Russia's Economic Transformation under Putin

A prominent specialist on the Russian economy presents a systematic account and analysis of Russia's economic transformation under President Vladimir Putin. The study covers the period from the financial crash of August 1998 through the years of spectacular growth leading to August 2004. The discussion encompasses the financial stabilization in the aftermath of the crash, the work of Putin's first economic team, the tax reform, tightened budgetary control, deregulation, land and judicial reforms, trade policies, the economic agenda for Putin's second term, and prospects for further economic reform. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: E60, E63, F13, H20, H60, P21. 1 figure, 2 tables, 57 references.     

China's Nuclear Energy in Light of the Disaster in Japan

An American specialist on Russian agriculture examines that country's agrarian policy, as well as the agricultural sector more generally, one year into the presidency of Dmitriy Medvedev. Focusing on the three key policy issues—state financial support, state intervention in the grain market, and international food trade policy—he assesses the extent to which current policy represents a continuation of that prevailing during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. The author discusses the appointment of a new Agriculture Minister in 2009, which may signal a different approach to the management of the sector, and concludes with an assessment of the impact of the global financial crisis. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: F130, Q100, Q170, Q180. 2 tables, 63 references.     

Imperial nationalism as the driver behind Russia's invasion of Ukraine

The roots of Russia's invasion of Ukraine are to be found in two areas. The first is the revival of Tsarist imperial nationalist and White Russian émigré nationalist denials of the existence of Ukraine and Ukrainians. Russian imperial nationalists believe the eastern Slavs constitute a pan Russian nation of Great Russians, Little Russians and White Russian branches of one Russian nation. The second is the cult of the Great Patriotic War and Joseph Stalin and the revival of Soviet era discourse on Ukrainian Nazis (i.e., nationalists). A Ukrainian nationalist in the Soviet Union and Vladimir Putin's Russia is any Ukrainian who seeks a future for his/her country outside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Russian World and who upholds an ethnic Ukrainian (rather than a Little Russian) identity. The Russian World is the new core of the Eurasian Economic Union, Russian President Vladimir Putin's alternative to the EU's Eastern Partnership. In the contemporary domain, Ukrainian nationalists are Nazi's irrespective of their language preference or political beliefs and if they do not accept they are Little Russians. Putin's invasion goal of denazification is a genocidal goal to eradicate the ‘anti-Russia’ that has allegedly been nurtured by Ukrainian nationalists and the West.     

Putin's Russia: shaping a ‘grand strategy’?

Since the middle of the last decade the Russian leadership has conducted a strategic overhaul, publishing a cascade of new concepts, strategies and doctrines that attempt to frame plans in a long‐term horizon to 2020 and beyond. Following Vladimir Putin's re‐election in 2012, a series of presidential instructions and new plans have been published to update this overhaul. This article examines this commitment to strategic planning and whether it is tantamount to a grand strategy. The article explores the various understandings of Russian strategy in the existing literature, before sketching a definition of grand strategy. It suggests that Moscow has shaped a broad horizon and made some progress towards achieving the goals it has set out. But a grand strategy is more than formulating plans, it is also the coordination of relevant organizations and resources—‘conducting the orchestra’—to execute effectively the plans. The article thus concludes by exploring the difficulties Moscow faces: on the one hand, an evolving and competitive international context and, on the other, a domestic context burdened by a heavy inheritance from the USSR and contemporary Russian problems. Taken all together, these suggest that although Moscow is committed to strategic planning, a grand strategy remains a work in progress.     

Japan's Political Leadership Deficit

Analysts have long pondered the question: 'Who rules in Japan?'. Prime Ministers who have exercised strong leadership have been the exception rather than the rule. Despite the widespread acknowledgment that Japan's political leadership deficit undermines the ability of the government to act swiftly in a crisis and to exercise international leadership in trade and foreign policy, a systematic explanation for Japan's weak political executive is yet to be advanced. While historical and cultural factors cannot be ignored, more relevant in a contemporary context are institutional factors that restrict the power of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. A parliamentary Cabinet system is not incompatible with strong leadership but, in Japan's case, the inability of the political executive to exercise indisputable authority, or indeed, merely to exercise the legitimate prerogatives of Prime Ministerial and Cabinet Office, is directly attributable to the constraints imposed by a collection of informal power structures within the ruling conservative party and by an autonomous central bureaucracy, all of which have held power away from the political executive. Various institutional remedies are currently being pursued to enhance the leadership of the executive branch. They are part of a deliberately engineered shift in power from non-elected bureaucrats to elected politicians. The reforms will also help to diminish the influence of ruling party factions over personnel selections to executive office and the ascendancy of internal policy cliques within party policymaking.     

‘New Cold War’ or twenty years’ crisis? Russia and international politics

President Vladimir Putin's foreign policy can be characterized as a ‘new realism’, repudiating some of the exaggerated ambitions of Yevgeny Primakov's tenure as foreign minister in the late 1990s while asserting Russia's distinctive identity in world politics. Rather than acting as a classic ‘balancing’ power prescribed by classic realist theory as the response to the hegemonic power of a single state, Russia under Putin tended to ‘bandwagon’ and the country has been a vigorous ‘joiner’. Putin insisted that Russia retains its ‘autonomy’ in international politics while moving away from earlier ideas that Russia could constitute the kernel of an alternative power bloc. However, the opportunity to integrate Russia into the hegemonic international order may have been missed because of what is seen in Moscow as the resolute hostility of groups in the West who continue to pursue Cold War aims of isolating and containing Russia. The Cold War was transcended in an asymmetrical manner, and this has given rise to four major failures: political, strategic, intellectual and cultural. The world faces the danger of the onset of a new era of great power bloc politics, thus restoring a Cold War structure to the international system. With none of the major strategic issues facing the international community at the end of the Cold War yet resolved, we may be facing a new twenty years’ crisis.     

Bonded but not embedded: trust in Australia-Indonesia relations,Keating & Suharto to Turnbull & Jokowi

The aim of this article is to use theories of bonded and embedded trust to explain the ‘roller-coaster’ nature of the Australia-Indonesia relationship. An examination of Prime Minister Keating and President Suharto as a case of bonded trust between leaders reveals the value such a relationship has in building trust in bilateral relations. However, it also reveals that such trust cannot survive changes in leadership if it has not become more broadly embedded in both government and society. This is particularly problematic given Australia’s tendency for rapid leadership and ministerial turnover across the past decade. While President Joko Widodo and Prime Minister Turnbull were able to develop a warm relationship which helped to reset the relationship and enabled them to navigate diplomatic incidents, Malcolm Turnbull’s recent political demise only serves to further highlight the necessity of building trust between societies. Without trust, cooperation between the two states will be limited. Building trust between societies will be required if Australia wants to develop a trusting relationship with Indonesia capable of undertaking deeper forms of cooperation on more sensitive issues – something which will be fundamental to Australia’s ability to navigate growing strategic uncertainty in the region.     

Putin,national self-determination and political independence in the twenty-first century

This contribution focuses on the right of nations to self-determination after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It suggests that sovereignty and territorial integrity are not as secure as once thought. A number of articles and statements issued by Vladimir Putin are analysed to identify nationalist themes which he uses to reject Ukraine's right to exist outside the Russian state. Key themes include a primordial account of national origins, the conflation of state and nation, and a refusal to recognise a right to self-determination of territories that had once been part of Russia. Putin's nationalism draws on imperial nationalism, state nationalism, revanchism and majoritarianism to underwrite his claims. Such views are widespread among established states, contributing to the instability of the contemporary world. It is argued that a reconfiguration of the relationship between state and nation is long overdue, as is the inflexible nature of territorial integrity.     

Cartoon epic heroes in indigenous Siberian revival: The meaning of ethnicity in Putin's Russia (Respond to this article at https://www.therai.org.uk/publications/anthropology-today/debate)

This article outlines a motivation for the Russian Federation's incursion into the Crimea, which concerns the Putin administration's relationship with Russia's citizens, rather than the outside world. I use a case study from Siberia – the Sakha people's revival of their national epic, the Olongkho – to explore the possibility that Putin's behaviour during the Ukrainian crisis serves to legitimate his authority within Russia, by appealing to conceptions of ethnicity that have their roots in Soviet‐era social engineering. Rather than deducing the Putin administration's motives from the events and relationships they immediately concern, I explore motivations emerging from the configuration of values, perceptions, and conventions that shapes and reproduces social difference in Russia. The Sakha Olongkho revival shows how the perceptions of ethnicity fostered during the Soviet era have become powerful indexes of morality and authority. Individual Sakha citizens now demonstrate their identities and values through adopting a stance towards a reified conception of Sakha ethnicity expressed in their choices of recreation, fashion and consumption. Sakha ethnicity has become integrated into the process whereby hierarchical social groupings emerge within Sakha society according to their avowal of specific tastes and norms. The relatively small size of the Sakha population – which is nevertheless the dominant ethnic group in their republic, Sakha (Yakutia) – enables us to see trends affecting the rest of Russia in microcosm. Thus, I suggest that former Soviet ethnicity has become so closely woven into Russia's morality that Putin's invasions of foreign states, in the name of the ethnic Russian community, bolster his claim to be a moral person and a legitimate and authoritative national leader.     

Putin's Russia: slowing the pendulum without stopping the clock

Vladimir Putin has been president of Russia for eighteen months, sufficienttime for some judgement about his style of leadership and achievements to have been made. He set out to restore order to a Russia that was fragmenting in Yeltsin's latter years and to revive Russians' pride in their country. Nonetheless, he remains committed to a liberal market economy integrated with the world economy. He encouraged force to bring order to Chechnya, but has not really tackled the problem of reconstruction. He has brought the regions under greater control by the centre, but has been prepared to compromise to avoid confrontation. His most tangible achievement to date has been in championing legislation, most of it long overdue, to establish the legal basis of a market economy. He has been able to exploit a working majority in the parliament, which Yeltsin never enjoyed. The success of this enterprise will depend to some degree on its political context. Persistent efforts by Putin and his team to exert control over the political process and the media will be counterproductive if they concentrate power with the president but leave him without broadly based, independent political support. Putin is likely to remain in power until 2008, however, so he has time on his side.     

Post‐communist Russia: a historic opportunity missed

This article analyses the nature of the current Russian system and its future trajectory. First, the continuity between the Yeltsin and Putin presidencies is made clear. The nature of the Russian system has, to a great extent, been influenced by Yeltsin, who strengthened demands not for independent institutions but for a new and more powerful authoritarian leadership. Putin has consolidated the system, based on personalized power. But despite signs of economic growth and outward stability there is evidence that the Russian system is unsustainable in the long‐term. The current system is based on a modification of the petro‐economy that reproduces the merger between power and business with the rentier class. Thus far, however, the model has not been able to solve social conflicts or stop the degradation of ‘human capital’. Nor is it likely to do so in the future.     

Russian geopolitical culture and public opinion: the masks of Proteus revisited

In this paper, we build on the work of Graham Smith, who was developing a critical geopolitics of Russia in his posthumous paper of 1999, published in this journal. Like Smith, we link the evolving geopolitical orientations of Russia to the search for a post-Soviet identity amongst its citizens and its political leadership. While Smith saw a core concept in Russian geopolitics having Protean masks, it is the leadership of the Russian state, specifically President Putin, who has successfully adopted a Protean strategy to appeal to the disparate elements of the Russian geopolitical spectrum. Based on a nationwide survey in spring 2002, we identify six clusters in Russian public opinion by socio-demographic characteristics and we connect each cluster to the main geopolitical orientations competing in contemporary Russia, including democratic statism and the increasingly marginalized Eurasianism that formed the core subject of Smith's paper.     

俄罗斯联邦权力结构改革与民族问题

俄罗斯独立后的联邦权力结构改革与民族问题有很强的关联性。俄罗斯独立之初,伴随着地方民族主义的抬头,各民族自治实体与联邦中央展开了权力争夺。叶利钦时期,俄联邦中央试图通过与地方分享权力来化解这种危机;普京执政以后,大力加强联邦垂直权力体系的建设,以求提高联邦的法律效率和整顿社会秩序。文章认为,民族因素是俄联邦权力结构组合和变迁的重要因素;普京对联邦权力结构的改革将减少地方和民族因素的影响,联邦权力体系的运行效率将大大提高。     

The triumph of Russian national security policy? Russia’s rapid rebound

Russia’s return to prominence in international affairs has been in many respects surprising. Russia’s easy seizure of Crimea, its role in Syria and its ambitious pivot eastward have emboldened Moscow at a time of crisis for the liberal order. This article characterises Russian national security policy as a deliberate ‘rebound’ strategy, designed to deliver a rapid return to power and status. The author defines rebounding in respect to four characteristics: a relatively short timeline for the rebounding state to achieve its goals; a strategic (re-)emphasis on territory and hard power; the construction of alternative networks of influence via institutions; and active efforts to undermine existing normative and legal orthodoxies. The author then assesses these in terms of specific Russian national security policy objectives, including in the key domain of information operations. The article concludes that Vladimir Putin has skilfully employed conventional material capabilities and geopolitics, combined with the exploitation of contemporary information networks for instrumental purposes. Paradoxically, though, those same factors will constrain Russian national security objectives in the future.     

Who identifies with the “Russian World”? Geopolitical attitudes in southeastern Ukraine,Crimea, Abkhazia,South Ossetia,and Transnistria

Abstract

The concept of the Russian world (Russkii mir) re-entered geopolitical discourse after the end of the Soviet Union. Though it has long historical roots, the practical definition and geopolitical framing of the term has been debated and refined in Russian political and cultural circles during the years of the Putin presidency. Having both linguistic-cultural and geopolitical meanings, the concept of the Russian world remains controversial, and outside Russia it is often associated with Russian foreign policy actions. Examination of official texts from Vladimir Putin and articles from three Russian newspapers indicate complicated and multifaceted views of the significance and usage of the Russkii mir concept. Surveys in December 2014 in five sites on the fringes of Russia – in southeastern Ukraine, Crimea, and three Russian-supported de facto states (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria) – show significant differences between the Ukrainian sample points and the other locations about whether respondents believe that they live in the Russian world. In Ukraine, nationality (Russian vs. Ukrainian) is aligned with the answers, while overall, attitudes toward Russian foreign policy, level of trust in the Russian president, trust of Vladimir Putin, and liking Russians are positively related to beliefs about living in the Russian world. In Ukraine, the negative reactions to geopolitical speech acts and suspicions about Russian government actions overlap with and confuse historical linguistic-cultural linkages with Russia, but in the other settings, close security and economic ties reinforce a sense of being in the Russian “world.”     

Rhetorically defining a social institution: how leaders have framed same-sex marriage

Questions about the definition, meaning and limits of marriage have become a topic of fierce political debate in advanced Western democracies over the past decade as political leaders have sought to grapple with the issue of same-sex marriage. The rhetorical choices of leaders as they have made the case for or against moving away from traditional definitions of marriage have been central to shaping the national debate within different jurisdictions. This article applies the theoretical lens of ‘discursive institutionalism’ (Schmidt) and the analytical purchase of ‘rhetorical political analysis’ (Finlayson) to compare the rhetoric of Prime Minister David Cameron in the UK, Prime Minister Tony Abbott in Australia, and President Obama in the USA. We argue that Cameron and Obama have, in different ways, each sought to discursively re-define the institution of marriage by drawing on elements already endogenous to the institution itself.     

Russia's Energy Policy: A Framing Comment

A prominent specialist on the Russian economy provides a framing comment on two preceding papers entitled "Russia's Energy Policy" (by Vladimir Milov, Leonard Coburn, and Igor Danchenko) and "Russia's Energy Policy: A Divergent View" (by Matthew J. Sagers). The author argues that Russia's current energy policy should be viewed as an outcome of competition between three overlapping programs. In this context, he identifies three policy models—the old Soviet, the liberal or oligarchic, and the most recent state capitalist. The latter is currently supported by President Putin, who prioritizes diversification of the country's economy at the expense of diminished investments in the oil and gas sector. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: L71, O13, Q40, Q48. 2 tables, 2 figures, 22 references.     

The Partito Democratico after the 2013 elections: all change?

This article analyzes the changes that occurred within the Partito Democratico (PD, Democratic Party) from the fiasco of the general election in February 2013 until the European elections in May 2014, focusing in particular on the extent to which the presence of a new, distinctive type of leadership has contributed to such transformations. The first section describes the most relevant events affecting the party in the period considered, such as the failure to gain a parliamentary majority, the problematic re-election of Giorgio Napolitano as President of the Italian Republic, the transition from Pier Luigi Bersani to Matteo Renzi as party leader, and the transition from Enrico Letta to Renzi as Prime Minister. The following sections deal with questions of renewal in the party's organization, with an emphasis on the key role played by Matteo Renzi as the new leader. To achieve its goal and explain how the PD has changed in recent months, the article resorts to the well-known framework of the three party faces proposed by Katz and Mair.     

The future of NATO enlargement after the Ukraine crisis

Russian President Vladimir Putin claims that his country's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was partly in response to NATO enlargement. NATO leaders counter that eastern enlargement is not a cause of the Ukraine crisis, and they argue that enlargement does not threaten Russia, but rather it creates stability for all of Europe. This article examines the history of NATO–Russian tensions over enlargement, considers how NATO's enlargement policy factored into the Ukraine crisis, and reviews options for the future of enlargement. Drawing on diplomatic history and geopolitical theory, the article explains Russia's persistent hostility towards NATO's policy of eastward expansion and highlights NATO's failure to convert Russia to its liberal world‐view. The alliance's norm‐driven enlargement policy has hindered the creation of an enduring NATO–Russia cooperative relationship and helped fuel the outbreak of conflict in Georgia and Ukraine. In light of this, NATO should alter its current enlargement policy by infusing it with geopolitical rationales. This means downgrading the transformative and democratization elements of enlargement and, instead, focusing on how candidate countries add to NATO capabilities and impact overall alliance security. A geopolitically‐driven enlargement policy would prioritize countries in the Balkan and Scandinavian regions for membership and openly exclude Georgia and Ukraine from membership. Ultimately, this policy would have the effect of strengthening NATO while giving it more flexibility in dealing with Russia.