Military command in the last decade

On 11 September 2010, the United States commemorated the ninth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. In those nine years, British forces have been engaged in military operations of unexpected location, intensity, scale and duration. While the performance of British troops has been repeatedly praised on these operations, there has been growing disquiet among commentators and, indeed, among the military establishment itself about the conduct of these campaigns. Specifically, the issue of British military command has come under increasing scrutiny. This article examines command frictions at the strategic and operational levels and seeks to provide a sociological explanation of these difficulties. It claims that British commanders have failed to identify a coherent strategy over the past decade while in‐theatre operational command has often been characterized by an ad hoc‐ery, incoherence and inconsistency. The article suggests that a ‘laissez faire’ command culture has been evident at strategic and operational levels. While individual mistakes may not be irrelevant, the article explores the way in which this command culture may be a product of institutional pressures within defence and, above all, a product of inter‐service rivalry. However, the laissez faire system of command in the armed forces may also be a reflection of much deeper cultural presumptions and preferences within British professional society itself which has always had a strong tendency towards pragmatism, decentralization and shorttermism. The article concludes by offering some suggestions as to how military command might be reformed in light of its potentially profound cultural origins.     

Breaking the covenant: governance of the British army in the twenty-first century

This article argues that the military covenant between senior army commanders and soldiers is breaking down for two reasons: first, British forces are being engaged in new and controversial wars of choice, putting new and distinct pressures on the covenant; and second because senior military commanders have not fully appreciated the changes to their authority and power in governing the British army. It further suggests that military commanders, central staff and ministers need to acknowledge the scale of the internal challenges to the military covenant and develop appropriate responses. Drawing on examples from gender equality and sexual orientation, allegations of war crimes in Iraq, the military's duty of care and the proposed launch of a British Armed Forces Federation, this article argues that these challenges show that the military leadership has no choice but to rethink its outdated approach to governance of the British army, if it is to remain fi t for purpose. Without appropriate adaptation, army chiefs will have themselves contributed to the breaking of the military covenant, between the army and the individual soldier.     

British judicial engagement and the juridification of the armed forces

Although the law has always been a major reference point in the conduct of war, little scholarly attention has focused on the transformative effect of recent legal challenges, judicial rulings and inquiries on the armed forces themselves, notably the 2011 Gage Inquiry into the death of Baha Mousa and the Philip Inquiry into the Mull of Kintyre helicopter disaster. Despite this, the impact has been significant in the ways it has transformed the governance regime of British armed forces and the professional autonomy of the military. This article conceptualizes the impact of law on the armed forces as ‘juridification’. In applying this concept, this article analyses the implications of this for the culture, conduct and organization of the British armed forces. It argues that juridification closes a civil–military relations gap between society on the one hand and the armed forces on the other. As important, juridification also brings with it permanent instability because of the inevitable conflicts that arise from the replacement of an old order based on authority, to a new military system based on rights. Thus the effects of juridification are not just a liminal moment—a transitory dislocation from established structures and the reversal of existing hierarchies—followed by the creation of a permanent new order. Rather, juridification has initiated an era of instability that is characterized by the absence of any permanent settlement of authority and rights in the governance of the armed forces. This has significant implications for the armed forces and their professional autonomy and the social, political and legal context in which armed forces have to operate.     

The defence dilemma in Britain

The UK faces a pressing defence dilemma. The declaratory goals of defence policy are struggling to match the demands made by operational commitments and the financial and organizational capacities. The article examines how and why this situation has come about. While recognizing that existing calls for higher defence spending, reform of the Ministry of Defence, efficiency gains or a renewal of the so‐called military covenant between the military and society may address discrete elements of the defence dilemma in Britain, it argues that current problems derive from a series of deeper tensions in the nexus of British defence more widely defined. These include a transnationalization of strategic practice, in ways that both shape and constrain the national defence policy process; the institutional politics of defence itself, which encourage different interpretations of interest and priority in the wider strategic context; and finally the changing status of defence in the wider polity, which introduces powerful veto points into the defence policy process itself. It argues that while a series of shocks may have destabilized existing policy, prompted ad hoc organizational adaptation in the armed forces and led to incremental cost saving measures from the government, a ‘dominant crisis narrative’—in the form of a distinctive and generally agreed programme of change—has yet to emerge. The article concludes by looking forward to a future strategic defence review, highlighting the critical path dependencies and veto points which must be addressed if transformative change in British defence is to take place.     

The United States and counterinsurgency: 'political first, political last, political always'

According to the status of forces agreement signed by Iraq and the United States in November 2008, US troops are to be withdrawn entirely from Iraq by the end of 2011. A few days later it was also revealed that the British force in Iraq, numbering about 4,100 troops, will be reduced to a contingent of just a few hundred military advisors by summer 2009. The counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, on the other hand, is to be intensified in the form of a ‘surge’ in military and political effort. Counterinsurgency operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq have long been at the centre of the security policy debate in the United States and elsewhere; a debate which seems unlikely to be resolved in the near future. But what exactly is counterinsurgency? This article offers some reflections on the practice and the politics of an especially complex form of military engagement. All military activity should be understood through the prism of politics, and counterinsurgency particularly so.     

Lessons from Helmand,Afghanistan: what now for British counterinsurgency?

This article analyses the conduct of British operations in Helmand between 2006 and 2010 and discusses the implications for the legacy and future of British counterinsurgency. A number of lessons stand out: first, competence in the field of counterinsurgency is neither natural nor innate through regimental tradition or historical experience. The slow adaptation in Helmand—despite the opportunity to allow the Basra experience to be a leading example of the need for serious changes in training and mindset—is an indication that the expertise British forces developed in past operations is but a distant folktale within the British Armed Forces. Substantially changed training, painful relearning of counterinsurgency principles and changed mindsets are therefore necessary to avoid repeated early failures in the future. Moreover, despite eventually adapting tactically to the situation and task in Helmand, the British Armed Forces proved inadequate in dealing with the task assigned to them for two key reasons. First, the resources of the British military are simply too small for dealing with large‐scale complex engagements such as those in Helmand or southern Iraq. Second, the over‐arching comprehensive approach, and especially the civilian lines of operations that underpinned Britain's historical successes with counterinsurgency, are today missing.     

‘Transformation in contact’: learning the lessons of modern war

The US and British armies have faced intelligent and adaptive enemies in Iraq and continue to do so in Afghanistan. While both armies have proved adept at fighting high‐intensity conflict, their initial performance against asymmetric threats and diffuse insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated how much each army had to learn about conducting counterinsurgency operations. This article examines one important means by which the US and British armies have transformed themselves into more flexible and responsive organizations that are able to harness innovation at the front effectively. It traces the development of the lessons‐learned systems in both armies from the start of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq to today. These changes have resulted in significant development within the organization of both armies. Reform of US and British army learning capabilities offers an important insight into the drivers of military change. The reformed lessons‐learned systems have been better integrated into training, experimentation, and doctrine and force development. While there are still challenges to be overcome, both armies have created robust structures that facilitate the movement of knowledge from recent experience at the front to the rest of the organization. As such, these reforms provide us with a useful case‐study that enhances our understanding of the role of ‘bottom‐up’ initiatives in military innovation.     

The military covenant and the civil–military contract in Britain

Is the British civil–military contract strained to breaking point? The contemporary portrayal of British civil–military relations is bleak, with academics, politicians, the media and military charities arguing that military–societal relations are in urgent need of repair. Through assessing the extent to which the reciprocal expectations of the armed forces and the British public are realized, this article will argue that the moral contract, although under stress, is not breaking. Underlying social trends and the use of doctrinal concepts such as the military covenant have, combined with recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, altered the expectations of both sides causing tensions within military–societal relations. Yet, while the armed forces do harbour unrealized expectations of the British public who are unwilling or unable to support the use of the military in recent conflicts, neither the public nor the military is so disillusioned with the performance of the other for the relationship to be described as breaking or broken.     

Campaign disconnect: operational progress and strategic obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009–2011

Success in war depends on alignment between operations and strategy. Commonly, such alignment takes time as civilian and military leaders assess the effectiveness of operations and adjust them to ensure that strategic objectives are achieved. This article assesses prospects for the US‐led campaign in Afghanistan. Drawing on extensive field research, the authors find that significant progress has been made at the operational level in four key areas: the approach to counterinsurgency operations, development of Afghan security forces, growth of Afghan sub‐national governance and military momentum on the ground. However, the situation is bleak at the strategic level. The article identifies three strategic obstacles to campaign success: corruption in Afghan national government, war‐weariness in NATO countries and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. These strategic problems require political developments that are beyond the capabilities of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In other words, further progress at the operational level will not bring ‘victory’. It concludes, therefore, that there is an operational‐strategic disconnect at the heart of the ISAF campaign.     

Expanding the Australian Empire?: The Australian Council for the World Council of Churches,the Menzies Government and the New Hebrides in the late 1950s

In the late 1950s the Australian Council for the World Council of Churches (AC‐WCC) inspired primarily by the Presbyterian Church, undertook a concerted campaign to pressure the Australian government to assume a greater role in the affairs of the New Hebrides. The AC‐WCC wanted the Australian government to take over the United Kingdom's role in the administration of the Anglo‐French Condominium. It was motivated to undertake this campaign by the dismal social and economic conditions in the islands, the neglect of the British and French colonial authorities, and their failure to offer the indigenous people a way forward to self‐government. The high point of the campaign was a meeting between Robert Menzies, the Australian prime minister and a delegation from the AC‐WCC in early 1958. As a result of this meeting Australian ministers and officials, for the final time, gave extended consideration to expanding Australia's empire in the South Pacific to include the New Hebrides. This article examines the AC‐WCC's campaign, explores the Australian government's response, and analyses the outcome of this important episode in Australia's involvement in the colonial territories of the South Pacific.     

Iraq: The Military Campaign

This article draws together early military implications of a campaign where intensive operations lasted barely a month. The deeper insights will need much more time for the post operations reports to be written, detailed battle assessments to be made, and the key decision-makers to record their thinking. As far as is possible, the article deals with the purely military aspects of the campaign. The promise of a decade of development of high technology air power was expected by some to show a new way of fighting wars. The evidence from the campaign appears to give a more mixed message. Certainly, a higher proportion of air weapons was guided in this conflict than in any previous war. Strategic intelligence appears to have been less accurate than had been expected. The unexpected initial resistance by Iraqi forces, followed by later capitulation, required flexible coalition operations. The spectre of the use of chemical and biological weapons proved unfounded. The effectiveness of special operations will be one area for deeper study. The media strategy will need reviewing for future operations. At this stage, the article does no more than record the sequence of events, make broad judgements about the strategic and tactical approaches of both the Coalition and Iraqi forces, and highlights areas where further investigation may be useful to draw firmer conclusions.     

British Perceptions and Responses to Sultan Ali Dinar of Darfur, 1915–16

This article illustrates how British perceptions of Sultan Ali Dinar of Darfur, in the context of the First World War, led to the downfall of his sultanate in 1916. It shows how the paranoia of the ‘imperial mind’ amplified the threat of militant Islam, personified by Ali Dinar, through the conviction that he was involved with outside enemy forces. British certainty of Ottoman and German complicity in the sultan's belligerence was presented with great intensity by officials, a conviction which formed a central justification for this extension of British rule in Saharan Africa. British officials actively propagated the idea of outside forces having a pernicious influence on Ali Dinar's bellicosity. Through their dogged insistence on this interpretative trope, the British elided other complex factors that informed the sultan's defiance, and misunderstood the internal divisions and stresses in Darfuri society that limited the effectiveness of his jihad. This article goes beyond existing studies by presenting a close analysis of the colonial record to examine in greater detail these two perceptions of Ali Dinar as ‘Muslim fanatic’ and ‘Turco-German co-conspirator’. In a new departure from existing works, this article analyses British views of Ali Dinar after Darfur was occupied, explores the sultan's motivations for his declaration of jihad against the British, and sheds light on the responses of ordinary Darfuris to their sultan‘s doomed defiance of the region's dominant power.     

Iraq,Afghanistan and the future of British military doctrine: from counterinsurgency to Stabilization

The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have had profound effects on both the British and US militaries. Among the most important is the way in which they have challenged traditional assumptions about the character of unconventional conflict and the role of the military within comprehensive strategies for encouraging sustainable peace. In the UK, the most important doctrinal response has been JDP 3–40 Security and Stabilisation: the military contribution. Security and Stabilisation is an ambitious attempt to synthesize elements of counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peace support and state‐building within a single doctrine that reflects the lessons learned from recent British operational experience. This article examines the purpose, impact and potential value of this important innovation in British doctrine. To do so, the article explores the genesis of Stabilization; analyses its impact upon extant British doctrine for counterinsurgency and peace support; discusses its relationship with the most important related US doctrines, FM 3–24: the counterinsurgency field manual and FM 3–07: the stability operations field manual; and debates the function of doctrine more broadly. It concludes by summarizing the primary challenges Security and Stabilisation must overcome if it is to make a serious contribution to the theory and practice of such complex interventions.     

St John's Ambulance Brigade and the Gendering of ‘Passive Defence’ in British Malaya, 1937–42

The St John's Ambulance Brigade established itself in British Malaya in the 1930s, as part of efforts to mobilise and train the colony's subjects for civil defence as the geo‐strategic climate in the Pacific deteriorated. This article demonstrates how the provision of emergency medical care was a gendered and racialised undertaking in the colonial context. Unlike the military, comprising mainly European and ‘trusted’ ethnic Indian soldiers, the realm of ‘passive defence’ was identified as a feminised undertaking for women and ethnic Chinese men who were considered to be either too vulnerable or too disloyal to bear arms. The rapid advance of Japan's military in south‐east Asia violently shattered such social boundaries, as many women and non‐European volunteers found themselves exposed by retreating Allied forces to the Japanese offensive and took up duties at posts from which their European supervisors had been forced to desert. Mainstream military historiography has often been highly gendered towards what is considered as the male‐dominated public domain of the battlefield. In this respect, the involvement of the St John's Ambulance Brigade reveals the process in which colonial ethno‐gender identities and hierarchies were being established, appropriated and subsequently subverted by the exigencies of the war in British Malaya.     

Lyndon Johnson's War? Part 1: Escalation

At the beginning of 1964 there were around 20,000 US military ‘advisers’ in South Vietnam, working alongside the South Vietnamese army in the latter's campaign against the communist guerrillas, led and supplied by the government of North Vietnam. By the summer of 1965 there were 125,000 American troops in the country, with more pledged for future deployment. Most of these were not ‘advisers’, but combat forces openly engaged in fighting the communists. In addition, since March 1965, a sustained American bombing campaign had been waged against targets in North Vietnam. This transformation in the nature of the American commitment to South Vietnam had been brought about by two factors: the continued weakness of South Vietnamese governments as military and civilians struggled for control; and the growing strength and success of the communist guerrillas. South Vietnam was regarded as a vital American interest for two reasons: it was perceived as a test of US resolution throughout the rest of the world; and, following the famous ‘domino theory’, it was believed that the loss of South Vietnam to communism would precipitate the weakening and eventual collapse of other non‐communist states in the region. Although there was opposition to the escalation of the war, both in Congress and the administration, there were also voices notably in the military, who wished to press on further and faster. The administration adopted a middle course, gradually increasing its commitment and continually planning for the next step. Although political motives undoubtedly played a part in this more measured approach—there was a presidential election in November 1964—it is clear that President Johnson was not at all convinced that any policy he chose would save South Vietnam. At the same time, he feared the consequences of withdrawal, both at home and abroad. A deeply insecure man, he allowed himself to be persuaded by his principal advisers, to whom he felt indebted for personal as well as political reasons.     

Tristan da Cunha

This paper explores the ambiguities of Englishness/ Britishness from a political geography perspective. An Anglo‐British identity is described in which English territoriality is shown to be both more and less than the geographical area of England. Upper England comprises the south‐east corner of the country only — the Home Counties’ — which is identified as the Crown Heartland of a particularly conservative nationalism. Greater England is the British face of English identity which as hegemon, empire and currently through the City of London used and uses Upper England as a base for extra‐territorial projects. Finally the implications of this unusual nationalism are reviewed in terms of a possible break‐up of England.     

Brexit: initial reflections

Even though the opinion polling before the British referendum on membership of the European Union showed a narrow gap between the two sides, the actual result—a vote to leave—on the morning of 24 June 2016 came as a surprise to many. Yet in truth both the referendum and its outcome had deep roots in British politics. In this article we cast an eye over the history of Britain's relationship with the EU, which has long been marked by a mixture of awkwardness and successful influence. We trace the origins of the referendum in long‐run tensions between, and within, the political parties, and in the lukewarm public support for European integration. We also examine more contingent, short‐term factors relating to the referendum campaign itself. We conclude by commenting on the divisions exposed by the vote along lines of geography, education, class and wealth, and suggest that reconciling these with the continuing tensions in the party landscape make a clean and speedy exit from the EU unlikely.     

Cosmos,chaos: finance,power and conflict

The article explores parallels between the fragility of globalization on the eve of the First World War, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 1907, and today's crisis of globalization following the post‐2007 recession. The fragility and interconnectedness of the international economy in both cases could provide a basis for an economic–military strategy. The temptation of using economic connectedness as a substitute for conventional and costly military strategy makes this course particularly attractive to a hegemon—the UK then, the US now—that is facing powerful competition from rising powers (Germany and the US then, China now). The challengers are likely to find their own alternative strategy, and the result breeds uncertainty. In consequence, rule‐based international orders are generally strained by transitions of power, even though all the parties see the desirability and need for a common system of rules.     

War-stained: British Combatants and Uniforms, 1914–18

Historians have long recognized the role of military uniforms in marking the transformation of civilians into servicemen. However, this was not a simple transition, completed the moment individuals put on service dress shortly after enlistment. Rather, the process of transformation continued throughout servicemen’s lives in the military, reflecting changed circumstances that might include a move to a different war theatre, promotion, or illness and injury. Focusing on the experiences of British soldiers during the First World War, this article explores the meanings of uniforms as servicemen were transformed from raw recruits into experienced combatants. It questions the extent to which the stained and worn uniforms that seemed the inevitable outcome of front line duty were seen as consistent with the manly heroism expected of soldiers, paying attention not only to the army authorities’ insistence on ‘spit and polish’, but especially to combatants’ perceptions of the effect of dirt on their own identities and sense of self. Thus, this article argues, the transformation into combatants involved potentially dangerous and degrading encounters with dirt and vermin, but also the development of strategies — centred on bodies and on uniforms — that sought to counter the threat of long-term harm and pollution.     

Skyjackers,jackals and soldiers: British planning for international terrorist incidents during the 1970s

Following the Munich Olympics massacre of September 1972, the British government conducted a series of contingency plans to ensure that Whitehall, police constabularies and the armed forces were prepared for similar crises affecting the UK and its citizens. This article examines the evolution of British counterterrorist planning during the 1970s, which still shapes Whitehall's crisis management procedures for responding to international terrorism, and also procedures for calling for military support in response to hijackings, hostage‐taking and similar incidents both domestically and overseas. It demonstrates that while there are differences in the character of the terrorist threat 40 years ago and today, there are also parallels between the practical and political challenges of counterterrorism in the era of the Baader–Meinhof group and Carlos the Jackal, and the struggle against al‐Qaeda and its affiliates today.