Supreme Court Advocacy in the Early Nineteenth Century

The early nineteenth century was transformative of the Supreme Court's practices. Yet understanding those fundamental changes requires some appreciation of practice before the Court in the late eighteenth century, and the developments in the early nineteenth century produced changes in the Court's practices that are still felt today. In this first half-century or so of the Court's existence, more dramatic developments and changes occurred in oral argument practice than in any other period of the Court's history. ¹     

The Other Supreme Court

相似文献   

The Supreme Court and Juvenile Justice

For so many things I thank the Historical Society profoundly, but place right at the top of my list the delightful opportunity your invitation has given me to read the prior Annual Lectures—interesting, exciting, thoroughly intimidating—touching on the Court's history, its cases, its people, even its wives (the subject of Justice Ginsburg's 1999 lecture). Wholly apart from the Society's many initiatives to preserve the Court's history and increase public awareness of its contributions to our nation, the now nearly three dozen Annual Lectures alone offer an amazing insight into this great institution.     

Oversimplifying the Supreme Court

I cannot tell you what a pleasure it is to be at the Supreme Court Historical Society. Of course, the Supreme Court is fortunate to have a Chief Justice who is also Chief Historian. I have read each of Chief Justice Rehnquist's books on the Court, and they are engagingly written narratives filled with a love and knowledge of this institution. The Chief Justice is steeped in the folklore of this remarkable Court as few have ever been. This is just one reason those of us throughout the federal judiciary admire and love the Chief. He has shown kindness to me ever since I was a young law clerk for Justice Lewis Powell. I don't know if it's appropriate or not to dedicate a speech, but I am going to do so anyway. This speech is for him.     

The Supreme Court in the Nineteenth Century

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, we find a Court which has not yet found its role, and whose principal impact is deciding which litigant wins in a particular lawsuit. Chief Justice John Marshall, appointed in 1801, changes that; he and his successor, Roger B. Taney, are the dominant figures in the Courts over which they preside. From 1801 until 1864-sixty-three years-the nation had only two Chief Justices; during the same time, it had fifteen presidents. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Chief Justices are less dominant and influential, sharing their authority with several notable Associate Justices. By the end of the century, the Court is beginning to wrestle with the many problems facing the nation after a little more than a century of existence.     

Punctuated Equilibrium and the Supreme Court

In the legislative and executive branches, policy scholars have used punctuated equilibrium (PE) theory to describe and explain patterns of change. However, there has been little examination of how PE might apply to courts and legal policy change. This article addresses that gap by providing evidence that legal policy change—here conceptualized as changes in what precedents the Supreme Court most often cites—is governed by PE theory. After making a prima facie case for the applicability of PE theory to the Court, I leverage network rankings of Supreme Court decisions to create a proxy for legal policy change that improves on existing measures. Using both a stochastic process model and an analysis of the punctuations the measure uncovers, I find strong evidence of PE processes.     

The Invisible Dance: The Supreme Court and the Press

Abstract

In America, Tocqueville writes, men were born equal; they did not have to become so.¹ But he is not unaware of the radical democratic character of the American revolution of which Gordon Wood has reminded us.² Prior to 1776, Tocqueville observes, the democratic principle was “far from dominating the government of society.” It was the Revolution that made it “the law of laws.” “The war was fought and victory obtained in its name” (1:1, ch. 4. 59).     

The Graver Tank Litigation in the Supreme Court

The very generality of the patent statutes in American law places a heavy burden on the courts and the patent bar for the development of patent law and policy. It is particularly important that we examine periodically how well the courts have performed that function and how well the bar has supported that effort. This article will focus on an earlier era in patent law—in particular the process surrounding the second Graver Tank decision, in the 1949 Term of the Supreme Court—to see what lessons that experience may hold for present day. ¹