中俄战略协作伙伴关系中的经济因素

建立在平等互信基础上的中俄战略协作伙伴关系有两个突出特点:它既允许实现各自国家的利益,同时也不限制伙伴的自由;它不是单一的关系,而是可在多个国家之间建立的一种关系。中俄战略协作伙伴关系的建立反映出中俄在政治关系中处于较高的发展水平,而两国的经济合作发展水平则远远落后于政治关系的发展。目前两国还存在着一些因素阻碍着经济合作的发展,但两国的友好关系将有利于问题的解决。     

历史上韩日关系的发展、制约因素及近期走向

韩日关系是东北亚最重要的一组双边关系。本文通过对金大中、卢武铉、李明博执政时期韩日关系发展的研究,分析影响两国关系走势的制约因素,进而对两国关系的近期走向进行分析。可见,在今后一段较长时期,韩日关系仍将保持合作与摩擦这样一种较为复杂的基本关系格局。韩日关系不会是一帆风顺,而是将在合作与摩擦中艰难曲折地向前发展,韩日关系离成熟的伙伴关系的实现,路还相当遥远。     

中国的“伙伴关系”意味着什么

问2013年10月2日至5日,国家主席习近平对印度尼西亚和马来西亚进行国事访问。双方的领导人一致决定,将中印尼关系、中马关系提升为全面战略伙伴关系。这一关系的含义是什么?类似的伙伴关系分为几类?在什么情况下中国与其他国家建立伙伴关系?     

孙中山与苏俄关系论析

本文运用近年新解密的俄罗斯档案及国内孙中山研究中发掘的有关文献资料,对孙中山与腚苏俄关系问题进行一些新的审视和探析.1917年俄国十月革命胜利后,孙中山十分关注俄国的沧桑巨变,进而由外交接触到联俄政策的酝酿,由确立联俄政策再到"以俄为师".他晚期政治理想中有着浓厚的"恋苏"情结.孙中山晚年既要苏俄的援助,又要维护中华民族利益,还要防止俄式共产主义和苏维埃革命的输入,在联俄与防俄间充分发挥了他的政治平衡.同时,孙中山在与共产国际和苏俄关系的互动中呈现出鲜明的策略性、现实性和独立自主性.苏俄在处理与孙中山的关系上存在大国沙文主义倾向.     

略论政治安全行为与社会危机

随着国际交流的不断深入,政治与社会之间的关系显得日趋复杂,国家政治安全行为已成为造成社会危机的重要因素之一。由于政治安全行为是在政治安全认知的指导下产生的,因而必须在政治安全认知的视角下分析政治安全行为与社会危机的关系。     

中亚国家的民族关系与地区安全

随着地缘政治的变化,中亚五国的民族问题凸显跨国性。民族与宗教因素相结合、相促发,利用宗教服务于极端民族主义是影响民族关系、制约国家经济建设和危及地区安全的突出征象。“9.11”事件以后,由于美国的军事介入,致使中亚的民族问题更加复杂,不仅关涉五国间的国家关系,而且牵动包括我国西北边疆及其他周边国家在内的地区安全。面临来自周边动荡带的巨大压力,中亚的稳定仍然十分脆弱,强化国家安全的任务极其艰巨。中亚各国政府针对本国出现的一些具体问题,积极推行一系列促进族际关系健康发展的措施,民族问题始终处于政府的控制之下,整个地区总体上保持基本稳定态势,但局部片区的安全形势不容乐观,种种变数难以预测。     

孙中山与苏俄关系论析

本文运用近年新解密的俄罗斯档案及国内孙中山研究中发掘的有关文献资料,对孙中山与苏俄关系问题进行新的审视和探析。1917年俄国十月革命胜利后,孙中山十分关注俄国的沧桑巨变,进而由外交接触到联俄政策的酝酿,由确立联俄政策再到“以俄为师”。他晚期政治理想中有着浓厚的“恋苏”情结。孙中山晚年既要苏俄的援助,又要维护中华民族利益,还要防止俄式共产主义和苏维埃革命的输入,在联俄与防俄间充分发挥了他的政治平衡。同时,孙中山在与共产国际和苏俄关系的互动中呈现出鲜明的策略性、现实性和独立自主性。     

近代以来日俄关系的发展演变与未来走向

近代以来日俄关系的发展道路是十分曲折而复杂的。两国间存在严重利益冲突的敏感问题至今仍未得到解决。其中,领土问题是制约两国关系进一步发展的关键因素。同时两国关系的改善也受到日美同盟的牵制。但尽管有这些障碍,在可预见的未来,俄罗斯与日本仍将继续发展和扩大彼此间的合作关系,这是由双方的国际战略、政治安全及经济利益所决定的。这一趋势有利于亚太地区大国关系的健康发展。     

由西方“人的安全观”引发的对国家与社会关系的重新思考——一种跨国关系—国内政治分析视角

在20世纪90年代以来由全球多国政府和知识精英参与的"新安全观"(亦称"非传统安全观"和"综合安全观"等)探讨中,尤以西方国家提出的"人的安全观"呼声最为强烈。在西方"人的安全观"理念中,传统的国家-社会模式被打破,社会不再被各类国界线划定为一些封闭的空间,人的安全问题也不再仅是国家内部问题,而同时成为全球市民社会的重要议题。尽管西方"人的安全观"暴露出很多不足与缺陷,但其跨国关系—国内政治分析模式促使我们去反思国家与社会关系的近现代理解模式,打破那种在一个封闭的国家内谈论国家与社会的关系或者仅以单一国家为单位谈论世界政治问题的局面,从而能更多地从国家与社会的关系来看待我国对外关系的变化以及在国际社会中的社会化进程,或者从另一方面来说我国对外关系的变化如何影响到我国国内社会改革和政治议程。     

中苏“蜜月期”文化关系出现的背景分析

中苏两国"蜜月期"文化关系与这一时期双方的外交、政治、经济关系有密切联系.50-60年代.中国外交上的"一边倒"政策、<中苏友好同盟互助条约>的签订、经济上苏联对中国的大力援助以及中苏文化在意识形态方面的趋同等多重因素的综合作用使中苏文化关系进入"蜜月"阶段.     

So far,so good? Russia and the ESDP

The progression from a European Security and Defence Initiative to a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has not left Russian policy–makers indifferent. The Yeltsin administration greeted the emergence of the European Union as a new player in European security, seeing it as a potential challenge to NATO and American influence. President Putin's emphasis on developing trust and cooperation with the West has changed the Russian perspective on the ESDP. Russian interest in dialogue and functional cooperation with the ESDP now stems primarily from a wish to add substance to the still nascent EU–Russia partnership, which Putin has chosen as Russia's foremost external priority. In view of the imbalance between EU and Russian economic capacities, the security sphere appears as the most promising area of cooperation on which to found a meaningful long–term partnership. This article traces the evolution of Russian perceptions of the ESDP since it was first launched in June 1999 and outlines the development of EU–Russia relations in this field, which has given Russia the most advanced mechanism for interaction with the ESDP available to a non–EU country. It explores prospective areas of cooperation, as they are viewed by each side, and looks into issues of potential discord. Finally, the article considers the future of Russia–ESDP cooperation in the light of Russia's revitalized partnership with NATO.     

A new Gaullist moment? European bandwagoning and international polarity

The transatlantic partnership needs to be reassessed. Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has chosen to bandwagon with the United States and to outsource its security to Washington. Bandwagoning has serious consequences when the use of force is at stake: it may lead to entrapment, where weaker allies may be involuntarily dragged into a conflict. It may also lead to abandonment, where the dominant ally may choose to discard their vital security concerns. With the evolution of the international system towards a multipolar configuration, this strategy of bandwagoning is becoming increasingly costly for Europe while the dominant power, the United States, is progressively confronted by other competitors at the systemic level. These classic dilemmas attached to an asymmetric partnership are exacerbated in a multipolar configuration. In particular, the abandonment scenario may become more and more frequent precisely because there is competition—and thus potential costs—at the international level: the United States may leave Europe alone, not by choice but by necessity. The current crisis in Ukraine illustrates this shift: while some American leaders were keen to escalate the conflict by arming Ukraine, the Obama administration's commitment to the defence of Europe has been minimal and it has largely delegated the management of the crisis to the Europeans themselves. Washington had other and more important priorities. Strategic autonomy is not an option for Europe; it has become a reality, a Gaullist moment where Europeans will have to learn to think and act strategically for themselves.     

Towards a comprehensive strategic partnership between Australia and Japan: Japan's perspective

With 2006 and 2007 marking two important anniversaries in the history of their bilateral ties, Australia and Japan are committed to reaffirming the significance of their relationship and expanding it into new dimensions. The Australian and Japanese foreign ministers have agreed to build a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ between their two countries. What are the factors that motivate Canberra and Tokyo to elevate their bilateral relations to the level of a strategic partnership? From a Japanese point of view, the main reason is the enhanced strategic importance of Australia with such indicators as Australian's enhanced security role, the structural changes in Asia and movements toward a new regional architecture, Japan's energy and food security, the trilateral strategic dialogue between Australia, the United States and Japan, and shared values and the Australian government's policy toward Japan. Both nations are expected to advance toward an even closer relationship with these factors in mind.1 1. The views expressed in this article, which was written in September 2006, are those of the author and do not in any way represent the views of the Embassy of Japan in Australia or the Japanese government. View all notes     

The War on Terror from the Perspective of Indonesia and Saudi Arabia

This article examines the perspective of two major Islamic nations—Saudi Arabia and Indonesia—toward the United States' War on terror and how this war shaped and influenced the behavior of the two Islamic governments toward domestic challenges and their partnership with the United States, as they have declared their support of the United States. Indeed the war against terror has developed several security concerns for both Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. However, each state has followed different methods to fight Islamic radical movements as well as a different framework of partnership with the United States on its war against terrorism.     

Success Conditions for Urban Networks: Eurocities and Sister Cities

The present paper investigates the role of urban networks in interaction and integration of cities by means of the “sister city” movement. The paper addresses the relationships of “Eurocities” with their “sister cities” to highlight the main factors behind the successful relationships. The data and information used for evaluation are based on the extensive survey questionnaires filled out by relevant departments or experts of municipalities in Eurocities. A logistic regression method is deployed to identify the most important factors in the success of sister city relationships. The results of our study show that the existence of any former relation with the sister cities affects the success of the relationship positively. This former relation makes it easier to have a future relation with an economic partnership while shortening the process and accelerating the economic partnership. The results also show that two factors, viz. similarities in urban problems and contributions of Eurocities to their sister cities stimulate the willingness of Eurocities to improve the relationship. The contributions as well as economic benefits provided from the sister city relationship and new business and investment opportunities have emerged as the most important factors in sister city relationship.     

基于多案例扎根分析的旅游者-目的地品牌关系研究

本文运用多案例扎根分析方法,通过收集与分析旅游目的地网上评论帖子,以品牌关系理论和目的地营销理论为依据,基于驱动因素、关系质量维度、关系影响3个维度构建了旅游者-目的地品牌关系概念模型。研究发现：消费情境、目的地认知形象、目的地个性和旅游者感知价值是旅游者-目的地品牌关系形成的驱动因素;旅游者-目的地品牌关系质量涵盖了旅游者满意和目的地依恋两个维度;旅游者-目的地品牌关系对旅游者行为的影响主要表现在目的地态度忠诚上。在此基础上,本文提出了目的地品牌建设的相关策略建议。     

Hollande and Africa Policy

Studies of French Africa policy have traditionally focused on its neo-colonial basis and the often corrupt nature of the relations it engendered because of the connivances of semi-official and unofficial networks and covert practices that characterised it. These are often referred to in the literature as la Françafrique. In seeking to understand François Hollande's Africa policy this article moves away from a neo-colonial, Françafrique analytical framework and instead seeks to engage with the continuity versus change debate in French Africa policy through the lens of geopolitics. The three central themes of Hollande's Africa policy—security, partnership and trade—are analysed, focusing firstly on the French interventions in Africa, notably in Mali, since 2012, before discussing French engagement with African regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States, and the increasing importance attached to economic and trade links. The article ends with a brief survey of some of the challenges facing French Africa policy.     

The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership: Russia's Evolving China Policy

The strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing is arguably the greatest Russian foreign policy achievement of the post-Soviet period. In just over a decade, the relationship has grown from a barely civil interaction to one of political and strategic convergence and flourishing economic cooperation. Once divisive issues such as border demarcation and Chinese 'illegal migration' into the Russian Far East have been largely defused, while bilateral trade has tripled during the past four years. Nevertheless, despite these successes, the strategic partnership remains fragile and vulnerable to bilateral and international developments. A negative historical legacy, enduring cultural prejudices and strategic suspicions, and even commercial disagreements threaten, over time, to undermine many of the gains of the recent past. In the transformed global environment after 9/11 there are signs that Moscow is rethinking its approach towards China as part of a more general evolution in Russian strategic calculus in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. China's emergence as the next super-power, the spectre of increased Sino-American tensions, the changing balance of power between Moscow and Beijing, and rival agendas in Central Asia all have the potential to rekindle once dormant political differences and security fears. Although the breadth of common interests means there is no early prospect of confrontation, the much-vaunted Russia–China strategic partnership may be giving way to a growing strategic divergence.     

Public–private partnerships in national cyber‐security strategies

Despite its centrality in the national cyber security strategies of the US and the UK, the public–private partnership is a nebulous arrangement, which is especially problematic in the context of critical infrastructure protection. Privately owned and operated critical infrastructure that is regarded as a potential national security vulnerability raises questions about the allocation of responsibility and accountability in terms of cyber security. As with many aspects of cyber security, this issue is often discussed with little reference to previous scholarship that could provide conceptual scaffolding. This article draws on the extensive literature on public–private partnerships in order to assess the tensions and challenges of this arrangement in national cyber‐security strategies. It finds that there is a serious disjuncture in expectations from both ‘partners’. The government regards privately owned and operated critical infrastructure as a key element of national security but is reluctant to claim a mandate to oversee network security. At the same time, the private sector is not inclined to accept responsibility or liability for national cyber security. This challenge for governments to manage national cyber security raises questions about how well equipped these states are to promote their own security in the information age. Acknowledging the flaws in the ‘partnership’ is an essential step towards addressing them.     

A decade of African Peace and Security Architecture

This article examines how the African Union (AU) has handled Africa's peace and security challenges since 2002, defines what has been successful and what remains aspirational. It does so by examining how the AU has responded, from using sanctions against coups, to deploying peacekeeping missions and mediating in conflicts. An African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has developed since 2002, including a Peace and Security Council, an African Standby Force, a Continental Early Warning System and a Panel of the Wise. This sounds impressive, but the operationalization record is patchy: AU‐deployed missions have been fully dependent on external donors; harmonization is a major problem; serious questions remain over AU capacity; and some of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are developing at a quicker pace than the AU. Given these circumstances and its internal capacity deficit, the AU will likely struggle to exercise oversight of regional processes, including the development of regional standby force arrangements. APSA is clearly based on a liberal peace model, yet democratic systems, respect for human rights and good governance aren't always in place in African countries, and the self‐interest of elites continues to be a constraint on APSA and its success. Over the last decade the AU has found a voice and, despite some setbacks, it has shown through AMISOM in Somalia that it is capable of conducting a successful peacemaking operation. Its biggest challenge is not making the decision to intervene or deploy forces, but the capacity of most African states to deploy effectively. APSA's dependence on external partners needs to diminish over the next decade if better African solutions are to be found to peace and security challenges in the continent. Yet, the internationalized nature of crises such as the one in Mali in 2012–13 requires international partnerships. Not all of Africa's security problems can be solved by Africa alone, but APSA does provide a vision framework for African and external partnership.