Multilateral sanctions against terror suspects and the violation of due process standards

The UN and EU sanctions regimes against suspected terrorists at first clearly violated commonly accepted due process standards. Both organizations gradually reformed the procedures that regulated which individuals and entities were subject to sanctions, yet the UN procedures in particular still evince important shortcomings. While international law scholars have debated how the sanctions regimes must be designed to be consistent with international law, political science scholars have, as yet, largely held back from looking into why the regimes evolved in the way they did. This article suggests that court decisions and proceedings and, in the case of the UN, falling commitment from member states, have prompted the UN Security Council and the Council of the EU to implement limited reforms. However, courts did not challenge the sanctions regimes per se and there was no substantial pressure from civil society actors. Moreover, owing to the competences and working methods of the UN Security Council and the Council of the EU, powerful member states could fairly easily deflect reform proposals from disaffected states and other UN and EU bodies.     

Gender as national interest at the UN Security Council

The United Nations Security Council has often been identified as a key actor responsible for the uneven trajectory of the international Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. It is, however, the Council members—who also seek to advance their national interest at this intergovernmental forum—that are pivotal in the Council's deliberations and shape its policies. Yet, little attention has been paid to this aspect of deliberative politics at the Council in feminist scholarship on WPS. This article seeks to address this gap in the literature. It notes that gender has increasingly become part of foreign policy interests of UN member states, as evidenced by practices such as invocation of ‘women's rights’ and ‘gender equality’ in broader international security policy discourse. The article demonstrates that this national interest in gender has featured in WPS‐related developments at the Security Council. Using specific illustrations, it examines three sets of member states: the permanent and non‐permanent members as well as non‐members invited to take part in Council meetings. The main argument of this article relates to highlighting member states’ interests underpinning their diplomatic activities around WPS issues in the Security Council, with the aim to present a fuller understanding of political engagements with UNSCR 1325, the first WPS resolution, in its institutional home.     

Can UN arms embargoes in Africa be effective?

Calls in 2007 for new UN sanctions on Iran and Burma reflect a current swing back in favour of using sanctions as a way of putting pressure on a regime without resorting to direct military engagement. This article assesses the effectiveness of UN sanctions in Africa and in particular of the most commonly imposed form of sanctions—the arms embargo. The article argues for an analysis of what sanctions achieve and suggests that for the most part UN embargoes have not stopped weapons reaching Africa not only because of the lack of capacity to implement them in some states, but also because of the lack of political will in others. In some post‐conflict situations such as Liberia, UN sanctions have been adapted to support economic reconstruction and security sector reform effectively. However, in the future there is likely to be a decrease in the use of UN sanctions in Africa but an increase in their use by the Africa Union and some of Africa's Regional Economic Communities.     

Gendering normative power Europe: lessons of the Women,Peace and Security agenda

The European Union is seen to operate at the international level by promoting ideas and values, rather than by exerting military or economic power. As a gender actor, the EU has played a key role in the development of formal equality, which is presented as a foundational principle of European integration. It therefore follows that normative power Europe should seek to promote these values in external affairs. This article interrogates the role of the EU as a normative gender actor in relation to its implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and related resolutions. Documentary analysis will be supplemented by a detailed assessment of speeches and public statements about the role of the EU as a gender actor in external affairs. This data will be used to assess whether there is a disjuncture between the dominant narrative about gender equality as a fundamental value of the EU and the actions of the organization. It will also allow us to assess whether gender mainstreaming is a tool for public diplomacy or has made a significant change to the way the external relations agenda is formulated and implemented. Additionally, the article will draw attention to the institutional obstacles to the EU performing a role as a gender actor in external affairs. It identifies a critical tension between framing the WPS resolutions as an extension of the EU's equality on the one hand, and understanding that gender mainstreaming is a mere policy tool in international affairs. In doing so, it highlights how competing institutional demands can ultimately undermine core values (e.g. equality) when they are used instrumentally.     

Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo: Emergent Norm,Moral Duty or the Coming Anarchy?

In March 1999 NATO justified the use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the grounds that it was necessary to avert an impending humanitarian catastrophe. This action was so controversial because it was the first time since the founding of the United Nations that a group of states, acting without explicit Security Council authority, defended a breach of the sovereignty rule primarily on humanitarian grounds. This article reflects on the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in international society by reviewing five books that explore the strengths and weaknesses of the contemporary legal and moral framework governing humanitarian intervention. The article identifies three broad positions: first, there is an emergent norm of humanitarian intervention; second, humanitarian intervention is seen as a moral duty; and finally, the claim that humanitarian intervention outside Security Council authority should not be legitimated because it threatens the principles of international order. Books reviewed: Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and the development of collective security: the delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII powers Francis Kofi Abiew, The evolution of the doctrine and practice of humanitarian inter‐vention Neal Riemer, (ed.) Protection against genocide: mission impossible? Stephen A. Garrett, Doing good and doing well: an examination of humanitarian inter‐vention Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, (eds.) Kosovo and the challenge of humanitarian intervention: selective indignation, collective action, and international citizenship     

Kosovo's final status

The Ahtisaari comprehensive proposal for a settlement of the status of Kosovo met with deadlock in the UN Security Council. It would neither be endorsed nor imposed upon the parties. In view of that position, a new round of negotiations, conducted by the EU, Russia and the US, was launched over a period of 120 days. During these discussions, Serbia's President Boris Tadic revealed a significant measure of flexibility when putting forwards options for wide‐ranging self‐government for Kosovo. However, these forward‐looking positions were undermined by a less advanced proposal emanating from other parts of the Belgrade government, including the Prime Minister. Moreover, the Serbian parliament sought to preempt developments by unilaterally adopting its own constitutional amendments relating to Kosovo, further undermining the credibility of Serbia's position at the international level. However, it could be argued that had Belgrade been willing to begin the previous round of negotiations let by Martti Ahtisaari with the advanced offers it was putting at the very end of the process, a different outcome might have resulted. Such action might have put pressure on western governments to impose an advanced autonomy settlement on Kosovo, rather than putting Belgrade under pressure to accept the Ahtisaari plan. In the end, Kosovo's independence was unilateral in two senses. On the one hand, Kosovo declared independence without the benefit of agreement from Belgrade or cover from the UN Security Council. On the other hand, Kosovo unilaterally accepted the provisions emanating from the Ahtisaari talks. These concessions had been made in the expectation that agreed independence would be forthcoming in return. Belgrade was therefore able to oppose independence and work against its consolidation, while profiting from Kosovo's agreement to the plan it had rejected.     

The Security Council: Behind the Scenes

Following the publication of the various enquiries into the circumstances of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, there has developed a view that the UN lacks the ability to manage complex missions. With particular reference to the case of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), the author pays special attention to the oversight of peacekeeping missions and the crucial role of the UN Security Council, the Secretary General and senior officials in the Secretariat and asks whether the Council is sufficiently equipped at ambassadorial level to address professional military issues. Does the Council have a right and a duty to know the details of peacekeeping missions in order to take decisions? A culture of secrecy has developed in the Security Council and it is common practice now for the Council's important debates to be held in secret. This means that its decision‐making is unaccountable. The author also questions the lack of enquiry into British policy towards Rwanda in the Security Council between 1993 and 1994.     

The UN and the African Union in Mali and beyond: a shotgun wedding?

The United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) have collaborated in building a viable African Peace and Security Architecture and have worked together in a number of armed conflicts over the past decade. Examples include the peace operations in Burundi and Somalia, and the hybrid peace operation in Sudan's Darfur region which is perhaps the most prominent illustration of this collaboration. Although the UN Security Council authorized the intervention in Libya, which was approved by leading regional organizations (the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Gulf Cooperation Council), it was opposed initially by the AU although the three African states in the Security Council voted for it. Relations cooled as a result and have grown colder still as the UN snubbed the AU and its initial efforts to engage in post‐conflict stabilization in Mali. While the AU sought to prove itself as a capable security provider and partner on the continent with its operation AFISMA, France's Opération Serval and the UN's peace operation for Mali, MINUSMA, bypassed the African Union. This article explores the underlying fault‐lines between the two organizations by examining interactions between the UN and AU since the latter's launch in 2002, but focusing on the Mali case. The fault‐lines emerging from the analysis are different capabilities, risk‐averse vs risk‐assuming approaches to casualties, diverging geopolitics and leadership rivalry.     

Clarity or ambiguity? The withdrawal clause of UN Security Council Resolution 242

Today the international community seems at a loss as to how to transact peace between Israel and Palestine (and Syria). UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 provides the principles for that peace. Yet there has always been a perceived ambiguity about its withdrawal clause. Diplomatic and UN records show clearly what the Security Council intended in Resolution 242. Nine of 15 members wanted total withdrawal, and the minority saw the virtue of small adjustments to the 1949 Armistice Line to accommodate Israel's demand for ‘secure and recognized’ borders. Every Security Council member upheld the overarching principle, ‘the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.’ Those who drafted Resolution 242 seem not to have checked that its terms were consonant with the Fourth Geneva Convention, even though they recognized the Convention applied. The Convention renders it illegal for those under occupation to agree terms with the Occupying Power which infringe the rights and protections of the Convention. Since the Convention remains in force until the end of occupation, no peace agreement which includes the adjustment of borders or ceding territory may be concluded until after a full withdrawal has taken place—a requirement fully consonant with Resolution 242's ‘inadmissibility’ principle, and removing any doubt regarding the requirement for a full Israeli withdrawal. To comply with it themselves and to avoid misapprehension, Quartet members must tell Israel, Syria and Palestine that they cannot recognize a peace agreement which would violate the Convention's terms.     

Italy as a negotiator in the EU equal opportunities policy process

The creation of both a Ministry and a Department for equal opportunities has been Italy's main institutional response to EU pressures in the field of equal opportunities policy. Nevertheless, the impact of Italian negotiators in the EU depends not only on the institutional resources available to them, but also on the political credibility acquired by presenting well‐defined and clear preferences during the bargaining process in the Council. This article considers how the Italian position was presented, and how successful it was, in two recently approved Directives, one decided by qualified majority vote, the other on a basis of unanimity. The aim of the analysis is to assess Italy's capacity to influence EU social affairs. Information was gathered by conducting qualitative interviews with the main political actors involved in the decision‐making process at the national and European levels.     

The ‘woman‐in‐conflict’ at the UN Security Council: a subject of practice

Since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, the woman‐in‐conflict has emerged as a central figure in the discourse of the UNSC Women, Peace and Security policy community. She is an ever‐present referent in discussions, the person in whose name critique is launched or action demanded. This figure is a representation of the needs and interests of the uncountable, faceless and nameless women affected by and living through war; a representation that takes place through imbuing her with particular meaning or characteristics. These meanings shape how the figure is understood in Women, Peace and Security discourse, which, in turn, constructs the horizons of possibility for both current and future policy and its implementation. This article explores how this figure is produced as a subject through layers of representation and is deeply embedded in the practices and relationships of power in the policy community. It suggests that accounting for these will offer an opportunity for feminist advocates to engage in this institutional space in more considered and effective ways.     

Women and Peace Building: Local Perspectives on Opportunities and Barriers

The UN Security Council Resolution 1325 has made strong provisions to include women in peace‐building interventions and actions. This is, however, rarely observed in practice beyond local‐level activities. This article discusses new qualitative evidence on the opportunities and barriers to women's participation in peace‐building processes, based on a comparative analysis of case studies conducted in Afghanistan, Liberia, Nepal and Sierra Leone. The findings show that women's engagement in peace‐building activities, beyond their immediate social relations, is restricted by institutional, economic, cultural and social obstacles. These barriers prevent the realization of gender equality objectives in peace‐building initiatives. Moreover, local understandings of peace typically place family relations at the centre of how women engage with peace‐building processes, and how other community members perceive women's roles in peace building.     

Right-Sizing International Criminal Justice: The Hybrid Experiment at the Special Court for Sierra Leone

In the decade since their establishment, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have made great advancements in the development of international criminal justice. Nonetheless, the ad hoc tribunals have been roundly criticized for their expense, inefficiency and slowness. When the Security Council decided to set up a court for Sierra Leone, it wanted to find a new model. The hybrid Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) is an effort to right-size international criminal justice: it has a pared-down budget, tightly focused mandate, limited time of operation, and a lack of institutional links to the Security Council. The negotiations over these issues led to repeated clashes between the UN Secretary General and the Security Council, with the Security Council consistently favouring a more modestly sized court. The SCSL has much to recommend it but its promise is shadowed by the paltry resources available to it. In its efforts to avoid creating another over-sized tribunal, the Security Council swung too far in the other direction. The lofty goals of ending impunity and providing justice demand more than a court on the cheap.     

The United Nations as the ‘Parliament of Man’

Abstract

Paul Kennedy. The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations. Toronto, ON: HarperCollins, 2006. Pp. xvii, 361. $36.95 (CDN); Ronald St John Macdonald and Douglas M. Johnston, eds. Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community. Leiden: Brill, 2005. Pp. xviii, 968. €235.00; $317.00 (US); S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong. Human Security and the UN: A Critical History. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006. Pp. xix, 346. $35.00 (US), paper; David M. Malone. The International Struggle over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council, 1980–2005. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. xiv, 398. $59.95 (CDN); Michael J. Matheson. Council Unbound: The Growth of UN Decision Making on Conflict and Postconflict Issues after the Gold War. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006. Pp. xvi, 422. $19.95 (US), paper; Ramesh Thakur. The United Nations, Peace, and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. xvi, 388. $32.99 (US), paper.     

Transatlantic relations and peace in Europe

In his recent novel Alain Crémieux imagines what might happen in Europe without NATO and US military forces and security commitments. Numerous border and minority conflicts break out, coalitions comparable to those in Europe's past begin to form, and the European Union is divided and ineffectual— until pro‐peace and pro‐EU forces rally. Most European countries then unite under a treaty providing for collective defence and security and a new central European government. The novel raises questions of international order: to what extent have the Europeans overcome their old ‘demons’ (distrust, power rivalry etc.), notably through the EU? While many theories purport to explain the peaceful relations among the EU member states, critical tests of the Union's political cohesion would come in circumstances without the US‐dominated external security framework, including US leadership in NATO. To what extent could the EU maintain cohesion and resist aggression or coercion by an external power against a member state, contain and resolve external conflicts affecting EU interests, and defend the Union's economic and security interests beyond Europe? To determine whether the US ‘pacifying’ and protective role has in fact become irrelevant, thanks in large part to the EU, would require a risky experiment—actually removing US military forces and commitments. The challenges and uncertainties that would face Europe without NATO argue that the Alliance remains an essential underpinning of political order in Europe. Moreover, the Alliance can serve as a key element in the campaigns against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To revitalize the Alliance, it is imperative that the Europeans improve their military capabilities and acquire the means necessary for a more balanced transatlantic partnership in maintaining international security.     

In the footsteps of George Orwell: Patrick McCarthy as Italian correspondent for Tribune, 1978–1980

Abstract

This paper examines Italy's contribution to the United Nations (UN) and how effective this has been in protecting Italian interests. The first part outlines the areas where Italy's input to the UN has been most relevant in terms of ideas, policies and participation, such as for example the campaign to ban the death penalty and its participation in collective security through participation in UN peacekeeping missions. This paper also highlights the critical role that Italy's long-standing positions on UN reform and the enlargement of the Security Council have played in defining Italy's status in the international community, and asks whether there have been significant changes in the traditional Italian position and its loyalty to the UN and, more generally, to the multilateral system. The second part analyzes the origin and rationale of Italy's policies toward the UN and their effectiveness in defining and defending the national interest. It explores the idea that these policies have been determined by the ‘institutional multilateralism’ of the Italian Constitution, the ‘genetic multilateralism’ of the Italian society and the ‘forced multilateralism’ of Italy as a middle-range power. Italy's positions on the UN and its reform are examined in the light of claims that Italy's foreign policy reflects its ‘complex of exclusion’ and presumed lack of influence in the ‘major stakes’ in world diplomacy.     

The new politics of protection? Côte d'Ivoire,Libya and the responsibility to protect

In March 2011, the UN Security Council authorized the use of force to protect civilians in Libya. This was the first time that the Council has ever authorized the invasion of a functioning state for such purposes. International society's relatively decisive responses to recent crises in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya has provoked significant commentary, suggesting that something has changed about the way the world responds to violence against civilians. Focusing on these two cases, this article examines the changing practice of the UN Security Council. It argues that we are seeing the emergence of a new politics of protection, but that this new politics has been developing over the past decade. Four things are new about this politics of protection: protecting civilians from harm has become a focus for international engagement; the UN Security Council has proved itself willing to authorize the use of force for protection purposes; regional organizations have begun to play the role of ‘gatekeeper’; and major powers have exhibited a determination to work through the Security Council where possible. However, the cases of Côte d'Ivoire and Libya also help to highlight some key challenges that might halt or reverse progress. Notably, states differ in the way they interpret mandates; questions are being asked about the UN's authority to act independently of specific Security Council authorizations; the overlap of regional organizations sometimes sends conflicting messages to the Security Council; and there remains a range of difficult operational questions about how to implement protection mandates. With these in mind, this article concludes with some suggestions about how the future challenges might be navigated in order to maintain the progress that has been made in the past decade.     

Libya and the state of intervention

The international response to the crisis in Libya has been remarkably quick and decisive. Where many other cases of mass atrocity crimes have failed to generate sufficient and timely political will to protect civilians at risk, the early response to Libya in 2011 has shown that the United Nations Security Council is able to give effect to the ‘responsibility to protect’ norm. While not an implementing party in a legal sense, the Australian government has taken a forward-leaning diplomatic stance in helping to mobilise broad support for addressing this crisis. In light of the ongoing political controversy over armed humanitarian intervention, the Libya case shows that state-based advocacy for R2P matters, given the on-going need to bolster the legitimacy of the principle. A discussion of Canberra's diplomatic activity is a prelude to an examination of the proceedings of the UN Security Council and the two key resolutions, the second of which gave effect to the forcible action. The article then considers three dimensions of the Security Council's implementation of the responsibility to protect: the language of the resolutions and the intriguing absence of a textual reference to the international community's responsibility to act; the expansive mandate for civilian protection in Security Council resolution 1973; and the first unanimous referral to the International Criminal Court, with novel support from the United States of America.     

European Union External Trade Policy: Multilevel Principal–Agent Relationships

This article examines the potential political influences on European Union (EU) external trade policymaking. Given the EU's volume of international trade and its extensive involvement in bilateral and multilateral trade arrangements, a better understanding of how the EU makes external trade policy is increasingly important. It is an extremely complex process—involving the EU public, the 25 member states' parliaments and governments, and the institutions of the EU, including the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. It is a system of multilevel governance with overlapping jurisdictions with numerous potential access points for societal interests to influence European external trade policy. In this article, we evaluate the probable political channels that societal interests could use to influence EU external trade policy. We employ the principal–agent (P–A) framework to examine five of the more important P–A relationships that are likely to influence EU external trade policymaking. We conclude that EU policymaking as it pertains to external trade is quite insulated from general public pressures. The primary institutions involved in external trade policymaking are the EU Council of Ministers and the Commission—both of which are largely insulated from the public. Future empirical work should focus on this relationship between the Council of Ministers and the Commission.     

小泉政府力促联合国改革的玄机

2005年是联合国改革年,小泉政府籍此推进其联合国改革外交,把删除敌国条款和加入常任理事国作为其主要目标。从国家利益出发,日本提出自己的联合国改革方案:恢复联大生机与活力、改革安理会、改革秘书处、修改敌国条款、重新考虑联合国会费分摊及增加联合国日本工作人员数量等。但由于联合国改革本身的复杂性和小泉政府的强硬外交路线,其联合国改革方案能否实现及落实程度仍未可知。