Warfare,political identities,and displacement in Spain and Colombia

This paper explores the causes of displacement during civil wars. Recent scholarship has shown that conventional civil wars – those in which forces are relatively balanced – and irregular civil wars – those in which one side is substantially stronger than the other – exhibit different patterns of violence. We hypothesize that, while the mode of violence differs, the form of displacement should be consistent across the wars: displacement is a tactic of war that armed groups use to conquer new territories. By expelling civilians associated with rivals, armed groups improve their odds of gaining control of contested territory. This implies that members of a group are targeted for displacement because of their identity and presumed loyalties. We test the theory using two fine-grained datasets on individuals displaced during a conventional civil war, in Spain (1936–1939), and an irregular civil war, in Colombia (1964–). In both cases, the war cleavage was ideological and reflected in national elections: the locations where political parties received support indicated which populations were sympathetic to rivals. In both civil wars, we observe higher levels of displacement in locations where more sympathizers of rival armed groups reside. The article is the first comparison to our knowledge of the sub-national dynamics of displacement within two different civil wars and it shows that the microfoundations of displacement are similar across types. Finally, the article explains macro-level differences with a coherent micro-level framework.     

民居中的奇迹——福建的土楼

土楼是福建西南部以永定为中心的客家人的民居。这种民居非常特殊,有方形、园形。多为四层,中间为庭院。居民多属同族、同宗、同姓。它是北方因战乱而南迁的移民带来的。在东汉以后。北方战乱,大姓士绅多聚居建成坞壁,作为保护自己。客家人南迁到福建西南,在少数民族与荒野之中,也采取这种形式建筑以适应防守需要。永居的土楼在当地环境亦有发展,特别是园形土楼,形成独特形式。由于客家人聚族迁移此地,土楼既适应其特殊环境,而且也进一步促进了客家人以耕读为中心的强大内聚力的文化的发展。因此,土楼既是客家文化的一种外在景观,又是其文化内涵的外在条件。     

试论魏晋隋唐时期的宗族政策

魏晋南北朝时期,既是中古宗族势力发展的顶点,也是其由盛而衰的转折点。各王朝在巩固与发展的过程中,一方面虽然必须借助于宗族与士族势力的支持;另一方面,它们都与异己的宗族与士族势力进行着强力的较量,并开始清理宗族势力在乡村社会中的根基。就其宗族政策而言,魏晋以依托为主,南北朝以收拢为主;收拢之力度南不如北。至隋唐时期,旧式宗族逐渐消解,新式宗族开始登上历史舞台,隋唐王朝则从制度上完成了对宗族这一社会力量的有效分解与钳制。在隋唐宗族政策的冲击下,中古宗族的政治与军事功能逐渐消退,经济互助功能以及血缘凝聚力的效能与影响明显逊于前代,宗族威权发生蜕变,开始了向近古新型宗族的演进。     

Local determinants of African civil wars, 1970–2001

In large-N investigations, civil conflicts – like any significant political event – tend to be studied and understood at the country level. Popular explanations of why and where civil wars occur, however, refer to such factors as ethnic discrimination, wealth inequalities, access to contrabands, and peripheral havens. The intensity of such factors varies geographically within states. Therefore, any statistical study of civil war that uses country-level approximations of local phenomena is potentially flawed. In this paper, we disaggregate the country and let 100 × 100 km grid cells be the units of observation. Having developed geo-referenced conflict data from Uppsala/PRIO's conflict database, we use GIS to identify regions of peace and conflict and as a tool to generate sub-national measures of key explanatory variables. The results from an empirical analysis of African civil wars, 1970–2001, demonstrate spatial clustering of conflict that co-varies with the spatial distribution of several exogenous factors. Territorial conflict is more likely in sparsely populated regions near the state border, at a distance from the capital, and without significant rough terrain. Conflict over state governance is more likely in regions that are densely populated, near diamond fields, and near the capital city. These promising findings show the value of the innovative research design and offer nuanced explanations of the correlates of civil war.     

Raise your voices! Civilian protest in civil wars

Under what conditions do protests occur in civil wars? Evidence from case studies suggests that protests can indeed play an important role in contexts of civil wars, with civilians using respective tactics both against the state and rebels. We argue that localities experiencing armed clashes are likely to see protest events in the same month. Civilians conduct protests due to battle-related changes in the local opportunity structures and grievances related to losses experienced through collateral damage. Using spatially disaggregated data on protest and battle events in African civil wars, we find support for our hypothesis that battles trigger civilian protests. This effect is robust to the inclusion of a comprehensive list of confounding variables and alternative model specifications, including the use of different temporal and spatial units. Our findings highlight the role of the civilian population and the spatial relationship between war events and protests in civil wars.     

The Father's Success and the Son's Failure: Explaining the Growth of Lebanon's Resistance to Syria's Invisible Occupation

In the 15‐year period since the Syrian military entry into Lebanon on June 1, 1976, allegedly to put an end to the civil war that broke out there a year earlier, Syria firmly solidified its control of the country, as evidenced by the signing of the “Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination between Syria and Lebanon,” on May 22, 1991, which granted Syria a special status. Yet, 14 years later, on April 24, 2005, the Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon. This article seeks to explain this relatively rapid decline in Syria's standing in Lebanon by examining the strategies of the two Syrian rulers who indirectly controlled this country during those years. It examines what was right in Hafiz al‐Asad's strategy in Lebanon, and what did not work in Bashar's policy. In 2000, the year of Hafiz al‐Asad's death, Syria's status in Lebanon seemed unshakable: 1) Lebanon's president (Emile Lahoud) acted as Damascus's puppet; 2) Hezbollah, the Shi‘a militia Hezbollah largely accepted Syria's authority while it simultaneously tightened its control over southern Lebanon and also began gaining popularity in the rest of the country; and 3) finally the politics of the noble families, which had characterized Lebanon since its establishment, began to gradually give way to a politics where a political figure is measured by the level of his connections to the country's power base in Damascus. Yet, merely five years later, Syria was under immense pressure to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. This suggests that we must look at the difference between the strategies of Hafiz al‐Asad and his son Bashar for controlling Lebanon to better understand the rapid deterioration in Syria's standing in the country. We argue that the difference in the degree of anti‐Syrian pressures from Lebanon's society and political elements between the two tenures is largely rooted in the different strategies that the two Syrian presidents adopted for informally ruling Lebanon. We identify three main areas where Bashar al‐Asad made mistakes due to his failure to continue his father's methods. First, Bashar put all his cards on Hezbollah, thus antagonizing all the other groups which resented that Shi‘a dominance. Second, in stark contrast to his father, Bashar distanced himself from the regular management of Lebanon's ethnic politics. Hafiz al‐Asad made sure that all the leaders of the different ethnic groups would visit Damascus and update him on their inter‐ethnic conflicts, and then he would be the one who would either arbitrate between them or, for expediency reasons, exacerbate these feuds. Once the ethnic leaders had to manage without Damascus, they learned to get along, making him far less indispensable for the running of the country. Finally, Bashar, unlike his father, did not make a real effort to gain international and regional legitimacy (or at least de‐facto acceptance) for Syria's continued control over Lebanon. Most conspicuously, while Hafiz participated in the First Gulf War against Iraq, his son supported Sunni rebels who fought against the United States‐led coalition forces there. This foreign acquiescence was significant since the Lebanese felt they had a backing when they demanded Syria's withdrawal in 2005. These different strategic approaches of the two rulers meant that the father's policies wisely laid the ground for some of the most controversial measures which were needed as part of any attempt to monopolize control over another country, such as Lebanon (assassinating popular but too independent‐minded Lebanese presidents/prime ministers or extending tenures of loyalist ones), whereas the son's policies myopically failed to do so properly. Indeed, the article will show that while both the father and the son took these same controversial measures, the responses of the Lebanese were completely different. Admittedly, some historical developments increased the Lebanese propensity to rise up against Syria, and these meant that Bashar did in fact face a harder task than his father in maintaining Syria's informal occupation. The Israeli withdrawal from its so‐called “security zone” in south Lebanon meant that one justification for the Syrian presence was gone. More importantly, the risk of renewed eruption of the civil war (which in turn had meant for many years a greater willingness by the locals to tolerate the Syrian presence which prevented the war's resumption) declined significantly due to a variety of processes that could not have been halted even with better “management” of the interethnic strife from Damascus (i.e., making sure that the ethnic groups remained in deep conflict with each other). Nevertheless, as we will show, Bashar's mistakes played a crucial role in bringing the rival ethnic groups together by making Damascus their joint enemy.     

Editorial

Abstract

During this last century war has taken more lives and wrought more damage than in all of human history. Its persistence - with over a hundred armed conflicts on the scale of ‘war’ raging in the last decade - prompts a search for causes, since diagnosis comes before a cure. Many fingers point to the stress of poverty as a major contributing factor, but both anecdotal and modelling approaches reveal that poverty has not been and is not now a significant proactive or enabling factor: if poverty were to become a thing of the past there would be no assurance that wars would be eliminated or even significantly reduced. Poverty is associated with societal stress and with sporadic and endemic societal violence, but stress does not lead to war or play a major role in enabling the rise to power of war prone leaders and their associated elites unless other factors are at play. The causal factors conducive to war making are varied but all are characterised by tribal, religious, and ethnic rivalries that political leaders exploit to mobilise support for war, and/or by the lust for money or hegemonic power of the political leadership. It is exceptionally difficult to prevent the rise of leaders who, for various self-serving reasons, are able to gain power and are prone to pursue policies leading to war. The way to thwart these ambitions is to create conditions, nationally and internationally, that are inimical to the rise to power of such leaders and, if they do gain power, to make the realisation of their war bent policies too costly to them. At the national level of governance the essential elements of policies to create such war inhibiting conditions are education, especially at the primary level, a free independent media, and a guaranteed protection of political and civil rights - in a phrase, democratic governance. At the international level of governance the support calls for financial and other forms of assistance that would enable national governments to carry through the democracy enhancing programmes and projects related to education and to political and civil rights, and measures to strengthen democratic control of the system of international institutions and to constrain the exercise of national sovereignty in those areas where doing so enhances ‘the global common good’, one key element of which is the radical diminution of international and intrastate wars. Economic and social rights are the other aspects that comprise the concept of ‘human rights’, and, though they are mutually reinforcing, for tactical reasons the struggle to achieve these rights should be pursued on a separate track from the struggle to gain political and civil rights that appear to face less formidable obstacles and could thus, in the short and medium term, progress sufficiently to have a significant impact in reducing the occurrence and intensity of wars.     

Contemporary Civil Conflicts in the Nile Basin States

This topic deals with the reasons for the civil conflicts in the Nile Basin Area in Africa. From the geographical point of view, these countries are suffering from the lack of demarcation of boundaries among them. From an economic point of view, they would fight over the abundant economic resources that were taken away wholly by the foreign companies, leaving the crumbs to be disputed over. Additionally, ethnic differences kindle ethnic and religious contradictions. This research will also ascertain some of these reasons, and then review examples of the civil conflicts in the area. Unless these contradictions can be rectified, or mitigated, they will continue to simmer and periodically re‐emerge as a full‐fledged civil war.     

The growth of secure inheritance in Anglo-Norman England

The following paper traces the crystallization of inheritance custom in England from 1086 to 1154. Inheritance of baronial estates has long been considered by historians to have been tenuous in the reigns of William the Conqueror and his sons, but by dating instances of forfeiture, escheat and other forms of disinheritance, and by comparing these dates with those of political turmoil, it can be shown that the custom became fairly secure and regular in the latter half of the reign of Henry I, only to be disrupted in the civil wars of Stephen's reign.     

The growth of secure inheritance in Anglo-Norman England

The following paper traces the crystallization of inheritance custom in England from 1086 to 1154. Inheritance of baronial estates has long been considered by historians to have been tenuous in the reigns of William the Conqueror and his sons, but by dating instances of forfeiture, escheat and other forms of disinheritance, and by comparing these dates with those of political turmoil, it can be shown that the custom became fairly secure and regular in the latter half of the reign of Henry I, only to be disrupted in the civil wars of Stephen's reign.     

China's and India's perspectives on military intervention: why Africa but not Syria?

This article addresses the puzzle for students of international relations as to why China and India, two major re-emerging powers in Asia, do not always baulk at military intervention invoked by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, while they rhetorically harbour strong reservations about it. The recent cases of Côte d'Ivoire (2011), Libya (2011), Syria (since 2011) and Mali (since 2012) show that both China and India acquiesced in external military intervention in these African countries plunged into brutal civil wars, with only intervention in Syria being rebuffed. By studying how they voted in the United Nations Security Council in 2011–12 and their discourses on intervention, including humanitarian intervention, this article examines why their decisions about intervention in Africa diverged from their decisions regarding intervention in Syria. The authors put forward the thesis that their behaviour can be explained by an interplay between norms and interests, in which they express a common anti-US liberal imperialist stance, shaped by a ‘collective historical trauma' and ‘post-imperial ideology', and demonstrate concerns for state failure and preferences for regional initiatives and political mediation to resolve civil wars.     

‘Those same cursed Saracens’: Charlemagne's campaigns in the Iberian Peninsula as religious warfare

While it is well known that many of Charlemagne's wars had a strong religious element, Frankish campaigns against the Muslims of Spain in his reign have generally been understood as secular exercises in power politics. This article presents evidence contemporary to Charlemagne's reign to argue against this, using a diverse range of sources to conclude that many observers of the Frankish invasions of the Iberian Peninsula understood them as religious wars aimed both at the defending of Christian communities in Francia and protecting and expanding the worship of Christianity in Spain. Further, although the prosecution of these wars was politically opportunistic, the sources suggest that Charlemagne and his court encouraged interpretations of these campaigns in religious terms and that they might be considered examples of religious war.     

乡村都市化与都市村民的宗族生活--广州城中三村研究

在珠江三角洲地区,随着城市的不断扩大,乡村都市化进程加快,都市宗族这种特有的文化现象亦受到影响,传统观念的文化土壤、都市环境的心理适应以及经济利益的内在牵引是都市宗族得以存续的条件.然而,都市生活的浸染,致使宗族权力再度萎缩,宗族意识日趋消解.随着"城中村"的改造、"村庄的终结",都市村民的宗族生活必将转化为远离其传统载体的文化躯壳,并在跨越边界的社区网络中渐淡地延续下去.     

Greed and grievance in civil war

While economic agendas have been shown to be an important factor in shaping civil wars, there are several problems with prominent explanations centring on rebel ‘greed’, notably those put forward by Paul Collier. Among these are: the way proxies for ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ have been used; the lack of attention to links between ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’; and the lack of attention to ‘greed’ among elements associated with counter‐insurgencies. Why has Collier's analysis proven so popular, despite its flaws? I suggest that it represents an attractive over‐simplification with a scientific aura. It achieves a degree of simplicity by excluding many of the most important features of civil wars, even to the extent of asserting that there is no point in asking rebels about their motivations. Furthermore, it is often politically convenient in that it tends to exclude a number of western governments—and (sometimes favoured) governments in poorer countries—from serious scrutiny. By contrast, the emphasis placed by Frances Stewart and her associates on the role of economic and political inequalities between groups offers a more nuanced understanding of how civil wars are caused and shaped, an understanding that is better able to take account of the nature of grievances and of the role of abusive government‐affiliated actors in generating grievances.     

Undermining Obligation to God: Hobbes’s Religious Rhetoric and False Forms of Obligation

ABSTRACT

This paper examines Hobbes’s use of religious rhetoric, specifically his definitions of the terms grace, faith, and future words in his explanation of the nature and origins of obligation. Through categorization and analysis of Hobbes’s different forms of obligation, paying special attention to the religious rhetoric of the false forms, it becomes evident that Hobbes’s view of obligation is designed not only to establish a political order, but to undermine man’s obligation to God, and as such, remove the possibility of competing obligation in the life of the citizen, and thereby reduce the cause of civil wars.     

Rebel with a Cause: Ahok and Charismatic Leadership in Indonesia

The representation of minority ethnic communities is an acute issue in many countries in East and Southeast Asia. In Muslim-majority Indonesia, the rise of Jakarta’s governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, nicknamed “Ahok”, was a surprising phenomenon given his ethnic and religious minority status as a Christian of Chinese descent. Even more surprising was his initial success as a politician despite a controversial style of communication that appears to contrast with prevailing cultural norms. We argue that the reason for Ahok’s unlikely rise to prominence lay in his ability to reshape the political narrative by shifting the focus of “Indonesian-ness” away from ethnic or religious identity to moral values based on transparency and integrity. Ethnicity and identity remain powerful forces in Indonesian politics, but we argue that Ahok has established a charismatic relationship with followers by positioning himself in opposition to some of the more pressing concerns in contemporary Indonesia.     

Diffusion patterns of violence in civil wars

Much of the current conflict literature attempts to explain the occurrence of violence as the result of determinants exogenous to the conflict process. This paper takes a different approach and analyzes how violence in civil wars spreads in space and time, drawing on earlier work on micro-diffusion of violence in criminology as well as high resolution conflict data. Two general scenarios are distinguished in our analysis: the relocation and the escalation of conflict. Relocation diffusion corresponds to a shift in the location of violence, whereas escalation diffusion refers to the spatial expansion of the conflict site. We argue that unconventional warfare in civil wars without demarcated front lines should primarily lead to the second type of pattern. We describe an extension to a joint count statistic to measure both diffusion types in conflict event data. Monte Carlo simulation allows for the establishment of a baseline for the frequency of contiguous conflict events under the assumption of independence, and thus provides a significance test for the observed patterns. Our results suggest that violence in civil wars exhibits patterns of diffusion, and in particular, that these patterns are primarily of the escalation type, driven by the dynamic expansion of the scope of the conflict.     

Situating banal nationalism,the culture wars,and civil religion: governing localized geographies of national identity in Indiana

Various material forms of national identity have become ubiquitous features of the post-9/11 American cultural landscape. This research specifically examines the ‘In God We Trust’ (IGWT) license plate in the state of Indiana as a material expression and territorialized form of national identity. While conceptually anchored in banal nationalism research, exploring the spatial patterns of adoption or non-adoption of IGWT license plates by Indiana residents is only possible through situating this research through the mediating lens of the culture wars and civil religion. Although the IGWT license plate project legislatively materialized through the localized spatial networks of non-state actors in the context of a new and conservative state–citizen relationship firmly anchored in the culture wars, adoption behavior is also mediated through the much broader influence of civil religion. We conduct a quantitative analysis to determine license plate spatial distribution by county, but more importantly to explore the sociodemographic dimensions of IGWT license plate adoption and non-adoption. While our results generally mirror the sociodemographic findings of social issue-based electoral geography, the imbrication of banal nationalism, the culture wars, and civil religion as materially expressed by the IGWT license plate yields an ideologically different and broader dynamic when compared to culture wars defined by national identity.     

‘Just and lawful war’ as genocidal war in the (United States) Northwest Ordinance and Northwest Territory, 1787–1832

This article focuses on the United States Northwest Ordinance of 1787's profession of ‘utmost good faith’ towards Indians and its provision for ‘just and lawful wars’ against them. As interpreted by US officials as they authorized and practised war against native communities in the Northwest Territory from 1787 to 1832, the ‘just and lawful wars’ clause legalized wars of ‘extirpation’ or ‘extermination’, terms synonymous with genocide by most definitions, against native people who resisted US demands that they cede their lands. Although US military operations seldom achieved extirpation, this was due to their ineptness and the success of indigenous strategies rather than an absence of intention. When US military forces did succeed in achieving their objective, the result was massacre, as revealed in the Black Hawk War of 1832. US policy did not call for genocide in the first instance, preferring that Indians embrace the gift of civilization in exchange for their lands. Should Indians reject this display of ‘utmost good faith’, however, US policy legalized genocidal war against them.     

American civil–military relations today: the continuing relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's The soldier and the state

Fifty‐five years after it was first published, Samuel Huntington's The soldier and the state remains an essential starting point for serious discussions of American civil–military relations. In part this is due to the boldness and ambition of the author. Huntington brought theory to a research area that had suffered from too little theorizing and then went on to formulate concepts that scholars and practitioners of civil–military relations still find useful. These include: the conceptualization of the military as a profession; the articulation of the two central forces shaping the nature of military institutions as the functional and the societal imperatives; and the formulation of subjective and objective control as the two main patterns of civilian control. This review article briefly revisits these concepts and argues that they retain utility in illuminating important issues in American civil–military relations today. It also argues, however, that Huntington's contributions were productive but not perfect. Some of his specific definitions, such as the content of military expertise, are debatable. Some of his central concerns, such as whether the United States could sustain a strong military over an extended period of time, are no longer central today. Finally, in some places the literature has moved beyond what Huntington offered. The best example is the ongoing debate over how the country's political leaders and its most senior military officers should interact. It is precisely on this point that Huntington's objective control is the weakest. While The soldier and the state certainly does not deserve uncritical acceptance, it does continue to merit a fair hearing. Current discussions of American civil–military relations are likely to be more reasonable and productive if Huntington is given a voice.