Analysing international nuclear order

William Walker's article, ‘Nuclear enlightenment and counter‐enlightenment’, raises fundamental questions about the history of efforts to construct order in international politics in relation to nuclear arms and weapons‐related capabilities. However, Walker's ‘enlightenment’ and ‘counter‐enlightenment’ tropes are clumsy and unsatisfactory tools for analysing contemporary policies concerning nuclear deterrence, non‐proliferation and disarmament. Walker holds that in the 1960s and 1970s most of the governments of the world came together in pursuit of ‘a grand enlightenment project’. This thesis cannot withstand empirical scrutiny with regard to its three main themes—a supposed US‐Soviet consensus on doctrines of stabilizing nuclear deterrence through mutual vulnerability, a notion that the NPT derived from ‘concerted efforts to construct an international nuclear order meriting that title’, and the view that the NPT embodied a commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament. Walker's criticisms of US nuclear policies since the late 1990s are in several cases overstated or ill‐founded. Walker also exaggerates the potential influence of the United States over the policies of other countries. It is partly for this reason that the challenges at hand—both analytical and practical—are more complicated and dif cult than his article implies. His work nonetheless has the great merit of raising fundamental questions about international political order.     

Bringing hegemony back in: the United States and international order

Hegemony suffers from a bad press. It is currently used to refer simply to United States primacy. Thus presented, the US is considered to have been hegemonic since 1945, or at least since 1990. Instead, hegemony is presented here as a legitimate institution of international society in which special rights and responsibilities are conferred on the hegemon. No such hegemony exists at present. However, given today's constellation of power, a circumscribed US hegemony potentially has a distinctive contribution to make to contemporary international order. To map out such a hegemonic institution, this article reviews some historical precedents. It finds that, rather than uniform, these have taken a variety of forms, especially with respect to the scope of the legitimacy and constituency within which they have operated. A scheme of hegemonies—singular, collective and coalitional—is set out as a more realistic way of thinking about hegemony's present potential.     

Foucault,realism and the power discourse in international relations

The work of Michel Foucault highlights the need to rethink the assumptions of disciplines such as international relations which have tended to remain narrow, universalist and positivist. In particular, the key concept of power has largely escaped critical inquiry. This article seeks to open up the power discourse in international relations by exploring the limits of traditional approaches such as realism and even critical theory, arguing for a ‘post‐positivist’ approach which incorporates Foucault's insights into the nature of power. Indeed, it goes beyond much of the ‘Third Debate’ in directly focusing on power and rearticulating its form and content as a category of analysis in international relations.     

Military doctrine,command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

Military doctrine is one of the conceptual components of war. Its raison d'être is that of a force multiplier. It enables a smaller force to take on and defeat a larger force in battle. This article's departure point is the aphorism of Sir Julian Corbett, who described doctrine as ‘the soul of warfare’. The second dimension to creating a force multiplier effect is forging doctrine with an appropriate command philosophy. The challenge for commanders is how, in unique circumstances, to formulate, disseminate and apply an appropriate doctrine and combine it with a relevant command philosophy. This can only be achieved by policy‐makers and senior commanders successfully answering the Clausewitzian question: what kind of conflict are they involved in? Once an answer has been provided, a synthesis of these two factors can be developed and applied. Doctrine has implications for all three levels of war. Tactically, doctrine does two things: first, it helps to create a tempo of operations; second, it develops a transitory quality that will produce operational effect, and ultimately facilitate the pursuit of strategic objectives. Its function is to provide both training and instruction. At the operational level instruction and understanding are critical functions. Third, at the strategic level it provides understanding and direction. Using John Gooch's six components of doctrine, it will be argued that there is a lacunae in the theory of doctrine as these components can manifest themselves in very different ways at the three levels of war. They can in turn affect the transitory quality of tactical operations. Doctrine is pivotal to success in war. Without doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy military operations cannot be successfully concluded against an active and determined foe.     

The Secret Policemen's Ball: the United States, Russia and the international order after 11 September

In this article, Anatol Lieven argues that the collapse of the Soviet and communist threats and the triumph of capitalism and bourgeois values gave the United States an unprecedented chance to act as a status quo hegemon, dominating the world with the consent of other major powers. The United States threw up this chance by acting instead as a 'dissatisfied' and even revolutionary power, creating a sense of menace and resentment across much of the world. After the 11 September attacks, the near-global threat of Sunni Islamist terrorism and revolution gives the United States another opportunity to rally much of the world behind it, in a kind of new 'Holy Alliance' of states against threats from below. But by mixing up the struggle against terrorism with a very different effort at preventing nuclear proliferation, and by refusing to take the interests of other states into account, the US risks missing this opportunity for a second time, and endangering itself and its closest allies such as Britain.     

Gender,sexuality and power in Arab society: Arab feminist criticism of discourse and social order

Adnan, Etel. Sitt Marie Rose. Sausalito, California: Post‐Apollo Press, 1982. 105 pp. $7.50 paper.

El Saadawi. Woman at Point Zero. London: Zed Press, 1983. iv + 106 pp. $6.25 paper.

Sabbah, Fatna A. Woman in the Muslim Unconscious. New York: Pergamon Press. 132 pp. including footnotes and index. $22.50 cloth, $9.95 paper.     

The effect of the telegraph on law and order,war, diplomacy,and power politics

Abstract

Until the invention of the electric telegraph in the 1830s, transferring messages at speeds greater than that of a galloping horse was on the whole an unreliable process and one that could produce ambiguous results. The electric telegraph was pioneered on the Continent, but commercialisation was left to the Englishmen Charles Wheatstone and William Fothergill Cooke, who built the first public line in 1839. From that date until well after the end of the First World War, the British dominance of worldwide telegraph cable production and ownership was overwhelming. This article traces some of the more significant effects of the telegraph in general, and of the British telegraphic hegemony in particular, in the spheres of politics, international diplomacy, and law and order.     

拉丁美洲军人干政国家的军人与民主

拉丁美洲军人干政国家中的军人是影响国家民主和民主化的重要因素之一。短期来看,拉丁美洲军人干政国家中军人对民主化的作用是不确定的：军人有时安邦定国为民主化奠定基础,有时践踏宪政成为民主化的障碍。军人干政不代表堵死民主化之路;军人返回军营也不代表通向民主化坦途。长远来看,军人干政不具备终极合法性,民主巩固的结果将是文人领军和宪政。在民主转型中的拉丁美洲军人干政国家,一方面民主转型是大势所趋,另一方面军人干政并未销声匿迹。民主的推行需要合理利用军人的积极作用,以形成独特的民主模式。