The social representation and reality of BSE's impact in North Central Alberta

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), popularly known as ‘Mad Cow’ disease, was discovered in the late 1980s in Britain; in 1996, scientists announced a ‘probable’ link between eating BSE‐contaminated meat and a new form of Creutzfeldt‐Jakob disease, a fatal human brain disease. Britain's beef industry was devastated, beef consumption dropped, export markets closed and a mass cull of older cattle was implemented. This article uses social representation theory to analyze how Canada's 2003 BSE outbreak was portrayed to Canadians in major newspapers and compares this representation with BSE's impact in two rural Alberta counties. The day Canada's BSE case was reported, the United States closed its border to Canadian cattle and beef. The event was represented as ‘devastating’ to Canada's cattle and beef industries and rural areas in general, a view that went largely unchallenged and was critical to gaining government support for the affected industries. Little evidence of economic devastation was found in the heart of Alberta's cow‐calf producing area; producers adapted to their changing economic circumstances and acquired other sources of income. But there is little doubt that the financial uncertainty associated with BSE added to stress levels among farm families.     

Differing approaches to congressional outreach: comparing Australia and New Zealand

Both Australia and New Zealand, in addition to engaging with the US executive branch, also protect and advance their bilateral relationship by engaging with the US Congress. Since 1987, Australia has pursued congressional outreach, or diplomatic lobbying, to protect and advance its security and trade interests. As a result, Australia has won both security and trade benefits. New Zealand's congressional outreach, on the other hand, has had a more challenging task of improving bilateral relations due, in part, to US objections to New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy. This article extends existing research on Australian and New Zealand congressional outreach, develops a framework for examining embassy-based congressional outreach and, through comparative analysis of Australian and New Zealand congressional outreach, gives greater insight into the nature and character of their efforts on Capitol Hill.     

The economic impact of the Australia–US free trade agreement

The Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) came into effect in 2005. It was the second preferential trade agreement that Australia signed, after its agreement with Singapore, and marked a departure from the primacy of Australia's previous trade policy of unilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation toward preferential liberalisation. This paper assesses the economic effects of AUSFTA by applying the Productivity Commission's gravity model of trade from its Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements review. The evidence reveals AUSFTA resulted in a fall in Australian and US trade with the rest of the world—that the agreement led to trade diversion. Estimates also show that AUSFTA is associated with a reduction in trade between Australia and the United States.     

Trade agreements and the myth of policy constraint in Australia

In this paper, I challenge the conventional view that trade agreements act as a major constraint on Australia’s industry policy options. Through a comparison with South Korea – a country with similar trade obligations to Australia – I find that the Australian government retains significant room to move in the industry policy sphere. However, Australian policy-makers appear far less willing than their foreign counterparts to use that space. To explain Australia’s comparative industry policy in-activism, I move beyond broad-brush explanations centred on ‘liberal ideology’ to explore the ideational, institutional and structural obstacles to the pursuit of a more proactive industry policy approach on the part of Australian policy-makers.     

Re-examining the Australian public's attitude to military casualties: post-heroic or defeat-phobic?

Australia, like most other developed democracies, is often alleged to suffer from ‘casualty phobia’. The perception that the Australian public will not tolerate casualties in foreign conflicts has shaped the decisions of both civilian and military policy makers. Measures taken to protect Australian forces from casualties may, for instance, also serve to increase the risk to civilians in the country to which they are deployed. The USA underwent a similar debate some years ago. Innovative public opinion research techniques—especially ‘survey experiments’ which allow researchers to establish causal relationships by consciously manipulating one variable while holding others constant—have established that the American public are not reflexively casualty-phobic and that the impact of casualties on public opinion can be outweighed by other factors, such as the public's confidence in the mission's overall success. In this article, the author replicates one of the key survey experiments from the US debate, suitably adapted to Australian conditions, with a nationally representative sample of Australian voters. The author finds that the same pattern holds in Australia as in the USA: casualties do lower public support for a given mission, but the mission's chances of success matter more.     

Timor-Leste’s foreign policy approach to the Timor Sea disputes: pipeline or pipe dream?

Over recent years, Australia and Timor-Leste’s bilateral relationship has been consumed by contested maritime boundary claims in the resource-rich Timor Sea. Intractable disagreements over the right to build a petroleum export pipeline have led Timor-Leste to reinvigorate its pursuit of permanent maritime boundaries as ‘a national priority’. This article examines Timor-Leste’s interests in the Timor Sea and assesses its strategies for achieving its foreign policy goals. It argues that Timor-Leste’s attainment of its stated goals relies on Australia shifting its Timor Sea policy, which has been largely consistent since the 1970s. Timor-Leste’s key strategy is a public diplomacy campaign that positions permanent maritime boundaries as the final stage of its independence struggle, and presents Timor-Leste as owning the disputed Greater Sunrise gas field under international law. While the public diplomacy campaign aims to win enough Australian ‘hearts and minds’ to put pressure on the Australian government, it ultimately fails to negotiate the strategic and historical realities of the interests that define Australia’s realpolitik approach to the Timor Sea.     

‘An ally for all the years to come’: why Australia is not a conflicted US ally

In 2011, Australia communicated a clear choice about its strategic future. It would continue to cleave tightly to the US alliance, expand its military links and work to advance the USA's conception of regional order. Given its economic interests, why has Australia bound itself to the US alliance? What lies behind this strong commitment and what would it take for Australia to change its relationship with the USA? This article presents an analysis of the current state of the US–Australia alliance and argues that Canberra's pursuit of close relations with the USA reflects the interaction of a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of the alliance with a set of resolutely political factors that have produced the current policy setting. The article first assesses the security cost and benefit behind the alliance. It then argues that the move also derives from the strong domestic support for the US alliance, a sharpened sense that China's rise was generating regional instability that only the US primacy could manage and the realisation that the economic fallout of such a move would be minimal. It concludes with a brief reflection on what it might take to change the current policy settings.     

Australia's relationship with the United States: the case for greater independence

A number of recent events—especially attempts to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement and Australia's participation in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq—have thrown Australia's relationship with the United States into sharp relief. While this relationship has historically enjoyed strong bilateral endorsement, such uncritical support is beginning to unravel. At the very least, the relationship is being subjected to a renewed, more critical scrutiny. This paper argues that a dispassionate analysis of the relationship is appropriate and overdue. Not only are the benefits that accrue to ‘Australia’ from the relationship debateable, even when judged within the limited calculus of the ‘national interest’, but Australia's uncritical support for US foreign policy is also helping to entrench potentially damaging aspects of American foreign policy and— somewhat ironically—undermining the legitimacy of its pre-eminent ‘hege monic’ position.     

Australia and the European Union in the World Trade Organisation: partners or adversaries?

Shared interests between Australia and the European Union (EU) in multilateral trade negotiations are increasing. However, the relationship in the WTO continues to be defined by conflicts over agriculture. This article examines the case for closer Australia-EU co-operation on shared interests in WTO negotiations while continuing to press for more rapid reform of EU agriculture policies. It traces the major changes in the interface between Australia and the EU in the WTO, including the re-structuring of the Australian economy over the past two decades and the more recent efforts by the EU to modify the trade impact of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) on world agriculture trade. The article concludes that closer co-operation between Australia and the EU in the WTO on shared interests would enhance Australia's influence in the multilateral trade system.     

Sovereign wealth funds: dangers and opportunities

Soaring oil prices since the early 2000s have led to a historic transformation of wealth from consuming regions to major oil exporters. In recent years many of these exporters have set up oil funds to utilize their massive and growing oil revenues. These funds are divided into two categories—stabilizing and saving. Their large investments in western markets have raised concerns that they might be driven by political and strategic interests rather than commercial ones. This article examines oil funds in the Persian Gulf, Norway and Russia. It discusses US and European proposals to regulate oil funds' investments. The article examines the International Monetary Fund's efforts to forge a consensus on a ‘code of conduct’ that would guide the relationship between oil funds and the recipient markets. The analysis argues against excessive regulation.     

The US–Australia free trade agreement: The interface between partisan politics and national objectives

The literature on the drivers behind bilateral treaties implies an assumption that international treaties are entered into primarily to achieve national objectives, not partisan political goals. This paper investigates whether this assumption is valid, using as a case study the recently enacted US–Australia Free Trade Agreement. A stated original purpose for the agreement—increasing access to the US market for Australian agricultural products—would yield significant economic benefits for Australia. However, when it became clear that this goal would not be achieved, the objective of the Australian government shifted. The most plausible explanation for the shift is that domestic political objectives had moved to the fore and prompted the government to pursue and adopt the treaty despite some evidence that it might not be in the national interest to do so.     

Transatlantic relations and peace in Europe

In his recent novel Alain Crémieux imagines what might happen in Europe without NATO and US military forces and security commitments. Numerous border and minority conflicts break out, coalitions comparable to those in Europe's past begin to form, and the European Union is divided and ineffectual— until pro‐peace and pro‐EU forces rally. Most European countries then unite under a treaty providing for collective defence and security and a new central European government. The novel raises questions of international order: to what extent have the Europeans overcome their old ‘demons’ (distrust, power rivalry etc.), notably through the EU? While many theories purport to explain the peaceful relations among the EU member states, critical tests of the Union's political cohesion would come in circumstances without the US‐dominated external security framework, including US leadership in NATO. To what extent could the EU maintain cohesion and resist aggression or coercion by an external power against a member state, contain and resolve external conflicts affecting EU interests, and defend the Union's economic and security interests beyond Europe? To determine whether the US ‘pacifying’ and protective role has in fact become irrelevant, thanks in large part to the EU, would require a risky experiment—actually removing US military forces and commitments. The challenges and uncertainties that would face Europe without NATO argue that the Alliance remains an essential underpinning of political order in Europe. Moreover, the Alliance can serve as a key element in the campaigns against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To revitalize the Alliance, it is imperative that the Europeans improve their military capabilities and acquire the means necessary for a more balanced transatlantic partnership in maintaining international security.     

Brexit,Ireland and the World Trade Organization: possible policy options for a future UK–Australia agri-food trade agreement

Prior to the UK’s accession to the then European Economic Community in 1973, Australia was a significant supplier of Britain’s food. Membership of the European Union (EU) resulted in trade diversion, closing the British market to Australian sugar, for example. This article questions whether the UK’s exit from the EU (‘Brexit’) might usher in a new agri-food trade regime, restoring Australian farmers’ access to the British market, or whether other opposing political economy considerations might prevail. Would the UK unilaterally adopt free trade? Can a comprehensive free trade area agreement between Australia and the UK, including agri-food products, be negotiated? Any new relationship will need to reflect the UK government’s stated preference for a frictionless border with EU 27 (particularly on the island of Ireland), the World Trade Organization’s rule book, and the interests of the UK’s farm lobbies, as well as the UK’s quest for ‘free trade’ with the wider international community.     

Australia's Economic Ambitions in French New Caledonia, 1945–1955

ABSTRACT

From 1945, consistent with its broader South Pacific ambitions, Australia sought to strengthen its economic position in New Caledonia. The leaders of the European-descended ‘Caledonian’ community wanted economic autonomy for the territory and improved trade with Australia. Yet the opportunity proved illusory. France remained committed to imperial preference and economic dominance. Its revival was underwritten by Marshall Plan aid, including in New Caledonia. Australia failed to provide enough of the coal that appeared to offer economic influence. In the 1950s the Melanesians gained the vote, and the Caledonians lost political power. Conservative governments in Australia showed less interest than their Labor predecessors. Australia would have welcomed an economically autonomous New Caledonia with close Australian links, but this idea clashed with France's centralist and unitary traditions. In the tension between New Caledonia's geography and its history, France had ensured that history won.     

Overcoming legacies of foreign policy (dis)interests in the negotiation of the European Union–Australia free trade agreement*

ABSTRACT

Despite a troubled trade history dominated by disputes over agriculture, the negotiation of a European Union (EU)–Australia free trade agreement (FTA) was initiated in 2015. The initiation of these negotiations was made possible because of the shift in EU trade policy towards the negotiation of what the EU terms ‘new generation free trade agreements’. The EU has concluded FTA negotiations with South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam and Canada, and is negotiating other FTAs— notably with Japan and the USA . The EU faces many commercial challenges to its FTA negotiations that go beyond tariff reduction, including the protection of its geographical indicators, public procurement and investor–state dispute settlement. These issues are likely to be substantial features of any EU FTA with Australia. In addition to these challenges, the promotion of sustainable development interests and human rights through FTA negotiations is an important component of the EU’s approach. The EU’s position on the trade-related aspects of sustainable development and the negotiation of human rights conditionality has presented significant challenges to the EU’s trade agenda, particularly in negotiations with Canada and Singapore. This article draws lessons from the EU’s new generation trade agreement negotiations to date. It compares these negotiations with Australia’s approach to FTA negotiations, and analyses potential stumbling blocks for an EU–Australia FTA in light of past tensions in the relationship. The article argues that shifts in both EU and Australian trade policies and positive developments in the relationship mitigate past obstacles to a negotiated agreement. However, EU– Australia relations still suffer from the tyranny of distance. The resulting deficit in foreign policy salience between the EU and Australia broadens the best alternatives to a negotiated agreement.     

Sino–American relations and the ‘Australian factor’: inflated expectations or discriminate engagement?

Orchestrating relations between its American security ally and increasingly crucial Chinese trading partner constitutes perhaps the major foreign policy challenge now confronting Australia. The Howard government insists that it can pursue such diplomacy without having to choose between the US and China in the event of a future great power regional confrontation. Both Washington and Beijing, however, appear intent on pulling Australia into their own orbits of influence. This article contends that neither of them will be content to allow Australia to apply a ‘discriminate engagement’ policy toward their own regional interests if Sino–American strategic competition intensifies over Taiwan or throughout the Asia–Pacific region. It reviews Chinese and American strategic expectations regarding Australia and their response to that country's relations with the other, and outlines growing policy imperatives that Australia must confront in order to overcome current anomalies in its ‘dual strategy’ directed toward China and the United States.     

Resource nationalism or resource liberalism? Explaining Australia's approach to Chinese investment in its minerals sector

Since 2005, a burgeoning wave of Chinese investments has set off a new ‘minerals boom’ in the Australian iron ore and coal mining sectors. While normally a welcome development, the state-owned and strategic nature of the investors has raised concerns in Australia about how these should be regulated. As a result, in February 2008 the Australian government declared an intention to more closely screen foreign direct investment (FDI) from state-owned sources, which both supporters and detractors alike have claimed is evidence of ‘resource nationalism’ in Australia's approach towards its trade and investment relationships with China. This article challenges this understanding through an examination of the characteristics of Chinese mining FDI, the dilemmas these present to the Australian government, and the relatively restrained nature of its response. Through this, Australia's FDI policy is explained as a defensive move against the potential for strategic behaviour by Chinese investors resulting from their state ownership, rather than any national program to subject minerals trade and investment to political control. On this basis, the article argues that Australian government policy instead evidences a ‘resource liberalism’ approach, which intends to ensure that the governance of Australia's minerals trade and investment with China remain market-based processes.     

Working holiday makers in Australia: food security,climate change,and the backpacker tax

This commentary considers an often overlooked contribution to food security in Australia—the labour of working holiday makers. Their ability to act as a flexible and mobile temporary workforce is essential to the maintenance of the Australian agricultural industry. Previously, no tax was payable on income below $18,200, but a 2015 proposal to increase their tax rate sparked a vigorous political debate and so revealed their importance to the agricultural industry. A decline in backpacker numbers would cause agriculture to shrink to cope with smaller workforces. But the effects of climate change are expected to further shrink agricultural areas as extreme events and hotter temperatures impact crops, livestock, and the productivity of agricultural workers. Issues that appear manageable when viewed in isolation, such as increases in the tax rate on working holiday makers, become more problematic when viewed in conjunction with other impacts affecting agriculture. Thus, the ‘backpacker tax’ risks making food security harder to maintain at a time when Australia's agricultural system is already vulnerable to climate change.     

Australia's flawed approach to trade negotiations: and where do we sign?

Economists have warned for many years that preferential trade agreements (PTAs) will not necessarily increase economic welfare in Australia given the relatively small size of the economy and the country’s lack of negotiating coin. The Productivity Commission cautioned in its major report on PTAs that there seemed to be a mindset of ‘agreements for agreement’s sake’, in part because of fears of missing out on a bandwagon that has attracted Australia’s major trading partners. Political and security considerations have played an important role in shaping Australia’s approach to PTAs. When politics trumps economics in negotiations of PTAs there is a risk of a rush to premature agreement that produces sub-optimal outcomes, that undermines broader plurilateral and global negotiations, and that introduces new and undesirable distortions in trade and public policies. Various theoretical approaches to trade policymaking provide insights into why Australian governments have been willing to conclude these sub-optimal deals.     

Symposium: Australia–US Economic Relations and the Regional Balance of PowerAustralia,the United States and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Diverging Interests and Unintended Consequences

When the talks for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) were launched in 2010, there appeared to be a coincidence of interests between the American and Australian governments in negotiating a high-quality, ‘21st-century’ trade arrangement that would multilateralise the bilateral and minilateral trade agreements that have proliferated in the Asia-Pacific region in the last 15 years. As the negotiations progressed, however, a divergence between American and Australian interests became apparent. Protectionist interests in the United States have prevented the administration from improving on market access agreements in the current preferential trade agreements with TPP partners, thereby undermining the multilateralisation objective. Some of the elements of the US template for 21st-century trade agreements, notably enhanced protection for intellectual property, and the inclusion of investor–state dispute resolution, clash with Australian trade priorities. Moreover, the central role of the TPP in the US ‘pivot to Asia’ has led to perceptions that it is part of a strategy to encircle China: consequently the TPP may force Australia to make the very choice between China and the United States that the government wishes to avoid.

当2010年启动跨太平洋伙伴关系时,在谈判高质量、“21世纪”的贸易安排时美国和澳大利亚政府的利益似乎走到了一起。这种贸易安排会使过去十五年里亚太地区繁荣的双边及微关系多边化。在谈判进行的过程中,美澳之间的分歧却变得明朗了。美国的保护主义利益集团阻碍政府在现行的与亚太伙伴的最惠贸易协定中改善贸易准入协定,因此损害了多边化的目标。美国21世纪贸易协议的模式,明显加强了知识产权的保护,而且包含了投资者—国家争端解决的内容,与澳大利亚贸易优先的考虑发生了冲突。但亚太伙伴关系在美国重心移往亚洲的计划中至关重要,让人觉得就是包围中国战略的一部分。因此亚太伙伴关系会迫使澳大利亚在中美之间做澳政府并不愿意做的选择。