ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND ENTRY IN SPATIAL MARKETS

For the purposes of simplicity, short-run cost functions are widely used in spatial markets literature, even when the long-run effects of entry are in question. In this paper, I show that if a long-run cost function is incorporated into a Löschian model, counter-intuitive and novel performance characteristics can result. Under some circumstances welfare per area can decrease as cost levels decrease.     

LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM IN AN IDEAL URBAN CENTRE

T he major raison d'ětre of democratic governments, local and otherwise, is to provide public goods and services that their citizens wish to have and for which they are willing to pay taxes. However, it is not feasible or expedient for individuals to choose types and amounts of public goods that they wish to "consume" at a given "price" as they would for products sold on the market place-because public goods are non-rival and/or non-excludable, and/or they generate externalities. Therefore, decisions regarding public goods and the taxes to pay for them have to be placed in the hands of representatives who are entrusted with the task of articulating the citizens' collective will.     

DISGUISED,URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE IN A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL WITH SEGMENTED LABOR MARKETS*

ABSTRACT This paper integrates the theory of segmented labor markets with the Ranis-Fei model of dualism to analyze two types of unemployment; disguised unemployment in the rural sector and urban unemployment. The major results obtained are (1) sector-specific accumulation in the urban area may raise unemployment and lower welfare and (2) sector-specific accumulation in the rural sector always raises welfare but increases disguised unemployment. These results highlight the importance of regional resource allocation and the role of the agricultural sector in reducing urban unemployment.     

COMPETITIVE FACILITIES: MARKET SHARE AND LOCATION WITH RANDOM UTILITY*

ABSTRACT. A new approach is proposed for calculating the expected market share. It is assumed that consumers patronize a facility according to a utility function, selecting the facility with the highest utility value. However, consumers'ratings of the utility components are stochastic by some random distribution. Therefore, the buying power of customers located at the same point is divided among several facilities. A probability that a consumer patronizes a certain facility can be calculated. Consequently, the expected market share by competing facilities can be estimated. This calculation is more than 1,000 times faster than repeating a simulation enough times to achieve a reasonable accuracy. The distance decay calculated using the new approach is approximately exponential. A procedure for finding the optimal location anywhere in the plane for a new facility that maximizes the market share is also introduced.     

FROM RESOURCE TO MARKET: POSTWAR SPATIAL CHANGES IN A SWEDISH FOREST COMPANY

Despite the wealth of empirical and theoretical literature on transnational corporations, little has been written about the spatial consequences of changes in the ownership of forest-based industries. These types of tnc embrace a broad range of activities, formerly based solely upon forest raw material, comprising sawmilling and pulp and paper manufacturing. In Sweden, these industries were mostly located near raw material supplies and concentrated on export production for the European market. During recent decades forest companies such as sca (Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget) have invested in or acquired production and sales units in most of the traditional market countries. This has involved a substantial increase in the numbers of foreign employees, new commodities and raw materials, and a shift in the centre of gravity of production and employment. The aim of this article is to investigate and model the locational changes in sca 's ownership (of production, sales, and administrative units) and in its organizational structure within and outside Sweden, from the 1950s to the present.     

TARIFF PROTECTION IN AN OPEN SPATIAL ECONOMY*

Spatial pricing models have been used to illustrate a tariff's asymmetric effects on consumers located at different points in the protected economy, and to demonstrate that the optimum tariff for a small open spatial economy may be positive. In these models, the distribution of households has been taken as uniform and fixed. We extend the spatial model by allowing households to optimally locate and consume variable amounts of land, as well as the domestic- or foreign-produced good. Land consumption, location rents, and the distribution of consumers are endogenous, responding to tariff-induced changes in the delivered prices of the domestic and foreign goods. Within this limited general equilibrium framework, a neoclassical result resurfaces: from the perspective of private consumers, the optimum tariff in a small open economy is zero. The possibility of a positive optimum tariff, however, may remain intact in a more integrated model where domestic profits and tariff revenues are redistributed within the spatial economy.     

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM OF SPATIAL PRODUCT AND LABOR MARKETS*

ABSTRACT A simple general equilibrium model relates spatial product markets and spatial labor markets. The firm is treated as being a spatial monopolist or as a Löschian competitor in the output market and as a spatial monopsonist in the labor market. Derived free spatial demand and free regional labor supply are defined, and their properties examined. The model provides the framework for analyzing the impact of a technological improvement in labor productivity on the structure of the spatial markets. The impact of entry on spatial labor supply is an important determinant of whether or not entry lowers wages and raises output prices. Unlike the spaceless competitive paradigm, zero-profit long-run equilibrium can occur in a space economy under conditions of increasing returns to scale.     

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND COMPETITIVE STRUCTURE: IMPLICATIONS OF THE HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) assigns the Environmental Protection Agency responsibility for protecting the public from hazards created by industrial wastes. The Agency has understandably used its mandate to construct cradle to grave regulation of waste substances that pose health hazards. The regulations, however, are likely to hike costs of legal disposal by increasing the demand for disposal sites, while at the same time reducing the supply. The higher cost of disposal may give an advantage to larger, existing firms, may deter entry of new firms to both waste generating and disposal industries, and promote illicit disposal. RCRA therefore may have the paradoxical result of increasing public exposure to hazardous wastes.     

THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF HIERARCHICAL INTER-URBAN SYSTEMS: EQUILIBRIUM AND OPTIMUM*

In this paper, I model a simple hierarchical inter-urban system in which the location of business firms is considered together with the determination of residential land-use patterns. By supposing a spatial externality between the business firms and all the residents of the region, three spatial structures are obtained: monocentricity, multicentricity, and a separate pattern where cities are spatially split with an agricultural land existing between them. It is also shown that the spatial structures of monocentric and multicentric patterns formed by the market principle tend to be more concentrated than the optimum.     

"空间剥夺"与县域经济发展问题——以吉林省中部地区为例

本文以"核心—边缘"理论为基础,着眼于实证区域的特征,分析县域经济发展中的"空间剥夺"问题。指出县域经济"空间剥夺"具有空间性、持续性和综合性特征。将其作用机理概括为三个方面:县域经济发展要素的"极化"效应,制度因素的作用和核心城市产业的空间侵占。指出空间距离,核心城市与县域经济的规模对"空间剥夺"的强度和作用机理产生影响。在实证分析的基础上,认为吉林省中部地区存在县域经济发展的"滞后"区域。其形成与"空间剥夺"有直接关系。本文还探讨了"空间剥夺"下县域经济发展的思路,提出培育与区域特征相协调的主导产业,遏制发展要素的"逃逸,"并适时调整县域经济发展的"重心,"完善与县域经济相适应的金融系统等建议。