Science,Technology and Changing Power Relations: the negotiation process of the agreement on Finnish-Soviet Scientific-Technical Cooperation, 1955

Finland and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on Finnish-Soviet Scientific-Technical Cooperation, the so-called TT-agreement, in 1955. Previous research has emphasized the viewpoint that the agreement was part of a new ‘softer’ strategy of the Soviet Union, the aim of which was to entangle Finland scientifically and technologically in the Soviet sphere of influence, and that anti-communist Finns formed a unanimous front against this inconvenient initiative. This article illustrates that adopting a different perspective makes possible an interpretation which indicates that the negotiation process for the agreement was less straightforward. Throughout the negotiations it is possible to observe the key issues of centralization and decentralization as well as the question of the status of science and technology policy in Finnish society. In essence, the TT-agreement was about determination of power relations and dominion not only between Finland and the Soviet Union but also between different interest groups inside Finland.     

From World War to Cold War: Scandinavian media attitudes to the Soviet Union 1945–1948

At the end of the war in Europe in 1945, an alliance-loyalty attitude was predominant among the Scandinavian public voices on the Soviet Union. This attitude incorporated a favourable image of the Soviet war effort and implied that the Soviet system had undergone changes during the war. Another significant group supported the Soviet system more unequivocally. These attitudes were dominant in the Scandinavian media and public debate until late 1945 or early 1946, when opposition to and fear of the Soviet Union began to be openly expressed in conservative and social-democratic newspapers. A bipartisan attitude to the Soviet Union had not developed at this stage, as the alliance-loyalty attitude was transformed into a clearer third-voice attitude that saw the Soviet Union on the one hand as a power which was not worthy of imitation, but which on the other hand accepted that the Soviet Union was seeking international peace and cooperation. Third-voice supporters in the Scandinavian media sought investigative reports on conditions in the Soviet Union, as they claimed that the growing anti-Soviet attitudes were based on a lack of accurate knowledge. Considering that Denmark, Norway and Sweden had experienced different conditions during the war, the differences in public attitudes to the Soviet Union were comparatively small. The public third voice on the Soviet Union was clearly weakened in 1948 by the reception of more critical information on the Soviet system and the perception of news on international developments.     

‘A Shop Window Where You Can Choose the Goods You Like’

This article examines the Finnish industrial and trade fairs held in the Soviet Union in the context of Finnish–Soviet trade and scientific–technical cooperation in the 1950s and 1960s. While primarily focused on fairs, it also discusses different activities that accompanied them, such as lectures, visits, and negotiations between Finnish traders and Soviet officials and specialists. This study illustrates how such first-hand contact played an important role in Finnish–Soviet communications. First, they helped Finnish producers showcase their goods and technologies directly to Soviet buyers in various ministries and organizations. Second, these contacts included diverse activities such as face-to-face contacts, lectures, and seminars, being a means of technology transfer from Finland to the USSR . Finally, although they were commercial interactions without explicit ideological purposes – like many international exhibitions of the last century – Finnish fairs demonstrated a technological gap between Finland and the USSR.     

Dismantling the Soviet Security System. Soviet–Finnish Negotiations on Ending Their Friendship Agreement, 1989–91.

The Soviet Union had tied Finland to its security system through the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) signed between the two in 1948. As the Soviet Union began to disintegrate at the end of the 1980s, Finland exited the Soviet sphere of influence – the region controlled through a system of bilateral and multilateral agreements. This article analyses the Soviet–Finnish negotiations to discard the FCMA treaty as a case study of the changing Soviet European neighbourhood policy. It gives important insights into the disintegration of the Soviet foreign policy mechanism during the Gorbachev era as it elaborates on both the intra-bureaucracy conflicts between the Kremlin and the Soviet foreign ministry, MID, and later between the Soviet central government and the Russian republic. As Finland was part of the Soviet security system, analysing Finland's exit from it sheds light onto the crucial change that took place in the Soviet foreign policy doctrine during the perestroika years. The Gorbachev leadership's decision not to defend its sphere of influence with force paved way for the upheavals of 1989 which led to the Cold War's end.     

“Genocide is Fascism in Action”: Aron Trainin and Soviet Portrayals of Genocide

ABSTRACT

This article examines the Soviet legal scholar Aron Trainin’s evolving writings on international law. Initially, Trainin formulated aspects of his concept of “crimes against peace” as a sort of Soviet alternative to Raphael Lemkin’s crimes of barbarity and vandalism. Crimes against peace both converged with the larger international movement to outlaw aggressive war, provided a Soviet alternative to proposed international crimes that they believed would threaten Soviet sovereignty, and provided a Soviet response to Lemkin’s proposals to outlaw mass killings. During World War II, Trainin articulated the Nazi extermination of the Jews as “crimes against peaceful civilians,” linking the Nazi atrocities to his concept of crimes against peace. Trainin’s concept of “crimes against peaceful civilians” encompassed the atrocities of the Holocaust while also asserting that the Soviet experience of the war – most notably Soviet sacrifice and suffering – meant that the Soviets should determine how international criminal law punished the war’s perpetrators. After World War II, when it became clear that genocide, rather than “crimes against peace” or “crimes against peaceful civilians,” was becoming the primary concept in international law to understand mass killings, Trainin portrayed the concept of genocide according to the perspective of Soviet propaganda, opposing an international criminal court for genocide, supporting the concept of cultural genocide, and portraying genocide as an inevitable outcome of capitalism. At the same time, Trainin and the Soviets never abandoned his concept of “crimes against peace,” portraying capitalism as inherently bound up with war and genocide. Trainin was the most significant genocide scholar in the Soviet Union, and his work exemplifies both the ways in which Soviet approaches to international law converged with other approaches, and the ways in which the Soviet Union diverged from non-Soviet international law.     

Norwegian and Soviet/Russian World War II Memory Policy During the Cold War and the Post-Soviet Years

Abstract

World War II has played a significant role in using “memory” in all kind of “memory politics” in Europe as well as in the USA. Using examples from Norway and the Soviet Union, later the Russian Republic, this article shows how successfully, but also how contradictorily, historical events can be used as memory politics. We will also see what “memory culture” and “memory policy” is predominant in circumpolar Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia after World War II. We are introduced to the concept of “memory agents”, the producers and directors of “memory politics”. The case is first and foremost the battle of Narvik in Norway in the spring of 1940. We also take a look at the circumpolar borderland between Norway and the Soviet Union during World War II, where the German “Gebirgsjäger” from the Narvik front regrouped and continued their assault on Soviet Union in Murmansk County from the summer of 1941. In what way were the war events useful in the post war era, and how could they directly affect Soviet–Norwegian relations during the Cold War? In addition we ask how memories contributed to the justification of different approaches to the foreign policy in both countries. Besides, the article demonstrates how the memory policy of World War II was affected after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union in Norway and Russia, respectively.     

From Revolution to Dissolution: The Quai d'Orsay,the Banque Russo-Asiatique,and the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1917–1926

This article explores the use made of Christianity during the Second World War and the dilemmas created for the Allies by Stalin's religious record. It is particularly concerned with the way in which Christianity appeared for a while to become a bridge between East and West, with the explicit promise of continued post-war co-operation. However, in the immediate aftermath of the war, Anglo-American policies in particular switched from using Christianity to rehabilitate the adverse image of the Soviet regime to what had been the inter-war policy of using religion to demonise it. Inter-war demonisation held up the Soviet Union as a model not to be emulated. Post-war demonisation pointed to the Soviet Union as an expansionist threat bent on world domination. The article examines Stalin's responses, and Allied perceptions of those responses, to the changes in Western religious policy and propaganda from the Second World War to the emergence of the cold war. The article seeks to show how both sides used religion for political purposes, but that in the final analysis Western reluctance to relinquish what was perhaps its most emotive means of indicting and containing Communism meant that Christianity, instead of becoming a bridge, became a divisive factor that contributed to both the onset of the cold war and public acceptance of it.     

Intelligence and Stalin's Two Crucial Decisions in the Winter War, 1939–40

In 1939–40, the fierce Winter War was waged between the Soviet Union and Finland. This article analyses Stalin's two main decisions, to attack and to make peace, and the intelligence behind those decisions. Already at the outbreak, it was obvious that the attack was based on a serious misjudgement. The Soviets did not foresee that the action would become a real war, very different from the occupation of eastern Poland in September. It will be shown that this was due more to Stalin's miscalculation of consequences than to any major failure of intelligence collection. As to why Stalin made peace at the very moment when the Red Army finally began winning, and with the Finnish government he had declared non-existent, this seems to be connected with defective assessment of intelligence from London and Paris. Even the Cambridge Five were discarded. Both real and perceived threats of Allied intervention weighed heavily in Stalin's decisions, in particular the southern threat against Baku and the Caucasus. The analysis will contribute to scholarly discussion on Stalin's foreign policy and the role of intelligence in Soviet decision-making. New evidence is mainly provided by intelligence and security documents released by the Central Archives of the Russian Federal Security Service.     

PERFECT REPRESENTATIONS OF SOVIET PLANNED SPACE

The article looks at mono‐industrial cities in the Baltic States during the Soviet era. In terms of economy, ethnicity and their urban appearance these heterotopic towns were outposts in the integration of the occupied European‐like territories into the Soviet Union. Thanks to the principles of planning and state‐favoured development that were applied across the Soviet Union, these towns, built for Russian speaking immigrants, stood out from the surrounding patterns of settlement that had developed naturally over time. The uranium producing town of Sillamäe in Estonia was built in secret and with lightning speed amidst the panic concerning the atom bomb immediately after the war, and provides us with a perfect model of Stalinist urban development. Stu?ka, built in the 1960s near a hydro‐electric power station in Latvia and Snie?kus, built in the 1970s next to a nuclear power station in Lithuania, were less separated from the surrounding landscape, but both provide a perfect example of Soviet modernism, which had been learned from mass‐housing in the West.     

THE ROLE OF FINNISH LEFTISTS IN SOVIET–FINNISH ARTISTIC EXCHANGES DURING THE LATE SOCIALIST PERIOD

The article examines artistic exchanges between the USSR and Finland from the viewpoint of the Finnish left. After WWII, Finland was in a difficult geopolitical position; although not occupied by the USSR, it received little support from the West and so remained an independent capitalist democracy, with little foreign leverage. The Soviet influence was felt in many areas, and throughout the Cold War, Finland received many more world-class Soviet artists than any other Western country. This was in part a consequence of Finland’s proximity to the USSR, but the Finnish Communist Party, a major domestic political force, also played a role. Immediately after the war, organizations associated with the Finnish Communist Party enjoyed a virtual monopoly over such exchanges, but this began to change in the mid-1950s. Around that time, the USSR began to allow Finnish artists to train and perform at its world-class arenas, and many of those Finnish students had links with the political left. Based on interviews and supported by archival material from Finland and Russia, the article explores the role of the Finnish left in these artistic exchanges.     

The basic structure of Chiang Kai-shek's diplomatic strategy

As a leader of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek carried on Sun Yat-sen's legacy of using diplomacy as a force in the modern era and planned to rely on diplomacy to revise China's unequal treaties with foreign powers. Chiang elaborated on Sun's ideas and maintained that diplomacy as a war without battles worked more effectively than wars with battles. Faced with the threat of Japanese invasion, he upheld the strategy of using one foreign country to control another. He expected the outbreak of a war between Japan and the Soviet Union or between Japan and the United States so that a war between Japan and China could be avoided. Chiang engaged in active diplomacy aimed at turning these expectations into reality. His diplomatic strategy had an impact during the Anti-Japanese War.     

冷战期间美国文化外交的演变

冷战开始后随着美苏两大阵营的对峙加剧,美国政府通过采取创建新闻署、组建和平队、成立国际交流署等手段,逐步将文化外交融入对外宣传范畴,演变为一种冷战工具,其间政治文化和领袖的国家使命感起到关键作用。这种文化外交在为美国赢得冷战的胜利发挥重要作用的同时,也使其国际信任度和软权力下降。     

Understanding the British Empire

In the immediate post-war period and during the early cold war, Britain regularly defended Switzerland's interests against the two emerging superpowers: the Soviet Union and especially the United States. This advocacy was not, however, altruistically motivated. In light of their experiences during the Second World War, British policy-makers could still see the benefits of a neutral Switzerland. But more importantly, the relatively wealthy Swiss were willing to pay for British support and a neutral Switzerland implied other financial, political, and strategic advantages. When there were no such advantages, London abstained from defending Berne. In the case of the negotiations leading to Switzerland's informal participation in the Western strategic embargo against the Eastern Bloc, Whitehall did not stand up to defend Swiss neutrality against US might. Yet this article demonstrates that even if the British had been willing to help the Swiss in their dealings with the Americans, they would have lacked the power to prevent Washington from imposing its will. Britain's power continued to decline after the war, and advocacy for Switzerland could only be successful if the Swiss position was acceptable to the United States.     

Layers of Disunity: The presidential politics of Finnish business, 1981–1982

This article examines the political activity of business in late Cold War Finland, the main focus being on the presidential election campaign of 1981–1982, which was a major watershed in Finnish politics. The purpose is to investigate the divisions cutting through business circles. Different layers of disunity can be found: a turf battle between business associations and their leaders, divergent attitudes towards the Social Democrats and disagreements concerning Finland’s foreign relations and trade, particularly with the Soviet Union. These divisions were long-lasting: they emerged by the mid-1970s and remained in effect until at least the late 1980s.     

JFK and the future of global leadership

On 10 June 1963 President John F. Kennedy gave a speech that changed the world. His commencement speech at American University helped to spur the signing of a world‐changing agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States—the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This episode of peacemaking is remarkable for two reasons. First, it arguably helped to save the world, since the nuclear confrontation at that stage of the Cold War was not a ‘stable balance of terror’, as sometimes described, but rather a highly unstable situation that was prone to accidents, misjudgements and potential disasters. Second, this was an episode of statesmanship in which presidential leadership played a crucial role. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy understood that he bore sole responsibility on the US side to find a way back from the brink of nuclear war. He used the ‘peace speech’ to create a novel kind of peace diplomacy, and worked together with his counterpart, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, to pull the superpowers back from this precarious brink.     

论地缘战略的主体间性——兼论中国地缘战略抉择

主体间性一词是20世纪西方哲学凸显出来的一个重要概念,对这一问题的研究有助于解决本体论、认识论和伦理学等多方面的问题。简单来说,主体间性就是主体之间的交互作用。主体间性具有物质性、实践性、历史性和社会性,其存在于集体主体之中,可以通过"教化"获得。据此,本文通过对四个经典地缘政治理论,即国家有机体论、海权论、陆权论和边缘地带论的历史分析,挖掘了隐含在其中的主体间性。并以美国对苏联和中国实施的地缘战略围堵为例,通过分析同一地缘战略所导致的截然不同结果,表明了地缘战略的构建、制定和实施都必须遵循主体间性。最后根据主体间性提出中国未来地缘战略抉择。     

大国对1954年日内瓦会议的态度

日内瓦会议前夕,苏、中、越(印支地区大国),美、英、法的会议态度可以分为三类:社会主义阵营三个国家的主导意见体现为苏联、中国的与会政策,谋求通过会议达成协议,恢复印支和平;美国坚决拒绝缓和;英、法两国持观望态度,一方面寄望于会议达成协议,另一方面又考虑如不能达成协议,即与美国一起筹划东南亚集体防御体系。这样,1954年日内瓦会议前夕,印支局势处在战争与和平的十字路口,是战争还是和平取决于各大国谁的主张占上风,何种态度将主导会议。     

美国对1969年中苏边界冲突的反应

1969年的中苏边界冲突使双方走到了战争的边缘,美国方面对中苏冲突的反应是一个从倾向于中国“好战”和“挑衅”到看清苏联意图的认识过程。美国一直想利用中苏分歧,使其在与苏联争夺霸权的较量中获利。1969年的中苏边界冲突客观上为美国提供了一个绝好的机会,尼克松政府也抓住了这个机会。中苏边界冲突造成的中苏关系空前紧张的形势,使尼克松、基辛格感到美国有可能在处理美、苏、中三角关系中处于优越地位。所以,中苏冲突客观上是促进美国加速调整对华政策的催化剂。     

WOMEN IN RELIEF WORK

This article suggests that it could be fruitful to approach women's employment in the context of the labour market rather than the household. In Finland until World War II, the public‐work schemes and relief work were the preferred policies concerning unemployed men and women. Women eligible to relief work were taken to work in mainly textiles in non‐residential workhouses. The difficulties faced in applying the ‘workfare’ policy to unemployed women paved the way for cash benefits in post‐war Finland. It is suggested that the Finnish case opens up a wider perspective on the relationship between the ideology of workfare and the rise and fall of the hegemony of wage labour.