The growth of an urban landscape: recent research in early medieval Norwich

In 1977, Alan Carter published an appraisal of the early development of Norwich in which he not only reviewed previous assessments of the city's growth but also set out models for testing by a range of archaeological and historical methodologies. Thirty years later, considerable research in Norwich has deepened understanding of pre‐Conquest occupation, identifying more closely the probable development pattern and enabling a re‐assessment and expansion of Carter's ideas. This paper reviews that research, seeking to determine both the character of the urban landscape by 1066 and its likely economic and social diversity, while proposing future research areas.     

'Walking a Real Tight-rope of Difficulties': Sir Edward Heath and the Search for Stability in Northern Ireland, June 1970-March 1971

Since we know Sir Edward Heath was forced to impose direct ruleover Northern Ireland in March 1972, before launching his governmentinto a series of highly constructive (if unsuccessful) initiativesthat led to the Sunningdale Agreement, his policy and approachtowards the province during the first 18 months of his premiershiphas rarely been seen as anything other than a tale of miscalculation,poor judgement and political ignorance. However, with the openingup of various official papers over the past few years, it isnow possible to offer a more sympathetic assessment of Heath'searly attempts to deal with the situation in Northern Ireland.This assessment suggests that his policy, far from being barrenand directionless, was beginning to evolve in quite innovativeand radical directions as it sought to stabilize and reformNorthern Ireland, directions that, significantly, pre-figurethe various policy initiatives Heath took after 1972. Theseincluded the pursuit of active cooperation between London andDublin, and between Dublin and Belfast, major political changein Northern Ireland, with the full involvement of the minorityin the governance of the region, and a consideration of futureconstitutional relationships between London, Belfast and Dublin.     

The Reception of Sir Edward Elgar 1918-c.1934: A Reassessment

It is generally believed that the reputation of Sir Edward Elgarexperienced a disastrous reversal of fortune after the GreatWar. This has conventionally been explained by the changingmusical tastes of the public and by a postwar reaction againstthe unappealingly ‘Edwardian’ character of Elgar'smusic. Both claims, I argue, have been exaggerated. Examiningevidence from concert programmes, gramophone record sales, andBBC broadcasts, this article demonstrates that Elgar continuedto enjoy estimable popularity after 1918. The article also considersthe way in which Elgar came to be seen as an archetype of ‘Englishness’and ‘Edwardianism’ in music. With a legacy of virulentattacks on the composer's ‘complacency’ and ‘jingoism’,critical attention by the 1930s had been refocused onto a perceivedrural nostalgia within Elgar's music. This atavism complementedinterwar visions of the Edwardian period as a prelapsarian ‘goldenage’. The implications of these changing perspectiveson Elgar are twofold. They can be seen to have laid the foundationsfor our ‘mature’ understanding of Elgar's life andwork; and they suggest that our views of the interwar reactionagainst the past might require profound and wide-ranging revision. ^*I am grateful to Professor Hugh Cunningham, Dr Peter Martland,and Dr David Turley for their comments on an earlier versionof this article.     

Sir Edward Grey,Germany, and the Outbreak of the First World War: A Re-Evaluation

ABSTRACT

Historians have variously condemned British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey for contributing to the escalation of the July Crisis of 1914, and praised him as an heroic advocate of peace. Addressing this conundrum, this article first assesses historiographical debates around the significance of Grey's policy towards Germany in the events that led to the outbreak of the First World War. It then traces Grey's foreign policy vis-à-vis Germany on the one hand, and the Entente on the other. Finally, it provides an innovative analysis of Grey's policy from the vantage point of Berlin, arguing that in July 1914 decisions taken by the governments of other countries escalated the crisis and were taken regardless of Grey's position. The article concludes that current historiography overestimates British agency in July 1914 and that Grey was not as important to the outcome of the crisis as both his critics and his defenders have claimed. His actions could not change the minds of those on the continent who were bent on war.     

Edward III’s siege of Calais: A reappraisal

In September 1346, Edward III brought his victorious army to the gates of Calais to begin a siege that over 12 months developed into the largest military operation conducted by the English on French soil during the fourteenth century. It is also perhaps the least understood campaign of Edward III’s reign, because of the loss of the army pay records. We know from chronicles that the men of Calais conducted a heroic defence of their town, and we know too that the English created and maintained an enormous logistical operation first to besiege and then to capture the port. What is little understood, however, is the scale, scope and chronology of the siege. The role played by English naval forces has received little attention, yet there is a series of pay records relating to their service which can compensate for the loss of the vadia guerre accounts and which can enrich understanding of the campaign. Using this evidence, this article reappraises the whole expedition, highlights the numbers of ships and mariners involved in the siege, and draws attention to periods of intensive military activity. Edward III’s ultimate objective was to capture, hold and use the town as a safe port of disembarkation for future invasions.     

Bruce Smith,Edward Shann,W.K. Hancock: The Economic Critique of Democracy in Australia

This paper argues that there were a number of writers in Australia from the late 1880s to the early 1930s who developed what is best described as an economic critique of the workings of democracy. The three writers considered by this paper, Bruce Smith, Edward Shann and W.K. Hancock, all developed critiques of Australian democracy along similar lines. The central feature of their argument was that Australian majoritarian democracy was making poor policy decisions because it attempted to override the laws of economics in the name of the popular will and ethics. They seemed to have believed that this problem would only be resolved once Australia possessed a mature and economically literate population.