Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten

Since its formal launch in June 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has developed at a remarkable rate. In the subsequent decade, the EU has carried out 22 ESDP military and civilian operations and become an important element of Europe's ability to respond to international crises. For all this, however, there remain grounds for concern. These relate in part to the fact that, for all the early activism of ESDP, those military missions undertaken to date have been relatively limited in size and scope. The EU has also strikingly failed to intervene in certain crises that once seemed ideally suited to an ESDP deployment. The ESDP has also to a degree failed to bring about the enhancement to European military capabilities that some had hoped would be its major achievement. More generally, there is a danger that an exclusive focus on EU security policies will serve merely to distract member states from the broader international strategic environment, with ESDP serving as an alibi for their continued failure to live up to their international security responsibilities.     

The strategic culture of the European Union: a progress report

This article re‐examines the EU's character and potential as a strategic actor, setting that analysis in the context of the debate on strategic culture. The definition of strategic culture as the political and institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force, coupled with external recognition of the EU as a legitimate actor in the military sphere, lends itself to a reappraisal around four core questions. First, military capabilities: establishing a European strategic culture is vital in order to rationalize the acquisition of capabilities necessary for the range of humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks envisaged. Equally, without military capabilities, all talk of a strategic culture would ring hollow. This article discusses how much closer the EU has come to acquiring those essential capabilities. Second, while the EU has gained significant experience of, albeit limited, military/policing experiences and established a growing reputation and some credibility for ad hoc action, to what extent and in what quarters have these experiences engendered a sense of reliability and legitimacy for autonomous EU action? Third, given that so far operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Balkans have depended on an integrated civil–military effort, do the policy‐making processes of the EU now ensure the appropriate level and depth of civil–military integration? Finally, considering that EU operations have been limited in time and scope, and that much of the EU's work in the Balkans has depended upon cooperation with NATO, what can be said of the evolving relationship between the EU and NATO?     

Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic culture

The European Union and its member states have moved with considerable speed towards the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Whether what has been achieved so far adds up to a revolution remains a moot point. The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Maastricht Treaty has not always been noted for its binding character, and too often the debate over security and defence has degenerated into an artificial, zero-sum-type game between Atlanticists and Europeanists. What is required for the success of the ESDP is not simply continued commitment to achieving the Headline Goals set out at Helsinki in 1999, but also the development of what the authors call a 'strategic culture', i.e. an institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the effective range of legitimate policy instruments of the Union. The authors argue that political commitment at the highest levels has been underpinned by the institutionalization, within the Council Secretariat, of the 'military option' in the form of the Military Committee and a Directorate General for the EU's Military Staff (DGEUMS). Even more importantly, there are already signs, especially through such concepts as 'security sector reform' and 'structural stability', that the EU, through its development and humanitarian programmes, has already recognized the necessity of military solutions.     

Strengthening the Polycentric Urban System in Europe: Conclusions from the ESDP

The first European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) document agreed in May 1999 calls for closer cooperation at the EU level in response to the challenges posed by globalization and the increasingly transnational impact of spatial development in Europe. The ESDP maps out a common approach to spatial development in the EU member states and supports an integrated perspective for European spatial development which goes beyond specialist viewpoints. This article focuses on the relationship between key statements on the European urban system contained in the ESDP and the 'real' structures and changes within this urban system. It also examines possible conclusions from the ESDP for urban policy in Europe in the light of the activities already launched to translate the ESDP into practice in the urban dimension of European spatial development.     

The European spatial development perspective and North‐West Europe: application and the future1

The European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) is the product of a north‐west European planning tradition. This article discusses the role of north‐west European concerns, in particular the use of the concept of polycentricity, in the making of the ESDP, and the application of the ESDP in the North‐west European Metropolitan Area (NWMA), more in particular in Germany, the UK, The Netherlands and Belgium. The article also explores the future of spatial planning as regards north‐west Europe. Much will depend on how Community policy will adapt to the enlargement of the European Union. However, it seems certain that existing member states, in particular those in north‐west Europe will see their share in the structural funds evaporate. This may give added significance to INTERREG IIIB respectively to the successor of this Community Initiative. In addition, concepts like territorial cohesion and territorial management may become functional equivalents to that of spatial planning, for which the Community is said to have no competence.     

A common European foreign policy after Iraq?

Taking as read the wide range of other instruments that the EU has for international influence (enlargement, aid, trade, association and other arrangements, etc.), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), under pressure from the Kosovo conflict, has been shaped by two important decisions in 1999: the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to give the EU a military capability when NATO as a whole is not engaged, and the appointment as the new High Representative for the CFSP of a high-profile international statesman rather than a senior civil servant.
A major European effort will still be needed if Europe is to be effective militarily, whether in the EU/ESDP or NATO framework. The management of the CFSP has been held back by the doctrine of the equality of all member states regardless of their actual contribution. This in turn leads to a disconnect between theory (policy run by committee in Brussels) and practice (policy run by the High Representative working with particular member states and other actors, notably the US). It has been difficult for Javier Solana to develop the authority to do this, not in competition with the Commission as so widely and mistakenly believed, as with member states themselves, and particularly successive rotating presidencies. It is important that misdiagnosis does not lead to politically correct solutions that end up with the cure worse than the disease. Ways need to be found to assure to the High Representative the authority to work with third countries and with the member states making the real contribution, while retaining the support of all. Then, with its own military capability, the EU can have a CFSP that is the highest common factor rather than the lowest common denominator, with member states ready to attach enough priority to the need for common policies to give Europeans a strong influence in the big foreign policy issues of the day.     

Transatlantic relations and peace in Europe

In his recent novel Alain Crémieux imagines what might happen in Europe without NATO and US military forces and security commitments. Numerous border and minority conflicts break out, coalitions comparable to those in Europe's past begin to form, and the European Union is divided and ineffectual— until pro‐peace and pro‐EU forces rally. Most European countries then unite under a treaty providing for collective defence and security and a new central European government. The novel raises questions of international order: to what extent have the Europeans overcome their old ‘demons’ (distrust, power rivalry etc.), notably through the EU? While many theories purport to explain the peaceful relations among the EU member states, critical tests of the Union's political cohesion would come in circumstances without the US‐dominated external security framework, including US leadership in NATO. To what extent could the EU maintain cohesion and resist aggression or coercion by an external power against a member state, contain and resolve external conflicts affecting EU interests, and defend the Union's economic and security interests beyond Europe? To determine whether the US ‘pacifying’ and protective role has in fact become irrelevant, thanks in large part to the EU, would require a risky experiment—actually removing US military forces and commitments. The challenges and uncertainties that would face Europe without NATO argue that the Alliance remains an essential underpinning of political order in Europe. Moreover, the Alliance can serve as a key element in the campaigns against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To revitalize the Alliance, it is imperative that the Europeans improve their military capabilities and acquire the means necessary for a more balanced transatlantic partnership in maintaining international security.     

The Importance of Context and Comparison in the Study of European Spatial Planning

The European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) was agreed in 1999 at Potsdam, Germany, as a non-binding framework intended to guide spatially significant policy-making at different spatial scales in order to achieve a more balanced and sustainable growth of the EU territory. This paper develops a conceptualization of the nature of transnational planning frameworks such as the ESDP and presents a framework for the investigation of the application of their policy orientations in the spatial planning systems of European states. It is argued that investigations of the application of transnational spatial development frameworks like the ESDP and the ‘Territorial Agenda of the European Union’ document adopted by EU member states in 2007, need to be sensitized to the diversity of territorial contexts in which these apply, and that a contextualized and comparative approach is therefore essential in evaluating their influence in Europe's varied territories.     

So far,so good? Russia and the ESDP

The progression from a European Security and Defence Initiative to a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has not left Russian policy–makers indifferent. The Yeltsin administration greeted the emergence of the European Union as a new player in European security, seeing it as a potential challenge to NATO and American influence. President Putin's emphasis on developing trust and cooperation with the West has changed the Russian perspective on the ESDP. Russian interest in dialogue and functional cooperation with the ESDP now stems primarily from a wish to add substance to the still nascent EU–Russia partnership, which Putin has chosen as Russia's foremost external priority. In view of the imbalance between EU and Russian economic capacities, the security sphere appears as the most promising area of cooperation on which to found a meaningful long–term partnership. This article traces the evolution of Russian perceptions of the ESDP since it was first launched in June 1999 and outlines the development of EU–Russia relations in this field, which has given Russia the most advanced mechanism for interaction with the ESDP available to a non–EU country. It explores prospective areas of cooperation, as they are viewed by each side, and looks into issues of potential discord. Finally, the article considers the future of Russia–ESDP cooperation in the light of Russia's revitalized partnership with NATO.     

Principles in the pipeline: managing transatlantic values and interests in Central Asia

After a decade of relative neglect post‐Soviet Central Asia has become a foreign policy priority for the transatlantic community. Both the United States and Europe have engaged with the region in recent years in pursuit of new strategic interests, including maintaining military basing access in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan and securing the export of Central Asian oil and gas to the West. Despite this period of renewed engagement, however, the quality of democratic governance within the region remains poor, especially in comparison with other post‐communist regions that successfully completed their political transitions. In fact, the United States and the European Union have often tempered promoting their Central Asian democratization agendas in order to maintain access to these strategically important fixed assets. The transatlantic struggle to balance the pursuit of strategic interests and democratic values has been rendered more difficult by Russia's recent resurgence as a regional power. Backed by the Central Asian governments, Moscow has challenged the purpose and influence of western‐based international and non‐governmental organizations in the region, thereby further diminishing the transatlantic community's capacity to promote sustained democratic reforms.     

From crisis to catharsis: ESDP after Iraq

For many observers, the Iraq crisis spelled the end for EU ambitions in the defence sphere. The profound public and bitter divisions that emerged were seen as illustrative of the insuperable problems confronting ESDP. This article argues, however, that the reverse is in fact the case. Far from sounding the death knell for ESDP, the crisis has had a cathartic effect in compelling the member states to face up to and resolve the major ambiguities that had always threatened to undermine EU defence policies. Consequently, these member states have, in the months following the war, laid the basis not only for a more modest but also for a more effective ESDP.     

Evictability and the Biopolitical Bordering of Europe

Migration and border scholars have argued that the Europeanization and securitization of borders and migration have led to forms of population regulation that constitute a questionable divide between EU and non‐EU groups, as well as between different non‐EU groups. This paper argues that these processes have impacted not only centrifugally, on non‐EU populations, but also centripetally, on the “intra‐EU” divide regarding minorities such as Europe's Muslims and Roma. I explain how a de‐nationalization of the concepts and methods of migration and border studies—beyond methodological nationalism and Eurocentrism—sheds light on the under‐researched impact of the EU's external border regime on minoritized EU citizens. I introduce the notion of “evictability” to articulate this de‐nationalization and discuss the case study of Europe's Romani minority to show how contemporary forms of securitization further divide Europe bio‐politically along intra‐European lines.     

The end of the 'Euro-Mediterranean vision'

Relations between the European Union and North Africa have veered away from the political vision expounded under the Barcelona Process. The Union for the Mediterranean will likely deepen this trend. The Euro–Mediterranean space is increasingly characterized by competitive, containment-based and exclusionary security strategies. The more political dimensions of the partnership are now given short shrift and the EU appears inattentive to the dynamics of change within North African societies. Countries such as Spain and the UK have been overly passive in rescuing the Euro-Med vision from French diplomacy and the nature of relations between Europe and North Africa are increasingly out of sync with the changing international system.     

Enhanced European Union–Australia security cooperation through crisis management

ABSTRACT

Since January 2003, the European Union (EU) has launched over 30 civilian and military crisis management missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy. These missions have involved the participation of both EU member states and third states. In order to help facilitate the participation of third states in these missions, the EU established the Framework Partnership Agreements on crisis management, setting out the legal framework for third-state participation. In April 2015, Australia became the seventeenth country to sign such an agreement with the EU. This agreement reflects both the common interest and values shared by Australia and the EU and the extent to which EU–Australia relations have evolved and deepened over the years. In addition, the increased engagement and socialisation of Australian military and civilian personnel with individual EU member states through their participation in such operations as the International Security Assistance Force operation in Afghanistan, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Combined Maritime Force have further facilitated opportunities for security cooperation at the EU level. Shared concerns and interests on counterterrorism, counter-piracy, instability and capacity-building have also opened up opportunities for increased cooperation between the EU and Australia. This article assesses the significance of the Framework Partnership Agreements on crisis management for EU–Australia relations within the area of security cooperation, and examines future prospects for cooperation.     

Europe as a global actor: empire by example?

The European Union (EU) spreads its norms and extends its power in various parts of the world in a truly imperial fashion. This is because the EU tries to impose domestic constraints on other actors through various forms of economic and political domination or even formal annexations. This effort has proved most successful in the EU's immediate neighbourhood where the Union has enormous political and economic leverage and where there has been a strong and ever‐growing convergence of norms and values. However, in the global arena where actors do not share European norms and the EU has limited power, the results are limited. Consequently, it is not only Europe's ethical agenda that is in limbo; some basic social preferences across the EU seem also to be unsustainable. Can Europe maintain, let alone enhance, its environmental, labour or food safety norms without forcing global competitors to embrace them? The challenge lies not only in enhancing Europe's global power, but also primarily in exporting rules and norms for which there is more demand among existing and emerging global players. This means that Europe should engage in a dialogue that will help it to establish commonly shared rules of morality and global governance. Only then can Europe's exercise of power be seen as legitimate. It also means that Europe should try to become a ‘model power’ rather than a ‘superpower’, to use David Miliband's expression. The latter approach would imply the creation of a strong European centre able to impose economic pains on uncooperative actors. The former would imply showing other actors that European norms can also work for them and providing economic incentives for adopting these norms. To be successful in today's world, Europe needs to export its governance to other countries, but it can do it in a modest and novel way that will not provoke accusations of ‘regulatory imperialism’.     

The birth of a united Europe: on why the EU has generated a ‘non‐emotional’ identity

ABSTRACT. In several respects, the European Union (EU) represents both a novel system of quasi‐supranational governance and a novel form of political community or polity. But it is also a relatively fragile construction: it remains a community still in the making with an incipient sense of identity, within which powerful forces are at work. This article has three main aims. Firstly, to analyse the reasons and key ideas that prompted a selected elite to construct a set of institutions and treaties destined to unite European nations in such a way that the mere idea of a ‘civil war’ among them would become impossible. Secondly, to examine the specific top‐down processes that led to the emergence of a united Europe and the subsequent emergence of the EU, thus emphasising the constant distance between the elites and the masses in the development of the European project. Finally, to explain why the EU has generated what I call a ‘non‐emotional’ identity, radically different from the emotionally charged and still prevailing national identities present in its member states.     

Mercosur and Brazil: A European Perspective

Brazil is the core state of South America and sustains an alliance called Mercosur. Mercosur was the focus of much European attention during the 1990s, both politically and economically, attracting large amounts of investment to the region. Brazil has difficulties pursuing the Mercosur integration process to its logical end, with resistance coming from both developmentalist visions of the past and industrial interests in the present. Mercosur has drawn Brazil closer to the European Union, functioning well as an instrument of Brazil's external ambitions, though also exposing it to the risk of free trade with Europe. For both Mercosur and EU‐Mercosur relations to remain useful to current Brazilian ambitions, they must remain short of achieving their final goals and linger in a prolonged state of negotiation. Some EU states also prefer this solution. After four years of preparations Mercosur entered into negotiations with the EU in 1999, and since then EU‐Mercosur negotiations have passed through several dramatic phases, often influenced by international political and economic developments, both in Europe and in Mercosur itself. The current Mercosur economic crisis impedes further progress in integration and also delays the EU‐Mercosur process. The election of Lula da Silva as president of Brazil is not expected substantially to change the course of Brazilian policies towards Mercosur and the EU, though, faced with the challenge of reviving Mercosur, the president might have to make difficult choices with regard to Brazil's own interests. Through an EU‐Mercosur agreement Lula could resuscitate the Argentinian and Uruguayan economies, though this might be at a cost for Brazil. Will Brazil be willing to pay this price in order to preserve Mercosur?     

Rhetoric of unity and cultural diversity in the making of European cultural identity

The fundamental aim of the cultural policy of the European Union (EU) is to emphasize the obvious cultural diversity of Europe, while looking for some underlying common elements which unify the various cultures in Europe. Through these common elements, the EU policy produces ‘an imagined cultural community’ of Europe which is ‘united in diversity’, as one of the slogans of the Union states. This discourse characterizes various documents which are essential to the EU cultural policy, such as the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Agenda for Culture and the EU’s decision on the European Capital of Culture program. In addition, the discourse is applied to the production of cultural events in European Capitals of Culture in practice. On all levels of the EU’s cultural policy, the rhetoric of European cultural identity and its ‘unitedness in diversity’ is related with the ideas and practices of fostering common cultural heritage.     

Europe's odyssey?: political myth and the European Union

The article argues that the European Union, despite being a different kind of polity, has political myths that are similar to those that have characterised nation‐states. It examines two types of political myth – foundation and exceptionalism – and demonstrates that they have been used in an attempt to make the European Union understandable and acceptable as a form of governing. The article also argues that political myths about the EU have had limited success not only because they are based on the same content as national myths but also because they do not always conform to recognisable narrative forms. The EU, with its ambiguous aim of creating ‘an ever closer union’, does not provide the basis for sacred narratives that become normative and cognitive maps that make the new polity ‘normal’ and provide the EU with ontological security.     

Differentiation as a double‐edged sword: member states’ practices and Brexit

The reform of the eurozone and the concerns surrounding a potential ‘Brexit’ has given rise to a new debate about differentiation but also disintegration in the European Union. This article provides a theoretical and analytical approach to understanding how differentiation is related to the debate on distribution of competences across various levels government. It finds that differentiation has played an important role in the EU integration process since the 1950s, even though the risk of fragmentation has always existed. Facing the benefits and costs of differentiation, the member states have developed their own practices. Three ideosyncratic groups of member states can be identified in this regard: first, a group of Anglo‐Scandinavian member states which refuse centralization of the EU; a Franco‐German group which considers the integration through the promotion of a ‘core Europe’; and, third, a group of central and east European member states who fear that differentiation would set their interests aside and relegate them to second‐class status within the EU. Finally, Brexit is not only about the status of the UK in the EU, but casts deeper questions on how to clarify the nature of relations between the eurozone and the EU as a whole.