Second demographic transition or aspirations in transition: an exploratory analysis of lowest-low fertility in Kolkata,India

Fertility transition occurred during the 1970s in Kolkata (erstwhile Calcutta), capital of the state of West Bengal, India, and has remained persistently at the low fertility level. Fertility rate in Kolkata attained its lowest-low level in the beginning of the present century. It currently has the lowest fertility rate (TFR 1.2) in India. This could be a case of second demographic transition (SDT) or pertains to changing dynamics in childbearing, childrearing, and/or aspirations for children. Using primary data of 600 couples (1200 individuals) and employing quantitative and qualitative methods, this study found that constraints in childbearing and childrearing; and aspirations for children have a strong negative and significant effect on second and higher order childbearing among couples, particularly among women. In our study there was no strong evidence of voluntary childlessness as well as decline in the importance of marriage, family and children as posited by SDT. Thus we argue that SDT might have to be redefined for a developing country context.     

Female Demographic Disadvantage in India 1981–1991: Sex Selective Abortions and Female Infanticide

Using evidence from a number of sources (including the 1981 and 1991 censuses of India, prior research, and NGO reports), this article examines whether bias against girl children persists during periods of development and fertility decline, whether prenatal sex selection has spread in India as elsewhere in Asia, and whether female vs. male child mortality risks have changed. The authors present estimated period sex ratios at birth (SRBs) calculated by reverse survival methods along with reported sex ratios among infants aged 0 and 1, as well as sex ratios of child mortality probabilities (q5), from the two censuses. The findings show an increase in ‘masculine’ SRBs and persistent (or even worsening) female mortality disadvantage, despite overall mortality decline, due to selective neglect and the spread of female infanticide practices in some areas. Research and reports indicate the increasing use of prenatal sex selection in some regions. In India, preference for sons appears to be undiminished by socio-economic development, which interacts with cultural sources of male bias. The increased masculinity of period SRBs in some areas, together with persistent excess female child mortality and female infanticide, creates a ‘double jeopardy’ for girl children. Legislation curbing prenatal sex determination and policy measures addressing societal female devaluation have had little impact, suggesting that female demographic disadvantage is unlikely to improve in the near future.     

Fertility Decline and Increasing Gender Imbalance in India,Including a Possible South Indian Turnaround

Birth rates in India have been in a definite decline since about 1985. However, contrary to our assumption that fertility declines in this region hinge on improvements in the status of women, declining fertility seems to be going hand in hand with worsening population sex ratios. This article examines the evidence for a causal connection between fertility decline and increasing gender imbalance by looking at differences in fertility and in gender inequalities between North and South India in the past, and their increasing convergence in gender inequalities in recent years. It pays special attention to the southern state of Tamil Nadu which has been in the forefront of the country's fertility decline but is nevertheless moving towards a North Indian pattern in many aspects of women's status. The Tamil Nadu example is a particularly striking way of studying the country-wide trend because it represents a break from the past, in contrast to North India, where increasing gender differentials may be seen more as an accentuation of long-existing trends. The main problem seems to be that pressures to lower fertility are occurring independently of a change in underlying son preferences and falls in fertility are being aided by technologies which allow one to manipulate not just the sex composition of living children, but also that of children as yet unborn. Some policy implications of this last situation are discussed.     

THE CAUSES OF THE ASIAN FERTILITY DECLINE

The Asian demographic transition is treated as one aspect of the global Industrial Revolution, which started in the West but now involves the whole world. In fact, the multiplication of per capita income in Asia in the second half of the twentieth century has been the world's fastest. With the rise in female education, urban living and non-agricultural employment, as well as the mortality decline that began early in the twentieth century and government family planning programmes, fertility fell nearly everywhere from the 1960s presaging below-replacement fertility levels. The continent's macro changes are outlined and micro studies of the causes of fertility decline and the delay or forgoing of marriage are drawn from India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Thailand and South Korea. It is concluded that marriages will be increasingly forgone or delayed and that most, perhaps all, ESCAP Asia will this century experience below-replacement fertility. The path followed is much more likely to resemble that of Mediterranean Europe than Northern Europe.     

Demographic transition theory: a neglected aspect of the nomadism-sedentarism continuum

This paper proposes an adaptation of demographic transition theory to the nomadism-sedentarism continuum. It is argued that a change along this continuum implies a change in the mode of production, which in turn entails changes in fertility and mortality. The following hypotheses are set forth: 1) at the pastoral phase of a nomadic society, fertility is relatively low and mortality is relatively high, yielding a low rate of natural increase; 2) as a pastoral nomadic society senentarizes, fertility begins to rise and mortality falls, resulting in a sharp rise in natural increase, but as sedentarization becomes more advanced, both these trends slow down somewhat; 3) as the nomadic society becomes fully sedentarized, there is a period in which fertility remains at a high level but then begins to fall slowly, whereas mortality, after reaching a temporary minimum, exhibits a minor increase followed by a resumption of a declining trend; and 4) in the postsedentarization phase, the demographic regime of the ex-nomads becomes similar to the 2nd and 3rd stages of the original demographic transition theory, with a slowdown of the decline in mortality, followed by a later slowdown of fertility and of the rate of natural increase. The hypothesis of rising fertility among sedentarizing nomads is related to both social modernization and economic growth and development, including an improved standard of living and public health services. The interrelated processes of general societal responses to population growth and the changing role of children in the family are assumed to account for the eventual fertility decline. Data from several countries, including a case history from Israel, suggest that birth rates increase along the continuum but their decline at postsedentarization will depend on trends in the general rural sector. Natural increase rates of sedentarizing nomads are considerably higher than those of pastoral nomads. It is concluded that this approach may fill a gap in demographic transition theory and provide a conceptual framework for future studies.     

FERTILITY CHANGES IN CENTRAL ASIA SINCE 1980

Limited studies document the fertility changes in Central Asia. Using survey and official data, this study describes the fertility changes since 1980 in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan. I first consider the swift decline in fertility in the 1980s and 1990s through the analysis of Synthetic Parity Progression Ratios (SPPRs). SPPRs show that women still have at least one child despite economic difficulties and that the end of communism affected more the transition to higher-order births. These results are however influenced by economic and demographic factors specific to each country. I investigate then the fertility upturn that is observed since the early 2000s—an issue neglected so far by demographers. Results from the analysis of official and household data show that in each country, the recent fertility increase resulted from the increase of distinct birth orders and was concentrated in specific ethnic groups.     

Were Women Present at the Demographic Transition? Questions from a Feminist Historian to Historical Demographers

This essay identifies some of the deficiencies in discussions about fertility decline that bridge the gap between feminist historians and historical demographers. The author suggests that women are portrayed in the historical demographic literature as lacking decision-making ability. The author emphasizes that women are viewed in the literature as reproductive resources in a national context or statistical entities in quantitative analysis rather than as active and informed participants in reproductive decision-making. The author points out that the concept of fertility decline itself identifies reproduction with a biological universe unrelated to issues of social change. Since the concept of demographic transition was introduced in the 1950s, it has been criticized for its false sense of universalism about a complex set of social relations. Princeton University's European Fertility Project is criticized by David Levine as describing "large-group behavior at the expense of familial experience." Levine uses the couple as the primary unit of analysis rather than region, but ignores, as pointed out by Jay Winter and Wally Seccombe, that the changing position of women and changing marital relations are key to fertility decline. Fertility discourses at the turn of the century focused on the decline in racial dominance, class differences in fertility, and women's selfishness in taking control of their bodies. Thereafter, there was a shift from eugenics and biologism to medical sciences, statistics, and social sciences and policy. The long period of historical invisibility of women is now being reworked by scholars such as McNicholl, who recognize the different interests of men and women in families. It is argued by Anthony Gibbons that lesbian couples may be pioneers in clearly separating their reproductive capacities from their sexuality, a direction that heterosexuals may be approaching.     

Korean unification: a solution to the challenges of an increasingly elderly population?

South Korea experienced below replacement fertility for the first time in 1983, which also marked the point from which fertility rates continued to decline over the next 20 years to reach a low of 1.2 in 2003. In spite of recent pronatalist policies, the fertility rate has remained near this level and has not increased appreciably. The reasons for sustained low fertility in South Korea are complex and solutions remain elusive. One option that has been suggested is reunification with North Korea, which could address the eventual decline in the population and mitigate the increasing proportion of the elderly. Although the conditions surrounding the German reunification experience were vastly different than what Korea will likely undergo, it is informative to look at Germany as a guide to the demographic parameters of reunification. Three projection models for 2015–2050 are presented; even the highest fertility models show that reunification will not be the answer to population restructuring already underway in South Korea as a result of sustained low fertility.     

Men’s participation in childcare and housework and parity progression: a Japanese population-based study

ABSTRACT

Although Japan has entered a phase of population decline due to decades of low fertility, studies on the determinants of fertility choices among Japanese couples remain sparse. Previous studies, mostly conducted in Europe, suggest that men’s active involvement in household labour may promote childbearing. We tested whether men’s participation in childcare and housework has an influence on parity progression in Japan. Our results show a positive relationship between men’s participation in childcare and parity progression but no consistent relationship between men’s participation in housework and parity progression. We also observed that other factors such as the sex composition of existing children influences couples’ decision to have another child. Our findings add to the scarce literature on Japanese people’s fertility behaviour.     

Rural–Urban Migration and Gender Disparities in Child Healthcare in China and India

This article assesses the impact of rural–urban migration on gender disparities in children's access to healthcare in China and India. Much research has shown widespread discrimination against girl children in both countries, including in health investments, contributing to the well‐known problem of Asia's ‘missing’ women. Much less clear is the impact of the massive rural–urban migration now occurring in China and India on discrimination against daughters. Migration is usually thought to have a positive effect on child health, because of improved access to healthcare facilities, but this is not necessarily equally beneficial for both sons and daughters. Based on fourteen months of fieldwork with rural migrant families in Shenzhen (China) and Mumbai (India), this article argues that where migration improves access to healthcare, it may increase rather than decrease the gender gap in treatment of child illness in the short term, as resources are concentrated on the treatment of sons. Furthermore, it is not the case that rural–urban migration necessarily leads to better access to healthcare even for sons: some forms of migration may actually have an overall negative effect on child health outcomes. For these two reasons, development strategies focusing on large‐scale rural–urban migration should not be seen as a short‐term solution to problems of gender inequity in child health.     

Africa's population and family planning dynamics

The historical and current demography of Africa in this discussion focuses on the context of population policy, contraceptive use, reproductive behavior, polygamy, and economic impacts. Sub-Saharan Africa countries have the highest rate of population growth in the world. 50% are aged under 20 years, and 20% are aged under five years. Urban areas are growing at the fastest rates in the world (5-6% annually). Population density remains low, except for areas where there is high soil fertility. Many African countries recognize the need for population policies. The most important donor to Africa, the World Bank, has pressured African governments to adopt family planning (FP) programs. A major World Bank study has shown that more FP services are desired by African women. Family expenditures for the 1980s for FP were estimated at $100 million annually, of which $53 million was provided by donors. Further expansion in the program is needed. The World Bank targeted contraceptive use at 25% of African married couples. Except for Egypt and North African countries, contraceptive use is around 3-4%. Another perspective on population reduction is to expand programs for child spacing and postnatal nutrition of mothers and infants. There has been a failure to turn health systems around to low-cost preventive health, particularly in rural areas. Infant mortality must be reduced before fertility will decline. Population growth can be slowed by changing the status of African women (high social status and recognition are associated with high fertility), age of marriage, child spacing, agricultural productivity, and nutrition. Demographic data on Africa have only become available during the past 25 years. African demographers are in short supply and require training abroad. Demographic data gaps and reliability problems are offset by the recent availability and quantity of survey data. Historical demography has produced conflicting results. Although some investigators, such as Ester Boserup, argue that population pressure results in agricultural innovations, Africa has yet to experience this phenomena. The youthful composition of the population guarantees continued population momentum. Fertility is enhanced by the cultural emphasis on perpetuating lineage and high fertility. Changes in reproductive behavior will depend on major social changes for women.     

Is gender inequality a barrier to realizing fertility intentions? Fertility aspirations and realizations in South Korea

Research highlights the emergence of national low fertility regimes and the importance of understanding how institutional gender inequity supports low fertility. In South Korea, where gender inequality is high and a national low fertility regime exists, many women express a desire for two children but bear one child. Does gender equity, particularly within the household, influence the realization of fertility desires within the context of institutional inequality? Using the Korean Longitudinal Survey of Women &; Families, in this paper, I test the effect of gender equity within the family on second births. Evaluating a subsample of married women with one child who desire a second child, I find that women’s gender role attitudes, husbands’ housework and women’s responsibility for children’s education influence the likelihood of realizing a second birth. Results highlight the importance of men’s household contributions and women’s educational responsibilities on the realization of fertility intentions within low fertility regimes.     

‘Ultramodern Contraception’ Re-Examined

The family planning literature considers behavioural family planning methods ‘ineffective’ because their users are not motivated to control their fertility. While this is true for the initial stages of fertility transition, studies report that urban, educated, and affluent women—propelled by a reaction against the medicalisation of the female body by Western technology—mainly use behavioural family planning methods. This elite group has the skill and knowledge to use such methods effectively. The term ‘ultramodern contraception’ has been coined to describe this phenomenon. This paper critically re-examines the ‘ultramodern contraception’ theory, and argues that it has certain limitations. Analysing three rounds of National Family Health Survey data for India, we argue that reliance on such methods may be a transient phase in the reproductive cycle of women, specifically before the desired gender parity of children is attained. Moreover, it may also be a manifestation of son preference.     

Pretransition marital fertility variation over time: was there deliberate control in England?

An important line of research concerning historical fertility patterns in currently developed countries of Europe has concluded that, prior to the fertility transition, marital fertility was essentially constant over time, and deliberate fertility control was virtually unknown. It has been argued that variations over time in overall fertility were largely the consequence of variations in nuptiality. Other researchers have challenged these views and present evidence for the existence of a significant minority of fertility controllers in pretransition populations. In this article, we find support for this second view and argue that (1) there was significant, non-random variation in marital fertility over time, prior to the transition; (2) in many cases, this variation in marital fertility was large relative to contemporaneous variations in nuptiality; and (3) in a substantial minority of the cases, the variation over time in pretransition marital fertility was so large that it is suggestive of deliberate fertility control. Thus, our findings question the view of fertility transition as an innovation in deliberate marital fertility control. While most of our evidence is based on data from England and Wales, we find corroboration of our key results in other European data.     

Population replacement,social mobility and development in Italy in the twentieth century

Abstract

Many scholars have expressed alarm at the low fertility and sustained immigration that have characterized Italy in the last decade (1.3 children per woman and an increase of more than 200,000 immigrants per year). This article takes a different approach, showing how low fertility and strong migratory balances (involving migration both between Italian regions and from abroad) have enhanced the formation of human capital, facilitating family strategies of upward social mobility, the construction of a more balanced labor market, increases in income and a decline in the graying of the population. The combination of low fertility and sustained immigration, therefore, has been and still is a fundamental resource for development of the population and of Italian society, especially in central and northern Italy. The article also discusses modifications in family and immigration policies suggested by these findings.     

The demographic transition: model and reality

Observed exponential population growth curves are short-term parts of a logistic or S-curve in demography or a product-cycle curve in technology. All human populations have the ability to adjust their rates of growth, a fact recognized by the demographic transition model. The acceleration of world population growth that began after 1650 and became conspicuous after 1850 was largely confined to industrialized countries of European culture until after World War II, when the S-curve passed the inflection point. Many signs indicate that the decline in growth rates may become striking in the 1980s or 1990s. The demographic transition agrees with the logistic curve, and since the ultimate carrying capacity of the Earth is limited, represents an intelligent adaptation. The industrial countries with the longest statistical records, such as Sweden and Finland, evidence early efforts to control fertility. The demographic transition in Sweden lasted from 1815 to 1930 and occurred without government interference. A question for postindustrial western society is whether birth rates will be adjusted to the rising death rates expected as the population ages. Birth and death rates in most formulations of the demographic transition model are typical of Western Europe at the start of the transition process but are much too low for most countries of the world. Japan's demographic transition and that of several other Asian countries have occurred much more rapidly than those of Western Europe and have demonstrated not only that the demographic transition model was applicable but that the time span could be shortened by a factor of about 10 when government policy was substituted for spontaneous development. The Indian experience however shows that the shortening of the transition cannot be imposed from above. The demographic transition is well on its way in most of Asia and Latin America, but Africa and the Muslim countries of Asia have so far done little to restrain their high fertility. It may be concluded that the actual form of the demographic transition is influenced by the point of departure and by how and when it takes place.     

EPICENTRES OF MISSING DAUGHTERS

The spatial spread of the female child deficit in India has been explored in terms of hot spots (with high deficits) and cold spots (with more female-favourable child sex ratios). It has been argued, using the Census of India data from individual censuses, that there is a contagion effect for both hot spots and cold spots. This paper takes this discussion forward by asking whether such an effect can be seen across censuses. To do so, it develops the concept of an epicentre to see whether a hot or cold spot in one census spreads shock waves across a wider region in later censuses. The longitudinal analysis of child sex ratios over three censuses—1991, 2001 and 2011—shows that the hot spots are epicentres for the spread of female child deficits, while the cold spots display a reverse effect.     

Women’s gender role attitudes and fertility intentions of having a second child: survey findings from Shaanxi Province of China

China is a country with a unique history of gender traditions and birth-control regulations. Traditional gender role attitudes, closely related to son preference, exert entrenched influence on the fertility intentions and behaviours of women in China. In recent years, despite the fact that employment characteristics and educational attainment of women have caught up with men, China has witnessed a resurgence of patriarchal Confucian tradition. Gender relations in the private sphere are increasingly regulated by traditional gender norms. Considering the declining fertility in China and recent fertility policy adjustments, this paper analyses the varying effects of gender role attitudes on fertility intentions of women under different birth control policies, utilising data from 1,422 questionnaires conducted in 2015 in the Shaanxi Province in northwestern China and using the Multinomial Logistic Model. Our findings imply that the relationship between women’s gender role attitudes and fertility intention differs between women affected by different birth control policies. We find that among married women with one child who are restricted to one child, the more egalitarian the gender role attitude, the more likely they intend to have a second child. Among married women who have had one child and are allowed to have two children, the more egalitarian the gender role attitude, the less likely they intend to have a second child. The results also indicate that traditional gender role attitudes and norms still play an important role in Chinese women’s fertility intentions.