Australia and India: the Indian Ocean and the limits of strategic convergence

Many Australian observers see Australia and India as ‘natural’ partners whose strategic perspectives are likely to become ever closer in coming years. This article will examine recent developments in the Australia–India security relationship and consider some possible limits to the strategic convergence of Australia and India, particularly in Indian Ocean security. It argues that Australia's challenge in coming years will be not only to address areas of common interest but to also actively engage with India on the interests and expectations of littoral states and extra-regional powers in the security of the Indian Ocean.     

Why US-Sino strategic competition is good for Australia

ABSTRACT

Faced with an increasingly authoritarian and assertive China, the United States (US) under President Trump administration’s has embarked on a course toward a more openly competitive US–China relationship. However, the debate in Australia has viewed the new era of US-Sino strategic competition mostly negatively. Indeed, arguments have been made for a need to ‘radically’ rethink Australia’s defence policy in order to prepare for a ‘post-US-led’ regional order. For some analysts, Canberra has even no other choice than to adopt a strategy of ‘armed neutrality’ to deal with an emerging China-dominated regional order and a declining US, confused and unwilling to defend its allies. In contrast, this article argues that on balance Trump’s course correction on China is positive for Australia as the US is likely to maintain its robust engagement in the Indo-Pacific. While the president’s inconsistencies partly undermine US declaratory statements in regards to greater competition with China, a bipartisan consensus is likely to continue to shift US policy in this direction. While greater US-Sino competition requires Australia to assume greater responsibilities for regional security, radical changes to its defence policy and security alignment are not needed.     

Change and continuity in strategic culture: the cases of Australia and New Zealand

The relationship between strategic culture and defence policies has not yet been much explored. Australia and New Zealand provide some evidence of the impact of strategic culture on defence policy. Australia has a dominant strategic culture which is strong enough to prompt both the major political parties to adopt realist defence policies, even though Labor has a traditionally ‘idealist’ outlook. Until the 1970s, New Zealand had a similar dominant strategic culture which influenced both major political parties, but it was always less strong than Australia's. In recent years, the Labour Party has rejected that culture, and allowed an alternative strategic culture based on its ideology to influence its defence policies. The result has been that on the last two occasions when Labour has been in government, New Zealand's defence policy has changed dramatically.     

Towards a comprehensive strategic partnership between Australia and Japan: Japan's perspective

With 2006 and 2007 marking two important anniversaries in the history of their bilateral ties, Australia and Japan are committed to reaffirming the significance of their relationship and expanding it into new dimensions. The Australian and Japanese foreign ministers have agreed to build a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ between their two countries. What are the factors that motivate Canberra and Tokyo to elevate their bilateral relations to the level of a strategic partnership? From a Japanese point of view, the main reason is the enhanced strategic importance of Australia with such indicators as Australian's enhanced security role, the structural changes in Asia and movements toward a new regional architecture, Japan's energy and food security, the trilateral strategic dialogue between Australia, the United States and Japan, and shared values and the Australian government's policy toward Japan. Both nations are expected to advance toward an even closer relationship with these factors in mind.1 1. The views expressed in this article, which was written in September 2006, are those of the author and do not in any way represent the views of the Embassy of Japan in Australia or the Japanese government. View all notes     

合作与冲突:联合国善后救济总署对华物资禁运述评

第二次世界大战结束以后,联合国出于人道主义精神对战争受灾国进行善后救济。但是中国的善后救济却面临重重困难,如何有效地将联总物资进行储运和分配,行总和联总有许多截然不同的设计和规划。二者之间存在的矛盾与摩擦,不可避免地导致了1946年联总对华物资禁运事件。     

Rewriting the history of Chinese families in nineteenth-century Australia

The nineteenth-century Chinese population in Australia was made up mostly of men, drawing many commentators to the conclusion these men faced an absence of family life, resulting in prostitution, gambling, opium use and other so-called vices. Recent research has, however, expanded and complicated our knowledge of Chinese families in New South Wales and Victoria, particularly concerning the extent to which Chinese men and white Australian women formed intimate relationships. This article traces the origins of the misconceptions about Chinese families in nineteenth-century Australia, and considers how new directions in scholarship over the past decade are providing methods for enlarging our knowledge. It argues that instead of being oddities or exceptions, Chinese-European families were integral to the story of Australia's early Chinese communities.     

The abandonment of procurement-linked strategic activism in Australia: standing still with room to move

In this paper I examine the extent to which preferential trade agreements (PTAs) limit the Australian government's ability to use public procurement for local industry development ends. I do so not only by examining Australia's PTA obligations, but also by examining how other governments with similar obligations—such as Korea—are using public purchasing policies to promote local industrial advancement. I find that the PTA obligations of the Australian and Korean governments leave them both significant scope to use public purchasing strategically. Interestingly, however, Australian policymakers have been standing still in the room that remains, and even abandoning PTA-compliant procurement-linked development policies. South Korean policymakers on the other hand have been capitalising on every inch of space left open to them—and even experimenting with new forms of strategic public purchasing that nonetheless comply with their international obligations. I conclude by offering some suggestions as to how we might explain these countries’ radically different approaches to procurement policy, despite their very similar international obligations.     

华人新移民在澳大利亚、新西兰的生存适应分析

澳大利亚、新西兰自上世纪七八十年代开始实行面向亚洲的政策以来 ,来自亚太地区不同国家的华人移民以及其他亚裔移民大量移进这两个国家。他们在异国他乡面临着以高失业率为主要特征的生存危机。但这一包括中国大陆新移民的华人群体 ,克服重重困难 ,站稳脚跟 ,逐步积累 ,取得了初步的成功     

Lost at Sea: Finnish government,shipping companies and the United Nations embargo against China during the 1950s

Finnish Cold War foreign policy was based on the desire to stay out of all international disputes. Yet, during the 1950s, two Finnish tankers, Wiima and Aruba, received an enormous amount of foreign attention when they tried to sail to Communist China. The United Nations had urged all countries, including non-members such as Finland, to stop selling strategic goods to China, which had intervened in the Korean War. The embargo created a highly profitable opening in the shipping market for anyone willing to transport such goods, and Finnish companies tried to fill it. This article suggests that they were in fact undermining the embargo more extensively than has been generally known. When the Finns were criticized for their actions, they interpreted this as a sign of the ruthlessness of great powers. At first, the Finnish government failed to recognize that these companies drove the country into the middle of international conflict and then took little decisive action to steer the country out of it. The allegedly pragmatic Finnish foreign policy was in this case actually based on unreliable information and incorrect assumptions.