The Imperialism of Internment: Boer Prisoners of War in India and Civic Reconstruction in Southern Africa, 1899–1905

During the course of the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, over 9,000 captured Boers were sent abroad to India as prisoners of war. Using hitherto unexamined sources, this article explores how, during their internment and repatriation, British officials and administrators across the empire collaborated in a concerted attempt to transform the imperial enemy into colonial collaborator. This involved a necessarily intercolonial effort to conduct a successful programme of ‘re-education’ capable of cultivating ‘white’ British virtues in preparing Boer POWs for their future rights and duties in reconstructing Southern Africa upon their repatriation. In so doing, the government of India and other colonial officials across the empire thus recapitulated their ideal of Britain’s imperial project in the Boer POW camps. Highlighting the intercoloniality of this process, India’s viceroy, Lord George Curzon, played as prominent a role as did the War Office, or South Africa’s soon-to-be pro-consul, Lord Alfred Milner. The microcosmic imperialism of Boer internment thus reveals a great deal about the nature and structure of power within the British Empire, and emphasises the value of an intercolonial or transcolonial perspective in examining the complex, global consequences of the Anglo-Boer War.     

The Dutch social democrats and the South African war, 1899–1902

This article examines the attitude of the Dutch Social Democrats towards the South African War (1899–1902). At the beginning of the war the SDAP (Social Democratic Workers’ Party) had three seats in the Staten‐Generaal (Parliament). By 1902 this had increased to seven. The South African War created a wave of nationalism in the Netherlands. The Boers were of Dutch descent, and the Dutch generally saw the war as their own. As much as it wanted to assist the Transvaal, the Dutch government, however, could not afford to annoy Britain upon whom she depended for commercial protection of her East Indian colonies. In Social Democratic circles there was a mixed reaction to the war, particularly as their enemy, the Dutch bourgeoisie, had taken the side of the Boers. Arguments were raised for and against on the one hand, humanitar‐ianism and the law of nations, and on the other, historic‐materialistic considerations. The organs of the SDAP—De Sociaaldemokraat and later Het Volk—supported the Boer cause. Their internationalism almost compelled the Social Democrats to stand aloof from the chauvinistic Dutch bourgeoisie. They pointed out that the Netherlands, with its policy on Acheh, an independent sultanate on Sumatra, was in actual fact also an imperialistic nation. Anti‐British sentiment among the Social Democrats rose sharply when the Amsterdam diamond cutters also became victims as many lost their jobs in the wake of the war. Chamberlain (the British Colonial Secretary) and Kitchener (British Commander‐in‐Chief) were seen as war criminals. When, towards the end of 1901, the Amsterdam Water Transport Leagues attempted to organise an international boycott of British shipping, the SDAP sympathised with the plan, but did not give its official approval. Nothing came of the attempt. The Dutch Social Democrats reluctantly accepted the peace, feeling that the Boers would in the future be exploited by British capitalism.     

'More carrot than stick', British Economic Warfare and Spain, 1941-1944

During the Second World War, economic factors became a centralaspect of Spain's relations to both Britain and Nazi Germany.In 1940, when the Franco regime was on the brink of joiningthe war on the side of the Axis, Britain tried to use Spain’sdependence on imports from the west to convince Franco to retainhis country's neutrality. Although, at the time, British ‘economicappeasement’ was not a major factor in the failure ofGerman-Spanish negotiations, it contributed to Spain's verygradual detachment from Nazi Germany over subsequent years.Between1941 and 1944, the focus of British policy towards Spain movedfrom keeping the country out of the war to restricting the servicesSpain rendered to the German war economy. Franco's sympathiesfor the Nazi regime and the economic and financial benefitsof continuing trade with Germany made British and US economicwarfare activities however only a partial success.     

French public attitudes towards the prospect of war in 1938 1939: 'pacifism' or 'war anxiety'?

This article challenges the received wisdom that French publicopinion was infused with pacifist sentiment during the 1930sand that this sentiment in turn contributed to the French defeatof 1940. It will suggest that French public attitudes towardsthe prospect of war can be better defined as ‘war anxiety’rather than the value-laden term ‘pacifism’. Takingas a test case the period between the Munich Agreement of September1938 and the outbreak of the Second World War less than a yearlater, the article will tease out the necessary distinctionbetween ‘pacifism’ and war anxiety. By employinga notion of ‘representations’ of public opinion,it will be shown how French opinion was demonstrably less pacifistthan many existing analyses assume. Instead, it will be contendedthat the public's anxieties with regard to a future war manifestedthemselves in a variety of ways, of which pacifism was merelyone example. Indeed, war anxiety increasingly demanded thatFrance prepare for an inevitable conflict, in stark contrastto simply retreating into a defeatist mindset. War anxiety wasfar from being a contributing factor in the defeat of 1940.     

Unmasking Britannia: The Rise and Fall of British National Identity

Abstract. British national identity is a supranational identity deriving from an imperial past. Warfare created Britain in the eighteenth century, and at first glance mass war in the twentieth century seemed to reinforce it. War, however, was a twoedged sword. On the one hand, it dominated the lives of Britons between 1900 and 1945, yet war and its social-political demands weakened the fabric of the British state which was designed to be a nation-state, rather a state-nation. The more it demanded loyalty to its national icons, the more it became clear that these were not ‘national’ at ail. In many ways war forged state and nation but in a way that has led to its possible break-up.     

Wesleyan Methodists,Humanitarianism and the Zulu Question, 1878–87

This article explores Wesleyan Methodists' responses to the Zulu question (a sequence of events from the Anglo-Zulu War through to British annexation of Zululand) in the 1870s and 1880s particularly in relation to their humanitarianism. In doing so, it approaches the question in the imperial context, examining the attitudes of both the Wesleyan missionaries in South Africa and the Wesleyan public in Britain. The way the Wesleyans responded to the Zulu question was highly complex, largely contingent upon specific historical contexts. The local missionaries and Wesleyans at home were sharply divided over the assessment of the Zulu War; but, once the Boers started meddling in the Zulu civil war, they were united in expressing humanitarian concerns and calling for British protection over the Zulu. Sincere as their sympathy might have been, however, the Wesleyans' humanitarianism comprised a number of beliefs and considerations that were secular as well as religious. This article demonstrates that, despite its apparently universalist impulse and language, humanitarianism as it was espoused by the Wesleyans was always deployed contingently in relation to other imperatives, such as proselytism and commerce.     

The Decline of the Empire and the Economic 'Decline' of Britain

In the 1950s and 1960s, decolonization coincided with the ‘goldenage’ of British capitalism, with record rises in popularliving standards. Economic historians have understandably usedthis coincidence to suggest that by this period the BritishEmpire was no longer offering substantial economic benefitsto the mass of the metropolitan population. Yet there were linksbetween economic performance and the decline of the Empire.First, despite the good performance, profoundly pessimistic‘declinist’ accounts of British society and theeconomy abounded in the early 1960s, and these had a major impacton policy formation. A key underpinning for such accounts wasthe ‘culture of decline’ intimately linked withthe loss of imperial status. Secondly, while it has become acommonplace of discussion of post-war Britain to assume thatreversing ‘decline’ and modernizing the economyrequired a re-orientation of policy away from the Empire andCommonwealth towards Europe, such a reorientation was not aconstant feature of modernization strategies. Indeed, a centralfeature of the initial period of Wilsonian ‘modernization’after 1964 was its attempt to use closer links with the Commonwealthto achieve this objective.     

Imperial Identity in Colonial Minds: Harold Moody and the League of Coloured Peoples, 1931-50

This article examines how the League of Coloured Peoples, foundedin London in 1931 by the Jamaican Harold Moody, used its versionof a British identity to seek equal rights for Britons of colour.I argue that by invoking an imperial British identity that drewon widely accepted elements of Britishness, namely respectabilityand imperial pride, the League gained support from black colonialsand white English people in its fight for equality. This wastrue despite the fact that a major element of the League's conceptionof British identity, racial equality, challenged the dominantidea that ‘true’ Britons were, by definition, white.The article focuses on the workings of the organization's ideologyin the context of two news-making issues: the campaign to restoreBritish citizenship to ‘coloured’ seamen in Cardiffin 1936, and the parliamentary and judicial reaction to discriminationby London's Imperial Hotel against League member Learie Constantinein 1943. The story it tells indicates that British identitieswere claimed and manipulated not only by natives of the BritishIsles, but also by colonial peoples. It further suggests thatunder the conditions of empire colonial peoples could simultaneouslyidentify with the imperial power and their (potentially national)home colony.     

The Politics of Provisioning: Feeding South Asian Prisoners During the First World War

During the First World War, the German and British Governments supplied culturally appropriate rations and secured special facilities for food preparation and consumption for South Asian prisoners of war whose loyalty both governments sought. The food provided in POW camps to South Asians serves as an index of the political status of colonial subjects at a moment when the future of European empires was far from certain. The British Government’s approach to feeding its South Asian servicemen held by the enemy thus reveals this population’s place within Britain’s wartime national and imperial imaginary and in its post-war planning.     

Anglo-Irish Relations, 1939-41: A Study in Multilateral Diplomacy and Military Restraint

‘This study bridges two gaps, one in the historiographyof Anglo-Irish relations between 1939 and 1941 and the otherin International Relations (IR) theory. Anglo-Irish relationsduring the Second World War have been the subject of numerousstudies focusing upon the bilateral nature of that relationship,but it was subject to serious multilateral considerations—theCommonwealth and the US. At moments of danger between the twostates, it was not the balance of a bilateral relationship,but rather of a broad multilateral structure which set the paceof British policy-making. This restrained British military planningagainst Eire. The history of Anglo-Irish relations in this periodpositively links the conduct of multilateral diplomacy withthe absence of the use of force. From the standpoint of IR theory,this provides a useful ‘hard’ case for how/why multilateralismmay matter. It also illustrates several of the deficienciesin IR theory, not least the Whiggish assumption that integrationor globalization follow a linear progression (against whichstands the equally Whiggish notion that interstate relationsare eternally cast). This article seeks to demonstrate thata somewhat wider appreciation of history makes it possible toreconcile multilateral diplomacy with many more traditional‘realist’ concerns.’     

Death and the Making of West Berlin, 1948-1961

This essay traces shifts in attitudes towards death, practicesof burial, and rituals of mourning in West Berlin from the 1948currency reform to the 1961 construction of the Berlin Wall.It shows that West Berliners in the years immediately followingthe Second World War maintained an arduous devotion to theirdead—particularly the war dead. Yet as the war becamea less immediate experience over the course of the 1950s, broadcultural shifts took shape, including a renewed sense of optimismand an emerging feeling that the suffering associated with thewar could be and was being redeemed. Meanwhile, a cult of thedead long venerated as part of the very foundation of Germanculture gradually became ‘less German’ and ‘moreWestern’ over that same period. In this way, it also becamea means of distinguishing West Berlin from its Communist neighbourto the East. By focusing on shifts in perceptions and practicessurrounding death, the essay reveals part of the process bywhich moral and ethical values were reconstructed after Nazism,and how the racist collectivism of the Third Reich graduallygave way to the broadly individualist, democratic-socialisthumanism that would form the basis of an expressly West Germanpolitics and society.     

Internal Decolonization? British Politics since Thatcher as Post-colonial Trauma

In recent years a growing number of commentators, especiallyones associated with the idea of a ‘new imperial history’,have argued that British politics and culture remained moreheavily shaped by colonialism and decolonization than had previouslyconventionally been thought. This paper pursues that line ofthought in relation to political debates during and since the1980s, especially those concerning devolution, constitutionalreform, and race relations. It then, however, highlights somemajor problems with and limitations of this kind of argument,suggesting that the emerging historiography of Britain's ‘internaldecolonization’ remains at present empirically weak, conceptuallycloudy, and often unhelpfully polarized.     

Harold Macmillan and the Deadline Crisis Over Berlin 1958-9

This article examines postwar British foreign policy by analysingthe decision-making process in Whitehall during the ‘deadlinecrisis’, the months between Khrushchev's ultimatum inNovember 1958 and Macmillan's famous voyage of discovery inFebruary 1959. The role played by the then British governmentduring this critical period of the Cold War was widely ignoreduntil the opening of the British archives for the late 1950sand early 1960s, under the thirty-year rule. Since then, scholarshave paid more attention to it. Diplomatic history is affectedgreatly by lack of access to public records; by utilizing previouslywithheld government documents, this paper results in a considerablereassessment of Britain's policy during the early cirisis months.Contrary to conventional wisdom, it argues that Macmillan'scontinuous attempts to shape alliance policy from behind thecurtain put alliance consensus at risk, provoked a deep breachof confidence and so diminshed his scope for effective actionseverely. His visit to Moscow did, in fact, achieve very little,if anything at all.     

'Is he still alive, or long since dead?': Loss, Absence and Remembrance in Nuremberg, 1945-1956

This article uses the search for the ‘missing’ Wehrmachtsoldiers in the 1950s as a prism through which to explore theways in which we might insert the notion of trauma into ourunderstanding of West Germany's status as a postwar society.In seeking to point out the connections between the ways inwhich ‘ordinary Germans’ suffered during and afterthe war on the one hand, and the inability of post-war WestGerman society to ‘confront’ the crimes of the paston the other, it argues that the traumatizing impact of warhas to be considered alongside the ideological and politicalnecessities of the Cold War and reconstruction if we are tounderstand why West German society failed to place the Holocaustat the centre of its memorial culture in the immediate post-waryears. Moreover, in pointing to the Lutheran church as a keysite of memorial politics in the post-war era, it argues forthe integration of a study of religious narratives, mentalitiesand discourses into an understanding of the evolution of thecommemorative practices of the 1950s which has hitherto beenshaped by an excessively one-sided focus on secular sites andnarratives.     

Loyalty and Royalty: Gibraltar, the 1953 54 Royal Tour and the Geopolitics of the Iberian Peninsula

This article explores the 1953–54 Royal Tour and in particularthe planning and eventual reception of the Queen and her partywhen they arrived in Gibraltar. These events are consideredin terms of three overlapping contexts: the imperial, the colonialand the geopolitical. First, the Royal Tour marked not onlythe debut of a new Queen but also the realization that the BritishEmpire was beginning to fragment with the eruption of independencemovements in South Asia and the Middle East. Hence, its internationalitinerary bound the remaining empire symbolically together,but also served as a reminder of the ‘gaps’ thatwere beginning to appear. Second, the analysis considers howthe Royal Tour presented an opportunity for the local residentsof Gibraltar to ‘perform their loyalty’ to the newQueen and the British Empire. The focus on performance is significantbecause the article does not presume that ‘loyalty’is simply pre-given. A great deal of work was involved in realizingthe reception of the Queen's party in May 1954 against a backdropof a territorial dispute with Spain over the future legal statusof Gibraltar. The Royal Tour offered the possibility, therefore,of persuading the British and Spanish governments of the localresidents’ qualities including a continued loyalty tothe British/imperial Royal Family and indirectly to Britain.Third, the article underscores the significance of such loyalperformances by considering Spanish opposition to the Queen'svisit in the light of Franco's efforts to establish his country'santi-Communist credentials. The Royal Tour, and the Gibraltarleg in particular, are thus show to be an intense locus of performanceslinked to the politics of empire, colonial rights and anti-imperialism. Animated, happy faces gazing at the sights and decorations showbetter than words the true feelings of the people of the fortress-colonytowards their young, beloved Queen. One correspondent of a Britishnewspaper said that he thought the 27,000 servicemen and civilianson the Rock were so fervidly loyal that they would tear to piecesanyone discovered in their midst with evil designs, and thatwas sufficient guarantee of their Majesty's safety.¹     

An enduring influence on imperial defence and grand strategy: British perceptions of the Italian Navy, 1935–1943

The Mediterranean was a vital artery of the British Empire. It was a strategic corridor, linking Britain to its Middle and Far East possessions and precious resources. Its control was a central tenet of British imperial strategy, yet by the mid-1930s, this faced a new challenge from Fascist Italy. The Italian Navy was central to expansionist aspirations and forced British reappraisals of the allocation of defence resources both in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. It therefore came to exert a generally under-appreciated influence on pre-war British imperial defence policy and war planning. Although consistently viewed as vastly inferior to the Royal Navy, it was still seen as an impediment to Britain's ability to deliver imperial defence across the globe, or conduct a worldwide war against multiple enemies. This view persisted even after important defeats were inflicted on it in 1940–1941, and continued right through to 1943. Awareness of the seriousness with which the British viewed Italian naval strength adds important context to debates about British strategy in the Far East and over Winston Churchill's preference for a ‘Mediterranean first’ strategy. Italian naval power played a greater role in shaping the Allied prosecution of the Second World War than is commonly accepted.     

A Matter of Foreign Policy: 'Final Solution' and 'Final Victory' in Nazi Germany

The primacy of foreign policy in Nazi Germany has been debatedfor decades. This article seeks not to re-open an old debate,but focuses on the two big aims of Nazi policy: ‘FinalVictory’ and ‘Final Solution’. In order toanalyse their relationship, they are identified as war aims;there follows an examination of both the role of the war inNazi doctrine and Hitler's role in decision-making in general.It can be shown that Hitler's original war plan saw ‘FinalVictory’ as a prerequisite for the ‘Final Solution’,but that from August 1941 the implementation of the ‘FinalSolution’ followed the intention of achieving ‘FinalVictory’ through the extermination of the European Jews.‘Final Victory’ and the ‘Final Solution’thus appear as goals which illuminate the primacy of foreignpolicy in Nazi Germany.     

Boer Propaganda During the South African War of 1899–1902

This article examines Boer propaganda on commando during the South African War by analysing how the two Boer governments and the military leadership endeavoured to inspire a citizen army and to keep the men in the field. In the South African War a commando was a Boer fighting unit, more or less the equivalent of a British regiment, and ‘on commando’ meant ‘in the field’. For the first seven months of the conflict, two important pro-Boer newspapers, De Volksstem and The Standard & Diggers' News were distributed on commando; carefully used, they exercised a significant impact on the combatants' morale. Later, in the guerrilla phase of the war, local newspapers, notably De Bazuin and De Zoutpansberg Wachter, often published under trying conditions, took their place. Furthermore, Boer officers played an important role by fanning patriotism in the ranks with their inspirational rhetoric. The Boer perception that his military and political cause was both just and noble before God was a useful propaganda tool, as were official war reports; they could, in addition to truths, include carefully selected half-truths and flagrant untruths.     

From Propaganda to Modernization: Media Policy and Media Audiences under National Socialism

To date, historians have worked on the assumption that NationalSocialism used the media to powerful propaganda effect. Yetat an early stage a few voices, especially within Anglo-Saxonscholarship, questioned whether the process was so direct. Increasinglythe individual media have been examined, both technically andin terms of their public the reactions they provoked. This essayexamines how the media can be said to have modernized underNational Socialism, and how newspaper readers, radio listenersand cinema audiences reacted to the development of the media.There were major differences. Radio was conceived as a mediumfor music and entertainment; new formats were developed in responseto listeners turning to programmes from abroad, so that Germanradio could no longer keep a monopoly on information. The majorityof feature films were melodramas and light entertainment, andalthough many carried a ‘message’, the cinema wasfundamentally a commercial, non-political sphere. Newspapersremained relatively conservative in presentation. The presswas largely concentrated in the hands of the party, so informationwas highly controlled, and due to difficulties of productionin wartime they became increasingly unattractive, and by 1942were trusted by few readers. The corpus of the media generallybecame technically more efficient, and sought to please itsgrowing audience. Total control of the media by the politicalleaders was not achieved. Particular elements, such as war films,or the ‘Wehrmacht Request Show’, had memorable success.Agenda setting by the media planners put certain key politicalideas into the forefront, and they were able to disseminatekey symbols and rituals of National Socialism. The media werebut one of many agents used, though, to foster political loyalty.The régime also, and more importantly, achieved thisby using existing attitudes, and through its permanent threatof violence towards the population, whom they also seduced withmaterial ‘treats’. It emerges that it is both possibleand helpful in studying the development of the media to examineit as a process of modernization in the media, in their organizationaland technical structures. This process was however underminedwherever in German society anti-modernist ideology and practicespersisted or fought back.     

William Morris Hughes,Empire and Nationalism: The Legacy of the First World War

Despite the amplitude with which Prime Minister W. M. Hughes voiced Australian claims during the First World War, his conduct in the immediate postwar years shows that his nationalism remained consistent with an imperial and British standpoint. This proposition is illustrated with reference to Hughes' role in the 1921 imperial conference, the Chanak crisis, and his post-prime ministerial memoir. While obsessed with expedients to improve the speed and scope of intra-imperial communications and thus facilitate consultation, Hughes was concerned to ensure that Australia played a proper role in arriving at a consensus on the deep common interest that unified Britain and the Dominions. His lack of concern for extending the scope for independent action won by the Dominions during the war, his dismissive remarks regarding the British role in the League of Nations, and the vehemence of his communications with London in 1922, must all be seen within the context of an imperial loyalty that survived the war undiminished.