The second Prodi government and Italian foreign policy: New and improved or the same wrapped up differently?

This article examines whether Italian foreign policy has undergone significant and substantial changes under the second Prodi government. The first part identifies the variables affecting continuity and change in a country's foreign policy and addresses the question of the conditions under which one can expect changes as a result of a change in government, and the conditions under which continuity is instead more likely. The second part looks at the second Prodi government's foreign policy on a number of topical issues, most of which were also faced by the Berlusconi government, to see to what extent the Prodi government's approach to foreign policy indeed changed from that of its predecessor. The article concludes that the Prodi government did not change Italian foreign policy in any substantial manner; differences existed only in the way the new government occasionally chose to present and justify its policies publicly.     

The institutional odyssey of the Italian Parliamentary Republic

This article examines the Italian foreign policy of the second Berlusconi government. The first section focuses on the episodes that critics have used to argue that, under the second Berlusconi government, there has occurred a process of ‘Americanization’ of Italian foreign policy, and provides an interpretation of their significance. The second section looks at these episodes against the historical background of Italian?–?American relations since the end of World War II and argues that, from this perspective, very little, if anything, has changed in Italian?–?American relations or Italian foreign policy in general.     

Italy's foreign policy toward China: missed opportunities and new chances

Abstract

This essay provides an account of the erratic and troubled history of the relations between Italy and the People's Republic of China since the 1950s. After reaching their highest point in the two years immediately following the Tiananmen events – when Italy, more than any other Western country, worked to break China's international isolation – they have considerably frozen for a long time. The reason has to be found not only in the crisis that, since 1992, has overcome the Italian political system, but even more so in the structural limits of Italy's economic foreign policy and in the lack of a coherent strategy aimed at promoting Italian goods in world markets that provide huge opportunities – opportunities mostly neglected by the political-economic Italian establishment. The Berlusconi government replaced this negligence with fear-mongering behavior and recurring and outspoken protectionist remarks of various centre-right leaders, who feared the potential damage caused by China's increased competitiveness (which represented, in their opinion, an unfair trade practice) to the national industry. Though too recent to say if it will bear fruit, Prodi has made a desperate attempt for Italy to make up lost ground by leading to China what has been emphatically defined ‘the greatest institutional and business mission ever organized by Italy’ just a few months after his comeback to Palazzo Chigi.     

Post-electoral politics in Italy: institutional problems and political perspectives

A dysfunctional electoral law and an obsolete bicameral Parliament contributed to the surprising results of the 24–25 February 2013 Italian elections, which have solved none of Italy's institutional and political problems. This article briefly analyses the distribution of votes, stressing especially that the success of the Five Stars Movement derives from the dissatisfaction and the protest of a significant sector of the electorate. Beppe Grillo, like Silvio Berlusconi, is a political entrepreneur, who through patience, hard work and commitment has constructed an organization with a wide geographical following. The presence in Parliament of the Five Stars Movement made the election of the President of the Republic very difficult. President Napolitano was obliged to accept an unprecedented second term and then led the Democratic Party, the People of Freedom and Civic Choice to form an unusual government, almost a sort of Grand Coalition. The government is here briefly assessed. The article ends underlining two critical aspects of the situation. Neither the Italian parties nor the party system have succeeded in reaching a satisfactory level of consolidation and stability. This means that the President of the Republic has been obliged to make good the shortcomings of the political parties. Even malgré soi, the President's behaviour has given rise to a situation in which his own position raises the urgent need for institutional reforms along the lines of the semi-presidential mould of the French Fifth Republic to bring to a close Italy's overlong political transition.     

Italian Security Policy after the Cold War

This article analyses the main trends in Italian security policy in the post-Cold War period. After a brief look at changes in the Italian perceptions of threat, it examines Italian policies within the UN, NATO and the EU, paying particular attention to how Italian decision makers conceive the relationship among these three organizations, especially with respect to the management of regional crises. The article then turns to examine and assess the foreign policy of the second Berlusconi government, which has often been accused of having broken with the past, especially with respect to Italy's policy in Europe. It concludes with a reflection on the likelihood that Italian security policy will continue to benefit from the type of bipartisan political support it has enjoyed in the last decade.     

Berlusconi,strong government and the Italian state

Over the past decade, state capacity has increased at all levels, including that of central government, and the emergence of effective government in Italy has proved popular. A second trend has been the reassertion of party government since 1996. Given these two trends, the large parliamentary majority obtained by Silvio Berlusconi's alliance, the Casa delle LibertÀ, might be expected to result in strong party government. In fact, Berlusconi's triumph offers something more and something less than party government, challenging Italian democracy. Nevertheless, as a consolidated democracy, Italy should be able to withstand such a challenge. One stable, democratic outcome to Italy's political transformation would be the consolidation of a Schumpeterian model of democracy. This would require the anomalies of the right's accumulation of powers to be resolved, a process which the left could promote by accepting that strong democratic government is a public good, and by organizing itself to challenge Berlusconi by campaigning to provide Italy with such government through parliamentary competition.     

The 2013 elections and the Italian political system

The February 2013 Italian general elections were characterized by the highest volatility to date. Although, thanks to the majority bonus, the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party) obtained the absolute majority of seats in the House of Deputies, it could not be considered the winner of the elections. Lacking a majority in the Senate, it was obliged to form a government with Silvio Berlusconi's party and with the rather small number of parliamentarians elected in former Prime Minister Mario Monti's list. In spite of his last-minute surge, Berlusconi was a clear loser, having lost almost six million votes in respect of his 2008 victory. Comedian Beppe Grillo's Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Stars Movement) received the highest-ever number of votes for a new entry into any post-war European general election. Unwilling to play the coalitional game and made up of inexperienced and incompetent parliamentarians, Grillo's party has remained isolated and ineffective. The present Italian party system consists of three poles, the Movimento Cinque Stelle playing the role of anti-system party. Institutional reforms and especially reform of the electoral system, which has been struck down by the Constitutional Court, are again the focus of debate. Restructuring of the Italian political system is yet to come.     

The government,the opposition and the President of the Republic under Berlusconi

This article assesses the behaviour of three actors, the government, the opposition and the President of the Republic, in the first two years of Berlusconi's government. Though solidly controlled by Berlusconi, his government has already had to replace two important ministers and some under-secretaries and has often behaved like a traditional coalition government. Moreover, it has so far achieved virtually none of the promises made in the 'Contract with the Italians'. It is feebly challenged by a divided opposition, unorganized, leaderless, unable to create a shadow government and just waiting for Romano Prodi's return from Brussels. Precisely because of its weakness, the opposition has often tried to rely on the President of the Republic as a check on Berlusconi's exorbitant power. Indeed, Ciampi has intervened in a more or less controversial way in the drafting of some government bills and has sent a solemn message to parliament asking for a more impartial and pluralist information system; to no avail. However, Ciampi's role and behaviour suggest that the problem of the powers of the President of the Republic has not been solved. Berlusconi's own preference for a popularly elected president and his unsolved conflict of interests indicate that the political and institutional transition in Italy is not yet over.     

Amici fragili: the alliance between the Lega Nord and the Popolo della Libertà as seen by their representatives and members

The alliance between the Lega Nord (LN) and Forza Italia (FI), later Popolo della Libertà (PDL), continued, uninterrupted, for over a decade, until November 2011. The problems that beset it under the fourth Berlusconi government are known; however, there is a lack of academic analysis of how such an alliance was seen and experienced by the people who made up the fabric of its constituent organisations. Based on interviews with institutional representatives and members from both parties, this article addresses the question of how people within them saw their ally and its leaders, and what they thought of the centre-right alliance under the fourth Berlusconi government. The analysis reveals that, although the LN's rhetoric, style and uncompromising stances on policy were the target of much criticism within the PDL, the latter nonetheless showed much respect for its ally, the way it was led, its ability to communicate effectively and its rootedness at the local level. However, LN members and representatives were, in turn, extremely critical of the PDL and its leader, and very much conceived of the alliance as a ‘marriage of convenience’. This notwithstanding, it is reasonable to expect that the PDL and the LN may find ways to rebuild their alliance in the future, if indeed the PDL continues to exist in its present form, due to their fundamental compatibility at the ideological level and their understanding of each other's priorities.     

The Italian public sphere: a case of dramatized polarization

This contribution is organized along two main interpretive lines. First: the Italian public sphere is very polarized because of well-established historical attitudes, a crowded media market and new technologies that push towards segmentation of the audience. The arrival of Berlusconi has only reinforced the already existing polarization that goes well beyond the borders of partisanship involving the content of news, the structure and professionalism of news outlets and also the recipients that divide themselves along the lines of political attitudes. The second characteristic feature of the Italian public sphere involves the tendency towards dramatization, which is also produced by the sudden commercialization of the entire mass media system that started in 1980. This article's thesis is supported by examples of dramatization and extreme political discourse. The consequences that derive from this situation are discussed in the conclusion.     

The Continuing Transformation of Italian Politics and the Contradictory Fortunes of the Lega Nord

There has been considerable academic debate about the transition in Italian politics, which began in the early 1990s and has continued ever since. The most significant recent milestone in this transition has been the May 2001 general election and this article focuses upon one important outcome of the election - the sharp electoral decline of the Northern League. The League has been one of the principal forces of change in Italian politics, so its decline needs to be fully understood. Even though its support has declined considerably, the League is part of Berlusconi's government and therefore, somewhat paradoxically, it remains a potentially important force, raising questions about the direction in which the Italian transition is heading.     

Reforming the Italian constitution

Abstract

The third parliamentary Bicameral Committee established to reform the Italian constitution conducted its business from January to June 1997. The results have been controversial and have attracted a great deal of criticism. The Committee's recommendations are subject to amendment by parliament and must then be approved (or rejected) in a general referendum. The Committee ended up recommending what is essentially a French‐style semi‐presidential system. It is accompanied by an electoral law that offers a premium of an additional 20 per cent of the seats to the majority, 55 per cent to be elected in simple majority electoral districts, and 25 per cent to be distributed nationally on a proportional basis. PDS leader Massimo D'Alema, chair of the Committee, has claimed victory since the Commitee produced a positive outcome, yet in fact he has certainly lost since he preferred a strong ‘premier’ model and a majority runoff electoral system. The Committee demonstrated that small parties, especially the former Christian Democrats, can exert influence over larger ones, that the parries retain firm control over the process of institutional reform, that the three major party leaders — D'Alema, Berlusconi and Fini — preferred their own reciprocal legitimization over the attainment of any major reform, and that Italy's political‐institutional transition is not yet over. Indeed, the proposed reforms are likely to prove neither sufficient nor adequate.     

The Italian national elections of 13 May 2001

As expected and long predicted by all the surveys, Silvio Berlusconi's Casa delle LibertÀ won the Italian national elections of 13 May 2001. The four coalition partners had significantly different results. Forza Italia became the largest Italian party while both the National Alliance and the White Flower lost votes but kept almost the same number of seats as in 1996, and were anyway happy to return to the government. The Northern League shared this kind of success, but lost heavily in terms of votes – falling below the 4 per cent threshold – and seats. In spite of its five years of good government, the Olive Tree/Centre-Left coalition was defeated. This article argues that the defeat was due to three major factors. First, the Olive Tree had broken its promise of one government, one Prime Minister, one programme of reforms. Second, it forfeited the advantage of incumbency by choosing Francesco Rutelli as its prime ministerial candidate, using an opaque procedure. Third, because of the differences of opinion among the various partners, the Olive Tree/Centre-Left could not capitalize either on its systemic reforms, that is joining the Euro and the reconstruction of a viable economic system, or on its piecemeal reforms. The list led by Rutelli, the Daisy, did relatively well. The real losers were the Left Democrats who, because of their organizational decline and political confusion, plummeted to their lowest percentage ever. Now Berlusconi has the chance to prove that he can not only win the elections, but also, in spite of his immense conflict of interests, govern the country. Come atteso e da lungo tempo previsto da tutti i sondaggi, la Casa delle LibertÀ di Silvio Berlusconi ha vinto le elezioni italiane del 13 maggio 2001. I suoi quattro alleati hanno ottenuto risultati diversi. Forza Italia è diventata il più forte partito italiano, mentre sia Alleanza Nazionale che il Biancofiore hanno perduto voti, pur mantenendo all'incirca lo stesso numero di seggi rispetto al 1996, ma sono comunque felici di ritornare al governo. La Lega Nord è egualmente soddisfatta per questo, nonostante abbia perso pesantemente in termini di seggi e di voti, non raggiungendo la soglia del 4 per cento. Questo articolo indica come, nonostante i suoi cinque anni di buon governo, la coalizione Ulivo/centro-sinistra sia stata sconfitta per tre fondamentali fattori. Primo, l'Ulivo non ha saputo mantenere le promesse fatte in campagna elettorale: un governo unico e un Primo ministro per tutto il corso della legislatura, e un programma di riforme. Secondo, ha sciupato il vantaggio derivante dall'essere il governo in carica scegliendo in maniera opaca il suo candidato alla presidenza del Consiglio Francesco Rutelli. Terzo, a causa delle differenze di opinione fra i diversi alleati, l'Ulivo/centro-sinistra non ha saputo sfruttare nè le sue riforme sistemiche, come la partecipazione italiana nell'Euro e il risanamento economico, né le riforme specifiche. La Margherita, lista guidata da Rutelli, ha avuto un buon successo, mentre i Democratici di Sinistra sono i veri perdenti poichè, in preda a confusione politica e organizzativa, sono piombati al loro pi basso livello percentuale di sempre. Adesso, Berlusconi ha la possibilitÀ di provare che non è soltanto capace di vincere le elezioni, ma anche, nonostante l'immenso conflitto di interessi determinato dalla sua posizione imprenditoriale, di governare il paese.     

Between myth and reality: the euro crisis and the downfall of Silvio Berlusconi

In mid-November 2011, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi tendered his formal resignation to President Giorgio Napolitano. It was a humiliating ‘political exit’ for the controversial Italian leader who had been the dominant figure in Italian politics since the mid-1990s. With Italy in the throes of an unprecedented financial crisis, Berlusconi’s squabbling centre-right coalition had appeared increasingly incapable of dealing with the economic emergency engulfing the country. To restore credibility, Napolitano appointed Mario Monti who quickly put together an emergency government. Since then, the downfall of Italy’s longest-serving post-war prime minister has generated a good deal of controversy. Allegations that Berlusconi was pushed out of power by a cabal of domestic and international detractors have been rife both inside and outside Italy. But how plausible are these claims? Was Berlusconi brought down by a conspiracy orchestrated by Napolitano and instigated by Italy’s EU partners? This article will address these questions and, to do so, it will chart the dramatic events that led to his downfall and examine the international and domestic contexts in which these events took place.     

The man who never was? The Italian transition and 2008 election

Abstract

The implications for the co-called Italian transition of the 2008 election initially seemed significant – but have since become increasingly uncertain as Berlusconi's conflict of interests has risen higher up the political agenda. This underscores the pertinence of asking about the sense in which the notion of ‘transition’ is actually applicable to the Italian case at all – bearing in mind that it describes a process now supposedly underway for some 17 years; and bearing in mind that its end point can seemingly not be identified (though by definition ‘transition’ implies movement between two points). Discovering if the term applies to the Italian case and if so whether 2008 has brought its conclusion nearer requires exploring if the political protagonists that have emerged from the election as the most significant players – the Popolo della Libertà and the Partito Democratico – have sufficient commonality of view, sufficient desire and sufficient power to complete a process of constitutional overhaul. The evidence suggests that while they have the view and the desire, there are significant limitations on their power. The election might potentially have been a watershed in the so-called Italian transition in the broader sense of system performance, aside from formal constitutional change. Here too, however, the evidence points away from the idea that 2008 represents a real sea change – though the chances seem good that it will come to be perceived as such.     

Constitutional change: an explanation

This paper first distinguishes the explicit changes that have been made in the text of the Italian constitution from others that have affected how constitutional balances work (e.g. new electoral laws), before considering both together. The turning point in both cases was 1989 and the transition from the first to the second Italian political party system. Down to that time the first system that originated in the Cold War fractures in Italian politics remained in force with only marginal and incremental changes. After 1989, however, both Italy's highly centralized structure and its system of proportional representation were called into question, resulting in the constitutional reform of 2001 that increased the powers of the regions and the electoral law reforms (which were not changes to the constitution). In both cases the consequences of these changes have proved to be contradictory, which is why reform of the Senate is now being contemplated to make the project for increasing the powers of regional and local government more coherent, as well as the form of government and the electoral laws in ways that will produce the majorities needed to make governments more cohesive and stable.     

Resisting Bodies: Narratives of Italian Partisan Women

The second part of 2015 Pulitzer Prize winning author David I. Kertzer's interview with the Italian political leader Romano Prodi covers the period from the fall of Prodi's first government in 1998. Starting with the causes of the 1998 crisis, the discussion follows Prodi's subsequent career as President of the European Commission (1999–2004), the introduction of the Euro, the expansion of the EU, and the attempts to introduce a new European constitution, before moving to the second Prodi government (2006–08). Describing his subsequent role as UN Special Envoy for the Sahel and his candidacy in the 2013 Italian presidential elections, Italy's former Prime Minister reflects more widely on the current state of European and Italian politics.     

The Swiss community in Genoa from the Old Regime to the late nineteenth century

Abstract

Drawing on extensive and original archival research, this article is the first to reconstruct the origins and historical development of the Swiss community of Genoa from the sixteenth to the late nineteenth century. During these four centuries, the Swiss were constant and significant agents of the Genoese economy and society. The Swiss presence in the city dates back to the mid 1500s, when Swiss soldiers were the predominant component of the army of the Republic. In the 1700s the Swiss community broadened its economic scope and varied its social configuration. It consisted of both a well-established Protestant, élite of merchant-bankers and textile entrepreneurs and a lower layer of craftsmen, confectioners, street vendors and servants. By the end of the 1700s the Swiss élite was such a thriving and well-integrated group that in 1799 Genoa was selected to be the seat of the first Swiss consulate of the Italian peninsula, the second in Europe after Bordeaux (1798). From the Restoration (1815) to Italian Unification (1861), the Swiss merchant-bankers and textile industrialists continued to be active promoters of the city's economic and trading system. In the decades after Unification (1861–80s), Swiss capital investments moved into new economic sectors (steam-shipping and maritime insurance) that contributed to the modernization of the Genoese and Italian merchant fleet. During the nineteenth century the Swiss community created its own social spaces and identity within the city – a church, a cemetery, a school, and a charitable foundation. As in many other northern Italian cities, the consolidation of the community's external image did not weaken the Swiss élite's integration with the local Genoese upper class.     

The Italian political system and détente (1963 - 1981)

This article examines the impact of détente on the Italian political system, linking together internal and international dynamics in both the political and the economic spheres. Relying on various new archival sources, it analyzes the conflicting effects on Italy of both the relaxing of Cold War tension and bipolarism, and the 'bipolar' strategy to reassert US hegemony: the failure of the reformist design of the center?-?left of the 1960s; the 'strategy of attention' in 1969?-?71 and its sudden halt; the building of a 'devaluation model' after the end of Bretton Woods, and the consequent shift from Kissinger's neo-centrism to 'national solidarity'. Détente favoured a crisis of the centrist pattern of Italian politics but at the same time the 'bipolar' features of both the US and the Soviet 'strategies of détente' led to a decline in US hegemony, relaunching the DC's centrality and its ability to manage external constraints. Reaganism was to recast US hegemony on a new basis.     

Italy: A new language for a new politics?

Abstract

The aim of this article is to analyze the language used by the major actors in contemporary Italian politics. After a brief introduction, which lists the general questions posed by such an analysis, we examine the language of the pre‐1992 regime, which has been rather too hastily condemned as obscure and solipsistic. We then pass to the self‐consciously simple language of Bossi, who constructs a discourse of protest, and of Berlusconi, who offers a discourse of government. These lead to the very different, albeit sometimes complementary, languages of Prodi and D'Alema, which go beyond populism and open new political perspectives. Through these and other examples we examine the role of political language in a changing Italy.