《日本学论坛》2003年总目录

·政治·论派阀解散运动的“虚”与“实”王庆西郑东丽(2;23)战后日本自民党社会统合能力分析———于政治体系的系统输入一侧程文明(2;30)国内外学术界关于日本55年体制的研究张伯玉(2;36)冷战后日本国家战略的“普通化”与中日关系李建民(3;35)“台独”势力的“日本情结”问题孙立祥(3;42)日本“有事法制”议案和新版《防卫白皮书》评析张森林(4;39)“世界军事大国”的日本模式仲光友覃翠英(4;44)·经济·日本对东亚直接投资“雁行模式”再思考金仁淑(1;33)现代化后的日本农业:问题与对策刘景章(1;40)日元国际化对中国参加东亚货币合作的…     

汪伪政权与"大亚洲主义"

汪精卫与其追随集团为确保其自身在政治上的合理性,为建立其思想理论基础而极力利用孙中山的大亚洲主义,并将之作为其宣扬“中日和平”的根据,汪伪政权为进行对民宣传而主导发行了《大亚洲主义》、《东亚联盟月刊》、《大亚洲主义与东亚联盟》及《大东亚月刊》等杂志,从分析这四种杂志内容的结果,我们可以知道汪精卫及其追随者们利用孙中山提出的大亚洲主义,作为使其“和平建国论”得以合理化的手段,并错误地将三民主义的民族主义与“大亚洲主义”等同起来,进而,连这种被歪曲的“大亚洲主义”也逐渐被日本侵略亚洲的理论,即所谓的“东亚联盟论”、“大东亚共荣圈论”所吸收,汪伪政权最终成为其代言人。     

华人外资和亚洲经济展望

序言亚洲经济正在迅速发展。本文所谓的“亚洲经济”主要系指东亚经济和东南亚经济,但最近经济发展的浪潮已经开始波及到印度及其他南亚国家。因此,本文的“亚洲经济”有时也包括南亚。亚洲经济取得迅速发展的原因有许多,当然日本企业的投资所起到的作用是很大的。本文所谓的“华人（诸）经济”系指中国大陆、香港、澳门、台湾及海外华侨与华人的经济。这些华人经济的飞速发展无疑主要是由于华人资本的积极活动所带来的;尤其是在国际市场,中国大陆以外的华人外资的活动更是丰富多彩。本文所谓的“中国大陆以外的华人外资”系指来自中国…     

“东亚模式与区域发展”研讨会综述

自20世纪50年代中期开始直到今天的东亚各国和地区的经济高速增长,使东亚模式开始为全世界所瞩目。但是1997年亚洲金融危机的爆发乃至2008年卷入全球金融危机,又促使人们重新审视东亚模式、并探讨后金融危机时代东亚区域发展路径,这不仅事关东亚,     

日本在“东亚共同体”建设中面临的困境

“东亚共同体”构想是一度作为东亚经济牵引车的日本酝酿已久的重大经济外交方针,但这一构想却因在现实中面临着诸多困境而在实践中举步维艰。日本亚洲认同意识的摇摆不定、东亚地区政治安全机制的匮乏、对美优先的经济政策方针和东亚区域经济结构性障等都成为束缚日本推动“东亚共同体”构想的重要羁绊,束缚着日本“东亚共同体”建设的实践。     

试探有关华侨文化华人文化的一些问题

经济的发展与合作必然导致文化的发展与交流。当今世界经济已日趋国际化和地区化,随着日本和亚洲“四小龙”的经济腾飞、中国的改革开放,以及泰国、马来西亚等国的急起直追,使世界上越来越多的专家学者、有识之士认为：世界经济重心已逐渐由欧美地区移向亚太地区。亚太地区在历史上早就形成了一个“东亚文化圈”。世界上不少人认为,中华文化在东亚文化圈中起着主导作用,或者说充当了内核。因此,也有人把东亚文化圈称为“汉字文化圈”的。而中华文化在东亚和世界各地的传播与弘扬,华侨华人发挥了积极的作用。因此,认真探讨有关华侨文…     

试析中日战争时期日本的侵略理论

中日战争时期,日本国内有许多侵略理论。这些侵略理论配合日本政府对外侵略政策,从理论上说明日本侵略的“合法”性,并煽动日本国民支持侵略战争,其中影响较大的有：东亚联盟论、东亚协同体论和大东亚共荣圈论。这些理论在实现日本独霸东亚、称雄世界的目的是一样的,但是,其手段有所不同。东亚联盟论主张以王道主义为指导,以”国防共同、经济一体化、政治独立”为条件,建立东亚联盟;东亚协同体论则主张以协同主义为指导,用协同主义代替中国的民族主义;大东亚共荣圈则以建设东亚新秩序为名,扩大侵略,以获得更多的资源。其中,东亚联盟不仅限于对理论的阐述,而且成立了东亚联盟协会,形成东亚联盟运动。汪精卫集团也大肆鼓吹东亚联盟是孙中山大亚洲主义的发展,在其统治地区组织了东亚联盟组织。东亚协同体论组织的昭和研究会在日本新体制运动开展后,参加了大政冀赞会,大东亚共荣圈被日本政府直接表述为基本国策。     

“绿色发展与东亚合作”学术研讨会综述

2010年3月29日，日本大阪产业大学亚洲共同体研究中心、中共中央党校国际战略研究中心和青海省行政学院在西宁联合召开了“绿色发展与东亚合作”学术研讨会。中共青海省委宣传部、省委政研室、省政府研究室、省经委、省环境保护厅、省发展改革委经济研究院、西宁市政府及省行政学院的有关负责人、青海民族大学、     

“日本投资模式”在东亚经济效应分析

根据小岛清的“边际产业扩张论”,日本对东亚的“顺贸易导向型”投资,对扩大东道国贸易,促进东道国宏观经济增长均有较大的积极效应,在东亚工业化初期发挥了“进口替代效应”,为建立“出口加工基地”做出了一定的贡献,但是由于日本对东亚投资结构的固定化类同化,技术转让滞后等,到了90年代后,不仅日本国内陷入长期的萧条,而且也诱导了东亚金融危机的爆发,且无力扭转东亚地区严重的经济危机。     

试析东亚经济的儒家文化因素

东亚经济在20世纪60年代到90年代发展迅速。东亚有共同的文化背景即汉文化。在东北亚的韩国和日本,都深受以儒家传统为主的汉文化的影响;亚洲四小龙中的台湾、香港和新加坡都是华人社会;在东南亚,经济快速增长的泰国虽是佛教国家,马来西亚和印尼是伊斯兰国家,但数百万华侨是这些国家经济的主导力量。儒家文化潜移默化的影响着东亚经济的发展。     

中日关系的回顾与展望

21世纪的中日两国存在着更直接的共同利益,作为发展中国家的大国中国和经济大国日本共为利益相关的东西邻国,这就是思考未来中日关系发展的出发点,无论从经济方面看,还是从政治方面看,“中国威胁论”都是不能成立的,在东亚一体化的过程中,中日两国责任重大,理应做出贡献,中日关系一定会发展得更好。     

清初清、日、朝鲜三国关系初探

中、日、韩三国关系历来是东亚关系史上的敏感话题,时至今日,中、日、韩关系仍然是左右着东亚地区甚至世界局势的敏感神经.而今天日本企图想成为联合国的常任理事国一事更加发人深省.现实需要告诉中国人研究历史上的中日关系尤其是明清时代的清日关系尤为重要,它是揭开现当代中日关系的钥匙.本文重点研究清初时期的清、日、朝鲜三国关系,对清初清、日、朝鲜三国关系的建立、变化和后滞影响进行研究,以求为我们的现实生活提供借鉴.     

东亚经济危机与东亚发展模式新探

本文从三个方面论述了东亚经济发展模式。首先,从历史的角度分析了东亚经济发展模式的产生、特点及其局限性。然后,进一步指出在经济全球化和信息化加速发展新的历史条件下,东亚发展模式已不能适应时代发展的要求,东亚发展模式与这次东亚经济危机存在着内在的必然的联系。最后,对东亚经济发展模式的发展与变革提出了自己的观点。     

Japan’s Twin-Track Diplomacy during the Cambodian Conflict, 1979–84: A “Member of the West” Pursuing an Independent Foreign Policy 1

The Cambodian conflict and the increase of the Cold War tension following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed major challenges to Japan’s Southeast Asia policy but, contrary to what is claimed in the existing research, did not halt Tokyo’s efforts to promote peaceful coexistence between the countries of ASEAN and Indochina. Declassified documents and other primary sources show that through the adoption of a twin-track diplomatic line, Japan acted as an “Asian member of the West”, committing to the anti-Soviet alignment but at the same time continuing to pursue its regional objectives. By engaging Vietnam and striving for a “regional” solution to the Cambodian conflict, Japan followed an independent diplomatic line, eventually expanding its role in Southeast Asia beyond the economic dimension to security issues. In the end, Japan’s bridging efforts in Southeast Asia, envisioned by Prime Minister Fukuda in 1977, helped Tokyo to lay the foundation for its involvement in the mature stage of the Cambodian peace process after the late 1980s.     

A call for a new Japanese foreign policy: the dilemmas of a stakeholder state

Japanese foreign policy is at a crossroads. A global power transition is under way; while the United States remains the leading global power, across the globe non‐western developing states are on the rise. Within Asia, China is a growing presence, wielding expansive claims on islands and maritime rights, and embarking on a defence buildup. As power shifts across Asia and the wider world, the terms of leadership and global governance have become more uncertain. Japan now finds itself asking basic questions about its own identity and strategic goals as a Great Power. Within this changing context, there are three foreign policy approaches available to Japan: (1) a classical realist line of working closely with the US in meeting China's rise and optimizing deep US engagement with China by pursuing a diplomacy focused on counterbalancing and hedging; (2) a transformative pragmatist line of rejuvenating itself through Abenomics and repositioning itself in East Asia; and (3) a liberal international line of pursuing a common agenda of enhancing global liberal‐oriented norms and rules through multilateral institutions along with the United States and the Asia–Pacific countries. Current Japanese foreign policy contains a mix of all three approaches. The article argues that a greater focus on the second and the third lines would enhance the current approach; it would ensure that Japan is more in harmony with the global environment and help it work positively for global and regional stability and prosperity, thus enabling Japan to pursue an ‘honorable place in the world’ (as stated in the preamble to its constitution).     

Japan's response to China's rise: regional engagement, global containment, dangers of collision

Japan and China's ability to manage their bilateral relationship is crucial for the stability of the East Asian region. It also has a global impact on the security and economic development of other regions. For just as China's rise has inevitably involved an expansion of its global reach, so Japan's responses to the challenges posed by China have increasingly taken a global form, seeking to incorporate new partners and frameworks outside East Asia. Japan's preferred response to China's regional and global rise in the post‐Cold War period has remained one of default engagement. Japan is intent on promoting China's external engagement with the East Asia region and its internal domestic reform, through upgrading extant bilateral and Japan–China–US trilateral frameworks for dialogue and cooperation, and by emphasizing the importance of economic power to influence China. Japan is deliberately seeking to proliferate regional frameworks for cooperation in East Asia in order to dilute, constrain and ultimately engage China's rising power. However, Japan's engagement strategy also contains the potential to tilt towards default containment. Japan's domestic political basis for engagement is becoming increasingly precarious as China's rise stimulates Japanese revisionism and nationalism. Japan also appears increasingly to be looking to contain China on a global scale by forging new strategic links in Russia and Central Asia, with a ‘concert of democracies’ involving India, Australia and the US, by competing for resources with China in Africa and the Middle East, and by attempting to articulate a values‐based diplomacy to check the so‐called ‘Beijing consensus’. Nevertheless, Japan's perceived inability to channel China's rise either through regional engagement or through global containment carries a further risk of pushing Japan to resort to the strengthening of its military power in an attempt to guarantee its essential national interests. It is in this instance that Japan and China run the danger of a military collision.     

日本对华"武装移民"政策及其战略目的

"九·一八"事变,日本武装占领中国整个东北之后,日本关东军、日本政府便开始积极策划向中国东北推行"武装移民"的侵略政策.到1937年日本实施"百万户移民"之前,先后向中国东北"武装移民"五次.日本"武装移民"的战略目的,就是要用日本移民来壮大日本在中国东北的实力,配合日本关东军镇压东北抗日武装,加强殖民地统治,达到长期霸占的目的.     

Japan's security policy,the US-Japan alliance,and the 'war on terror': Incrementalism confirmed or radical leap?

Japan's response to the 'war on terror', in the form of the despatch of the JSDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, has given policy-makers and academic analysts grounds for believing that Japan is becoming a more assertive military power in support of its US ally. This article argues that JSDF despatch does not necessarily mark a divergence from Japan's previous security path over the short term. This is because its policy-makers have continued to hedge around commitments to the US through careful constitutional framing of JSDF missions and capabilities, allowing it opt-out clauses in future conflicts, and because it has also sought to pursue economic and alternative diplomatic policies in responding to terrorism and WMD proliferation in the Middle East. However, at the same this article argues that Japan has established important precedents for expanded JSDF missions in the 'war on terror', and that over the medium to longer terms these are likely to be applied to the bilateral context of the US-Japan security treaty in East Asia, and to push Japan towards becoming a more active military power through participation in US-led multinational 'coalitions of the willing' in East Asia and globally.     

海外华资对侨乡的投资探讨--以广东侨乡为例

包括港澳台资本及东南亚等地的华人华侨资本在内的海外华资,一直是中国外资引入的主力军,对中国大陆,尤其是广东侨乡的发展起了巨大的推动作用.本文以广东侨乡为例,论述了海外华资对侨乡的投资进程,并从国际直接投资理论出发,试对这一资本流入进程进行理论阐释.而且,通过对广东侨乡的分析,探讨海外华资投资所带来的经济发展效应.     

Asia's century and the problem of Japan's centrality

Japan has long been regarded as a central component of America's grand strategy in Asia. Scholars and practitioners assume this situation will persist in the face of China's rise and, indeed, that a more ‘normal’ Japan can and should take on an increasingly central role in US‐led strategies to manage this power transition. This article challenges those assumptions by arguing that they are, paradoxically, being made at a time when Japan's economic and strategic weight in Asian security is gradually diminishing. The article documents Japan's economic and demographic challenges and their strategic ramifications. It considers what role Japan might play in an evolving security order where China and the US emerge as Asia's two dominant powers by a significant margin. Whether the US–China relationship is ultimately one of strategic competition or accommodation, it is argued that Japan's continued centrality in America's Asian grand strategy threatens to become increasingly problematic. It is posited that the best hope for circumventing this problem and its potentially destabilizing consequences lies in the nurturing of a nascent ‘shadow condominium’ comprising the US and China, with Japan as a ‘marginal weight’ on the US side of that arrangement.