The Dynamics and Interactions Between the President's and the Public's Civil Rights Agendas: A Study in Presidential Leadership and Representation

Past research views presidents as reactive and minor actors in the civilrights policy process. However, that research has focused solely on the latter stages of the policy process. This report views the president's role from an agendasetting perspective. A content analysis reveals that presidents lead public opinion on civil rights, but that the public has little impact on the president's civil rights agenda. The distinction between discretionary and required agenda items explains this asymmetry between the president and the public in civil rights policymaking. A fuller notion of policymaking that includes all stages of the process, from agendasetting to implementation and evaluation, is required to understand the role of the president in civil rights policymaking and leads us to revise the perception that presidents play reactive and minor roles in civil rights policy.     

Assessing Presidential Communications in Civil Rights Policymaking

This chapter compares the public communications of modern presidents across target groups and issue areas of civil rights. We find that attention, support, and symbolism on civil rights vary considerably across individual presidents and political party. Not surprisingly, in their public messages Democratic presidents are more attentive and supportive of civil rights than are Republican presidents. Some results were expected, while others were surprising. Lyndon B. Johnson was attentive and supportive; but, unexpectedly, George H. W. Bush was highly attentive to and quite nonsupportive of civil rights. Also surprisingly, on most indicators, Bush's policy statements were less symbolic and less equivocal than were Ronald W. Reagan's. Most attention is given to blacks as a target group (although this is declining) and to the employment issue area. Overall, the findings reveal the considerable flexibility and discretion in presidents' public communications in the civil rights realm.     

A Transformed Triangle: Court, Congress, and Presidency in Civil Rights

The relative permeability of the three elements of a triangle-the Supreme Court, Congress, and the president-to civil rights interest groups has varied over time. For almost two decades after World War II, the Supreme Court was the groups' preferred arena because Congress was resistant and presidents could thus do little or were hesitant to act. For a brief time in the mid-1960s the president and Congress became supportive of civil rights groups' claims while the Court also remained accessible. Starting in the late 1960s executive and legislative support for civil rights moderated, with presidential support declining significantly in the 1980s. When the Supreme Court adopted that latter stance, Congress became the body through which to protect civil rights by reversing the Court's decisions. In this examination of the "transformed triangle" in civil rights policymaking, we look at this change over time and at "flip-flops" in litigation as one administration changes the position espoused by its predecessor, and we also give some attention to the Supreme Court's response to congressional reversal of its rulings.     

The President and the Public: Inaugural Addresses in American History

This article examines presidential inaugural addresses to gain a perspective on the changing relationship between the people and the presidency throughout American political history. The analysis suggests three distinct models of inaugural address—constitutional, party, and plebiscitary—each articulating a different understanding of presidential leadership and the relationship between the presidency and the people. The constitutional presidents see themselves largely as restrained, constitutional officers with a minimal relationship to the people. The party model yields a role for the president which is more tied to the people's will, especially as expressed through party. Even though tied more strongly to the public, party presidents recognize constitutional limits on their roles and powers. Plebiscitary presidents often eschew party affiliation and the guise of constrained constitutional officer, and cast themselves as engines of the American political system fully tied to public opinion. Plebiscitary presidents often make few references to other political actors or to the Constitution. Beyond helping us to better understand the contours of American political development, this analysis challenges the prevalent assumption in studies of the presidency that nineteenth-century presidents were not popular or “public” leaders.     

Passing Nonincremental Policy: Presidential Influence in Congress,Kennedy to Carter

This article represents an important step in understanding early, modern presidents’ strategic use of signing statements by taking a sharp focus on the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. In contrast to recent presidents who have used the instrument increasingly to challenge legislative provisions, Eisenhower's use of signing statements was rather complex—from political credit-claiming, explaining the provisions of bills to the American public, and reinforcing his views on the federal-state balance of power—to maintaining bipartisan relations on foreign policy, shaping implementation of congressional bills, and selectively criticizing Congress for overspending. The theoretical framework devotes particular attention to the interplay of contexts—electoral, institutional, and economic—on Eisenhower's use of signing statements by policy area across his two terms.     

Presidential Coequality: The Evolution of a Concept

The assertion that the presidency is coequal in power to the other branches in the American system of government is often heard, has been suggested by all recent presidents, and has even made its way into political science. But tracing the history of the concept demonstrates that this assertion is an invention of quite recent vintage. Those who wrote and favored the Constitution did not make such claims, nor did early presidents. Even Andrew Jackson's famous and, to his generation, shocking assertion of coequality coincident with his censure was not really a claim of equal power between branches. According to our systematic analysis of presidential rhetoric it was Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford who initiated and popularized the idea of interbranch coequality. They did so to defend themselves in two episodes of substantial presidential vulnerability: Watergate and the ensuing midterm elections. Subsequent presidents have elevated something that would have seemed wrong and absurd to any founder into a blithe truism. This belief harms governance by creating both artificially high expectations for the president and a presumption of institutional stasis. The “second constitution” based on popular beliefs about interbranch relations continues to evolve, as much a product of happenstance as of rational design.     

“Going Public” Reconsidered: Reagan's 1981 Tax and Budget Cuts,and Revisionist Theories of Presidential Power

This paper examines the thesis of the public presidency. In light of the success of Ronald Reagan, many revisionist scholars have criticized traditional models of presidential politics. Whereas traditional views emphasized the bargaining presidency, these recent scholars now argue that, today, the politics of rhetoric dominate the politics of bargaining. This paper examines the central case study of the going-public model, Reagan's 1981 tax and budget cuts, a critical case because it represents Reagan's central legislative success and because many scholars and pundits have credited this success to Reagan's frequent televised public appeals. The case reveals that a strong bargaining dynamic played a part in the 1981 process, and that going public strategies were not as dominant as previously thought.

What has changed significantly is the balance of incentives and constraints that influence strategic choice and the kinds of politicians in the Oval Office who make them. Contemporary presidents, after carefully considering their options, will choose going public over bargaining more often than did their predecessors.

–Samuel Kernell, Going Public     

Checking Executive Power: A Simulation Model of Unilateral Executive Behavior

Abstract

What systematic influence does the court exert on unilateral authority? Though questions relating to the expansion and the exercise of unilateral executive power remain a perennial concern in political science, existing studies of the unilateral presidency generally focus on relations between the executive and the legislature, with less attention paid to the impact of the judiciary on executive behavior. Using a system of differential equations to model executive unilateralism and judicial constraints, simulation results identified four broad patterns of unilateral executive behavior and judicial influence. Overall, presidents strategically anticipate reactions from the courts and employ unilateral actions accordingly. Although they are cognizant of the court’s ability to strike down their actions, and thereby harming their preferred policy preferences and legacies, presidents nonetheless act unilaterally, albeit at a lower level. Results add to existing studies in separation of powers and constraints on unilateral executive behavior.     

The power of words: the changing role of the Italian head of state during the Second Republic

Many authors use the metaphor of an accordion to describe the enlargement of the constitutional functions of the Italian head of state: because of the weakness of the political parties the president is able to ‘open and play the accordion’ according to his own interpretation of his institutional powers. While useful, this metaphor does not take into account the structural changes that have occurred over the last 30 years, as well as the informal powers that recent presidents have resorted to, which were the most important factors in the metamorphosis of the presidential figure. Structural changes include the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the First Republic and the mediatisation and personalisation of politics and party structure. Informal powers include those of ‘esternazione’ (a term that roughly means ‘to render public personal statements without previous consultation with the cabinet’) and of moral suasion. By analysing the development of these two powers, this article aims to describe the changing role of the head of state during the Second Republic. It also defines a typology of presidential moral suasion, which is proposed as a useful tool to analyse presidential style and strategy in influencing law-making. The analysis of the innovative use of communicative powers by the last two presidents, Ciampi and Napolitano, shows how the transformation of the Italian presidency can probably be considered permanent.     

Assessing Effectiveness of Veto Threats in the Bush Administration (1989-1993): Preliminary Evidence from Case Studies

Presidents have many tools in the policy-making process. One of the most powerful of these is vetoing legislation. Although presidents can veto legislation at will, the use of the veto is costly as it can be perceived as a sign of weakness. Veto threats may provide the president with a bargaining tool relying on the power of the veto without incurring its costs. This article provides a framework for understanding the use and effectiveness of veto threats. First, the present understanding of the use of veto threats is discussed, including the conditions under which they are most likely to occur and to be effective. Next, we provide a conceptualization of the context in which a veto threat is issued and the result of such a threat. Finally, using the Bush administration (1989-1993), we illustrate two possible results with case studies of civil rights and child care legislation.     

The Administrative Presidency as Supervised Collaboration: The Case of Ocean and Coastal Zone Management

Scholars have paid little attention to the operation and effectiveness of offices, councils, committees, task forces, and the like within the Executive Office of the president. This neglect may be understandable given the opacity within the White House. Yet it is also unfortunate given the popular view of executive centralization as a counterpoise to a fragmented bureaucracy and given that “supervised collaboration” is the primary mechanism through which presidents can seek to coordinate policy implementation. With this in mind, the following study examines attempts to integrate the management of America's oceans and coasts under the past two administrations. Limited progress in this area to date speaks to institutional incentives and constraints that should temper the enthusiasm of those who look to the presidency as a source of administrative coordination. White House initiatives have come only recently and have resulted much more from a desire to shape policy than from concerns about efficiency, per se. Even so, the case of ocean and coastal zone management speaks to the limitations of unilateral presidential action.     

The Blue Slip: A Theory of Unified and Divided Government, 1979–2009

In recent years, the role of presidential candidates in constructing their own coalitions to secure both the nomination and election has increased as their reliance on their own party organization has decreased. Recent presidents also have devoted more of their energies to building coalitions crucial to the adoption of their program and its policies. Yet in this era of entrepreneurial candidacy, presidential effectiveness has varied considerably. This article suggests that the extent of convergence and divergence of presidential selection and governing coalitions determines presidential effectiveness. It is also suggested that the roots of presidential governing effectiveness lie in the electoral core coalition, the product of the nomination and general election coalitions that supported the presidential candidate. The article (1) describes the developments that make this theory of presidential coalition-building pertinent to the recent presidency, and (2) sketches the theory and illustrates its applicability to Richard Nixon's sponsorship of the Family Assistance Plan.     

Explaining Supreme Court Policymaking in Civil Rights: The Influence of the Solicitor General, 1953–2002

What factors explain Supreme Court policymaking in civil rights cases? Despite the importance of this question of law and policy, few empirical studies have explored the problem on the area of racial and ethnic discrimination. This study seeks to fill this gap by assessing the importance of the solicitor general, the federal government's representative before the Supreme Court, as a litigant and in the filings of amicus curiae briefs. The findings confirm that the solicitor general's presence in civil rights cases does matter when explaining whether the Supreme Court reaches a liberal or conservative outcome. This research demonstrates the significance of executive‐judicial interaction in explaining Supreme Court policymaking in civil rights cases.     

Lincoln as Commander-in-Chief

Abstract

Abraham Lincoln's presidency was defined and dominated by war, yet Lincoln himself had very little direct experience with warfare; nor had the American presidency been truly tested by war when he took office. Lincoln had to negotiate very difficult political and constitutional terrain as he waged the Civil War: issues of executive authority, constitutional powers and their limitations, and the nature of civil liberties during war constantly bedeviled him. His guiding principle in all these matters, and the greatest lesson we can learn from him today, was his flexibility and his pragmatism.     

Public Outreach,Executive Orders,and the Unilateral Presidency

Scholars have traditionally and loosely defined executive orders as presidential directives that instruct bureaucrats about how to implement policy. In contrast, proclamations are thought to be used by presidents to address policy matters regarding the general public. This has been an assumption that scholars have accepted without empirical evidence. We have long known that presidents strategically pursue policy to build support among numerous groups, such as African Americans, religious organizations, women, educators, and labor unions. Presidency scholars also know that executive orders are an expedient tool that an administration utilizes to pursue its policy agenda. As a result, why should we assume that the exclusive target population of executive orders is members of the federal bureaucracy? This is the first study to explore whether and how presidents from 1936 through 2008 use executive orders to target specific populations with policy.     

Building Alliances or Rallying the Base: Civil Religious Rhetoric and the Modern Presidency

Abstract

Civil religious rhetoric has been utilized throughout American history to legitimize political interests by drawing upon broadly shared beliefs regarding the nation’s identity, meaning, and purpose in the world. Although scholars have traditionally assumed this rhetoric was employed to unify the nation, others emphasize its potential to exacerbate conflict as policy debates morph into battles over the national identity. This research project analyzes presidential speeches from Franklin Roosevelt through Barack Obama (1939–2012) and finds that the type of speech delivered, public approval of the president, and the partisan composition of Congress influence the prevalence of civil religious rhetoric. It concludes that modern presidents have more often relied upon civil religion to rally the partisan base than build alliances with the opposition.     

A New Model of Executive Power: A Montesquieuan Explanation of the Obama Presidency

Abstract

The perennial concern over executive overreach continues well into Obama's presidency, leading many to wonder if the “unitary executive” is here to stay. Discussions of executive war powers focus on three models. The Hamiltonian perspective gives presidents the lead position in foreign affairs; the second model, following Madison, presents Congress as the leader when initiating hostilities. Finally, Jeffersonians present emergency powers as extra-legal, giving presidents a sphere of actions that cannot be contained within constitutional discussions. Problematically, current scholarship implicitly or explicitly grounds these explanations in Locke's political philosophy. This occurs despite a dearth of references to Locke during the Constitutional Convention and infrequent references to his thought during early debates over executive-congressional divisions of war powers. Comparatively, all of these seminal American figures frequently mention Montesquieu, often fighting over the specifics of his theory. While scholars widely acknowledge this influence, they rarely mention him during discussions of war powers or the nature of executive power in general. This article examines the Montesquieuan understanding of executive power and shows how this model represents a viable alternative to the Lockean one. Most importantly, examining the executive from a Montesquieuan perspective provides solutions to current problems that the Lockean perspective does not.     

Elite Leadership,People of Mexican Origin,and Civil Rights: Dennis Chavez and the Politics of Fair Employment

People of Mexican origin lacked broad-based mobilization for civil rights during the mid-twentieth century and failed to gain attention with national leaders unaware of the unique conditions in the Southwest. In the absence of these factors, elite leadership and issue networks filled the gap. In this article I explore the case of New Mexico. I argue that the elite leadership of New Mexico Senator Dennis Chavez helped to shape national debates regarding fair employment and other civil rights legislation. Chavez helped work for the passage of a strong state fair employment law in New Mexico in 1949 and increased awareness of the place of people of Mexican origin in civil rights policy and politics nationally and in New Mexico. Gaining support from African Americans, Catholics, Jews, and labor unions, Chavez helped to include people of Mexican origin in debates regarding civil rights policy. However, a lack of national legislation, policy implementation, and the rise of backlash politics prevented the creation of a strong policy and strong agency.     

The Eisenhower Administration: Bridge to the Institutionalized Legislative Presidency

Eisenhower's contributions to the modern presidency are primarily institutional and to some extent, stylistic: his reliance on the professionalism of civil servants in the Bureau of the Budget, his continuation of the annual programming process as well as the procedures for coordinating the executive branch's legislative role, his creation of a White House office to represent him on Capitol Hill, and his respect for Congress as a legislative body. What Eisenhower did not do is equally significant: he did not reject the model of an activist presidency, reverse the New and Fair Deal policies of his Democratic predecessors, or pursue his centrist agenda in a blatantly partisan manner. The Eisenhower experience demonstrates that incivility, inhumanity, and inanity are not inevitable consequences of divided government.     

The Right Tool for the Job: The Canalization of Presidential Policy Attention by Policy Instrument

This article investigates how presidential policy attention is allocated across policy tools and whether there is a channeling of tool use by policy area. I also examine whether there is evidence of disproportionate information processing within presidential policy attention allocation and whether it is common across presidential policy tools. Presidential messages, hearings on administrations' legislative proposals, amicus briefs, and executive orders are employed to capture presidential policy tools. The allocation of attention via these four instruments is examined from 1957–2007 in the policy areas of defense and foreign affairs, macroeconomics, banking and commerce, civil rights, law and crime, and labor and immigration. I find that there is a canalization of presidential policy attention by instrument, and that the opportunity structure of policy tools shapes attention allocation. Additionally, I find evidence for punctuated equilibrium theory in the allocation of presidential policy attention via these four tools. When presidents do shift their attention to an issue area, they often attack the issue with some coordination of their policy instruments.