试析尼克松政府的西欧外交

尼克松总统上台执政时,正值美国深陷越战不能自拔,而当时的国际局势较战后初期已发生了重大变化。为了使美国的对外政策适应这种变化,尼克松提出了以"实力"、"谈判"和"伙伴关系"为三大支柱的新战略——"尼克松主义",并应用于西欧外交,对美国的西欧政策做了转折性调整。虽然尼克松的西欧外交标志了美欧关系史上的一个新时代,但其实施却困难重重。     

Eisenhower and Nixon: A Friendship of Unequals

Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon are linked forever in the history of the American presidency, yet only recently have scholars paid notable attention to their relationship. While this uptick in research about how the two men related to each other has been important, it has not fully grappled with the political implications of their relationship. This article argues that understanding the friendship the two men had, including how it changed over time, provides insight into the way each viewed and conducted his own politics. I argue that the two most often shared an Aristotelian friendship of utility, which provided Eisenhower with a rising conservative politico and Nixon with a respected national figure for a mentor. Though neither would ever come to fully understand the other they influenced each other in profound ways.     

20世纪70年代尼克松政府的环保政策

20世纪60年代末70年代初,美国环保运动的发展进入了一个新的阶段。环境保护不再是作为经济发展的附属物出现,而是作为一个独立的领域,有了自己的理论和目标。在迅速发展的环保运动推动下,尼克松政府采取了一系列影响巨大的环保措施,确立了日后美国环保运动的发展方向。但是,由于政治、经济、哲学等多方面原因,1970年之后,尼克松政府在环保政策上有所后退。本文力图通过对尼克松政府环保政策兴衰的探讨,揭示当时美国环保运动发展的某些特点及其与政府政策之间的关系。     

试析尼克松政府的环境外交

在尼克松执政时期,环境成为美国外交的主要议题之一.尼克松政府通过北约、经济合作与发展组织和联合国国际组织,围绕环境监管、环境保护和污染治理等主题进行外交活动.尼克松的环境外交体现出其先行一步的外交构想和具体的环境行动.美国的环境外交因先于其他国家而取得了国际环境领域的有利地位,并推动了20世纪70年代初环境领域的国际合作达到一个高潮.不过,尼克松的环境外交更多地着眼于美国所处的国内外环境形势和现实利益,与第三世界为实现符合发展中国家利益的环境主张形成了明显的对照.     

Richard Nixon and the Failed War Against the Trading World

Books reviewed:
Foreign Relations of the United States , 1969 – 1976, vol. 3: Foreign Economic Policy , 1969 – 1972; International Monetary Policy , 1969 – 1972.     

尼克松主义对日韩安全合作关系的影响

就某种意义而言,“尼克松主义”是美国在内外交困的局势下实施的“收缩战略”。美国的脱身政策引起日韩两国的不安,两国一方面采取种种“自卫”的措施,另一方面加强安全合作。“韩国条款”和所谓的“事前协商”是美日韩安全合作关系的分水岭。     

Nixon, Kissinger and the breakup of Pakistan, 1971

Based upon recently published American documents, this article examines the United States's policy towards the crisis which led to the breakup of Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh at the end of 1971. President Richard M. Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, deliberately kept this policy closely under their control and were guided more by geopolitical than by moral considerations. In particular, they were anxious to forge a new relationship with communist China and the contribution of the Pakistani president, Yahya Khan, in facilitating contacts between the US and China were greatly appreciated by the two men. Nixon's visceral dislike of the Indian prime minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, also contributed to a degree of myopia and misperception regarding India's objectives and their possible consequences. As the conflict between the rebels in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and the central government deepened and Indian involvement on the side of the rebels grew, Nixon and Kissinger saw another threat in the shape of Soviet military and moral support for India. An Indian victory would not only increase India's prestige and position vis-à-vis those of Pakistan, but tip the global balance of power towards the Soviet Union and away from the United States. Frantic diplomatic efforts, combined with scarcely veiled threats, finally succeeded in preventing the total disintegration of Pakistan, but there is some doubt as to whether this was likely in the first place and whether US policy was successful in relation to either China or the Soviet Union.