Towards a Democratic Bill of Rights

This paper examines two different bill of rights models for Australia: the Dialogue model and a Democratic model. The Dialogue model aims to protect rights through a bill of rights, strong political review mechanisms, intergovernmental dialogue, and rights-based judicial review. The paper argues that, despite its popularity, there are serious problems with the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Dialogue model and it outlines an alternative model, a ‘democratic bill of rights’, which attempts to avoid these problems by strengthening democratic institutions and political review mechanisms without adopting rights-based judicial review. The paper concludes that a democratic bill of rights is likely to be an effective and more democratically legitimate way of protecting and promoting human rights in Australia.     

Japan's response to China's rise: regional engagement, global containment, dangers of collision

Japan and China's ability to manage their bilateral relationship is crucial for the stability of the East Asian region. It also has a global impact on the security and economic development of other regions. For just as China's rise has inevitably involved an expansion of its global reach, so Japan's responses to the challenges posed by China have increasingly taken a global form, seeking to incorporate new partners and frameworks outside East Asia. Japan's preferred response to China's regional and global rise in the post‐Cold War period has remained one of default engagement. Japan is intent on promoting China's external engagement with the East Asia region and its internal domestic reform, through upgrading extant bilateral and Japan–China–US trilateral frameworks for dialogue and cooperation, and by emphasizing the importance of economic power to influence China. Japan is deliberately seeking to proliferate regional frameworks for cooperation in East Asia in order to dilute, constrain and ultimately engage China's rising power. However, Japan's engagement strategy also contains the potential to tilt towards default containment. Japan's domestic political basis for engagement is becoming increasingly precarious as China's rise stimulates Japanese revisionism and nationalism. Japan also appears increasingly to be looking to contain China on a global scale by forging new strategic links in Russia and Central Asia, with a ‘concert of democracies’ involving India, Australia and the US, by competing for resources with China in Africa and the Middle East, and by attempting to articulate a values‐based diplomacy to check the so‐called ‘Beijing consensus’. Nevertheless, Japan's perceived inability to channel China's rise either through regional engagement or through global containment carries a further risk of pushing Japan to resort to the strengthening of its military power in an attempt to guarantee its essential national interests. It is in this instance that Japan and China run the danger of a military collision.     

The limits to optimism: Australia and the rise of China

The Australian government optimistically expects that China's rise can be easily managed. They predict US–China relations will be cooperative, and reject concerns that Australia may face hard choices between them. This optimism seems to be based on the view that as China grows it will become increasingly integrated into a US-led global system. That overestimates America's power, and underestimates China's ambitions. The best we can hope for instead is that China and the US will cooperate in a concert of power, but the US will be very reluctant to make the necessary concessions to China for that to happen. So there is a real risk of even worse outcomes: Chinese primacy, sustained US–China hostility, or war. Australia therefore needs to try to persuade America to work with China in building a new ‘Concert of Asia’.     

Contestability ‘theory’, its links with Australia’s competition policy,and recent international trade and investment agreements

This article examines how contestable market theory (contestability) has come to reconfigure the economic and regulatory concept of competition in order to enhance the compatibility of Australia’s economy with international trade and investment agreements. Australia has recently negotiated and signed a raft of bilateral, plurilateral and regional agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and the Australia–China Free Trade Agreement. In order to ensure that Australia meets its obligations and commitments to these agreements, two key advisory bodies—the Harper Panel on Competition Policy Review and the Financial System Inquiry—made recommendations, the majority of which were accepted by the government, to ready Australia’s competition governance and economic policy for greater global integration. Such impact is dependent on, among other things, how domestic competition policy meshes with the free market ideology underpinning such international agreements, which favours the breakdown of barriers to markets. Less well known is the role of contestability in radicalising ideology as it countenances monopolisation and privatisation in the guise of market access by justifying the substitution of actual competition with the mere threat of competition. The article concludes that the monopoly power of transnational corporations will be enhanced through the acquiescence of governments to the new governance regime of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which, supported by domestic policy, is set to redraw competition policy in the light of contestability theory.     

‘Once and For All’: The Fourth UN World Conference on Women and the Institutionalisation of Women's Human Rights in American Foreign Policy

Though the slogan predates the Fourth UN World Conference on Women, ‘women's rights are human rights’ has become inextricably linked to US First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton's keynote address at the 1995 Conference in Beijing. The speech turned a line socialised by transnational feminist organisers into a State Department mantra with long-lasting policy ripples still felt today. This article uses new sources from the Office of the First Lady to examine the intra-departmental dynamics, policy architecture and domestic political considerations that shaped the content of the speech and the Clinton Administration's conception of women's rights as human rights. Early documents show that a focus on human rights was not inevitable, as other policy areas were better developed with more public support. But fear of rollback from previous international standards, external pressures from civil society, a desire to link foreign policy with domestic political aims and ultimately a strong backlash to American participation at the Conference on the basis of China's human rights record all elevated women's human rights as a US delegation priority.     

Australian and People's Republic of China government conceptions of the international order

Through qualitative comparative analysis of policy documents and official statements over the last 10 years (2008–2018), this paper examines Australian and PRC government conceptions of the international order and the associated policy implications. Their understandings of the international order are informed by their self-defined national role conceptions and perceptions of other states, and are manifested in discussions of institutional reform, international law and human rights. Australia's self-conception as a middle power informs its emphasis on maintenance and US leadership of the existing order, while the PRC's self-conceptions as both a developing and established power enable it to frame itself as either an upholder or reformer of the order. Both governments highlight the ‘rules-based’ mechanisms of the WTO, and are more likely to agree on trade and economic issues than on other matters. Their responses to the 2016 South China Sea arbitration tribunal decision and discussions of the role of human rights in the international order suggest less agreement is likely on international law and human rights norms. While Australia considers the PRC a potential challenger to the existing order, Australia does not feature in PRC discussions of international order, suggesting its limited ability to affect PRC foreign policy decisions.     

Perspectives on Australian foreign policy 2006

Australia in 2006 reaffirmed its close relationship with the United States while deepening engagement with other major power partners, with further agreements concluded with China, cooperation extended with Japan, and the profile of ties with India enhanced. Australia continued to navigate through the sometimes sensitive relations among the major powers, amid additional pressures arising from North Korea's nuclear test. Tensions with Indonesia were followed by a new security agreement, though increased confidence was needed in the relationship at both official and public levels. Internal disorder in several southwest Pacific states challenged Australia's capacities to provide effective short and medium term responses. Involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq continued, with the latter situation particularly problematic. Growing demand for energy in the Asia–Pacific region directed further attention towards Australia's uranium resources, as climate change issues assumed a higher profile in domestic debate and multilateral activities.     

Overcoming legacies of foreign policy (dis)interests in the negotiation of the European Union–Australia free trade agreement*

ABSTRACT

Despite a troubled trade history dominated by disputes over agriculture, the negotiation of a European Union (EU)–Australia free trade agreement (FTA) was initiated in 2015. The initiation of these negotiations was made possible because of the shift in EU trade policy towards the negotiation of what the EU terms ‘new generation free trade agreements’. The EU has concluded FTA negotiations with South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam and Canada, and is negotiating other FTAs— notably with Japan and the USA . The EU faces many commercial challenges to its FTA negotiations that go beyond tariff reduction, including the protection of its geographical indicators, public procurement and investor–state dispute settlement. These issues are likely to be substantial features of any EU FTA with Australia. In addition to these challenges, the promotion of sustainable development interests and human rights through FTA negotiations is an important component of the EU’s approach. The EU’s position on the trade-related aspects of sustainable development and the negotiation of human rights conditionality has presented significant challenges to the EU’s trade agenda, particularly in negotiations with Canada and Singapore. This article draws lessons from the EU’s new generation trade agreement negotiations to date. It compares these negotiations with Australia’s approach to FTA negotiations, and analyses potential stumbling blocks for an EU–Australia FTA in light of past tensions in the relationship. The article argues that shifts in both EU and Australian trade policies and positive developments in the relationship mitigate past obstacles to a negotiated agreement. However, EU– Australia relations still suffer from the tyranny of distance. The resulting deficit in foreign policy salience between the EU and Australia broadens the best alternatives to a negotiated agreement.     

The securitisation of migrant smuggling in Australia and its consequences for the Bali Process

This article analyses the Bali Process in the context of Australia’s securitised approach to migrant smuggling, and the consequences this has for both the Australia–Indonesia diplomatic relationship and the Bali Process overall. The Bali Process is the premier regional forum for combating migrant smuggling and is well placed to discuss and develop regional cooperation policies on irregular migration within the region. In particular, the Bali Process remains a key domain where Australia and Indonesia can contest and amend the norms and practices around the human rights of refugees and asylum-seekers. This article traces and analyses the emergence of Australia’s bilateral agreements for offshore processing and resettlement between 2011 and 2014, which Australian political elites aligned rhetorically to the Bali Process, but which the authors argue remain in tension with stated Bali Process objectives in terms of rights and protections for asylum-seekers and refugees. This article identifies that Australia’s security-driven policies and regional disagreements over humanitarian responsibility remain an ongoing tension within Bali Process states, and provides commentary on the implications of this for future Australian policy relating to regional cooperation on irregular migration.     

Australia’s submarine technology cooperation with Japan as burden-sharing with the USA in the Asia-Pacific

Australia, Japan and the USA are all facing dual pressures that require them to do more with less. Internationally, they deal with the challenge of managing China’s rapid rise. However, domestically, they must cut government spending and reduce government debt. With internal balancing effectively ruled out as a long-term solution, the three states are seeking ways to optimise external balancing, or cooperation with like-minded states. This article focuses on Australian motivations regarding the recent proposal for submarine cooperation with Japan, and places it in the context of longer trends that poise the USA, Australia and Japan for even greater trilateralism in the future. Australia’s proposal to buy submarines from Japan, should it go through, would cement Australia and Japan’s fledgling security relationship in steel and coin. For Australia, it would help it to overcome its undersea capability gap, and Japan could set a precedent to re-enter the global weapons market if all goes well. Furthermore, Australia can use defence-technology cooperation with Japan to signal to the USA the seriousness of its commitment to burden-share in pursuit of regional security and determination to politically support the USA’s ‘Pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific. However, domestic politics have begun to play an important role in Australia, with a ‘spill’ motion against Prime Minister Tony Abbott barely overcome by a backroom deal with the opposition to build the submarines domestically, and this is an important development to keep an eye on.     

The Ernest Gellner Nationalism Lecture: The Soviet Union,self‐determination,and the creation of the postwar human rights system

The USSR played a key role in the establishment of the post‐World War II human rights system despite its repressive and even murderous domestic record. It forged an alliance with the countries of the Global South in support of decolonization, self‐determination, and social and economic rights, policies opposed by liberal states like the United States, Great Britain, and France. These positions were deeply rooted in the socialist tradition. Moreover, when a human rights movement emerged in the mid‐1960s, its members—in its origins overwhelmingly from the intelligentsia—called not for the overthrow of the Soviet Union but for the fulfilment of Soviet law. The language of rights, proclaimed with such flourish in the 1936 constitution and its successor in 1977, served as the weapon hurled by dissidents as they called on the Soviet government to respect freedom of speech and assembly, and national rights, including the right to emigrate. In turn, the international human rights movement developed from the 1960s to the 1990s largely through support for the Soviet dissident movement, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch prime examples. The Soviet experience is critical to any global history of human rights.     

To Eliminate Colour Prejudice: The WCTU and Decolonisation in Australia

From the mid‐1930s to the mid‐1960s the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) in Australia played a key role in the articulation and development of human rights for Aborigines. They provided practical and political support and scaffolding while developing an important ideological base, and they formed alliances across class, gender, race, religious, and political lines to achieve their goal of racial equality. Their activism coincided with the period associated with decolonisation. It has been argued that, in Australia, the end of empire coalesced with the rise of the labour movement in the 1940s. However, this article argues that as a means of understanding WCTU involvement in defending and shaping an Aboriginal rights agenda, the rise of labour is an important but partial explanation. It downplays the role of gender and religion in formulating an ideological position while masking its political implications. Here, I explore the politics of WCTU reform, particularly connections between gender, religion, and race, and trace the Union's defence of Aboriginal human rights in post war Australia.     

North Korea’s participation in the Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights

North Korea’s participation in the UNHRC’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR)—a peer review in which states make recommendations to one another for improving human rights implementation—is a notable exception to its rejection of other human rights mechanisms. What explains North Korea’s willing participation in the UPR? This essay analyses North Korea’s participation in the first (2008–11) and second (2012–15) UPR cycles through its written submissions, responses to recommendations, and recommendations to other states. It finds that North Korea has consistently accepted weak recommendations, rejected more specific policy changes, and implemented accepted recommendations on a limited basis, allowing it to claim compliance with human rights at minimal cost. The UPR’s reliance on states’ self-reports and its inability to adjudicate competing factual claims allow North Korea to reject claims of egregious abuses, openly advocate for a radically state-centric vision of human rights, and challenge the legitimacy of human rights mechanisms like the Commission of Inquiry and Special Rapporteur while building support from other states with similar views. Notably, the Commission of Inquiry appears to have motivated North Korea to increase its cooperation with the UPR, demonstrating that the UPR complements but cannot replace other UN human rights mechanisms.     

Thirty years of the Australia–Japan partnership in Asian regionalism: evolution and future directions

This article reviews the development of the Australia–Japan partnership in building regional institutions such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation over the last three decades since the NARA Treaty was signed in 1976. In a unique partnership, academics, business people, politicians and officials in both countries were central to establishing these regional economic institutions. This article, however, argues that while both countries had shared understandings on regional issues during the first two decades after the treaty, the last decade has seen divergent regional understandings, especially over the rise of China. Japan sees the growing influence of China as a political obstacle due to growing bilateral tensions arising from historical and territorial issues, while Australia finds it a great economic opportunity to promote its trade with and attract investments from China. This differing understanding on China between both countries may act as a major hurdle to the effective and functional partnership in East Asian regionalism.     

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 70: protection of human rights in Australia*

This commentary reflects on the legacy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on its 70th anniversary, in terms of the protection of human rights within Australia. I reflect on Australia’s failure to implement domestically the terms of the two founding Covenants, and the resulting piecemeal protections that exist for human rights. I finish by considering the growing complexities in understanding human rights, responsibilities, and limits.     

Australia,the United States and a 'China growing strong': Managing conflict avoidance

How to deal with a rising China constitutes one of the most seminal challenges facing the ANZUS alliance since its inception a half a century ago. Australia must reconcile its geography and economic interests in Asia with its post-war strategic and historic cultural orientation towards the United States. It must succeed in this policy task without alienating either Beijing or Washington in the process. The extent to which this is achieved will shape Australia's national security posture for decades to come. Three specific components of the 'Sino-American-Australian' triangle are assessed here: the future of Taiwan, the American development of a National Missile Defence (NMD), and the interplay between Sino-American power balancing and multilateral security politics. The policy stakes for Australia and for the continued viability of ANZUS are high in all three policy areas as a new US Administration takes office in early 2001. The article concludes that Australia's best interest is served by applying deliberate modes of decision-making in its own relations with both China and the US and by facilitating consistent and systematic dialogue and consultations with both of those great powers on key strategic issues.     

中美《上海公报》谈判的第二阶段

中美《上海公报》谈判的第二阶段是在1972年2月21～28日美国总统尼克松访华期间。谈判前夕,黑格访华,其名义上是为尼克松访华做技术上的准备,实际上是以苏联的军事威胁来吓唬中方,迫使中方在《上海公报》台湾问题上让步,但中方不为所动。《上海公报》谈判第二阶段共进行了六次谈判,双方在台湾问题、"人民要革命"以及双方都"不在亚太地区谋求霸权"的措辞上进行了争论。《上海公报》谈判最终取得了成功,其主要经验和启示是:应当从战略高度和长远角度来看待和处理中美关系;妥善处理台湾问题;认识和尊重差异,寻求和发展共同点。     

South Sudan: a volatile dynamic of accountability and peace

Since the warring parties to South Sudan's civil war (2013–15) signed a peace agreement in August 2015, South Sudan has endured a series of setbacks and clashes that have threatened the fragile peace process. This article examines many key factors affecting the peace process, including rampant corruption, military factionalism, gross human rights abuses and ineffective foreign intervention/pressure. It shows that the past and present failure to structure accountability at the institutional level drives the instability and distrust that has limited the political dialogue and consensus needed to implement the peace deal. To frame this issue of accountability, the article distinguishes between core (essential) and peripheral (self‐serving) objectives of promoting accountability. In doing so, it seeks to devise and apply the logic of this dynamic of accountability and to explain the unexpected outcomes of South Sudan's conflict. It argues that, rather than transforming the conditions and hostile relations of South Sudan's situation, international demands for accountability continue to fuel the volatile tensions between international authorities and the various factions inside the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The central conclusion the article draws is that instead of signifying the official beginning of the end of the conflict, the peace agreement has wedged itself between the core and peripheral objectives of accountability, thereby setting the stage for further stalemate and increasing distrust among domestic and international authorities.     

Australia's ‘special strategic relationship’ with Japan: another ‘China choice’?

In July 2014, Australia's new Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, and his Japanese counterpart, Shinzō Abe, elevated the status of bilateral ties to a ‘special strategic relationship'. Both sides also agreed on intensifying their defence technology cooperation, including in the submarine space. As well, Prime Minister Abbott called Australia a ‘strong ally’ of Japan. Yet, the prospect of a further strengthening of Australia–Japan defence relations has led to criticism by Australian strategic commentators. In particular, critics argue that closer strategic relations with Japan could damage Australia's ties with a rising China. In a worst-case scenario, Australia might even become ‘entrapped’ in a Sino-Japanese conflict. However, this argues that a closer defence relationship is in Australia's strategic interests in the face of China's increasing challenge to the rules-based order in the region. China's uncompromising position in the South China Sea and its more assertive behaviour have led to a greater congruence of threat and risk assessment between Australia and Japan. Indeed, Australia and Japan are increasingly facing a security dilemma vis-à-vis China, albeit to varying degrees. Therefore, for Australia, promoting Japan's ‘security normalisation’ contributes to regional stability. As well, the article points out that closer strategic ties with Japan do not automatically come at the expense of Sino-Australia relations. China's leverage to ‘punish’ Australia for unwanted strategic behaviour is limited, and concerns about ‘entrapment’ in a Sino-Japanese war are exaggerated. However, the more China exerts coercive diplomacy, the closer Australia–Japan defence relations are likely to become.     

The US–Australia free trade agreement: The interface between partisan politics and national objectives

The literature on the drivers behind bilateral treaties implies an assumption that international treaties are entered into primarily to achieve national objectives, not partisan political goals. This paper investigates whether this assumption is valid, using as a case study the recently enacted US–Australia Free Trade Agreement. A stated original purpose for the agreement—increasing access to the US market for Australian agricultural products—would yield significant economic benefits for Australia. However, when it became clear that this goal would not be achieved, the objective of the Australian government shifted. The most plausible explanation for the shift is that domestic political objectives had moved to the fore and prompted the government to pursue and adopt the treaty despite some evidence that it might not be in the national interest to do so.