Post-electoral politics in Italy: institutional problems and political perspectives

A dysfunctional electoral law and an obsolete bicameral Parliament contributed to the surprising results of the 24–25 February 2013 Italian elections, which have solved none of Italy's institutional and political problems. This article briefly analyses the distribution of votes, stressing especially that the success of the Five Stars Movement derives from the dissatisfaction and the protest of a significant sector of the electorate. Beppe Grillo, like Silvio Berlusconi, is a political entrepreneur, who through patience, hard work and commitment has constructed an organization with a wide geographical following. The presence in Parliament of the Five Stars Movement made the election of the President of the Republic very difficult. President Napolitano was obliged to accept an unprecedented second term and then led the Democratic Party, the People of Freedom and Civic Choice to form an unusual government, almost a sort of Grand Coalition. The government is here briefly assessed. The article ends underlining two critical aspects of the situation. Neither the Italian parties nor the party system have succeeded in reaching a satisfactory level of consolidation and stability. This means that the President of the Republic has been obliged to make good the shortcomings of the political parties. Even malgré soi, the President's behaviour has given rise to a situation in which his own position raises the urgent need for institutional reforms along the lines of the semi-presidential mould of the French Fifth Republic to bring to a close Italy's overlong political transition.     

The Price for Austria's Security: Part I — Joseph II,the Russian Alliance,and the Ottoman War, 1787–1789

This article examines Lyndon Johnson's handling of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear-sharing issue and specifically plans for a NATO Multilateral Force during the first three years of his presidency. The article argues that although Johnson did not confront the nuclear sharing/Multilateral Force issue directly for the first year of his presidency, he subsequently made sensible policy decisions in the face of a number of challenges. These included pressure for a speedy resolution of the nuclear-sharing issue from within his own State Department and from the government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the one side, and opposition to the Multilateral Force from the British and French governments on the other. The nuclear-sharing issue is discussed in the context of challenges to NATO, most notably French President Charles de Gaulle's rejection of US leadership and his withdrawal of French forces from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966 and broader debates about nuclear consultation within the alliance. The article concludes that by using the advisory process well and through some deft diplomacy, particularly refusing to demand a quick resolution to the nuclear-sharing problem, the Johnson administration had effectively resolved the nuclear-sharing issue by late 1966.     

Berlusconi,strong government and the Italian state

Over the past decade, state capacity has increased at all levels, including that of central government, and the emergence of effective government in Italy has proved popular. A second trend has been the reassertion of party government since 1996. Given these two trends, the large parliamentary majority obtained by Silvio Berlusconi's alliance, the Casa delle LibertÀ, might be expected to result in strong party government. In fact, Berlusconi's triumph offers something more and something less than party government, challenging Italian democracy. Nevertheless, as a consolidated democracy, Italy should be able to withstand such a challenge. One stable, democratic outcome to Italy's political transformation would be the consolidation of a Schumpeterian model of democracy. This would require the anomalies of the right's accumulation of powers to be resolved, a process which the left could promote by accepting that strong democratic government is a public good, and by organizing itself to challenge Berlusconi by campaigning to provide Italy with such government through parliamentary competition.     

Macmillan,Nkrumah and the 1961 Application for European Economic Community Membership

The views held by African Commonwealth leaders are absent from the historiography of the Britain's first EEC application, despite their value for understanding why the Macmillan government experienced such difficulty in reorienting its foreign policy towards Europe. Between July 1961, when Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah established his opposition to the application, and January 1963, when it was vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle, the Anglo-Ghanaian relationship was characterized by tension and acrimony. This article seeks to understand the impact of Nkrumah's objections to the application and Macmillan's reaction to Nkrumah's concerns. Though the Ghanaian President alone did not alter the course of Britain's approach to the Community, he did add to the tense atmosphere in which London considered how to approach the Commonwealth. Furthermore, Macmillan's efforts to maintain a positive relationship with Nkrumah, in the context of the Cold War, demonstrate the reluctance with which the prime minister loosened ties with the Commonwealth.     

Identifying the Critical Members of the House of Representatives

This article combines the historical record of presidential-congressional relations with previous scholarly findings to develop a model that identifies the members of Congress whose support is critical to the president's ability to build enacting coalitions. It then analyzes the relationship between President Obama and the House of Representatives during the 113th Congress as a case study that demonstrates the model's utility. Conventional wisdom and political pundits suggest that presidents working in divided government will have impossible difficulty working with Congress, but history suggests otherwise. The president's ability to successfully build enacting coalitions during divided government requires him to perform two rather disparate tasks. First, the president must minimize the amount of presidential party members who cross party lines to vote against the president's position. Second, the president must entice at least some opposition party members to cross party lines and support the president's position. Using data from 1981 to 2015, I find that representatives’ behavior on presidential support votes are related to constituency-level presidential strength, electoral vulnerability, ideological moderation, and ideological extremity. I use these results to identify the critical members of the 113th Congress. When a majority of these critical members supported President Obama's positions his legislative efforts were successful. When a majority of these members opposed the president's positions, the House Republican majority defeated the president.     

Campaigning and governing: an analysis of berlusconi's rhetorical leadership

This article explores the communication strategy of Silvio Berlusconi through the analytical framework of the ‘permanent campaign’ model. Beginning with the distinction between ‘personal popularity’ and ‘political consensus’, the article looks at the different aspects of Berlusconi's political communication strategy since his election victory in May 2001 and assesses the rationale and effectiveness of his permanent campaign. The author concludes that, despite Berlusconi's strong commitment to the communication process, his leadership appears more similar to the rhetorical Presidency model than to the experiences of leaders who have shown that campaigning can also be used to govern. The article identifies two key limits: (1) the link between the drive for personal popularity and the building of support for the government's main policies appears weak; (2) all communication strategies are undermined by deep divisions within the ruling coalition.     

Ruinismo: the Catholic Church in Italy from ‘mediation culture’ to the Cultural Project

It is only seven years since Monsignor Camillo Ruini resigned from his role as President of the Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI), yet it feels much longer. The tempestuous events that marked Silvio Berlusconi's decline, on one hand, and the election of Pope Francis to the Holy See, on the other, have made such an impression on recent Italian history that seems to leave no time for reflection on what has happened over the last twenty years. This article explores how, during this time, Cardinal Ruini has re-fashioned the relations between the Catholic Church and Italian politics, following a pattern that has come to be known as ‘ruinismo’. The essay follows the development of the theological-political line of the Conference, from the “mediation” of the “Catholic Party”, the Christian Democrats (DC), to the “policy of presence” of politically committed Catholics, defined in these terms by the ecclesiastical congress in Loreto in 1985 and fully carried out under Ruini's management, with the backing of Berlusconi's governments. The aim is to establish whether and to what extent the “Ruinian” rule may be regarded as the consequence of mainstream Catholic politics of the 1980s and, equally, as a response to the cultural and political transformation brought about by the upheavals of the corruption scandals of 1989–91. Only from this long-term perspective is it possible to determine whether Ruini's exit has brought an end to ruinismo.     

Land,citizenship and the consolidation of constitutional democracy in Southern Africa

This review article discusses recent books on land reform and its implications for racial reconciliation and constitutional democracy in formerly white‐ruled states in Southern Africa. It is argued that President Mugabe's opportunistic use of the land issue in his power struggle with his domestic opposition—and propaganda warfare with his international critics—should not obscure the symbolic and material importance of Zimbabwe's highly unequal land ownership. Moreover, Mugabe's militant stance is having resonance in neighbouring South Africa and Namibia, where the racially skewed ownership of land—and other resources—could also become sites of struggle that, as in Zimbabwe, threaten not only economic growth, but also the construction of a broad (non‐racial) citizenship and the consolidation of constitutional democracy. Such a chain of events is also likely to have adverse consequences for western–African relations.     

Does size matter? Foreign aid in Taiwan's diplomatic strategy, 2000–8

This article is the first systematic attempt at estimating the size of Taiwanese foreign aid and, thus, the cost of Taiwan's aid diplomacy. It questions the Republic of China (ROC) President Ma Ying-jeou's justification of his ‘diplomatic truce’ with China as necessitated by an ineffectiveness of his predecessor Chen Shui-bian's costly aid diplomacy. Deriving its evidence from the ROC governmental budgets, local media reports and interviews with Taiwanese officials involved in foreign aid implementation, the article argues that President Chen did not engage in ‘generous financial aid’ and proposes that this parsimony, rather than futility of aid diplomacy as a strategy to expand Taiwan's international space, should be considered as contributing to Taipei's diplomatic failures from 2000 to 2008.     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975, Part two: January 1972–January 1973

Although anticipated, the North Vietnamese ‘Easter offensive’ against South Vietnam in 1972 created problems for the United States. Having reached a rapprochement with Communist China, President Nixon and his foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, believed that the attack could have serious repercussions for their attempt to balance it with détente with the Soviet Union, not to mention the US's credibility as a Great Power. They also feared it would damage Nixon's prospects for re‐election in November 1972. Despite opposition from his Defense Secretary, Nixon renewed the bombing of North Vietnam which had been stopped by President Johnson in 1968. This helped to bring the North Vietnamese back to the conference table and after complex negotiations, a draft peace agreement was ready for initialling in October 1972. However, President Thieu of South Vietnam saw significant drawbacks in the agreement and refused to go along with it. The North Vietnamese chose to have one more attempt to win on the battlefield and President Nixon, who had scaled down the bombing when peace seemed closer and won a landslide victory in the presidential election, launched another eleven days of concentrated bombing raids on North Vietnam at the turn of the year. This led to the final agreement initialled on 23 January 1973, which President Thieu reluctantly acceded to. Thieu's reservations were justified, but Nixon realized that, despite his electoral victory, he could not count on the continued support of Congress and the American people for the war. Far from bringing ‘peace with honor in Vietnam and Southeast Asia’, the January agreement was a fig leaf to cover American withdrawal.     

Political party support in the Korean fifth republic: An ecological analysis 1981–1985

The absence of surveys detailing the voting intentions and past voting behaviour of Koreans has left obscure important aspects of party development during the Fifth Republic. Ecological analysis of district level voting returns for the 1981 and 1985 National Assembly elections is used to find two distinct patterns of voter continuity. In 1985 the ruling Democratic Justice Party was able to hold its 1981 voters while attracting considerable support from former opposition party voters. The opposition parties, in contrast, showed great turmoil, lost voters being compensated for by gains from other parties. These two patterns are attributed to a pro and anti‐government cleavage in Korean society. The pro‐government voters had a natural home in the ruling party while the anti‐government voters lacked a single focus and, hence, were more volatile.     

Trump,Montenegrins and the third world war

Thanks to President Trump's controversial interview in which he described the Montenegrin people as very aggressive, suggesting that Montenegro could be the cause of a third world war, this small Balkan nation got more attention than it had ever had before. Effectively, Trump exaggerated a historical stereotype of Montenegrins and based his comment on Montenegro's political behaviour from several centuries ago when they developed a warlike ethos. How this awareness of Montenegro's aggressive nature as a warrior people made its way to Donald Trump and how exactly he thinks Montenegrin bellicosity could be the cause of a third world war, we can only speculate. Montenegro has fewer than 700,000 inhabitants. The Montenegrin army counts some 1,800 soldiers. Most of the soldiers in active service see the job as a secure source of income, not a chance to prove their combat skills. Montenegro is therefore most unlikely to be the source of aggression itself. Starting from President Trump's statement regarding Montenegro, in this article, the author problematizes the historical roots of Montenegrin traditional masculinity, the reasons why the question of NATO membership still provokes controversies over Montenegrin identity and the position of Montenegro in contemporary geopolitics.     

The 2013 elections and the Italian political system

The February 2013 Italian general elections were characterized by the highest volatility to date. Although, thanks to the majority bonus, the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party) obtained the absolute majority of seats in the House of Deputies, it could not be considered the winner of the elections. Lacking a majority in the Senate, it was obliged to form a government with Silvio Berlusconi's party and with the rather small number of parliamentarians elected in former Prime Minister Mario Monti's list. In spite of his last-minute surge, Berlusconi was a clear loser, having lost almost six million votes in respect of his 2008 victory. Comedian Beppe Grillo's Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Stars Movement) received the highest-ever number of votes for a new entry into any post-war European general election. Unwilling to play the coalitional game and made up of inexperienced and incompetent parliamentarians, Grillo's party has remained isolated and ineffective. The present Italian party system consists of three poles, the Movimento Cinque Stelle playing the role of anti-system party. Institutional reforms and especially reform of the electoral system, which has been struck down by the Constitutional Court, are again the focus of debate. Restructuring of the Italian political system is yet to come.     

Political language in Italy and Great Britain

Abstract

Patrick McCarthy underlined the role of political language in the crisis of the Italian Republic. It was both a reflection of the crisis and an active agent of political change. A study of Berlusconi's political language reveals the importance of his new, simplified style of political communication in the creation of his party Forza Italia and of his own personal charisma. He has been able to adapt his rhetoric to changing political circumstances and to different publics. Romano Prodi was successful in 1996 in constructing his image as the ‘anti-Berlusconi’, and Walter Veltroni also broke with the old style of hermetic political discourse acknowledging the inspiration both of Robert Kennedy and Tony Blair, but the language of the centre-left in recent years has generally failed to convey a clear message and has perpetuated obscurity in order to conceal its internal divisions. A comparison with the political language of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair reveals interesting similarities and differences. Thatcher, like Berlusconi, appealed to the need for national revival in the face of the threat from the left, but her language, unlike his, was rooted in the tradition of Protestant individualism and invigorated rather than challenging the existing party system. Blair managed to make skilful use of a new rhetoric of emotion and to incorporate elements of Thatcher's appeal in his ‘new Labour’ synthesis. In conclusion: McCarthy was deeply preoccupied with the possibility of an alternative and more honest style of political communication.     

Ambassador George Buchanan and the July Crisis

During the July Crisis, the United Kingdom was put under strong pressure from Russia and the latter's ally, France, to declare it would fight alongside them. Britain had made the entente cordiale with France in 1904 and a Convention with Russia in 1907. The British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, George Buchanan, was the key figure in diplomatic communication between Britain and Russia at this time and his performance has drawn diverse comments over the decades. Some analysts believe he genuinely sought to restrain Russia from war, but was undermined by his own government, who too easily accepted St. Petersburg must mobilise its army. But others feel Buchanan's reports of Russian mobilisation were ill-informed and unhelpful to the government in London. This article examines Buchanan's performance, arguing that he attempted to preserve peace for a time and does not deserve some of the criticisms levelled at him. Nonetheless, the preservation of the Triple Entente was a priority for him and, after about 28 July, once it became clear that European war could not be avoided, he became tardy in reporting Russia's war preparations, appearing more interested in defending his hosts’ behaviour than in providing an accurate analysis of events.     

The Italian broadcasting system between politics and the market

Silvio Berlusconi's success in the European elections of 1999 reopened the Italian debate over the leader of Forza Italia's conflict of interests in the media and politics. This question is one among many that currently concern the relationship between the media, the market and politics in Italy. The Italian broadcasting system has long been subaltern to the political climate and its idiosyncrasies: in the past, the incapacity or lack of desire to regulate the development of the system made the formation of Berlusconi's broadcasting trust possible;in the present,an excess of political sensitivity prevents thoroughgoing reform.The development of digital pay-TV,coupled with the resistance of the state broadcaster,Rai,to return to a mission of public service,provide good examples of some of the contradictions that mark the Italian path to the globalization of communication.     

Across the Threshold:

The long reign of Tupou IV of Tonga ended in 2006 at a time when pressure for political change, building during the previous 25 years, was beginning to turn towards direct action. Tentative reform efforts by the king's children were insufficient to satisfy the growing demands, and were partially vitiated by controversy over royal business interests and privileges. During the king's last year, protest broadened from governance issues to economic, social and policy issues in which diverse interest groups were drawn together, having little in common other than opposition to one thing or another. Within two months of the king's death, his successor had instigated or approved some significant steps forward, but reformists declared themselves unsatisfied. A resulting riot in which large areas of the capital were destroyed, has been variously represented as an attempted coup, as a spontaneous outburst of righteous exasperation and as an attempt at political intimidation. Reform continues to be the object of government, but long-term reformists have damaged their reputations and the growing public esteem for democracy. The quest for a new national consensus has become more difficult.     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975 Part three: January 1973–July 1975

The final volume of the Foreign relations series of documents on Indochina during the Nixon and Ford presidencies is not as detailed as those which preceded it. However, the documents do not support the view that, once the January 1973 Agreement between the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam and the United States had been concluded, the US was prepared to accept DRV's hegemony over the rest of Indochina, provided only that there was a ‘decent interval’ before it occurred. In fact, both the Nixon and Ford administrations did seek to prevent this from happening, but found their hands tied by congressional opposition. In the case of Cambodia, the United States also found itself the victim of its own illusions about the willingness of the People's Republic of China to support an alternative government led by the former ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Following the more or less total collapse of American policy in April 1975, some interesting ‘post‐mortems’ from various government departments on the history of US involvement in Indochina are also printed in the volume under review.     

Exceptionalism of a kind: the political historiography of US foreign relations

The recent US mid‐term elections have not only dented President Obama's image at home and abroad, they have seen the return to ‘divided government’ whereby one party controls the Executive and the other controls either the Senate or the House of Representatives or both. Such divided government has been quite frequent since the Second World War; but the situation is often portrayed by political scientists as dysfunctional, even as they acknowledge that the Founders of the Republic deliberately created a federal system which would minimize concentrations of political power. Yet divided government is only one complaint among many levelled by American commentators at their political system. This article examines such criticisms both theoretically and historically, and also develops a historical approach which discusses American attitudes to the past, particularly US foreign relations. Here the emphasis is upon the ideologies that have powered American expansion, first across the North American continent and then overseas. A peculiar, even ‘exceptional’ aspect of this expansion has been its rhetorical form, in particular the invocation of past presidents to justify contemporary actions and the creation of a doctrinal canon (classically expressed in the Monroe doctrine). While these two lines of enquiry (emphasizing history and political science) are the methodological double core of the article, they are not treated discretely; rather the focus is on the interplay between the two.     

Reappraising Walter Bagehot's Liberalism: Discussion,Public Opinion,and the Meaning of Parliamentary Government

Summary

This article offers a novel and comprehensive account of Walter Bagehot's political thought. It ties together an interpretation of Bagehot's liberal commitment to norms of discussion and deliberation, with an analysis of Bagehot's extensive arguments about the institutions of representative government. We show how Bagehot's opposition to American-style presidentialism, to parliamentary democracy, and to proportional representation were profoundly shaped by his conceptions of government by discussion, and the rule of public opinion. Bagehot's criticisms of English parliamentarianism, both of its pre-1832 and post-1832 varieties were also motivated by those principles, as was his own proposal for parliamentary reform. By examining the whole range of Bagehot's writings on representative government (not merely his preference for parliamentarianism over presidentialism) and by connecting his institutional recommendations to his liberal principles, we are also able to better clarify Bagehot's position in Victorian political thought. The article concludes with a discussion of the debate leading up to the Second Reform Act, in which we elucidate Bagehot's disagreements with other prominent exponents of liberalism including John Stuart Mill, the “university liberals,” and Robert Lowe.