Modernising colonialism: The British Labour movement and Africa

The article evaluates the widely held view that the Attlee governments lacked a distinctive approach to colonial affairs by examining the Labour movement's post-war, institution building activities in Kenya. In Labour's colonial policy deliberations, Kenya was the focus of particular attention and is used as a case study to shed light on the Labour leadership's wider imperial concerns and objectives. From the 1920s, the Labour party advocated that the colonies be encouraged to develop trade unions, co-operatives and local government. Some tentative moves in this direction were made in 1930 by Ramsay MacDonald's administration but it was not until Labour came to power in 1945 that, in response to international pressure and the nationalist challenge, significant steps were taken to promote institutions which would organise the African masses. The argument advanced is that Labour leaders drew on their movement's historical traditions to encourage forms of African economic and political activism which were likely to stabilise colonial rule.     

Labour and the bomb: the first 80 years

The UK government's consideration of whether to replace Trident evokes past controversies about the bomb including occasions when the Labour Party advocated unilateral renunciation of British nuclear weapons. Out of office, fierce debate engulfed the party, fuelled by, and in turn fuelling, intra-party conflict. In power, while Labour governments took different decisions on key defence issues to their Conservative counterparts, they nevertheless ensured that the UK remained a nuclear weapons state. Labour also ensured the habits of secrecy in nuclear decision-making were ingrained, though these were challenged by the current government. This article examines the development of Labour's approach to nuclear weapons since 1945. Particular attention is given to the 1980s as members of the current cabinet will have clear recollections of campaigning on an anti-nuclear policy in the 1980s. The Blair government has embarked on public debate ahead of a formal decision and should the issue of Britain's nuclear status become embroiled in a political battle over the leadership succession, anti-nuclear sentiment may re-emerge. Yet if the past is guide to the future, the history of Labour governments suggests that the real debate will be about what replaces Trident not whether it is replaced.     

Restoration Leeds and the Aldermen of the Corporation, 1661–1700

Abstract

In the 1945 General Election, the Conservative Party under the leadership of Winston Churchill was defeated in a largely unexpected Labour landslide. The former Prime Minister's son, Randolph Churchill, MP for Preston since 1940, also lost his seat, but by a swing much lower than the national average. This was hardly due to his performance as a constituency MP. He was largely absent on military service. His ability to antagonise his own constituency workers was no help to his cause. He did have the advantage of name recognition and a heroic war record, but these were hardly decisive factors. It is argued here that his comparatively strong electoral performance was due to his adoption of the cause of social reform combined with his ability to campaign in a flamboyant manner that appealed to electors, which suggests that a very different result might have been possible if his approach had been taken up nationally by the Conservative Party.     

‘A Rather Novel Constitutional Experiment’: The Formation of the 1977–8 ‘Lib‐Lab Pact’

By March 1977, the Labour government which had narrowly been re‐elected in the October 1974 election, had lost its parliamentary majority, and was facing a vote of confidence tabled by the Conservative opposition. Senior Labour figures thus desperately sought to secure support from one of the minor parties. Unable to broker a deal with either the Ulster Unionists or the Scottish National Party (SNP), largely due to ideological differences, the Labour leadership entered into negotiations with the Liberal leader, David Steel. The result was that the Liberal Party agreed to provide the Labour government with parliamentary support, in return for consultation, via a joint committee, over future policies, coupled with the reintroduction of devolution legislation, and a pledge to provide for direct elections for the European parliament (ideally using some form of proportional representation). There was some surprise that Steel had not pressed for more, or stronger, policy commitments or concessions from the Labour prime minister, James Callaghan, but Steel was thinking long term; he envisaged that Liberal participation in the joint consultative committee would foster closer co‐operation between Liberals and Labour moderates/social democrats, and eventually facilitate a realignment of British politics by marginalising both the Labour left, and the increasingly right‐wing Conservatives Party.     

The End of the Road in Land Reform? Limits to Redistribution in West Bengal

The hypothesis that failures of land reform programmes are due to the political power of dominant classes is problematic where land is scarce, ownership not highly concentrated and politics not especially exclusionary. Since the late 1960s, land reform in West Bengal has been initiated by radical rural political mobilization—with significant participation by the agrarian underclass. The Communist Party of India (Marxist)—the largest radical party in West Bengal-has been unable to extend its redistributive land reform agenda beyond a point because of political difficulties rooted in West Bengal's intense competition for scarce resources. It has modified the land reform agenda to accommodate the competing demands of the poor and the non-poor, and there are signs that land reform is losing saliency in the policy agenda. This paper argues that the weak implementation of land reform in West Bengal is explained not by the power of the dominant classes, but as an adaptation of policy to an environment of resource scarcity and a relatively low level of land concentration.     

Three's a Crowd?: Government, Owners, and Workers during the Nationalization of the British Coalmining Industry 1945-47

The passing of the coalmining industry into public ownershipon 1 January 1947 should have been an occasion for rejoicingby the Labour Party and its supporters, yet celebrations weremuted by the looming shadow of critical coal shortages Despitethis concurrence of nationalization and coal crisis, littleattention has been focused on possible linkages between thetwo events. More generally, scant consideration has been givento the question of what happened to the industry when facedwith nationalization. This article's principal argument is thatthe fuel crisis was rooted not (as other historians have argued)in the atrocious weather, but in the very process of nationalization—or,rather in the combination of a lack of preparation for publicownership and (even more importantly) in the preoccupation withnationalization at the expense of the ‘stabilization’of the industry before entering the uncharted waters of publicownership. The chief conclusion is that during the run-up toVesting Day neither miners nor owners had any substantial incentiveto improve industrial productivity and output The period wasat best a standstill, and in many ways—as the crisis indicated—wastedmonths that a fuel-starved Britain could ill afford ^*This article is based on my MA thesis, ‘Fresh Start orFalse Dawn⁷ the coalmining Industry and Nationalisation, 1945–7'I would like to thank my supervisors, Ranald Midne and PhilipWilliamson for their continued support, and also David Howelland the referees of Twentieth Century British History for theirvaluable comments on earlier drafts of this work.     

A Parliamentary Victory: The British Labour Party and Irish Republican Deportees, 1923

After the 1918 general election the Labour Party became the official opposition party at Westminster. In response to the growing Irish republican campaign to establish an independent Irish state the Labour Party had to re-assess its relationship with Irish nationalism. The Labour Party was now acutely conscious that it was on the verge of forming a government and was concerned to be seen by the British electorate as a responsible, moderate and patriotic government-in-waiting. Although it had traditionally supported Irish demands for home rule and was vehemently opposed to the partition of Ireland, the Labour Party became increasingly wary of any closer relationship with extreme Irish nationalism which it believed would only damage its rapidly improving electoral prospects. Therefore the Labour Party supported the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 even though it underpinned the partition of Ireland and sought to distance itself from any association with Irish republicanism as the new Irish Free State drifted into civil war. In early 1923 the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) alighted upon the new issue of the arrest and deportation without trial, to the Irish Free State, of Irish republicans living in Britain who were obviously British citizens. The attraction of this campaign for the Labour Party was that it enabled the party to portray itself as the defender of Irish people living in Britain without having to take sides in the Irish civil war. In addition the Labour Party was able to present itself as the protector of civil liberties in Britain against the excesses of an overweening and authoritarian Conservative government. One of the main reasons the issue was progressed so energetically on the floor of the House by the new PLP was because it now contained many Independent Labour Party (ILP) ‘Red Clydesiders’ who themselves had been interned without trial during the First World War. Through brilliant and astute use of parliamentary tactics Bonar Law's Conservative government was forced into an embarrassing climb-down which required the cobbling together of an Indemnity Bill which gave tory ministers retrospective legal protection for having exceeded their authority. By any standard, it was a major achievement by a novice opposition party. It enhanced the party's reputation and its growing sophistication in the use of parliamentary tactics benefited it electorally at the next election which led to the first Labour government.     

‘Today is the Dawn’: The Labour Party and the 1929 General Election

This article treats three themes: how Labour planned and fought the 1929 election, to whom it appealed and the results. It draws upon the MacDonald Papers, National Executive Committee minutes, the Daily Herald, London News, Labour sources in book form, electoral materials and secondary sources. It discusses the party's tactics and strategy for progress, funding and influences on its campaign. Such influences included the 1927 Trade Union Act, the Cheltenham agreement (1927) with the Co-operative Party and the appearance of the Liberal counter-cyclical economics proposals. The article argues that Labour's perceived base was wider than expected. Women and the rural classes, including farmers, were emphasized as target groups. Labour thought the key to a majority lay in the countryside. An investigation of the results from 1929 seems to imply this was not strictly the case, but there was a number of such constituencies which Labour was close to gaining. The Liberal revival helped Labour in the rural areas. Central planning was a light touch in 1929. It did, however, involve setting the framework for the campaign and making policy on all of the matters referred to above.     

Change and continuity in strategic culture: the cases of Australia and New Zealand

The relationship between strategic culture and defence policies has not yet been much explored. Australia and New Zealand provide some evidence of the impact of strategic culture on defence policy. Australia has a dominant strategic culture which is strong enough to prompt both the major political parties to adopt realist defence policies, even though Labor has a traditionally ‘idealist’ outlook. Until the 1970s, New Zealand had a similar dominant strategic culture which influenced both major political parties, but it was always less strong than Australia's. In recent years, the Labour Party has rejected that culture, and allowed an alternative strategic culture based on its ideology to influence its defence policies. The result has been that on the last two occasions when Labour has been in government, New Zealand's defence policy has changed dramatically.     

Organic Union or Aggressive Altruism: Imperial Internationalism in East Africa in the 1920s

This article assesses the influence of international questions on the Conservative and Labour parties’ imperial policy in East Africa in the 1920s. Conservatives encouraged a policy of ‘organic union’, which meant the consolidation of settler control in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika by either formal or informal means. They preferred to ignore or minimise the influence of the League of Nations mandates provisions in Tanganyika, arguing that colonial questions, which in their view included mandatory affairs, were a domestic jurisdiction. The Labour Party was more sympathetic to ideas of liberal internationalism, and pursued a policy of ‘aggressive altruism’ in East Africa when in office, especially in the late 1920s. The article compares the two parties’ respective positions with reference to closer political union, settler relations, labour and land policy, and Indian rights, and by detailing the personal relationship between the conservative governor of Kenya, Sir Edward Grigg, and Labour's colonial secretary, Lord Passfield.     

“We're socialists not nationalists”: British labour and the national question(s)

The UK Labour Party, which in government delivered devolution to Scotland and Wales, has struggled to adapt to a multilevel and increasingly territorialised political space, where demands for significant territorial reform grow ever louder. These challenges intensified with the Scottish independence referendum and the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union. During this prolonged constitutional moment, the Labour Party has had to articulate the case for a plurinational and multicultural British identity and for the Union, and to a large degree, has struggled to do so. Capturing the period from 2012 to 2020, this article examines the discursive strategies adopted by the Labour Party and individuals within it. It identifies a deep discomfort, more pronounced in London and Edinburgh than in Cardiff, with the national questions and a reliance on largely instrumental arguments, albeit ones rooted in traditional left-wing values of welfare and social solidarity between working people.     

The British Parliamentary Labour Party and the Government of Ireland Act 1920

Immediately after the First World War the British Labour Party was forced to reconsider its relationship with an increasingly militant Irish nationalism. This reassessment occurred at the same time as it was becoming a major political and electoral force in post‐war Britain. The political imperative from the party's perspective was to portray itself as a responsible, moderate and patriotic alternative governing party. Thus it was fearful of the potential negative impact of too close an association with, and perceived sympathy for, extreme Irish nationalism. This explains the party's often bewildering changes in policy on Ireland at various party conferences in 1919 and 1920, ranging from support for home rule to federalism throughout the United Kingdom to ‘dominion home rule’ as part of a wider evolving British Commonwealth to adopting outright ‘ self‐determination’ for a completely independent Ireland outside both United Kingdom and empire. On one aspect of its Irish policy, however, the party was adamant and united – its opposition to the partition of Ireland, which was the fundamental principle of Lloyd George's Government of Ireland Bill of 1920 which established Northern Ireland. Curiously, that aspect of Labour's Irish policy was never discussed in the party at large. All the running was made by the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) in the house of commons in 1920. The PLP's outright opposition to the bill acted as balm throughout the wider party, binding together the confusing, and often contradictory, positions promulgated on the long‐term constitutional future of Ireland and its relationship with Britain.     

Defenders of the state: the Irish Labour Party,coalitionism and revisionism, 1969–77

Irish Labour Party politics underwent a significant transformation during the period 1969–77. During these years, the party moved from a position of opposition to coalition and apparent support for socialist politics to involvement in a coalition government with Fine Gael and an abandonment of its previously stated goal, the thirty-two-county socialist republic. This paper locates the main factor behind this shift in Labour’s attachment to the institutions of the Republic of Ireland state. As that state was threatened by the crisis in Northern Ireland from 1969 onwards, so the Labour Party was compelled to shift ground politically and move towards agencies that could offer stability. This led to permanent shifts in Labour policy and strategy.     

New Labour's Escape from Class Politics

The connection between trade unions and parties of the left is traditionally close across Europe. In Britain the link is more than close: it is intimate, defining, and constitutive of what the Labour Party is and has been since its inception. This link allowed the party to survive during bad times and helped it to govern during good times, but during the 1970s it became less helpful, as policies backed by the unions not only failed to work but were also repudiated by union members themselves in what came to be known as the "winter of discontent" in 1979. New Labour was therefore built on the understanding that its past connection to the unions, and hence to a particular sort of "class politics," needed to be rethought and renegotiated. It is the new defining feature of the Labour Party.     

Blair's project in retrospect

New Labour came into being as an attempt to frame a successor project to Thatcherism, but in practice it has proved to be a continuation of it. Blair's project was to achieve hegemony for Labour by blending free market policies with a concern for social cohesion. He accepted the new economic settlement that Thatcher had established, but believed it could be made more sustainable if it was tempered with a concern for social justice. Within the Labour Party his project was set in terms of modernizing social democracy, but in the country as a whole it was perceived as a variation on One Nation Toryism—a strand in the British political tradition which the Conservatives had seemingly forgotten. In fact, Blair's domestic agenda has had more in common with Thatcher's than with either social democracy or One Nation Toryism. There were significant constitutional reforms in the first term, but privatization and the injection of market mechanisms into hitherto autonomous institutions has remained the central thrust of policy. Blair has been committed to modernizing Britain, but his conception of modernization was a variation on Thatcher's. In one centrally important area, Blair diverges from Thatcher: he believes an essential component of Britain's modernization was an improved relationship with the EU, culminating in British entry into the euro. Yet his uncompromising support for the US over Iraq has left Britain as deeply alienated from France and Germany as it had ever been in Thatcher's time. Britain may still some day join the euro, but it will not be Tony Blair who takes us in. Blair's strategy was to attain hegemony for New Labour by appropriating the Thatcherite inheritance. In domestic terms, this strategy has been a success, but it relies on continuing Conservative weakness and an economic and international environment congenial to neo‐liberal policies. At present both of these conditions appear to be changing to Blair's disadvantage. The Conservative Party seems to be shaping a post‐Thatcherite agenda. At the same time, the US is leading a movement away from neo‐liberal orthodoxies towards protectionism and deficit financing and faces an intractable guerrilla war in Iraq. In these circumstances, the neo‐Thatcherite strategy that sustained Blair in power could prove to be his undoing.     

New Labour - New Europe?

The key question often asked of the new Labour government’s approach to Europe is whether this is new Labour, new Europe or new government, old Britain? There are three routes into the EU which Britain could follow: (1) it could play a lading part in the definition of a new political role and vision for an enlarged EU in the twenty-first century; (2) it could be a constructive and pragmatic participant in EU policy discussions, but without an overall vision for the EU; 93) it could become a side player within the EU, left behind as Europe develops in directions it cannot support. In its tone and rhetoric, the new government is certainly aiming for the first of these roles. On policy substance, however, its approach is somewhat cautious and pragmatic. In the four policy areas examined in this article - employment, the single currency, enlargement and institutional reform - some striking changes in tone and emphasis are not wholly matched by new policy innovations. This indicates continued caution over public opinion and the question of sovereignty. However, as the authors argue in the final section, British public opinion allows considerable scope to define a new role for Britain in the EU, while domestic constitutional reform could begin to change the nature of the sovereignty debate.     

Playing Both Sides Against the Middle: The Labour Party and the Wholesaling Industry 1919 1951

This article examines the Labour party's attitude towards thewholesaling industry. During the inter-war period wholesalers,‘middlemen’ as they were commonly called, occupiedthe position of bogeyman in much Labour party thinking and literature.As a result the Labour governments of the 1920s took actionsdesigned to achieve two ends: to improve the efficiency of fooddistribution, and to limit the power of middlemen to exploitboth ends of the food production chain, farmers and consumersalike. This ideological positioning of the middleman by Labour,and the reforms introduced under the MacDonald governments,stressed the need to establish farmers’ co-operativesand consumers’ protection agencies, and also emphasizedthe importance of other measures designed to boost efficiency.However, by the time of the Attlee governments the cornerstoneof the inter-war policy, the producer co-operative, had beenabandoned and the focus of debate shifted to various forms ofnationalization. This change of policy is examined in this article.Though post-war Labour manifestos pledged to nationalize sectionsof the wholesaling industry, and despite the fact that the partyunder Attlee discussed the nationalization of wholesaling atlength, the industry remained in private hands. An attempt tounderstand how and why the nationalization of wholesaling wasopposed within the party and shelved by the Attlee governmentsis central to this study.     

Labour's Strategic Defence Review

Labour’s Strategic Defence Review claims to be ‘radical’, leading ‘to a fundamental reshaping of British forces’ while being ‘firmly ground in foreign policy’. Five questions are discussed: 1) Is labour’s defence policy different from that of its Conservative predecessors? 2) Has foreign policy ‘led’ defence policy? 3) How open was the review process and to what extent has Labour succeeded in creating a new consensus on defence policy? 4) Has the SDR successfully addressed the problem of overstretch? 5) Does it provide the ‘modern, effective and affordable armed forces which meet today’s challenges but are also flexible enough to adapt to change’, as it claims? This article argues that on the first two questions the answer is a qualified ‘yes’; that on the third, the process was more open than ever before but that it is difficult to identify specific decisions influence by more open debate; that on the fourth, Labour has attempted a balancing act which may be vulnerable, not least to changes in the economy; and that on the last question, Labour has succeeded in shifting the focus of the armed services towards power projection capabilities as required by their foreign policy baseline.     

The Labour Party and the League of Nations: The Socialist League's Role in the Sanctions Crisis of 1935

When the Labour Party—influenced by the NEC and the TUCGeneral Council—decided to support League of Nations sanctionsagainst Italy in 1935 this signalled its recognition that itwas necessary to challenge the fascist dictators with collectiveforce. The way in which this decision marked the discreditingof pacifism within the Labour Party has been fully examined.The Socialist League—the organ of the Labour left—alsounsuccessfully opposed the sanctions policy. Nevertheless, existingaccounts have focused on its chairman, Cripps, and his refusalto trust the ‘capitalist’ and ‘imperialist’National Government to impose sanctions. Instead, this articleconsiders the Socialist League as a whole and highlights divisionsthat emerged within it over sanctions. The official SocialistLeague line demanded ‘mass resistance’ against theNational Government. However, a sizeable minority—particularlythose with overtly pro-Soviet affinities—decided to supportcollective security now that the Soviet Union had joined theLeague of Nations. These internal divisions seriously weakenedthe Socialist League case. They explain how the NEC–TUCwas able so conclusively to defeat its radical anti-capitalistarguments, thereby gaining a fuller mandate with which to developits policy of armed collective security before the Second WorldWar.     

Were New Labour’s cultural policies neo-liberal?

This article assesses the cultural policies of ‘New Labour’, the UK Labour government of 1997–2010. It takes neo-liberalism as its starting point, asking to what extent Labour’s cultural policies can be validly and usefully characterised as neo-liberal. It explores this issue across three dimensions: corporate sponsorship and cuts in public subsidy; the running of public sector cultural institutions as though they were private businesses; and a shift in prevailing rationales for cultural policy, away from cultural justifications, and towards economic and social goals. Neo-liberalism is shown to be a significant but rather crude tool for evaluating and explaining New Labour’s cultural policies. At worse, it falsely implies that New Labour did not differ from Conservative approaches to cultural policy, downplays the effect of sociocultural factors on policy-making, and fails to differentiate varying periods and directions of policy. It does, however, usefully draw attention to the public policy environment in which Labour operated, in particular the damaging effects of focusing, to an excessive degree, on economic conceptions of the good in a way that does not recognise the limitations of markets as a way of organising production, circulation and consumption.