of Orientalism, 1961–3

Between 1961 and 1963, a political crisis in Iran prompted U.S. foreign-policy makers to briefly consider supporting political reform that would have pushed the Shah toward a more constitutional role and moved Iran toward democracy. Yet Washington instead decided to bolster the Shah's regime to carry out social and economic reforms that coalesced as the Shah's White Revolution in 1963. Policy-makers relied in part on a psychological profile of Iran to shape their decisions, believing that the Iranian people were psychologically unprepared to rule, and that the Shah was psychologically unprepared to give up power. This article encourages diplomatic historians to explore how the language and ideas of psychology influenced the modernization theories and policies that U.S. policy-makers applied to Iran, the Middle East, and the wider ‘Third World.’ After briefly exploring the history of U.S. racial, religious, and cultural perceptions of Iran - many of which fit traditional stereotypes of Orientalism - the article examines the influence of political and developmental psychology at a time when racial and religious bias were increasingly taboo. Psychology offered more acceptable, scientific ways to understand Iran and the Middle East, though it led to familiar conclusions. While attempting to modernize Iran, policy-makers modernized Orientalism.     

The cult of St Minias and the struggle for power in the diocese of Florence, 1011–1018

Foundation of churches and monasteries in the tenth and eleventh centuries often have more to do with economic and political concerns than they have to do with religious motivation. Though historians have long recognized the importance of the basilica of San Miniato al Monte in Florence for the history of the Tuscan romanesque, they have largely failed to see that its foundation stemmed from conflicts over competing interests between rival families in the northern Tuscan elite. The tenth and early eleventh centuries saw the formation of several powerful family lineages (consorterie) in northern Tuscany, which organized their regional patrimonies into proprietary monasteries. Two of those lineages — the Guidi and the Cadolingi — derived much of their wealth from the seizure of properties formerly held by the bishops of Florence. Endowing its two proprietary monasteries at Fucecchio and Settimo at the end of the tenth and beginning of the eleventh centuries with a patrimony which may have included lands claimed by the bishop, the Cadolingi patronized a faction within the Florentine clergy that challenged the moral qualifications of Bishop Hildebrand to be bishop.In order to defend episcopal properties from usurpation by the Caldolingi and Guidi and to provide a cover for his own family's appropriation of ecclesiastical property, Bishop Hildebrand consciously orchestrated after 1014 the revival of the cult of the first martyr of Florence, St Minias. The core of that program was the construction of the basilica and monastery of San Miniato. Endowing the basilica with the episcopal properties he sought to protect, the bishop appointed a loyal abbot who agreed to write a new Passio of the saint. Bishop Hildebrand managed to hold on to his office in spite of the challenges to his prelacy, but shortly after his death his sons lost control of the church property bequeathed to them by their father.     

Iran in the Nazi New Order, 1933–1941

Despite a succession of scholarly studies over the years, the relationship between Reza Shah’s Iran and National Socialist Germany has not been fully explored. Rather than focusing on the supposed Aryan ideological sympathies that bound the two countries together, this article argues that the real driver of the German–Iranian relationship in the 1930s was economic and based in the mutual interaction of state economic initiatives. It states that Iran’s place in Nazism’s economic system was the outcome of two factors: the “New Plan” of Reich Economics Minister Hjalmar Schacht, and its focus on clearing agreements as a motor for depression-era trade, and the connections of Schacht’s system to Reza Shah’s strategy to modernize Iran. In exploring this issue the article focuses on relations between Germany and Iran during three distinct moments: first, the period from 1918 to 1928 and the working out of a new relationship after the First World War; secondly the period of Schacht’s New Plan in Iran in the mid-1930s; and finally the period from the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 to the British–Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941. During this last period Iran both belonged to the Nazi–Soviet trade zone created by the Pact and attempted to defend its neutrality.