'More carrot than stick', British Economic Warfare and Spain, 1941-1944

During the Second World War, economic factors became a centralaspect of Spain's relations to both Britain and Nazi Germany.In 1940, when the Franco regime was on the brink of joiningthe war on the side of the Axis, Britain tried to use Spain’sdependence on imports from the west to convince Franco to retainhis country's neutrality. Although, at the time, British ‘economicappeasement’ was not a major factor in the failure ofGerman-Spanish negotiations, it contributed to Spain's verygradual detachment from Nazi Germany over subsequent years.Between1941 and 1944, the focus of British policy towards Spain movedfrom keeping the country out of the war to restricting the servicesSpain rendered to the German war economy. Franco's sympathiesfor the Nazi regime and the economic and financial benefitsof continuing trade with Germany made British and US economicwarfare activities however only a partial success.     

The German Secret State Police in Spain: Extending the Reach of National Socialism

Germany encroached in Spain's internal affairs that followed providing military support the Spanish Civil War in the interest of pursuing National Socialist objectives through the establishment of an extensive apparatus of National Socialist organisations in Spain, including the Gestapo. Cooperation was officially established between Spanish and German police on 25 November 1937, which was extended to the Spanish political police on 31 July 1938, when they entered into a secret agreement with the German Gestapo for mutual assistance. The Gestapo trained the Spanish ordinary police and political police to contribute to maintaining the Franco regime in control of Spain, just as the Gestapo in Germany was charged with investigating and suppressing all forms of anti-state tendencies, and exported its methods and proceedings to Spain under the guise of contributing to the struggle against the alleged danger of worldwide communism. In addition to cooperation with Spanish police on suppressing dissent against the Franco regime, other functions related to serving the interests of National Socialist Germany, which deployed the Gestapo for various purposes while Spain constituted an extension of National Socialist Germany's sphere of influence. This was ensured through the Gestapo maintaining a presence in Spain until 1945.     

The persistence of the rural idyll: peasant imagery,social change and nationalism in Spain 1939–1978

In this article the authors propose a historical analysis of the role of romantic rural imagery in the Spanish (state and peripheral) re-nationalization processes during the Franco dictatorship through the scope of the political and identity meanings assigned to it. Their goal is to better comprehend twentieth-century Spain by examining the use (and abuse) of the rural imaginary by Spanish, Basque and Galician nationalisms, particularly during the time of the totalitarian regime of General Franco, giving special attention to the cultural loans between the ideological (and national) blocs traditionally interpreted as monolithic and irreconcilable: Francoism (1936–1975) and its political opposition.     

'Our Spanish Brothers' or 'As at Plombieres'? France, The Legacy of Resistance and the Spanish Opposition to Franco, 1945-1948

The case of French relations with the semi-Fascist regime ofGeneral Francisco Franco of Spain after the Second World Waroffers historians the opportunity to explore various influenceson French foreign policy. This article examines France’sofficial policies towards the Spanish anti-Franco oppositionas an example of the impact that the legacy of the Resistancehad on postwar foreign affairs. Yet the French Foreign Ministryonly reluctantly embraced the Resistance vision of universalrepublicanism in Europe. Rather, the importance of keeping Frenchpolicy in line with that of the Western Alliance consistentlyshaped policy towards various Spanish groups. The result wasa significant Franco-American-British effort to unite the anti-Francoopposition in Spain 1945–1948 but one that was easilyabandoned once it proved impracticable. Resistance ideas ofa renewed foreign policy following liberation were thus limitedby the importance the government attributed to alliance politicsin the emerging Cold War atmosphere.     

Political geography around the world IX: Academic geography in Spain and Franco's regime, 1936–55

Contemporary academic Geography in Spain begins in the 1940s with the educative reform carried out by General Franco's regime. However, Spanish academic Geography did not present any Fascist trend; for instance, German geo-politics did not achieve any relevance. Possible reasons for this political-ideological contradiction may be found in the role played by the staff that manned the new University geography departments, whose scientific behaviour was totally isolated from any Fascist political approach.     

Three's a Crowd?: Government, Owners, and Workers during the Nationalization of the British Coalmining Industry 1945-47

The passing of the coalmining industry into public ownershipon 1 January 1947 should have been an occasion for rejoicingby the Labour Party and its supporters, yet celebrations weremuted by the looming shadow of critical coal shortages Despitethis concurrence of nationalization and coal crisis, littleattention has been focused on possible linkages between thetwo events. More generally, scant consideration has been givento the question of what happened to the industry when facedwith nationalization. This article's principal argument is thatthe fuel crisis was rooted not (as other historians have argued)in the atrocious weather, but in the very process of nationalization—or,rather in the combination of a lack of preparation for publicownership and (even more importantly) in the preoccupation withnationalization at the expense of the ‘stabilization’of the industry before entering the uncharted waters of publicownership. The chief conclusion is that during the run-up toVesting Day neither miners nor owners had any substantial incentiveto improve industrial productivity and output The period wasat best a standstill, and in many ways—as the crisis indicated—wastedmonths that a fuel-starved Britain could ill afford ^*This article is based on my MA thesis, ‘Fresh Start orFalse Dawn⁷ the coalmining Industry and Nationalisation, 1945–7'I would like to thank my supervisors, Ranald Midne and PhilipWilliamson for their continued support, and also David Howelland the referees of Twentieth Century British History for theirvaluable comments on earlier drafts of this work.     

Loyalty and Royalty: Gibraltar, the 1953 54 Royal Tour and the Geopolitics of the Iberian Peninsula

This article explores the 1953–54 Royal Tour and in particularthe planning and eventual reception of the Queen and her partywhen they arrived in Gibraltar. These events are consideredin terms of three overlapping contexts: the imperial, the colonialand the geopolitical. First, the Royal Tour marked not onlythe debut of a new Queen but also the realization that the BritishEmpire was beginning to fragment with the eruption of independencemovements in South Asia and the Middle East. Hence, its internationalitinerary bound the remaining empire symbolically together,but also served as a reminder of the ‘gaps’ thatwere beginning to appear. Second, the analysis considers howthe Royal Tour presented an opportunity for the local residentsof Gibraltar to ‘perform their loyalty’ to the newQueen and the British Empire. The focus on performance is significantbecause the article does not presume that ‘loyalty’is simply pre-given. A great deal of work was involved in realizingthe reception of the Queen's party in May 1954 against a backdropof a territorial dispute with Spain over the future legal statusof Gibraltar. The Royal Tour offered the possibility, therefore,of persuading the British and Spanish governments of the localresidents’ qualities including a continued loyalty tothe British/imperial Royal Family and indirectly to Britain.Third, the article underscores the significance of such loyalperformances by considering Spanish opposition to the Queen'svisit in the light of Franco's efforts to establish his country'santi-Communist credentials. The Royal Tour, and the Gibraltarleg in particular, are thus show to be an intense locus of performanceslinked to the politics of empire, colonial rights and anti-imperialism. Animated, happy faces gazing at the sights and decorations showbetter than words the true feelings of the people of the fortress-colonytowards their young, beloved Queen. One correspondent of a Britishnewspaper said that he thought the 27,000 servicemen and civilianson the Rock were so fervidly loyal that they would tear to piecesanyone discovered in their midst with evil designs, and thatwas sufficient guarantee of their Majesty's safety.¹     

Writing and Publishing the Cold War: John Berger and Seeker & Warburg

Following Christopher Lasch's early study, accounts of the ‘culturalcold war’ have become largely synonymous with the activitiesof the Congress for Cultural Freedom. The major accounts ofthe Congress have drawn on a comparatively narrow range of archivesources, personal papers, memoirs, and interviews Recent studiesof cold war broadcasting have broadened the scope of the ‘cultural’and made extensive use of previously inaccessible archive materialin Europe, North America, and the former Soviet Union This articlecontinues the process of broadening our understanding of thecultural dimensions of the cold war by focusing on the publishersSeeker & Warburg and highlighting, more generally, the opportunitiesthat publishers' archives afford for opening up new areas ofinvestigation and research on the cold war ^*I would like to thank John Berger, Mary Eagleton, Simon Gunn,Louise Jackson, and an anonymous referee for comments on anearlier version of this article I would also like to thank RandomHouse and Independent Labour Publications for permission toquote from material in the Seeker & Warburg Archive andthe ILP Archive Material from the Blair, E correspondence ispublished courtesy of the Lilly Library, Indiana University,Bloomington, IN Finally, I would like to thank Michael Bottand his colleagues at the University of Reading for their assistancein identifying relevant material in the Seeker & WarburgArchive     

The Trouble with Propaganda: the Second World War,Franco's Spain,and the Origins of US Post-War Public Diplomacy

This paper explores the internecine conflict that characterised and undermined US propaganda toward neutral Spain in the Second World War. These tensions primarily confronted those who saw US propaganda as an ideological weapon of mass persuasion in a crusade against Fascism with those who defended that US informational and cultural operations should be subservient to traditional diplomacy, and so be limited to explaining US foreign policy and advancing bilateral friendship. In addition, the article argues that the unambiguous subordination of propaganda to diplomacy that characterised US public diplomacy during the cold war was one of the lessons learnt out of the civil war that US propagandists fought over Spain between 1941 and early 1945.     

Protestantism as a transnational ideology

The Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement (SFCEM), founded as a Spanish organization to favour the integration of Spain in Europe, was composed of representatives of various political organizations of the Republican government in exile. Correspondence between the President, Salvador de Madariaga, and the members of the Basque and Catalonian delegations discloses one of the most critical issues of the time: how to organize the Spanish regions after the fall of Franco’s regime. This article explores how the ideas of a Spanish federation – defended by Madariaga – and the interest of the nationalist groups collided during the decades of 1950s and 1960s. The result was a harsh debate on separatism between the Basques and Catalans, who saw Franco’s Spain as the representation of centralism and repression of their identities, and other Spanish exiles.     

‘The Most Developed of the Underdeveloped Nations’. US Foreign Policy and Student Unrest in 1960s Spain

Throughout the 1960s, Spanish students staged a strong opposition against the dictatorship of General Franco. Also during this decade, the U.S. Foreign Service in Spain began to pay great attention to these students for two key reasons. On the one hand, student protests posed a threat to US defensive interests in a country with a high strategic value during the Cold War in southern Europe. However, on the other hand, campus agitation could lead to positive effects for the United States if students’ expectations of social change were channeled toward national development in a context of order and political stability. So, how could student activism and idealism be directed toward a controlled modernization of Spain? This article attempts to answer this question by studying American programs aimed at disseminating the principles of modernization theory in Spanish universities as an instrument to (1) influence students’ political and intellectual socialization and to immunize them against radical ideologies and (2) channel students’ aspirations towards constructive and responsible reform of their country's socioeconomic structures.     

On fascistization: Mussolini’s political project for Franco’s Spain, 1937–1939

‘Single party, single militia, single worker’s union, on these three pillars the great Spain of tomorrow will be built’, wrote Mussolini to Franco in August 1937, only four months after the new single party, Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS, was created. From the Duce’s point of view, all the political tools developed to achieve a brilliant present and a greater future were the result of Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War. The political implementation of fascism, the single party, corporativism, propaganda and economic modernization were considered to have been derived from Italy’s military and diplomatic involvement in Spain. But, surprisingly, that political presence has largely been undervalued by historians examining the political construction and nature of Franco’s Spain. This article re-evaluates the importance, and limits, of Mussolini’s political project in Spain: fascistization.     

Did Organization Really Matter? Party Organization and Conservative Electoral Recovery, 1945-59

Organizational recovery has traditionally been considered animportant factor in any explanation of the Conservative Party'selectoral recovery during the fifteen years after 1945. Thisarticle examines the extent of this recovery in three marginalseats, which the Conservatives either held or regained to formtheir new parliamentary majority. It demonstrates that, in anumber of constituencies, whatever the wider community mighthave thought, the reality of local organization—whetherin terms of financial health, membership numbers, the deliveryof political education, election campaigning, the effectivenessof party agents, or level of activity—was considered tobe less than impressive to those involved intimately. The articleconcludes that although the value of the Conservative Party'sextensive grass roots should not be denied, the precise roleand effectiveness of local organization should be reconsidered.     

Representations of the Outbreak of World War II in Polish Film, 1945–67: From Partial Recognition to a Component of National Memory

In September 1939, Poland was invaded by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, starting World War II. The war’s end in 1945 marked not the true liberation of the country, but the beginning of a period of Soviet domination that ended only in 1989. As a result, for forty-five years of Polish history, the alliance made by the Hitler with Stalin in 1939 and its tragic consequences for Poland were taboo across society. Polish filmmakers presenting the beginning of World War II were constrained by realities of the Communist state and its own historical narratives. These films reflect what happened to their country in 1939 and highlight the political changes that occurred within Poland under Communist rule, as well as the impact of shifts in the regime itself. The most significant period in this regard was 1945–67, when the outbreak of war was first presented following the end of Stalinism, emerging as a component of national memory both generally and for the Communist authorities.     

‘Unity,stability, continuity’: heritage and the renovation of Franco’s dictatorship in Spain, 1957–1969

Spain between 1957 and 1969 – the period in the history of the dictatorial regime of General Francisco Franco known as desarrollista (development‐guided) – presents a peculiar case of a state‐driven heritage industry. The present article examines the desarrollista policy aimed at creating and coordinating heritage tourism, focusing on periodical publications, official speeches, films and promotional materials. It looks at late‐Francoist heritage as a vehicle for achieving, simultaneously, an ideological and an economic effect. Economically, heritage was conceived as a tool for diversifying and individualising Spain’s tourism product in the Mediterranean market, and above all, for confronting the uneven territorial and seasonal distribution of ‘sun and beach tourism’. At the same time, ideologically, the models and uses of heritage examined here served the regime’s interest in securing the country’s territorial unity, maintaining the high profile of the Catholic Church, and re‐legitimising the Civil War (1936–1939) which had brought Franco to power.     

An Unequal Apportionment: The Conflict over Space Between Protestants and Catholics at the Beginning of the Wars of Religion

Although theological and political aspects of the Wars of Religionhave been extensively studied, their spatial dimension has oftenbeen neglected. Despite the plethora of urban monographs, spacehas been considered as the setting rather than the object ofconflict. On account of its scarcity, space brought a varietyof benefits and accordingly generated strategies of appropriationand exclusion for which the two confessions were unequally prepared.If Charles IX was the first to ‘tolerate’ Protestants,he almost always confined them to domestic space or excludedthem from the centre of towns. Employing a sociology of dominationdrawn from the work of Pierre Bourdieu, this article seeks toexamine the unequal situation of the two confessions from aspatial perspective, refusing to explain this difference solelyby recourse to theological concepts. On the contrary, it attemptsto show how, in a manner that requires explanation, socioconfessionalinequalities were transformed into spatial ones.

The space which before any other seems to me to raise the problemand manifest just that strong social and historical differentiationbetween societies is the space of exclusion—of exclusionand imprisonment. Michel Foucault, La scène de la philosophie(1978)¹

     

Neutrality and submarine warfare: Germany and Spain during the First World War

The Spanish government maintained official neutrality during the Great War because deviating from neutrality would supposedly endanger the nation’s already limited political and social stability and even threaten the survival of the monarchic regime. In August 1914 there were no direct Spanish interests in the conflict and no benefit to be obtained from any intervention by Spain, which was very weak in military terms and in the international arena. Nevertheless, Spain’s geographic location and its commercial dependence on the Entente made it especially vulnerable to the pressures of France and Great Britain, both of which attempted to take advantage of the services that Spain could offer in the economic war; Spain’s importance increased with the prolongation of the fight. Germany, in contrast, could not hope for more from Spain than its strict neutrality because of its highly important political and economic ties with the Entente and its defencelessness before England and France, from which Germany could not protect it. Because Germany could not wait for Spain’s participation next to her, the primary target of German diplomacy had to be to resist the influence of the Entente and maintain Spanish neutrality while preventing Spain from inclining towards favouring the Allies. To achieve this objective, Berlin fed, with vague promises, the idea that a Spanish collaboration would be rewarded with the annexation of some territories. On this basis, we can begin to study German–Spanish relations during the Great War, which came to be determined by incidents that were caused by the submarine war. The dependence on the Entente also helps to explain the last evolution of the relations between Germany and Spain, which could follow no other policy than that imposed by the final development of the war: taking up a position near the winners and distancing from, and nearly rupturing ties with, Germany. Using both Spanish and German documentation allows us to reach different conclusions that aim to contribute substantially to understanding the relationship between Spain and Germany during the Great War.     

Revolutionary versus Reactionary: Contrasting Portuguese and Spanish Civil-Military Relations during Democratisation

The military is an important factor for the success or failure of democratisation processes. Portugal and Spain provide two paradigmatic cases. Despite their socio-economic, political and cultural similarities, these countries developed very different civil-military relations which significantly impacted their transitions. After having handed power over to a civilian dictator, Salazar, the Portuguese military eventually caused the downfall of his authoritarian Estado Novo regime and steered the transition to democracy. In contrast, the Spanish military, which had helped Franco defeat the Second Republic, remained loyal to the dictator’s principles and, after his death, obstructed the democratisation process. Drawing on primary and secondary sources, this interdisciplinary article contrasts the challenges posed by the military and the policies implemented by the Iberian governments to depoliticise and control it. It shows that the failed coups d’état in these countries helped tighten civilian control and paved the way for democratic consolidation. Using a policy instruments comparative framework, this paper demonstrates that not only the attitudes of the military but also the tools used to keep them under control were substantially different in Portugal and Spain. Historical legacies from the Spanish Civil War, Second World War and Colonial conflicts, as well as contextual factors, serve to explain this variation.