A Wider Europe: the View from Moscow and Kyiv

The expansion of NATO and the enlargement of the EU will produce outside states in which perceptions and policies will be influenced by feelings of exclusion and isolation. Russia and Ukraine are two important examples. In Russia the sense of exclusion results from NATO expansion and it was exacerbated by the air strikes against Serbia. Although Ukraine also responded negatively to NATO's attack on Serbia, Ukrainian perceptions of exclusion are caused primarily by disappointment that EU membership is proving so difficult to attain. Based on elite interviews, opinion surveys and the analysis of focus group discussions, this article compares and contrasts the attitudes towards NATO and the EU in the two countries.     

Guaranteeing Europe’s security? Enlarging NATO again

At the end of 2002, NATO will again decide to enlarge its membership. This process of enlargement of the Alliance is driven by summit timetables; summits require commitments and grand gestures, and in Prague that could involve invitations to seven or more states to accede to the Washington Treaty. But there are three sets of issues into which this plays uncomfortably. First, there is an EU‐NATO and EU security agenda (also including enlargement) which is a significant and difficult set of issues. Second, NATO itself is undergoing change, particularly after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and enlargement complicates those reform processes. Third, the wide European agenda, and in particular relations with Russia, throw out complicating factors. Is there a way of managing all of these dilemmas?     

The constitutive power of outsiders: The European neighbourhood policy and the eastern dimension

At a time when the EU is attempting to mark itself out as a power for transformation, particularly in its neighbourhood, this article analyses the ability of outsiders in the margins of Europe to have a constitutive impact on the nature of the EU's policies, its borders and not least its identity and perception of its security environment. Analysing the EU's relationship with Ukraine and Belarus through the European Neighbourhood Policy, the article argues the ENP's effectiveness and nature is dependent upon two factors: first, where the partner countries are located (and locate themselves) along a continuum of positive–negative otherness with respect to the EU and; second, their ability to utilise particular strategies of marginality to pursue their goals. If the EU is understood as a transformative power, this article argues that the nature of this power is significantly circumscribed by the attitudes, preferences, strategies and identities of those it seeks to influence.     

Poland, Germany and the EU

The eastward enlargement of the European Union may well be the biggest challenge in the history of European integration. It is, however, accompanied by profound internal and external crises highlighted by the EU's difficulties in coping with the effects of economic globalization, of which the most obvious are high unemployment and a growing scepticism with regard to integration. This article argues that the solutions to both these challenges are deeply interconnected: while enlargement is a strategic necessity in its own right, it is also the only factor galvanizing EU member states into action for the reforms which are inevitable if the integration project is to be kept afloat.
As the new democracies of central and eastern Europe prepare for EU membership and the EU prepares for enlargement, Poland and Germany can reflect on the past eight years of a historically unprecedented improvement in their relationship. Bringing Poland into the EU (as well as into NATO) has become a key item in the Polish-German 'community of interest'.     

NATO, the Baltic states and Russia: a framework for sustainable enlargement

In this article the author discusses the projected enlargement of NATO, focusing on the candidacy of the three Baltic states. He examines the factors that have induced the Baltic governments to seek NATO membership, the steps the alliance has taken in the lead–up to the Prague summit in November 2002, the evolution of US policy with regard to the potential entry of the Baltic states into NATO, and the arguments that have sometimes been raised against Baltic membership. He argues that the admission of the Baltic states into NATO will be a step forward both for the alliance and for European security, but he believes that it should be accompanied by a restructuring of the alliance that would give much greater weight to its political dimension. One key objective of this restructuring would be to establish a closer relationship with Russia, moving beyond the NATO–Russia Council that was set up in May 2002. The way to do this is not by treating Russia as a special case, but by encouraging the Russian government to apply for NATO membership (as other countries have) and then helping Russia to carry out far–reaching political and military changes that would eventually qualify it to enter the alliance.     

The Atlantic burden‐sharing debate—widening or fragmenting?

The Atlantic burden‐sharing debate during the early part of the twenty‐first century is shaping up to be very different from those of NATO’s first fifty years. The resources needed for direct defence of western Europe have fallen sharply, and further cuts are possible. The gradual strengthening of European cooperation means that the EU is becoming an actor in its own right in many international regimes. Debates about which countries are pulling their weight internationally are also taking into account contributions to non‐military international public goods–financing EU enlargement, aiding the Third World, reducing emissions of climate‐damaging pollutants. In this new multidimensional debate, it becomes more apparent that states that contribute more to one regime often do less than most in another. Germany, for example, is concerned about its excessive contribution to the costs of EU enlargement, but it spends considerably less than France and the UK on defence. European countries contribute three times as much as the United States to Third World aid, and will soon pay almost twice as much into the UN budget. Yet they were dependent on the US to provide most of the military forces in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, and would be even more dependent in the event of a future Gulf war. This widening of the burden‐sharing debate contains both dangers and opportunities. It could lead to a fragmentation of the Atlantic dialogue, with each side talking past the other on an increasing number of issues, ranging from global warming to Balkan peacekeeping. In order to avoid such a dangerous situation, the US and European states should maintain the principle that all must make a contribution to efforts to tackle common problems, whether it be through troops in Kosovo or commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Yet there should also be some flexibility in defining who does how much. The preparedness of some countries to lead, by doing more, will be essential if international cooperation is to have a chance to work.     

‘One in,all in?’ NATO’s next enlargement

In 1999 NATO heads of state invited three states to join the alliance and are set to invite yet more states to join in November 2002 at the Prague summit. At present there are ten states that have declared their interest in gaining accession to NATO councils, and the prospect is that even more states will most likely be interested in joining in the years to come. The question for NATO is no longer whether to enlarge but how to manage enlargement. This article argues that NATO should invite seven of the ten currently declared aspirant states to join the alliance, on the condition that before actual accession occurs, each state must subsequently meet political, military, economic, security and legal standards that are set forth in an annexe to the official invitation. Furthermore, NATO should determine to hold a summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council triennially, for the purpose of assessing the candidates' membership progress in meeting the criteria, and to this end establish a mechanism, in the form of identified bodies, for the assessment of the candidate members' progress. Such a formal process sets forth a graduated yet assured process that aspirant states must progress through that will result in guaranteed accession to NATO councils and protection. A formal process such as this will ameliorate many of the problems that will almost surely arise from proceeding in a more ad hoc, piecemeal manner, while at the same time keeping the door open to other states who may want to join in the future.     

More than a storm in a teacup: the defence and security implications of Scottish independence

In September 2014 the people of Scotland will vote on whether to become an independent nation, with the defence and security of Scotland proving to be one of the more vociferous areas of debate. This article argues that defence and security implications of this referendum are far more fundamental than either the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ campaigns have admitted. It makes four points. First, it suggests that the Scottish government's plans for defence and security in NATO and the EU are at odds with its proposed armed forces and that Scotland may well find itself having to make far greater commitments to defence to assure its allies. Second, it argues that a vote for independence will represent a game‐changing event for the remainder of the United Kingdom's defence and security, which will have significant consequences for the United Kingdom's partners and allies in NATO, the European Union and elsewhere. Third, the article contends that even a vote against independence will have a long‐term impact, in that the ‘West Lothian question’ and Scottish support for nuclear disarmament influence the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review. Finally, the article highlights how this issue has revealed weaknesses in the think‐tank and academic communities, particularly in Scotland. The independence vote does, therefore, represent ‘more than a storm in a tea cup’ and thus there needs to be far greater engagement with these issues within the United Kingdom and elsewhere.     

Does a multi‐tier NATO matter? The Atlantic alliance and the process of strategic change

This year NATO will celebrate its 60th anniversary. So far the world's most powerful military alliance has been a remarkable success story. However, as the first decade of the new century draws to a close there appears to be a widening strategic rift among the allies. ‘Two‐tier NATO’ is by now an established piece of shorthand in international strategic debate to indicate an ‘alliance à la carte’ divided into two or more factions of member states with divergent interests. Evidently, the alliance increasingly struggles to reach consensus on a whole range of strategic issues. So is NATO on a path to disintegration and, ultimately, to failure? This article argues that the organization has developed from a fixed ‘two‐tier’ into a rather fluid ‘multi‐tier’ alliance. On many issues the alliance is in fact divided into several different camps that are pushing in different directions. Thus, allies can be grouped into one of three tiers: a ‘reformist’, a ‘status‐quo’ and a ‘reversal’‐oriented one. While the evolution of such a multi‐tier alliance will not inevitably result in NATO's demise unmanaged, this manifestation of camps will continuously disrupt the organization's strategic agility. The article finds that if NATO is to maintain strategic vitality, it needs to develop new institutional mechanisms and establish a consensus on its strategic posture in the changing international order and to make ‘variable geometry’ work.     

The ‘R’ in BRICs: is Russia an emerging power?

The concept of emerging powers presupposes several features shared by the states in question including regional preponderance, aspiration to a global role and the contesting of US unipolarity. This article assesses the role of Russia as an emerging power. It asks how Russians interpret the international system, what kind of system they would prefer, what they are trying to do in the current system and why, and how these considerations affect their relations with the US hegemony, other centres of power such as the EU, and other emerging powers. The author discusses the structural, liberal and regional interpretations of state behaviour and how they relate to the Russian model, arguing that Russia's policy is strongly affected by its domestic economic and political context. Russia is highly responsive to trends in the former Soviet Union and regions it perceives to be in its own space (e.g. EU and NATO Europe and north-east Asia). In the larger international system, Russia's approach is a mix of partnership or acquiescence on matters of vital interest to the hegemonic power, and more competitive behaviour on issues deemed central to Russian but peripheral to US interests. The article concludes that Russia is not an emerging power in the conventional sense. Its foreign policy is dominated by efforts to reverse the decline of the 1980s and 1990s. This entails fostering international conditions conducive to allowing reconsolidation without external hindrance. Its second major priority is regional: to restore Russian influence over the former Soviet states. In essence, Russian policy aims to limit further losses and promote conditions that will allow it to re-emerge as a great power.     

A common European foreign policy after Iraq?

Taking as read the wide range of other instruments that the EU has for international influence (enlargement, aid, trade, association and other arrangements, etc.), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), under pressure from the Kosovo conflict, has been shaped by two important decisions in 1999: the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to give the EU a military capability when NATO as a whole is not engaged, and the appointment as the new High Representative for the CFSP of a high-profile international statesman rather than a senior civil servant.
A major European effort will still be needed if Europe is to be effective militarily, whether in the EU/ESDP or NATO framework. The management of the CFSP has been held back by the doctrine of the equality of all member states regardless of their actual contribution. This in turn leads to a disconnect between theory (policy run by committee in Brussels) and practice (policy run by the High Representative working with particular member states and other actors, notably the US). It has been difficult for Javier Solana to develop the authority to do this, not in competition with the Commission as so widely and mistakenly believed, as with member states themselves, and particularly successive rotating presidencies. It is important that misdiagnosis does not lead to politically correct solutions that end up with the cure worse than the disease. Ways need to be found to assure to the High Representative the authority to work with third countries and with the member states making the real contribution, while retaining the support of all. Then, with its own military capability, the EU can have a CFSP that is the highest common factor rather than the lowest common denominator, with member states ready to attach enough priority to the need for common policies to give Europeans a strong influence in the big foreign policy issues of the day.     

NATO: the practice and politics of transformation

The Iraq crisis caused a deep rift in US–European relations and within Europe. NATO seemed sure at least to be damaged, if not fatally undermined. But to the dismay of those who have been waiting for many years for NATO finally to unravel, the Atlantic alliance spent 2003 proudly showing off its transformation project, and looking forward to its next enlargement in 2004. Yet these necessary improvements to NATO's political and military structures, and to its deployable capability, cannot alone secure the alliance's future. This article argues that what is needed, as ever, is a shared determination among governments that NATO can continue to serve their needs. There has been no better opportunity since the end of the Cold War to place the US-European security relationship on a firm footing through NATO. There has also been no moment when the penalties of failure have been higher. If NATO's transformation agenda, together with the NATO–EU 'Berlin Plus' arrangement, are not exploited to the full, then US-European security relations are unlikely to recover from Iraq.     

Going It Alone: Belarus as the Non-European European State

In the second paper of a symposium devoted to the contemporary status of Belarus, a noted American specialist on the electoral geography of the states of the former Soviet Union challenges assertions in the preceding article (Ioffe and Yarashevich, 2011) that only Russia and Ukraine are valid comparators against which to gauge the success of the Lukashenka model. Expanding the scope of comparison to include the three other countries neighboring Belarus (Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland), he demonstrates that a broader range of policy changes can be considered by its leadership in efforts to limit damage from the economic crisis in Belarus and position the country for renewed growth within a global economic frame-work. Examination of a wide range of social and economic indicators and government policies reveals, however, that in many ways an unreformed Belarus is poorly positioned for competition in an increasingly interconnected world, in which the elements for successful development are quite different from those providing economic stability in the past. A closing section of the paper revisits the debate on whether most Belarusian citizens actually aspire to a more "European" way of life or instead prefer the "Eastern" alignment and reliance on a Russian benefactor whose own economic future looks increasingly uncertain.     

Russia's Several Seats at the Table

In his reply to Jonathan Haslam's article published in the January 1998 issue of International Affairs , William Odom outlines his vision of NATO and its origins and purpose, and discusses the American strategic view of the post-Cold War world against which the decision to expand NATO should be seen. Russia will, he maintains, remain a problem for the West, but its importance and power should not be overemphasized. The danger facing the Western security order is not one of Russia's exclusion but of US power ebbing out of Europe—a distinct probability unless NATO expands.     

Transatlantic relations and peace in Europe

In his recent novel Alain Crémieux imagines what might happen in Europe without NATO and US military forces and security commitments. Numerous border and minority conflicts break out, coalitions comparable to those in Europe's past begin to form, and the European Union is divided and ineffectual— until pro‐peace and pro‐EU forces rally. Most European countries then unite under a treaty providing for collective defence and security and a new central European government. The novel raises questions of international order: to what extent have the Europeans overcome their old ‘demons’ (distrust, power rivalry etc.), notably through the EU? While many theories purport to explain the peaceful relations among the EU member states, critical tests of the Union's political cohesion would come in circumstances without the US‐dominated external security framework, including US leadership in NATO. To what extent could the EU maintain cohesion and resist aggression or coercion by an external power against a member state, contain and resolve external conflicts affecting EU interests, and defend the Union's economic and security interests beyond Europe? To determine whether the US ‘pacifying’ and protective role has in fact become irrelevant, thanks in large part to the EU, would require a risky experiment—actually removing US military forces and commitments. The challenges and uncertainties that would face Europe without NATO argue that the Alliance remains an essential underpinning of political order in Europe. Moreover, the Alliance can serve as a key element in the campaigns against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To revitalize the Alliance, it is imperative that the Europeans improve their military capabilities and acquire the means necessary for a more balanced transatlantic partnership in maintaining international security.     

Uganda's Flower Farms and Private Sector Development

The European Union's (EU) pledge to assist private sector development (PSD) in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states is a key pillar of its bilateral trade relationship with former colonies. It is this ostensible support to PSD that allows the EU to contend that its pursuit of market opening in ACP countries under Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) is not detrimental to human well‐being in low‐income countries, in spite of risks of import flooding and EU monopolization of emerging sectors. This article explores the legitimizing ‘development’ rationales of EU PSD frameworks from the perspective of stakeholders in a strategic site of private sector activity in the ACP grouping. Specifically, it explores Europe's PSD agendas from the standpoint of investors, managers and workers in Uganda's cut‐flower sector, which is domestically seen as one of the sectors most likely to bring economic benefits to Uganda. Based on interviews with stakeholders in the industry, the article explores whether actors in this business sector concur with the underlying ‘pro‐poor’ rationales of Europe's PSD framework and whether Europe is seen as a meaningful partner in this prioritized site of private sector activity.     

From Cohesion to Territorial Policy Integration (TPI): Exploring the Governance Challenges in the European Union

The European Union (EU) is searching for new approaches to manage problems that span different policy sectors. In the regional policy field, incompatibilities between the EU's territorial development objectives and its transport, agricultural, competition and environmental policies, are well known. The need to integrate territorial policy concerns into these sectoral policies (territorial policy integration or “TPI”) has recently emerged as a key policy priority. This article examines the EU's capacity to implement TPI. It does so in relation to two member states (Germany and the Netherlands) and the European Commission. It finds that the administrative implications of implementing TPI are far more demanding than any of these actors are currently able to handle. Moreover, some EU-level networks are potentially relevant to TPI, but these are mostly focused on regional policy matters (i.e. they are relatively inward looking). If these administrative issues are not taken more seriously, “integration” will struggle to make headway in an EU which is notoriously sectorized.     

The future of NATO enlargement after the Ukraine crisis

Russian President Vladimir Putin claims that his country's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was partly in response to NATO enlargement. NATO leaders counter that eastern enlargement is not a cause of the Ukraine crisis, and they argue that enlargement does not threaten Russia, but rather it creates stability for all of Europe. This article examines the history of NATO–Russian tensions over enlargement, considers how NATO's enlargement policy factored into the Ukraine crisis, and reviews options for the future of enlargement. Drawing on diplomatic history and geopolitical theory, the article explains Russia's persistent hostility towards NATO's policy of eastward expansion and highlights NATO's failure to convert Russia to its liberal world‐view. The alliance's norm‐driven enlargement policy has hindered the creation of an enduring NATO–Russia cooperative relationship and helped fuel the outbreak of conflict in Georgia and Ukraine. In light of this, NATO should alter its current enlargement policy by infusing it with geopolitical rationales. This means downgrading the transformative and democratization elements of enlargement and, instead, focusing on how candidate countries add to NATO capabilities and impact overall alliance security. A geopolitically‐driven enlargement policy would prioritize countries in the Balkan and Scandinavian regions for membership and openly exclude Georgia and Ukraine from membership. Ultimately, this policy would have the effect of strengthening NATO while giving it more flexibility in dealing with Russia.     

NATO's Triple Challenge

NATO's future is again the subject of speculation and debate despite its having fought a recent and apparently successful war in Kosovo. This article proposes that there are three aspects to this challenge. First, NATO is facing a series of dilemmas in its relations with non‐members: how should it manage relations with Russia, and with the applicants for membership? The authors argue that NATO should seek to develop a consolidationist posture. The second challenge is that of developing an EU–NATO partnership in the light of the Helsinki Headline Goals. This, it is proposed, can be developed through a division of labour. The third task, that of military restructuring, is overshadowed by the complexities of processing a working European military structure. In conclusion, the authors suggest that a strategy for the alliance, a key component of the Cold War, but subsequently lost, can be refashioned from the above elements.     

Repairing NATO's motors

NATO moves toward its next summit (to be held in Newport, Wales in September 2014) in a mood of anxiety and uncertainty. This is not simply because telling questions are being asked of the alliance in relation to Afghanistan and Ukraine, but because the twin motors which have sustained NATO now show signs of considerable wear and tear. The first of these motors relates to principles of purpose. This encompasses the activities (or purposes) which NATO has consciously pursued in the last 25 years: namely, operations, enlargement, partnership, transatlanticism and security. The second is principles of function: the means, in other words, by which NATO is kept in motion. Here, American leadership, cohesion and trust, burden‐sharing and credibility all matter. These motors are not about to completely break down (NATO has underlying strengths which make that unlikely) but they do need attention. NATO's good health requires it to focus on a series of core tasks—what this article refers to as readiness, reassurance and renewal. These three tasks speak to an agenda of consolidation and preservation, rather than one of task expansion. But this is not a conservative agenda; grasping the nettle of prioritization and focus requires, in itself, a certain foresight and enterprise. Managed successfully, it is an agenda that will preserve and strengthen NATO in what are increasingly troubled times.