The Judicial Bookshelf

A persistent reality of constitutional government in the United States from practically the beginning of the Republic has been the close link between the Constitution itself and the Supreme Court. Oddly, this link derives more from the Constitution's impact on the American political system than from what the Constitution itself actually says or contains. True, Article III included cases “arising under this Constitution” in describing the proper reach of the federal judicial power, and Article VI specified that “[t]his Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land … ” ¹ But the document not only provided scant means for enforcing that supremacy, but also failed even to specify how this “supreme Law” should be interpreted. It soon became clear, however that the task of interpretation would fall upon the Supreme Court, as illustrated by Chisholm v. Georgia. ² In the face of assurances made by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Marshall, and others during the ratification debates in 1787–1788 that a state could not, without its consent, be made a defendant in the federal courts by a citizen of another state, ³ the Justices in 1793 construed the language in Article III conferring the federal judicial power in suits “Between a State and Citizens of another State” to encompass a suit brought by a South Carolinian against the State of Georgia. The uproar that ensued prompted swift ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, which reversed the Court's first excursion into the realm of constitutional interpretation. Despite this rebuke, it was only a short time before Chief Justice Marshall insisted that the judicial power encompassed the authority “to say what the law is.” ⁴ Thus, from the assumed role of expounding of the Constitution evolved the companion duty of guarding it as well.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

The year 2005 will remain notable in Supreme Court history. A nearly unprecedented period of stability in the Court's membership came to an end. The nation witnessed the appointment of a new Chief Justice, and, for the first time since 1971, a President and the Senate confronted the momentous responsibilities of two simultaneous vacancies to fill.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

"In law, also, men make a difference," ¹ counseled Felix Frankfurter the year before his appointment to the Supreme Court. Frankfurter highlighted one of the three critical components of judicial decision-making in constitutional law: alongside the text of the Constitution itself and the cases that pose various questions for decision are the women and men who answer those questions. Those answers, as Frankfurter believed, are invariably influenced by the values Justices bring with them to the Bench. Yet he was expressing no newfound truth, but an awareness that had been apparent for a long time. "Impressed with a conviction that the true administration of justice is the firmest pillar of good government," President George Washington wrote future Attorney General Edmund Randolph in 1789, "I have considered the first arrangement of the judicial department as essential to the happiness of our country and the stability of its political system." To be sure, the Court's role in the political system was unclear, but Washington realized the impact the Court might have in the young Republic. This required, he told Randolph, "the selection of the fittest characters to expound the laws and dispense justice." ² And as he filled the six seats Congress had authorized for the Supreme Court, the first President made sure that each nominee was a strong supporter of the new Constitution.     

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Standard nomenclature in Supreme Court literature contrasts the "old Court" and the "new Court" (or, sometimes, the "modern Court"). By most accounts, the dividing line between the two falls during the years 1937–1940, when the nation witnessed a judicial and constitutional revolution. The proverbial "irresistible force" (in the form of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal program to cope with the Great Depression) met the "immovable object" (in the guise of the Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes that, for a short time, stymied many of the President's initiatives). The result was Roosevelt's audacious assault on the Court through the Court-packing plan and the hasty change of mind by Hughes and Justice Owen J. Roberts that gave Roosevelt the five sure votes he needed so that his agenda could receive the constitutional stamp of approval. This flip-flop was promptly followed by the Court's adoption of a new agenda for itself, one that elevated civil liberties into a preferred position in the hierarchy of constitutional values and demoted property interests, which heretofore had been accorded heightened judicial protection.     

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“The good that Presidents do is often interred with their Administrations. It is their choice of Supreme Court Justices that lives after them.” ¹ This was the assessment offered by one leading opinion journal more than seven decades ago, after President Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated Professor Felix Frankfurter to the Supreme Court to fill the opening occasioned by the death of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo. Because vacancies on the Court not only are infrequent but also occur at irregular intervals, the comment illustrates the reality that selection of Justices is among the most important and consequential responsibilities that fall to any chief executive.     

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Millions were reminded on January 20, 2009, that the inauguration of an American President is as remarkable as it is routine. In this distinctly republican rite, the chief executive publicly subordinates himself to the fundamental law of the land. As the Constitution dictates, “[b]efore he enters on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: ‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.’” ¹ This display of constitutional fealty was remarkable because the variety of political systems, experiences, and cultures across today's globe graphically illustrates that the seamless and peaceful transfer of authority from one political party or individual to another, as was witnessed at President Barack Obama's inauguration and at President George W. Bush's inauguration in 2001, is not always a foregone occurrence everywhere. January's event was routine in that, from the outset of government under the Constitution and with the notable and tragic exception of 1860, the defeated party or individual has accepted, if not welcomed, the verdict rendered by the electoral process. That was the outcome even in 1800, when the notion of a violence‐free shift of control in a country founded on the principle of government by the “consent of the governed” ² was first put to the test at the presidential level. The assumption of authority by Thomas Jefferson and the Democratic‐Republicans from John Adams and the Federalists marked the world's first peaceful transfer of power from the vanquished to the victors as the result of an election. ³ Given the stark national partisan differences that had crystallized in the short time since ratification of the Constitution and the fact that finalization of the election required extraordinary intervention by the House of Representatives to break an Electoral College tie, this outcome was a greater achievement than is sometimes acknowledged. “Partisanship prevailed to the bitter end and showed no signs of abating,” according to one historian who has recently revisited this critical and precedent‐setting election. “Over the campaign's course, George Washington's vision of elite consensus leadership had died, and a popular two‐party republic … was born.” ⁴     

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Citizens, elected officials, legal practitioners and scholars, and most certainly readers of this journal can surely agree on one verity concerning the U.S. Supreme Court: that an abundance of literature in print and, increasingly, in digital form exists about this capstone institution of the third branch of government. For confirmation, one has only to conduct an online subject search in even a modest-sized library or at one of the Internet-based bookstores to reveal literally hundreds of titles on virtually every aspect of the Court's work as well as the Justices who have sat on its Bench.     

The Judicial Bookshelf

Some may be surprised to realize that nearly a half century has lapsed since publication of The American Supreme Court by Robert G. McCloskey. ¹ One reviewer praised the book as “unique,” one that could be read “profitably by layman, student, lawyer, and constitutional lawyer.” ² Readers familiar with that compact volume will recall the antinomy that the author put forward as the defining theme of American constitutional history: the tension between fundamental law and popular sovereignty. The latter suggests will and the former restraint. The antinomy is reflected in the founding documents of the Republic. The Declaration of Independence trumpets “inalienable rights” in the same paragraph that it emphasizes “government by the consent of the governed.” The Constitution, “ordain[ed] and establish[ed]” by “We the people,” insisted in Article VI that it “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” This conflict between equally valid principles lies at the heart of judicial review in the federal courts, where appointed and politically unaccountable judges sit in judgment on the actions of the politically accountable representatives of the people. In McCloskey's view, one principle “conjures up the vision of an active, positive state; the other emphasizes the negative, restrictive side of the political problem.” ³ Opposites though these principles are, Professor McCloskey emphasized that Americans have managed to cling simultaneously to both. “But like most successes in politics and elsewhere, this one had a price. The failure to resolve the conflict between popular sovereignty and fundamental law perhaps saved the latter principle, but by the same token it left the former intact. And this meant that fundamental law could be enforced only within delicately defined boundaries, that constitutional law, though not simply the creature of the popular will, nevertheless had always to reckon with it, that the mandates of the Supreme Court must be shaped with an eye not only to legal right and wrong, but with an eye to what popular opinion would tolerate.” ⁴     

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A well‐established fact of American government is the unpredictability of vacancies on the U.S. Supreme Court. Representatives and Senators face voters every two and six years, respectively. A President serves for four years and may be reelected only once. Justices, however, do not sit for fixed terms and in effect enjoy life tenure. After his inauguration as the forty‐third president in January 2001, George W. Bush had no opportunity to make a High Court appointment until he was well into his second term when, on July 1, 2005, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor announced her intention to leave the Bench. ¹ By contrast, the forty‐fourth President encountered his first High Court vacancy much sooner, and in his first term, as Justice David Hackett Souter notified the Obama White House on May 1, 2009, of his intention to retire from “regular active service as a Justice” when the Court recessed for the summer. ²     

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Laments about federal judges, Supreme Court Justices in particular, are nearly as old as the Republic. Those who say otherwise perhaps have either poor memories or a need to read more history. True, the Court has not been continuously caught up in strife, but controversies have occurred often enough to make Court-bashing a routine part of American political life.