British civil–military relations and the problem of risk

Drawing primarily on the experience of the UK since 2001, this article examines the increasing prevalence of risk as an organizing concept for western defence and security planning and its implications for civil–military relations and strategy‐making. It argues that there may be tensions between such approaches and the principles of good strategy‐making, which aim to link means and resources to ends in a coherent manner. Not only does risk potentially blur the relationship between means and ends in the strategy‐making process, it also exposes it to contestation, with multiple interpretations of what the risks actually are and the strategic priority (and commitment) which should be attached to them. The article examines these tensions at three levels of risk contestation for British defence: institutions, operations and military–society relations. In the case of the UK, it contends that the logic of risk has not been able to provide the same national motivation and sense of strategic purpose as the logic of threat. In this context, calls for a reinvigoration of traditional strategy‐making or a renewed conception of national interest may be missing a more fundamental dissonance between defence policy, civil–military relations and the wider security context. More widely, the strategic ennui that some western states have been accused of may not simply be a product of somehow falling out of the habit of strategy‐making or an absence of ‘political will’. Instead, it may reflect deeper social and geostrategic trends which constrain and complicate the use of military force and obscure its utility in the public imagination.     

The military covenant and the civil–military contract in Britain

Is the British civil–military contract strained to breaking point? The contemporary portrayal of British civil–military relations is bleak, with academics, politicians, the media and military charities arguing that military–societal relations are in urgent need of repair. Through assessing the extent to which the reciprocal expectations of the armed forces and the British public are realized, this article will argue that the moral contract, although under stress, is not breaking. Underlying social trends and the use of doctrinal concepts such as the military covenant have, combined with recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, altered the expectations of both sides causing tensions within military–societal relations. Yet, while the armed forces do harbour unrealized expectations of the British public who are unwilling or unable to support the use of the military in recent conflicts, neither the public nor the military is so disillusioned with the performance of the other for the relationship to be described as breaking or broken.     

Continuity and change: prospects for civil—military relations in Turkey

Early indications suggest that the appointment of General Yaþar Büyükanýt as chief of the Turkish general staff (TGS) at the end of August 2006 marked a new era in civil‐military relations in the country. Yet it would be a mistake to see the military's more forthright attitude under Büyükanýt simply as a return to the past. Civil‐military relations in Turkey have always been characterized by a combination of continuity and change. Both the legal basis for and the TGS's own perceptions of the role and responsibilities of the military have remained unchanged for over 70 years. However, the extent and the manner in which the military has influenced politics have always varied. In recent years the TGS's ability to ensure that government policy remains within acceptable parameters has been primarily based on its public prestige rather than the prospect of a full‐blooded military coup. Although the TGS has always been the most respected institution in the country, the Turkish public's willingness to tolerate, or even to encourage, its assumption of a more active political role has traditionally varied according to changes in the prevailing domestic political circumstances: falling during times of stability and confidence and rising during times of uncertainty. In early 2007 both the country and the government of the moderately Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP) appeared to have lost momentum and direction. In such an environment, and in the continued absence of an eff ective political opposition, many Turks will once again look to the country's military to prevent the JDP from increasing its control over the apparatus of state, starting with the appointment of a new president in April 2007. To date the JDP has always backed down in the face of pressure from the TGS. However, whether it will continue to do so, and what the TGS can or will do if the JDP defies its warnings, currently all remain unclear.     

Regional policy in Russia today: The new role of the state

For many years, all regional policies in the USSR were realized by industry ministries (i.e. supermonopolies). The present regional problems are mainly the result of their activity. The disintegration of the USSR sees the end of this traditional regional policy, but at the same time all spatial problems became more acute. Russia needs social and economic regional policies, the absence of which can stop reform and increase the disintegration of the country. However, the present liberal economic strategy of the government does not leave enough space for Western‐style regional policy.     

The double interregnum: UK–US relations beyond Blair and Bush

The downturn in relations between the UK and the US under the premiership of Gordon Brown presents an interesting opportunity to analyse the nature of the relationship between the two states. Brown's policy of creating distance between his approach and that of his predecessor, Tony Blair, and between himself and President Bush, offers a case‐study in whether it is possible to be cool towards an incumbent leader while remaining close to the state he leads. In other words: is it feasible to be anti‐Bush and pro‐American? It also provides an opportunity to analyse the role of political timing in inter‐state relations. By appearing driven by reaction to the events of 2003 despite taking office in 2007, Brown put himself out of step with the prevailing mood of the time. By also acting as if the Bush administration was a lame duck counting out its time to retirement in 2009, Brown allowed himself to be outmanoeuvred in his bid for America's attention by the conciliatorily pro‐American new leaders of France and Germany. By acting as if the Bush administration is a political interregnum, the Brown government has invited the United States to treat his own administration the same way. The result is a dual interregnum in UK–US relations, with each incumbent leader awaiting the political demise of the other before better relations can be resumed.     

The Rhetoric of Convention: The Foundational Saul Narratives (1 Samuel 9–11) Reconsidered

Biblical scholars have applied new methodologies to the royal narratives in the Deuteronomistic History (Joshua–Kings) as viable resources for recovering authentic historical information regarding the monarchic cultures of ancient Israel and their impact on the development of Israelite religion. The present study considers anew the narratives regarding Israel's first king, Saul son of Kish. A recurring motif in these narratives is the appeal to socio‐religious convention, which is suggestive of a rhetorical strategy among the authors that sought to situate the Saulide royal lineage in familiar traditions that the institution of kingship was perceived as disrupting.