The Decline of the Empire and the Economic 'Decline' of Britain

In the 1950s and 1960s, decolonization coincided with the ‘goldenage’ of British capitalism, with record rises in popularliving standards. Economic historians have understandably usedthis coincidence to suggest that by this period the BritishEmpire was no longer offering substantial economic benefitsto the mass of the metropolitan population. Yet there were linksbetween economic performance and the decline of the Empire.First, despite the good performance, profoundly pessimistic‘declinist’ accounts of British society and theeconomy abounded in the early 1960s, and these had a major impacton policy formation. A key underpinning for such accounts wasthe ‘culture of decline’ intimately linked withthe loss of imperial status. Secondly, while it has become acommonplace of discussion of post-war Britain to assume thatreversing ‘decline’ and modernizing the economyrequired a re-orientation of policy away from the Empire andCommonwealth towards Europe, such a reorientation was not aconstant feature of modernization strategies. Indeed, a centralfeature of the initial period of Wilsonian ‘modernization’after 1964 was its attempt to use closer links with the Commonwealthto achieve this objective.     

'A Matter of Regret': Britain, the 1983 Grendada Crisis, and the Special Relationship

When the USA launched a military intervention in Grenada inOctober 1983 it was against the wishes of its closest ally,Britain, who felt deliberately misled as to Washington's intentions.As a former British colony and member of the Commonwealth, withthe Queen as Head of State, Grenada remained of interest toBritain. This article will provide a detailed analysis of Anglo-Grenadianrelations and the events and contacts between the USA and Britainduring and after the 1983 crisis and assess the role of the‘special relationship’ in shaping Britain's reactionto the intervention. I conclude that the conventional wisdomthat Britain was ‘in the dark’ about what was happeningis not entirely accurate. ^*The views expressed in this article represent those of theauthor alone.     

'The Affairs of a Distant Dependency': The Nigeria Debate and the Premiership, 1916

We provide the first full account of the intertwined corporateconflicts and political tensions behind the ‘Nigeria Debate’of 8 November 1916, the beginning of the crisis that toppledthe Asquith coalition The debate had its ongins in an attemptby the Lagos authorities and the Colonial Office to break theemerging monopoly of a ‘Ring’ of British firms overNigerian trade The government sought to encourage foreign (especiallyAmerican) investment with a highly publiazed sale of formerGerman assets. Sir Edward Carson, the recognized leader of politicaldiscontent, took up the firms' agitation against the policy,alleging official neglect of British interests. Bonar Law, whoas Colonial Secretary was the minister responsible, decidedto counter-attack. He argued that Carson, while claiming tobe a disinterested patriot, was defending the private interestsof profiteering firms. Spurning compromise, and demonstratingthat the issue was not a simple tariff reform/free trade choice,Bonar Law treated the debate as a test of Unionist support forhis leadership. Carson's followers privately acknowledged thatBonar Law won; but the strength of Carson's support, even witha bad case, and uncertainties about Lloyd George's position,persuaded Bonar Law that the administration could not continueon its present basis. For Asquith the endgame then began     

Anglo-Irish Relations, 1939-41: A Study in Multilateral Diplomacy and Military Restraint

‘This study bridges two gaps, one in the historiographyof Anglo-Irish relations between 1939 and 1941 and the otherin International Relations (IR) theory. Anglo-Irish relationsduring the Second World War have been the subject of numerousstudies focusing upon the bilateral nature of that relationship,but it was subject to serious multilateral considerations—theCommonwealth and the US. At moments of danger between the twostates, it was not the balance of a bilateral relationship,but rather of a broad multilateral structure which set the paceof British policy-making. This restrained British military planningagainst Eire. The history of Anglo-Irish relations in this periodpositively links the conduct of multilateral diplomacy withthe absence of the use of force. From the standpoint of IR theory,this provides a useful ‘hard’ case for how/why multilateralismmay matter. It also illustrates several of the deficienciesin IR theory, not least the Whiggish assumption that integrationor globalization follow a linear progression (against whichstands the equally Whiggish notion that interstate relationsare eternally cast). This article seeks to demonstrate thata somewhat wider appreciation of history makes it possible toreconcile multilateral diplomacy with many more traditional‘realist’ concerns.’     

The Boer War and the Media (1899-1902)

The South African War that broke out in October 1899 was bothvery old and very new. It was a traditional war, the last ofthe old-fashioned British imperial wars, with cavalry playinga significant part. But it was also a very modern war, for instancein the British Army's use of railways to subdue the Boers inthe early months of 1900, or the use of trench warfare by theBoers along the Modder river. It was disturbingly new in theway that it changed in the autumn of 1900 from a war betweenarmies to a guerrilla war against a civilian population, mostdistastefully so in the British concentration camps set up tohouse Boer women and children. Above all, it was a distinctlycontemporary war in its impact on the media, especially thenewspapers, and in the interaction between the media and thoseparticipating in the fighting. It was a significant war, farbigger than originally expected, and was therefore big news.The British Army, ill-prepared for the original Boer invasionof Natal, at first numbered 75,000 troops. In the end, the Britishand imperial forces totalled 450,000 with contingents from Canada,Australia, New Zealand, and India. The British lost 22,000 men,13,000 of them from disease. The Boers lost about 7,000 in thefield, while another 27,000 (many of them very young children)are estimated to have died in the concentration camps. Therewere also about 20,000 black and ‘coloured’ Africanswho died in concentration camps, though this was little reportedat the time. So it was a major episode in British military history.The impact on British opinion of the relief of Ladysmith andespecially of Mafeking in 1900 was quite overwhelming. In afrenzy of ‘jingo’ celebration, the verb ‘mafficking’entered the language. In these circumstances, the consequencesof the Boer War on the media and its representation of war wereinevitably massive.     

Three's a Crowd?: Government, Owners, and Workers during the Nationalization of the British Coalmining Industry 1945-47

The passing of the coalmining industry into public ownershipon 1 January 1947 should have been an occasion for rejoicingby the Labour Party and its supporters, yet celebrations weremuted by the looming shadow of critical coal shortages Despitethis concurrence of nationalization and coal crisis, littleattention has been focused on possible linkages between thetwo events. More generally, scant consideration has been givento the question of what happened to the industry when facedwith nationalization. This article's principal argument is thatthe fuel crisis was rooted not (as other historians have argued)in the atrocious weather, but in the very process of nationalization—or,rather in the combination of a lack of preparation for publicownership and (even more importantly) in the preoccupation withnationalization at the expense of the ‘stabilization’of the industry before entering the uncharted waters of publicownership. The chief conclusion is that during the run-up toVesting Day neither miners nor owners had any substantial incentiveto improve industrial productivity and output The period wasat best a standstill, and in many ways—as the crisis indicated—wastedmonths that a fuel-starved Britain could ill afford ^*This article is based on my MA thesis, ‘Fresh Start orFalse Dawn⁷ the coalmining Industry and Nationalisation, 1945–7'I would like to thank my supervisors, Ranald Midne and PhilipWilliamson for their continued support, and also David Howelland the referees of Twentieth Century British History for theirvaluable comments on earlier drafts of this work.     

Internal Decolonization? British Politics since Thatcher as Post-colonial Trauma

In recent years a growing number of commentators, especiallyones associated with the idea of a ‘new imperial history’,have argued that British politics and culture remained moreheavily shaped by colonialism and decolonization than had previouslyconventionally been thought. This paper pursues that line ofthought in relation to political debates during and since the1980s, especially those concerning devolution, constitutionalreform, and race relations. It then, however, highlights somemajor problems with and limitations of this kind of argument,suggesting that the emerging historiography of Britain's ‘internaldecolonization’ remains at present empirically weak, conceptuallycloudy, and often unhelpfully polarized.     

George V and Repulicanism, 1917-1919

This article is a study of the British monarchy's reaction towhat it saw as a republican threat at the end of the First WorldWar. It challenges the widely received view that the most importantrepublican moment in modern British history was in the early1870s. Written from previously unused material in the RoyalArchives, it chronicles the emergence of Palace worries aboutthe rise of militant socialism, which the royal family equatedwith republicanism; and it illuminates the tactics designedby the King and his advisers to take the republican edge offthe labour movement and to deal with the immediate social andeconomic crisis. Lord Esher summed up Palace policy in the phrase‘the "democratization" of the monarchy’. In practice,this meant expanding the royal family's social and charitablepurposes to ensure the Crown's survival. The policy would havean enduring influence on royal thinking and behaviour. ¹ This article was written for the Visiting Fellows' Colloquium,All Souls College, Oxford. It expands a line of argument thatwas put more tentatively and with far less documentation inChapter 6 of my book Royal Bounty: The Making of a Welfare Monarchy(London, 1995). By gracious permission of Her Majesty the Queen,I have been able to make use of material from the Royal Archivesat Windsor.     

'More carrot than stick', British Economic Warfare and Spain, 1941-1944

During the Second World War, economic factors became a centralaspect of Spain's relations to both Britain and Nazi Germany.In 1940, when the Franco regime was on the brink of joiningthe war on the side of the Axis, Britain tried to use Spain’sdependence on imports from the west to convince Franco to retainhis country's neutrality. Although, at the time, British ‘economicappeasement’ was not a major factor in the failure ofGerman-Spanish negotiations, it contributed to Spain's verygradual detachment from Nazi Germany over subsequent years.Between1941 and 1944, the focus of British policy towards Spain movedfrom keeping the country out of the war to restricting the servicesSpain rendered to the German war economy. Franco's sympathiesfor the Nazi regime and the economic and financial benefitsof continuing trade with Germany made British and US economicwarfare activities however only a partial success.     

'An unholy row in Lancashire': The Textile Lobby, Conservative Politics, and Indian Policy, 1931-1935

This article argues that the ‘Lancashire lobby’remained a vital presence in British politics in the 1930s,not relegated to the political sidelines by ‘gentlemanlycapitalists’ at Westminster. The region's strength, inConservative circles especially, was based not on its numericalstrength in MPs, or in its economic might, but in the symbolicimportance Lancashire had for Conservatives. As this articledemonstrates, this was most evident during the debates overthe Government of India Bill between 1931 and 1935, when theparty's leadership made great, and successful, efforts to keepthe region's representatives from opposing the Bill, and potentiallyswinging many other Tories into opposition as well.     

Conducting Locarno Diplomacy: Britain and the Austro-German Customs Union Crisis, 1931

It has frequently been asserted that following its signing ofthe Treaty of Locarno in 1925 Britain withdrew from Europeanaffairs to concentrate on imperial and domestic concerns. Thisarticle, building upon an argument developed in an earlier volumeof Twentieth Century British History (Vol. 6. (1995), 1–22),seeks to demonstrate, using the example of British policy andthe customs union crisis, that rather than cutting Britain awayfrom European affairs, Locarno had the opposite effect. By signingLocarno, Britain had undertaken commitments it had no desireto honour, i. e. siding with either France or Germany in a renewedEuropean war. The continuing reconciliation between France andGermany was essential to ensure that peace would prevail inEurope and thereby secure a fundamental objective of Britishforeign policy. British policy regarding the customs union crisisprovides an example of how important Britain believed its roleto be in harmonizing Franco-German relations and maintainingthe Locarno system.     

Imperial Identity in Colonial Minds: Harold Moody and the League of Coloured Peoples, 1931-50

This article examines how the League of Coloured Peoples, foundedin London in 1931 by the Jamaican Harold Moody, used its versionof a British identity to seek equal rights for Britons of colour.I argue that by invoking an imperial British identity that drewon widely accepted elements of Britishness, namely respectabilityand imperial pride, the League gained support from black colonialsand white English people in its fight for equality. This wastrue despite the fact that a major element of the League's conceptionof British identity, racial equality, challenged the dominantidea that ‘true’ Britons were, by definition, white.The article focuses on the workings of the organization's ideologyin the context of two news-making issues: the campaign to restoreBritish citizenship to ‘coloured’ seamen in Cardiffin 1936, and the parliamentary and judicial reaction to discriminationby London's Imperial Hotel against League member Learie Constantinein 1943. The story it tells indicates that British identitieswere claimed and manipulated not only by natives of the BritishIsles, but also by colonial peoples. It further suggests thatunder the conditions of empire colonial peoples could simultaneouslyidentify with the imperial power and their (potentially national)home colony.     

Churchill and Britain's 'Financial Dunkirk'

At the end of World War II, the UK, on the verge of bankruptcy,was threatened with ‘a financial Dunkirk’. WinstonChurchill was eager to help the new Labour government tacklethis crisis. However, his ability to give such help, in hisposition as Leader of the Opposition, was constrained by importantdivisions within his own party. These caused him considerablepolitical difficulties as 1945 came to a close, prompting amajor Conservative rebellion against his leadership on the questionof the proposed US loan to Britain. Yet, in spite of his discomfitureon this issue in the domestic sphere, he went on, during his1946 trip to the USA, to play a key role in overcoming congressionalopposition to the loan. Moreover, he did so in close collaborationwith Clement Attlee’s government. In reciprocating thespirit of unity that Labour had showed in 1940, Churchill revived,during Britain’s ‘financial Dunkirk’, thespirit and the ethos of the original. Using previously unpublishedevidence, this article tells the story in full for the firsttime.     

The Politics of Citizenship in 1940s Britain: The British Nationality Act

The article examines the enactment of the British NationalityAct, 1948. The legislation created a legal status—Citizenshipof the UK and Colonies—that included Britons and ‘colonial’British subjects under a single definition of British citizenship,and entrenched their right to enter the UK. Between 1948 and1962, some 500, 000 non-white British subjects entered underthe legislation, despite documented evidence of elite suspicionof non-white Commonwealth migration. The article argues thatthis apparent contradiction can only be understood by examiningthe legislation in the context of past migration patterns andBritain's international position in 1948. The legislation wasonly marginally related to migration; it was rather an attemptto maintain a uniform definition of subjecthood in the faceof Canada's unilateral introduction of its own citizenship,and it was an affirmation of Britain's place as head of a Commonwealthstructure founded on the relationship between the UK and theOld Dominions. ^* For comments on earlier drafts, I owe my thanks to John Dorwin,Katie Goebs, Iain McLean, and Desmond King.     

Harold Macmillan and the Deadline Crisis Over Berlin 1958-9

This article examines postwar British foreign policy by analysingthe decision-making process in Whitehall during the ‘deadlinecrisis’, the months between Khrushchev's ultimatum inNovember 1958 and Macmillan's famous voyage of discovery inFebruary 1959. The role played by the then British governmentduring this critical period of the Cold War was widely ignoreduntil the opening of the British archives for the late 1950sand early 1960s, under the thirty-year rule. Since then, scholarshave paid more attention to it. Diplomatic history is affectedgreatly by lack of access to public records; by utilizing previouslywithheld government documents, this paper results in a considerablereassessment of Britain's policy during the early cirisis months.Contrary to conventional wisdom, it argues that Macmillan'scontinuous attempts to shape alliance policy from behind thecurtain put alliance consensus at risk, provoked a deep breachof confidence and so diminshed his scope for effective actionseverely. His visit to Moscow did, in fact, achieve very little,if anything at all.     

Bad Language and BBC Radio Four in the 1960s and 1970s

In the late 1960s and early 1970s there was a new intensityto complaints from listeners to BBC Radio about the strong languagethey heard on the air. There had long been a public expectationthat the BBC had some form of ‘guardianship’ overthe English language, but there was also now a desire from manyproducers within the BBC to reflect contemporary society moreclosely than it had done in the past, and the use of demoticspeech in dramas and documentaries was one dimension of thischange. Such a desire was part of a broader move towards ‘decensorship’in literature, film, theatre, and popular mores in Britain inthis period. The tension this caused between broadcasters andlisteners was especially acute on Radio Four—the main‘broad brow’ speech network of BBC Radio, and onecharacterized by a fiercely conservative audience. Through previouslyunpublished records of its internal discussions between c.1968and c.1979, this article explores the response of the BBC tolisteners’ complaints and press coverage about swearing.It suggests that BBC Radio reacted strongly to audience concern,but that wider anxiety about the reputation of the BBC as awhole also affected decisions over language. In so doing, itillustrates a previously neglected dimension to the BBC's taskof negotiating a precarious consensus on matters of taste anddecency.     

Why 'Indicative Planning' Failed: British Industry and the Formation of the National Economic Development Council (1960-64)

The NEDC (Neddy) was established in 1962 through a joint initiativeof leading industrialists and the Conservative Government. Itsbroad aim was to improve economic co-ordination between companiesand policy-makers, and thus enable Britain to steer a courseaway from ‘stop-go’ and towards stable growth. Thisarticle examines the sources of the Neddy's swift demise intoirrelevance by 1964. Aspirations for the NEDC were multipleand conflicting. Leading industrialists considered it a vehiclefor increasing their influence over the course of economic policy.The government, however, was jealous of its policy-making autonomy,and interested in the NEDC primarily as a signal to currencyspeculators of their commitment to tackling the various supply-sideproblems of the UK economy. The article stresses two sets of‘institutional’ factors which doomed the NEDC'stransformative potential even as it was being set up. First,business was suspicious of co-operation with (and, more particularlyrevealing sensitive firm level information to) a body that wasso close to central government. Employers were justifiably worriedthat the NEDC would be used by future governments as the basisfor more dirigiste rather than merely indicative planning. Second,companies wedded to the economic organizational principle of‘collective laissez-faire’ resisted peak-level effortsto induce co-ordination. Thus, paradoxically, the very co-ordinationproblems in British business that prompted the NEDC's creationwere the primary reasons for its failure.     

Mass Politics and the Techniques of Leadership: The Promise and Perils of Propaganda in Weimar Germany

This paper traces the development of ideas about ‘professional’and ‘scientific’ publicity during the Weimar era,and their gradual absorption by mainstream politicians and officialsfrom the late 1920s onwards. The unprecedented wartime effortsto influence domestic morale and the scandalous revelationsof misinformation afterwards greatly increased popular awarenessof the ability of élites to manipulate public opinion,and generated intense interest in the problems of communicatingwith mass publics. Nowhere was this fascination greater thanin Germany, where many attributed their defeat primarily tosuperior enemy propaganda. The result was a wide-ranging postwardiscourse about the power of this modern ‘weapon’and its unavoidability as a part of modern political and commerciallife. Far from learning the so-called ‘lessons of thewar’, government self-representation efforts were steadilycriticized by journalists and advertisers as both quantitativelyand qualitatively inadequate. Whereas most republicans regarded‘propaganda’ as mendacious and unstatesmanlike,many of the radical parties’ publicity efforts clearlyreflected the basic tenets of the concurrent propaganda discourse,in particular the emphasis on emotional appeal and ritualisticsymbols. During the crisis of the early 1930s, amidst the visiblesuccess of the Nazis’ advertising-inspired campaigning,the spread of this discourse across the political spectrum helpedto hollow out democratic conceptualizations of leadership andpublic opinion from the very centre of Weimar political life.     

Loyalty and Royalty: Gibraltar, the 1953 54 Royal Tour and the Geopolitics of the Iberian Peninsula

This article explores the 1953–54 Royal Tour and in particularthe planning and eventual reception of the Queen and her partywhen they arrived in Gibraltar. These events are consideredin terms of three overlapping contexts: the imperial, the colonialand the geopolitical. First, the Royal Tour marked not onlythe debut of a new Queen but also the realization that the BritishEmpire was beginning to fragment with the eruption of independencemovements in South Asia and the Middle East. Hence, its internationalitinerary bound the remaining empire symbolically together,but also served as a reminder of the ‘gaps’ thatwere beginning to appear. Second, the analysis considers howthe Royal Tour presented an opportunity for the local residentsof Gibraltar to ‘perform their loyalty’ to the newQueen and the British Empire. The focus on performance is significantbecause the article does not presume that ‘loyalty’is simply pre-given. A great deal of work was involved in realizingthe reception of the Queen's party in May 1954 against a backdropof a territorial dispute with Spain over the future legal statusof Gibraltar. The Royal Tour offered the possibility, therefore,of persuading the British and Spanish governments of the localresidents’ qualities including a continued loyalty tothe British/imperial Royal Family and indirectly to Britain.Third, the article underscores the significance of such loyalperformances by considering Spanish opposition to the Queen'svisit in the light of Franco's efforts to establish his country'santi-Communist credentials. The Royal Tour, and the Gibraltarleg in particular, are thus show to be an intense locus of performanceslinked to the politics of empire, colonial rights and anti-imperialism. Animated, happy faces gazing at the sights and decorations showbetter than words the true feelings of the people of the fortress-colonytowards their young, beloved Queen. One correspondent of a Britishnewspaper said that he thought the 27,000 servicemen and civilianson the Rock were so fervidly loyal that they would tear to piecesanyone discovered in their midst with evil designs, and thatwas sufficient guarantee of their Majesty's safety.¹