The Kelly naval mission to Greece,May 1919–October 1921

Abstract

This article focuses on the activities of the Kelly naval mission to Greece between 1919 and 1921, the period when the geographic importance of Greece from the naval perspective and the potential of her navy attracted the interest of Britain. Notwithstanding the fact that plans to institute a pivotal Anglo–Greek naval partnership in the Eastern Mediterranean were frustrated because of the Asia Minor catastrophe, the Kelly naval mission to Greece was largely successful in developing the Greek Navy. During its term in Greece, work was expedited at the Ministry of the Marine, the recruiting law was revised and a significant number of Greek naval officers were admitted to British naval schools. Moreover, the syllabus of Greek naval colleges was updated and the Greek Naval Air Service developed on solid foundations. Financial difficulties and political complications hindered the realization of the more ambitious projects of the mission, i.e. the establishment of a new arsenal at Skaramanga and the procurement of sorely needed naval units. However, maintaining the many old Greek warships in working condition would have been impossible had it not been for the success of the mission in developing the organization and infrastructure of the Salamis arsenal.     

Missed Opportunities: Winston Churchill,the Air Ministry,and Africa, 1919–1921

Relying on a thorough examination of relevant archival documents housed in several European archives, this paper analyses Austrian Chancellor Metternich's Near Eastern policy from 1829 to 1833 with special attention paid to Austria's relations with Russia. Its primary goal is to refute some already deep-rooted claims relating to Metternich's attitudes towards Russia and the Ottoman Empire from 1829 to 1833 and to offer a different assessment of his role in the diplomatic concert to the one generally held by proving firstly that Metternich did not fear Russia's policy towards the Ottoman Empire during this period, secondly that his policy was consistent and the meeting in Münchengrätz in 1833 was not such an important turning point in the Austrian—Russian relations but simply the climax of the already existing good relationship between the two conservative Powers, and, finally, that no Austro-Russian quid pro quo was agreed upon in this North Bohemian town, which means that Metternich did not have to give up Austrian interests in the Near East for the Russian support in the West because both countries' interests in the two areas were identical. Finally, the paper attempts to point out the fact that though Metternich's policy definitely was conservative, it cannot be sufficiently explained by such a superficial single-word labelling because much of his rationality based upon an in-depth analysis of the affairs lay beyond it, at least of those issues concerning the Eastern Question in the early 1830s.