TWO-DIMENSIONAL BERTRAND COMPETITION: BLOCK METRIC,EUCLIDEAN METRIC,AND WAVES OF ENTRY*

This paper examines two-dimensional spatial competition, with Bertrand price determination. With a block metric, equilibrium prices are significantly lower when market areas are squares than when they are diamonds (rotated squares) of the same size. If demand density grows, waves of entry occur, and the shapes of market areas change from squares to diamonds and back to squares again. The former change leaves prim unchanged, whereas the latter cuts prices in half. Results are also derived for a Euclidean metric, with square and hexagonal market areas. Optimal waves of entry are examined with the block metric. With either metric, the socially optimal market shape becomes suboptimal if market areas are constrained to be of the zero-profit size.     

LOCATING OUTSIDE A LINEAR CITY CAN BENEFIT CONSUMERS*

ABSTRACT We investigate the effects of restricting the locations of firms in Hotelling duopoly models. In standard location‐price models, the equilibrium distance between firms is too great from the viewpoint of consumer welfare. Thus, restricting the locations of firms and shortening the distance between them improves consumer welfare by reducing prices and transport costs. We introduce strategic reward contracts into location‐price models and find that, in contrast to the above result, restrictions on the locations of firms reduce consumer welfare. These restrictions reduce transport costs but increase prices by changing the strategic commitments of the firms.     

SPATIAL PRICING IN INTERDEPENDENT MARHETS*

ABSTRACT. Conditions for spatial price equilibrium are derived for a set of firms in oligopolistic spatial competition, distributed at fixed locations in a heterogeneous region where consumer purchasing patterns are a probabilistic function of the price distribution rather than a deterministic function of proximity to firms. The resulting prices vary with accessibility to consumers or with the degree of local spatial monopoly, and result in non-zero profits for firms. Conditions describing the existence and stability properties of this spatial price equilibrium are defined, and are shown to be equivalent for two different hypotheses concerning disequilibrium pricing behavior: a partial price adjustment model and a Bertrand game. For two different profit goals, total profit maximization and profit rate maximization, it is shown that a spatial price equilibrium exists and is at least locally quasi-stable.     

HOTELLING'S “MAIN STREET” WITH MORE THAN TWO COMPETITORS*

ABSTRACT. I analyze oligopolistic competition among three or more firms located on Hotelling's (1929) Main Street and show that in contrast with Hotelling's duopoly, the symmetric locational structure supports a noncooperative equilibrium in prices. However, in a two-stage game of location choice in the first stage, and price choice in the second stage, there exists no subgame-perfect equilibrium where the whole market is served. This is because, starting from any locational pattern, firms have incentives to move toward the central firm. This strong version of the Principle of Minimum Differentiation destroys the possibility of a locational equilibrium. The results are a direct consequence of the existence of boundaries in the space of location. The sharp difference between these results and those of the standard circular model (whose product space lacks boundaries) shows that the general use of the circular model as an approximation to the line interval model may be unwarranted.     

Price Variation in Spatial Oligopolies

The “geography of price” is being given renewed attention by geographers and economists. This paper examines spatial price variation in both unbounded (circular) and bounded (linear) one-dimensional markets. Firms compete for consumers in the short run by adjusting price until the Bertrand equilibrium is reached in the market. While firms act as spatial oligopolists in specific market segments, the profit-maximizing price of any given firm depends directly and indirectly upon the spatial-economic properties (locations, marginal costs) of all other firms in the market.     

ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF HOUSING TRAIT PRICES IN A THIRD WORLD CITY*

ABSTRACT. A first step in the process of economic analysis of housing markets in Third World cities is the econometric analysis of housing trait prices. The information on market price of housing is basic to the derivation/estimation of other market parameters such as housing demand and supply elasticities. In addition, housing trait prices constitute invaluable inputs into the analysis of effects of government housing programs. This paper presents estimates of housing trait prices in a Third World city housing market, the city of Jos in Nigeria. Nonlinear stochastic specification of a policy constrained hedonic price function is presented as an unbiased estimator of housing trait prices. The Box-Cox statistical procedure was employed in the paper to obtain hedonic regression coefficients which are the parameters needed to compute the average prices evaluated both at the mean of each trait and at their margins. The potential uses of housing trait prices for policy analysis are discussed briefly.     

LOCATION AND MARKET POWER HOTELLING REVISITED*

ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the determination of industry structure in a product market, given a monopolistic factor market. The characteristics of industry structure examined include the number of firms, their pricing and locational pattern. It is shown how a monopolistic factor owner–a landowner–structures the product market in order to extract maximum rent. Asymmetry characterizes the resulting locational pattern. All the product market firms charge different prices in equilibrium. No matter how large the number of firms competing in the product market, the landowner can always guarantee himself positive profits. The paper concludes with a discussion of possible applications and tests of the theory.     

Cournot Retail Chains

In this paper a model of spatial Cournot competition among retail firms is devised and used to assess the effect of a variety of structural factors on retail prices and profits. The model illustrates the spatial chain of interaction that firms must anticipate to reach equilibrium when organized in chains or as independents. It shows the sensitivity of price to the location of stores, the number of stores per location, and transportation cost.     

Spatial Price Discrimination in Two-Dimensional Competitive Markets

Intuition suggests that firms that can apply price discrimination make higher profits than firms that are restricted in their pricing policy. In this paper, we show that, in general, this is not the case. In the framework of a two-dimensional spatial model with elastic demand à la Lösch, we further investigate the interplay of transport costs, competition, and price policy. One of our results is that under realistic specifications of parameters each firm gains a monopolistic area in the center of its market that has the same shape as the entire market, but with a convexly or concavely distorted separating line, depending on the extension of the market.     

ON THE SHAPE OF MARKET AREAS IN LÖSCHIAN SPATIAL MODELS*

ABSTRACT. The paper analyzes the lattice shape of equilibrium configurations of firms in spatial models. Lösch's assertion that free entry will result in hexagonal market areas is proved for a variety of assumptions about the nature of the market equilibrium, and about the preferences of customers. All the models considered, however, incorporate rational entry behavior and identify the stable lattice as an entry deterring equilibrium. A simple proof is presented of the optimality of hexagonal market areas, at least among regular space-filling configurations.     

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERREGIONAL PRICE LINKAGES*

ABSTRACT Vector autoregression models are used to analyze the relationships between Texas and Illinois corn prices, and the New Orleans export price. Decomposition of error variances suggests an increasing exogeneity in the recent years between the export market and the two U.S. markets. Impulse response functions indicate that the export price influences both the Illinois and Texas prices.     

Duopoly prices under congested access*

Abstract. Consider two firms, at different locations, supplying a homogenous good at constant marginal production cost. Consumers incur travel costs to the firm for each unit purchased, and the travel costs increase with the amount of travel to each firm (congestion). When all traffic and all congestion are generated by travel to a duopolist, both the Nash–Bertrand equilibrium prices and the Nash–Cournot equilibrium prices exceed the sum of the marginal production cost and the marginal external travel cost. However, when the road is shared by travelers to the duopolists' facilities and travelers in competitive markets, the Nash–Bertrand duopoly price equals the competitive price and the Nash–Cournot price contains a markup.     

Domestic timber auctions and flexibly specialized forestry in Japan

In Japan, a well-established, widespread system of local timber market auctions, featuring the exchange of privately owned logs, is increasingly threatened by imports organized according to mass production principles. This article assesses the evolution, rationale, and functions of Japan's timber auctions that were primarily created in post-war Japan to provide key roles linking small-scale (private) forest owners to flexibly specialized value chains that are consummated in Japanese homes. The conceptual point of departure for the analysis is flexible specialization theory's interpretation of industrialization as a contest between mass production and small-scale production. We extend this discussion by giving analytical priority to markets as an institution distinct from firms and by interpreting markets from the perspectives of transaction costs and embeddedness, concepts normally deemed antagonistic to one another. Empirically, four case studies of timber auctions located in central and southern Japan are analyzed based on personal interviews with auction managers and participants within the context of broader trends in forestry. Three auctions feature 'silent' bidding and one involves open bidding. While the auctions exhibit varying characteristics, they continue to be the fulcrum of localized forestry systems, even as they are threatened by declining prices driven by imported wood and by restructurings within the Japanese solid wood sector. The continued resiliency of the flexible specialization model, and the auctions that are at its core, has important implications for forestry throughout Japan.     

Profit-Rate Maximization in Interdependent Markets: A Research Note

In the theory of the firm it is conventional to regard firms as (total)profit-maximizing institutions. In this paper it is shown that the interdependence among firms that is characteristic of monopolistic competition makes it plausible for them also to choose to maximize the rate of profit on capital advanced. For a homogeneous product with inelastic total demand, such as gasoline retailing, firms acting as rational agents, facing fixed costs in a homogeneous spatial market, and choosing to set prices under rate of profit-maximization can achieve higher total profits than firms operating under total profit-maximizing objectives.     

旅游产品价格波及影响：方法建构与实证测算

现阶段我国针对旅游产品价格影响范围与程度的规范性研究相对缺乏.本文借助旅游卫星账户编算中的相关产业旅游份额核算方法,通过劈分归并包含“合成”旅游业的投入产出表,通过投入产出价格影响模型,测算了旅游产品价格波动对其他产业价格水平及物价总水平的影响,以及相关产业价格水平变化对旅游产品价格的量化影响,为产业分析与旅游产品价格关系研究提供一个新视角.     

THE LAW OF ONE PRICE IN A NETWORK: ARBITRAGE AND PRICE DYNAMICS IN NATURAL GAS CITY GATE MARKETS*

ABSTRACT. In this paper we develop a model of the law of one price in a network where many markets are linked with a structure of paths. We show that arbitrage-free prices depend on the structure of the network and so do price dynamics. Our estimates indicate that local bypass and open access pipeline transportation were instrumental in opening arbitrage paths to natural gas city markets and causing their prices to converge. Spot markets in the city gates, pipeline hubs, and production fields, that are scattered over distant points in the vast pipeline network in the United States, now form a single market.     

MEASURING THE EFFECT OF COST VARIATION ON INDUSTRIAL OUTPUTS*

ABSTRACT. This paper introduces the household interactive variable input-output (HIVIO) model to measure the effect of cost variation on industrial outputs. The model produces a variety of cost elasticities that separate out impacts on industrial prices, imports, and outputs, with “own” and “cross” elasticity components. Like the conventional input-output multipliers, these cost elasticities can be useful parameters to evaluate the substituting behavior of firms and consumers. By using the 1980 Korean input-output transactions table, we find the wage and import price effects on industrial prices, outputs, and import demands.     

Optimizing the Spatial Structure of the Agricultural Production Function

Important characteristics of spatial agricultural production functions are derived by introducing a non‐negative curvilinear spatial demand function for production input intensities. Given the usual neoclassical rationale assumptions of spatial demand for capital and labor inputs under competitive environment of farming in developing agricultural economies, the optimal production levels are determined by optimizing spatial demand for production inputs. Decreasing price‐to‐transport costs ratio (that is, decrease in the prices of capital goods or increase in freight rates) and increasing wage‐to‐travel costs ratio (that is, increase in labor wages or decrease in the travel rate) expand the limits of the (spatial) optimal boundary of the demand for agricultural capital goods and labor input respectively. These effects occur on account of the operation of (positive) spatial price gradient and (negative) wage‐gradient in the market region. It may be noted that elasticities of demand for production factors are spatially variant and have significant effects on the alterations in the structure of agricultural production. However, the spatial optimal solution of production has a complicated relationship with them. The price elasticity has negative and wage elasticity has positive spatial gradients in the market region. Farmers located in the periphery of the market region are not much affected by the proportionate changes occurring in the prices of agricultural capital goods but are more sensitive to the proportional changes in labor wages. Because of a decreasing trend in capital input demand and increase in labor input with distance from the market, capital‐product diminishes with a decreasing rate and labor‐product increases with an increasing rate in the spatial structure of agricultural production. As a result, capital‐labor ratio falls toward zero, which raises profit rate per unit of capital investment especially in the outer part of the market region. The equilibria of optimal production with price elasticity as well as of capital intensity with labor employment (that is, capital‐labor ratio as unity) determine spatial limits of the optimal production zone which is shifted outward subject to the provision of cheap transportation, stabilizing market prices and/or increasing wage rate at the market center. It will help in extending outwardly the optimal spatial limits of capital investment and will mobilize capital resources of farmers in the periphery for efficient and competitive capital‐dominated farming.     

Are the home values and property tax burdens of permanent homeowners affected by growth in housing rentals and second homes: Evidence based on big data from Florida

Homeowners who make their homes their primary residence have resisted the entry of rentals into their neighborhoods and cities. Possible reasons underlying this resistance are that rentals reduce the property values, increase the property tax burdens, and raise the price of public services for these homeowners. We relate the market values of single-family homes occupied by permanent homeowners, the effective property tax rate of these homeowners, and the tax price they pay for public services to shifts in their city's housing units toward a variety of different types of rentals and second homes. Our analysis is based on large panels of Florida homes containing hundreds of thousands and millions of observations. Our results show that increases in the share of a city's housing units used as rentals or second homes reduce the home values, increase the property tax burdens, and raise the public services prices of homeowners who permanently reside in single-family homes. Impacts vary in magnitude among single-family, condominium, and mobile homes used as rentals and second homes. Estimated impacts are the strongest for share increases in single-family rentals and second homes.     

SEQUENTIAL SALES OF SIMILAR ASSETS: THE LAW OF ONE PRICE AND REAL ESTATE

ABSTRACT The housing literature largely overlooks the price evolution of similar assets sold sequentially, even though such sales often occur with new residential developments. The law of one price implies no persistent price pattern for identical assets sold sequentially. Nonetheless, the auction and nonauction literatures reveal conditions leading to sales sequence effects on prices. This paper examines price evolution in the condominium market where similar units are sold sequentially in a setting with minimal consumption risk. The results indicate no pervasive sequence–price relationship for sequential sales of similar property units.