Russia,nuclear leakage,and the non-proliferation regime

Abstract

Russia inherited from the Soviet Union vast holdings of nuclear weapons and of the fissile materials necessary to build them. These nuclear assets have been in the possession of a Russia in the midst of an extraordinarily difficult and turbulent political, social, and economic transformation. Never before have such enormous inventories of nuclear weapons and fissile materials existed in such circumstances of political instability and uncertainty and economic distress. The economic struggles and financial crisis experienced by Russia since it emerged as an independent state in 1991 have placed enormous stress on its society. The Russian military and the Russian nuclear complex have not been exempt from these pressures. This reality has led to concerns that the Russian state is not in a position to provide adequately for the safety and security of its nuclear assets. If true, this would raise the risk that these assets could leak out of Russia and into the hands of those who wish to acquire nuclear weapons –the so called nuclear leakage problem.     

Pakistan's nuclear bomb: beyond the non-proliferation regime

Pakistan's status as a nuclear power, which was made manifest when it carried out six nuclear tests in May 1998, came under renewed international scrutiny following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001. Of most immediate concern was the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, which was believed to be vulnerable to Muslim terrorist groups with close links to the al-Qaida organization, headed by Osama bin Laden. However, the international crisis centering on the 'war against terrorism' is bound to revive debate about Pakistan's involvement in the nuclear non-proliferation regime; the risks of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir; and the need for tighter curbs on the export of nuclear technology to politically volatile regions in the Muslim world. These debates are likely to be overshadowed by Pakistan's own perceptions of the danger it faces of a military threat from a nuclear-capable India; its aspirations as a regional power; and its desire to be recognized as 'first among equals' in the Muslim world community of nations. Any attempt to draw Pakistan into the non-proliferation regime and to persuade it to assume its responsibilities as a nuclear power will need to address these concerns. Ultimately, however, it will be for Pakistanis to decide how long they wish to subordinate their country's economic well being to the pursuit of a nuclear programme whose priorities are defined by an unaccountable military regime.     

The moral acceptability of nuclear deterrence: A critique

Theorists within the just war tradition of ethics differ in their conclusions about nuclear warfare and nuclear deterrence. This paper examines three arguments for the conditional moral acceptability of nuclear deterrence—those of the U.S. National Conference of Catholic Bishops in their pastoral letter, of J. Bryan Hehir, and of Michael Walzer—and argues that none of the three constitutes intellectually compelling and practically useful moral advice. The bishops fail to convince us that nuclear use can ever fulfil the requirements of proportionality, and therefore that the intention to use nuclear weapons can ever be justified. Hehir fails to convince us that nuclear deterrence policies in fact distinguish categorically between intention and use. Walzer's case that deterrence is bad but necessary is more convincing but it, like Hehir's, does not constitute coherent moral advice for the citizen, soldier or government official. I conclude that, given the inadequacy of attempts to justify nuclear deterrence, even conditionally, we have a strong moral obligation to pursue alternatives.

The level of citizen concern about the dangerous possibility of nuclear war has become greatly heightened in Europe and the United States in the 1980s. This is probably due to at least three factors: the significant technological developments in nuclear weaponry that have occurred during the last decade, the increased fear of Soviet military strength, and the concentration of recent U.S. administrations on developing and improving a nuclear war‐fighting capability. But even before the growth of the peace movement since 1980, a ‘new debate’ about the morality of nuclear weapons and deterrence policy had begun in academic and theological circles. In this paper, I will analyze three arguments of moral philosophers and theologians, all working within the ‘just war’ tradition, about whether nuclear deterrence, in any form, can be morally justified.     

The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence

NATO's nuclear deterrence posture has since the late 1950s involved risk‐and responsibility‐sharing arrangements based on the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. Since 1991 gravity bombs, deliverable by US and allied dual‐capable aircraft, have been the only type of US nuclear weapons left in Europe. Although many other factors are involved in the alliance's deterrence posture and in US extended deterrence—including intercontinental forces, missile defences, non‐nuclear capabilities and declaratory policy—recent discussions in the United States about NATO nuclear deterrence have focused on the future of the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. The traditional view has supported long‐standing US and NATO policy in holding that the risk‐ and responsibility‐sharing arrangements based on US nuclear weapons in Europe contribute to deterrence and war prevention; provide assurance to the allies of the genuineness of US commitments; and make the extended deterrence responsibility more acceptable to the United States. From this perspective, no further cuts in the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe should be made without an agreement with Russia providing for reductions that address the US—Russian numerical disparity in non‐strategic nuclear forces, with reciprocal transparency and verification measures. In contrast, four schools of thought call for withdrawing the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe without any negotiated Russian reciprocity: some military officers who consider the weapons and associated arrangements unnecessary for deterrence; proponents of ambitious arms control measures who accept extended deterrence policies but view the US weapons in Europe as an obstacle to progress in disarmament; nuclear disarmament champions who reject extended nuclear deterrence policies and who wish to eliminate all nuclear arms promptly; and selective engagement campaigners who want the United States to abandon extended nuclear deterrence commitments to allies on the grounds that they could lead to US involvement in a nuclear war.     

Waltz the Hall: The American Play Party

Spurgeon has provided the academic world with a superb exampleof how oral history has the power not only to supplement thehistorical and academic record but also to enlarge our understandingof a topic. These days, few know of the esoteric folklore genre,the play party, and those who do might well assume that it hasbeen defunct for several decades. Even nineteenth- to earlytwentieth-century folklorists wrote about it as an old and dyingform of childhood recreation. Vance Randolph wrote some     

Stephen Pinker and the long peace: alliance,deterrence and decline

It is now widely accepted, at least among academic students of war, that there has been a great and generally benign transformation in the character of war. The sort of big wars involving the world's greatest powers, those that in practice or in prospect dominated international affairs from the rise of Napoleon to the collapse of communism, are now considered to be essentially obsolescent. But to what extent is that really true?     

Containment and territorial transnational actors: Israel,Hezbollah and Hamas

Containment has been salient in intellectual and policy debates for 60 years. It informed US foreign policy towards the USSR and, later, the so‐called rogue states. The endurance of containment beyond the Cold War suggests that it possesses the quality of transferability, the capacity of a grand strategy from the past to transcend the circumstances that gave rise to it, to suggest what should be emulated and what avoided in future policies. Drawing on the notion of transferability and on the method of structured, focused comparison, this article uses Israel's foreign policy towards Hezbollah and Hamas to argue that containment is transferable from the state level to a state/territorial transnational actor (TNA) relationship, albeit with permutations. This argument is examined in relation to four issues: the circumstances under which containment arises; its applicability to territorial TNA; the objectives sought by implementing containment; and the role of legitimacy as a component of containment. In so doing the article seeks to make a contribution to the debate on containment. While there is a rich literature on state containment, research on containing territorial TNA has been extremely limited.     

Deaths,disappearances, borders: Migrant disappearability as a technology of deterrence

This paper analyses migrant disappearances in connection to EU bordering practices and techniques. Drawing on fieldwork in various localities at Greek borderlands, I argue that death or disappearance, due to drowning, hypothermia, exhaustion, violence, deprivation of medical care, and road accidents, to name but a few examples, has become an integral part of border enforcement in the Global North. To engage analytically with such an instantiation of border violence, I propose to utilise the notion of migrant disappearability. This disappearability is a produced condition (as opposed to accidently or randomly appearing) of everyday existence that does not necessarily lead to death or disappearance but, nevertheless, exerts pressure towards certain kind of precarities and threats by limiting the horizon of possibilities racialised migrants from the Global South have ahead of them. Furthermore, the state of being disappearable is a social space one constantly enters, leaves, re-enters and leaves again; rather than being at the forefront at all times, it looms above like a ghost.     

The fuzzy limits of self-reliance: US extended deterrence and Australian strategic policy

As a close US ally, Australia is often seen as a recipient of US extended deterrence. This article argues that in recent decades, Australian strategic policy engaged with US extended deterrence at three different levels: locally, Australia eschews US combat support and deterrence under the policy of self-reliance; regionally, it supports US extended deterrence in Asia; globally, it relies on the US alliance against nuclear threats to Australia. The article argues that in none of these policy areas does the Australian posture conform to a situation of extended deterrence proper. Moreover, when the 2009 White Paper combines all three policies in relation to major power threats against Australia, serious inconsistencies result in Australia's strategic posture—a situation the government should seek to avoid in the White Paper being drafted at the time of writing.     

New approaches to deterrence in Britain, France, and the United States

The three western nuclear powers have in recent years been more preoccupied with threats from regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction than with potential major power threats. London, Paris, and Washington have each substantially reduced their deployed nuclear forces and sharply cut back their range of delivery systems since the end of the Cold War in 1989‐1991. While each has manifested greater interest in non‐nuclear capabilities for deterrence, each has attempted, with varying degrees of clarity, to define options for limited nuclear use. All three have articulated their nuclear employment threats within a conceptual framework intended to promote deterrence. Despite the differences in their approaches and circumstances, the three western nuclear powers are grappling with tough and, to some extent, unanswered questions: what threat will deter? To what extent have the grounds for confidence in deterrence been diminished? To what extent has it been prudent to scale back deployed nuclear capabilities and redefine threats of nuclear retaliation? To what extent would limited nuclear options enhance deterrence and simplify nuclear employment decisions? What level of confidence should be placed in the full array of deterrence and containment measures? To what extent is deterrence national policy, and to what extent is it Alliance policy?     

War veterans as transnational actors: politics,alliances and networks in the interwar period

Historians have often considered the international veterans’ organizations which came into being after World War I as proof of the pacifist, internationalist orientation of the majority of the Great War ex-combatants. However, veterans active in these organizations were often inspired by specifically national and partisan objectives that belie any simplistic equation between altruistic transnational activism, international cooperation and pacifism. Conceiving of war veterans as transnational actors, this article explores the origins and decline of the veterans’ transnational sphere in the interwar period. It singles out four shades of competing veterans’ internationalism and describes the crucial differences that separated actors such as Henri Barbusse, René Cassin, Henri Pichot and Carlo Delcroix, among others. The article argues that both the veterans’ organizations and their protagonists, while reaching out across national borders, remained embedded in specific constellations of personal trajectories, political partisanship, nation-state interests and inter-state alliances. Their political and social activities also tried to reshape, and were subjected to, existing or emerging spatial configurations such as Great Power alliances and wider internationalist projects. Thus, the article shows that there was no homogeneous transnational sphere in international veteran politics; it was rather the competition between different internationalist practices and projects which shaped veterans’ transnational activities.     

理性策略,非理性表达——《信仰、仪式与乡土社会》中的风水现象与风水功能

陈进国《信仰、仪式与乡土社会——风水的历史人类学探索》(中国社会科学出版社,2005)一书,也许是中国大陆最早以“风水”作为研究专题的博士论文。长期以来,风水在大陆学术界是一个禁忌的话题。禁忌源自我们对于风水的价值判断。我们可以举出无数的例证,来说明风水建设对于社会资源的浪费,以及它