Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975, Part two: January 1972–January 1973

Although anticipated, the North Vietnamese ‘Easter offensive’ against South Vietnam in 1972 created problems for the United States. Having reached a rapprochement with Communist China, President Nixon and his foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, believed that the attack could have serious repercussions for their attempt to balance it with détente with the Soviet Union, not to mention the US's credibility as a Great Power. They also feared it would damage Nixon's prospects for re‐election in November 1972. Despite opposition from his Defense Secretary, Nixon renewed the bombing of North Vietnam which had been stopped by President Johnson in 1968. This helped to bring the North Vietnamese back to the conference table and after complex negotiations, a draft peace agreement was ready for initialling in October 1972. However, President Thieu of South Vietnam saw significant drawbacks in the agreement and refused to go along with it. The North Vietnamese chose to have one more attempt to win on the battlefield and President Nixon, who had scaled down the bombing when peace seemed closer and won a landslide victory in the presidential election, launched another eleven days of concentrated bombing raids on North Vietnam at the turn of the year. This led to the final agreement initialled on 23 January 1973, which President Thieu reluctantly acceded to. Thieu's reservations were justified, but Nixon realized that, despite his electoral victory, he could not count on the continued support of Congress and the American people for the war. Far from bringing ‘peace with honor in Vietnam and Southeast Asia’, the January agreement was a fig leaf to cover American withdrawal.     

Leaving Vietnam: Nixon,Kissinger and Ford, 1969–1975. Part one: January 1969–January 1972

Some have suggested that Richard Nixon's narrow victory in the US presidential election of November 1968 was due to his persuading the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) to boycott the Paris peace talks for the settlement of the Vietnam War between the US government, that of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the representatives of the communist guerrilla movement in South Vietnam. This seems doubtful. The new president had abandoned the hawkish stance he had adopted when vice‐president in the Eisenhower administration and was anxious to bring the unpopular war to an end. The question was: how? The president, together with his influential National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, adopted a policy of ‘Vietnamization’, which involved the progressive scaling down of the US military presence and the handing over of responsibility for waging the war to the GVN. At the same time, the president recognized that too precipitate an American withdrawal and, above all, one which took place under the terms of an agreement which was too favourable to the communists, would have a deleterious effect upon its allies and its own position as a Great Power. In order to bring about a satisfactory agreement with the DRV, the US employed a twin strategy: secret talks between Kissinger and senior DRV representatives in Paris, coupled with veiled threats of an escalation of the war if the communists acted unreasonably and occasional displays of military strength, such as the incursion into Cambodia in 1970. Although it seemed, briefly, that there might be a breakthrough in Kissinger's secret negotiations with the DRV later in 1971, they broke down mainly as a result of the communists' insistence that the US in effect dismantle the South Vietnamese government for them. An angry Nixon secretly considered retaliation against the DRV to force it to modify its demands and publicly revealed the existence of the negotiations and much of their content to the American people in a speech on 25 January 1972. At the same time, however, he insisted that Vietnamization would continue.     

Nixon, Kissinger and the breakup of Pakistan, 1971

Based upon recently published American documents, this article examines the United States's policy towards the crisis which led to the breakup of Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh at the end of 1971. President Richard M. Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, deliberately kept this policy closely under their control and were guided more by geopolitical than by moral considerations. In particular, they were anxious to forge a new relationship with communist China and the contribution of the Pakistani president, Yahya Khan, in facilitating contacts between the US and China were greatly appreciated by the two men. Nixon's visceral dislike of the Indian prime minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, also contributed to a degree of myopia and misperception regarding India's objectives and their possible consequences. As the conflict between the rebels in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and the central government deepened and Indian involvement on the side of the rebels grew, Nixon and Kissinger saw another threat in the shape of Soviet military and moral support for India. An Indian victory would not only increase India's prestige and position vis-à-vis those of Pakistan, but tip the global balance of power towards the Soviet Union and away from the United States. Frantic diplomatic efforts, combined with scarcely veiled threats, finally succeeded in preventing the total disintegration of Pakistan, but there is some doubt as to whether this was likely in the first place and whether US policy was successful in relation to either China or the Soviet Union.     

中美《上海公报》谈判的第二阶段

中美《上海公报》谈判的第二阶段是在1972年2月21～28日美国总统尼克松访华期间。谈判前夕,黑格访华,其名义上是为尼克松访华做技术上的准备,实际上是以苏联的军事威胁来吓唬中方,迫使中方在《上海公报》台湾问题上让步,但中方不为所动。《上海公报》谈判第二阶段共进行了六次谈判,双方在台湾问题、"人民要革命"以及双方都"不在亚太地区谋求霸权"的措辞上进行了争论。《上海公报》谈判最终取得了成功,其主要经验和启示是:应当从战略高度和长远角度来看待和处理中美关系;妥善处理台湾问题;认识和尊重差异,寻求和发展共同点。     

中美《上海公报》谈判的第一阶段

1972年2月28日,中美两国政府在上海发表了第一个联合公报,即著名的《上海公报》,标志着中美长期隔绝的结束和两国关系正常化进程的开始。《上海公报》的谈判经过了两个阶段:第一阶段是1971年10月20～26日,美国总统国家安全事务助理基辛格第二次访华期间;第二阶段是1972年2月21～28日,美国总统尼克松访华期间。第一阶段的谈判经过了三个回合,双方先后各自提出了三个版本的草案稿,涉及公报的写法、内容、表述等问题,但核心是台湾问题。经过双方反复讨论,中美各有让步,除台湾问题外,其他问题基本达成共识。这就为4个月后的尼克松成功访华和第二阶段的谈判奠定了扎实的基础,从而推动了中美关系正常化的进程。     

美国与联合国中国代表权问题

对致力于推动中美关系正常化的尼克松与基辛格而言,如何处理联合国中国代表权问题似乎颇为棘手。实际上,与北京改善关系是他们处理此问题的战略前提,如何避免美国国内保守阵营的攻击则是两人制定具体战术的出发点,至于蒋介石政权的反应则基本不在他们的考虑范围内。1971年中国成功恢复在联合国的合法席位,虽与尼克松政府的相关政策不无关系,但其根本原因则在于中国自身,即只要中国不发生内乱,任何力量都无法阻止其加入联合国的步伐。而只要北京不让步,台北当局被驱逐出联合国就是必然的结局。     

分歧与协调:佐藤内阁对联合国中国代表权问题的政策选择

亲台反华的日本佐藤内阁在1971年联合国中国代表权问题上费尽心机,不仅是为台湾当局继存于联合国的“逆重要问题案”的始作俑者,甚至一度对美国将安理会席位交归中华人民共和国的主张持“保留意见”。但随着尼克松访华计划的公布,视日美关系为日本对外关系核心的佐藤内阁迅速调整政策,公开与美国政府在联合国图谋“两个中国”并存局面。佐藤内阁顽固追随美国在联合国中国代表权问题上的政策立场,不仅遭到日本国内要求调整对华关系的反对力量的猛烈攻击,同时也使执政的自民党在对华政策上的内部分歧越发难以调和,并最终导致佐藤内阁失去调整对华政策的历史契机。     

美国对1969年中苏边界冲突的反应

1969年的中苏边界冲突使双方走到了战争的边缘,美国方面对中苏冲突的反应是一个从倾向于中国“好战”和“挑衅”到看清苏联意图的认识过程。美国一直想利用中苏分歧,使其在与苏联争夺霸权的较量中获利。1969年的中苏边界冲突客观上为美国提供了一个绝好的机会,尼克松政府也抓住了这个机会。中苏边界冲突造成的中苏关系空前紧张的形势,使尼克松、基辛格感到美国有可能在处理美、苏、中三角关系中处于优越地位。所以,中苏冲突客观上是促进美国加速调整对华政策的催化剂。     

Between Détente and Differentiation: Nixon’s visit to Bucharest in August 1969

President Nixon’s decision to visit Romania in the summer of 1969 demarcated a symbolic turning point in the relations of Washington with Bucharest and the Eastern European communist states in general. This article examines the policies of both sides leading to this historical event and its respective outcomes. It places the opening of Romania to the United States and the latter’s embrace of such a prospect within the broader Cold War context of the time; the policy of differentiation and the imminent détente. Just a year after the invasion in Czechoslovakia, Nixon and Kissinger sought to explore the compatibility of their policy towards the rest of the socialist states with their grand design of the superpower détente with the USSR. Ceausescu’s independent profile within the Soviet bloc constituted Romania a textbook example for such an endeavour.     

20世纪70年代初台湾当局对美“外交”与联合国中国代表权问题

1971年第26届联合国大会前一年内,在尼克松政府的要求和现实的压力下,台湾当局在联合国中国代表权问题上不断让步,但最终还是没能保住其在联合国的席位。在决策过程中,蒋介石表面上不断展示强硬立场,实质上却并非如此。他手下的高级"外交官"们为保住台湾当局在联合国的席位而倾向于妥协,但在威权体制下难于向蒋介石进言。     

The Iron and Steel Industry of the Lipetsk Industrial Node

The Lipetsk iron and steel industry, in existence since 1899, began a major expansion program in the middle 1950's, designed to make it one of the principal steel producers of the Soviet Union. The status of the expansion program as of 1969–70 is analyzed in detail, including a rundown of ore, flux and coke sources. The use of sintered ore from near-by deposits of the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly, high-temperature oxygen-enriched air blasts in the blast furnaces, large-capacity blast furnaces and steelmaking oxygen converters are expected to reduce the costs of production below existing levels in the Soviet iron and steel industry and to foster an efficient operation based on modern, automated equipment. (See also Shabad, Basic Industrial Resources of the USSR, pp. 98–101; maps, pp. 40, 96; News Notes, Soviet Geography, February 1970, p. 143; June 1972, pp. 409–410; June 1973, p. 407.)     

The Blue Slip: A Theory of Unified and Divided Government, 1979–2009

In recent years, the role of presidential candidates in constructing their own coalitions to secure both the nomination and election has increased as their reliance on their own party organization has decreased. Recent presidents also have devoted more of their energies to building coalitions crucial to the adoption of their program and its policies. Yet in this era of entrepreneurial candidacy, presidential effectiveness has varied considerably. This article suggests that the extent of convergence and divergence of presidential selection and governing coalitions determines presidential effectiveness. It is also suggested that the roots of presidential governing effectiveness lie in the electoral core coalition, the product of the nomination and general election coalitions that supported the presidential candidate. The article (1) describes the developments that make this theory of presidential coalition-building pertinent to the recent presidency, and (2) sketches the theory and illustrates its applicability to Richard Nixon's sponsorship of the Family Assistance Plan.     

新中国与意大利关系正常化的历史考察

新中国成立后20多年,一直没有与意大利建立外交关系。直至1969年初,中意两国关系正常化才迎来了转机,其原因主要是:中苏两国从结盟走向对抗、西方大国纷纷调整对华政策、意大利国内左翼政党力主承认新中国以及中意经贸发展的驱动。从1969年2月至1970年10月,中意两国围绕建交问题进行了长达22个月的谈判,最终于1970年11月6日签署联合公报。中意关系正常化掀开了两国关系的新篇章,标志着以美国为首的西方阵营孤立新中国的政策开始破产。     

Richard Nixon and the Failed War Against the Trading World

Books reviewed:
Foreign Relations of the United States , 1969 – 1976, vol. 3: Foreign Economic Policy , 1969 – 1972; International Monetary Policy , 1969 – 1972.     

华沙会谈与中美对第二次台湾海峡危机的处理

华沙会谈对中美双方处理第二次台湾海峡危机产生了不同的政策影响和作用。会谈虽然有利于中美决策者了解对方的意图,但会谈使双方的分歧更加尖锐;中国通过华沙会谈调整和改变了对台湾和沿海岛屿的政策,而美国则更加明确了沿海岛屿的政策。     

蒋介石力阻美国将台湾问题"国际化"

蒋介石退踞台湾期间,对于美国寻找各种机会使台湾问题"国际化"的企图,基本上采取抗拒的立场.具体表现在在20世纪40年代末到50年代初期,针对美国叫嚣的"台湾地位未定论",蒋介石通过对<开罗宣言>的反复重申,坚持了台湾是中国一部分的立场,维护了中国对台湾的主权地位;在50年代中后期两次台海危机中,蒋介石坚守金门、马祖这两个与大陆保持联系的纽带,拒绝美国以海峡为界,实现"划峡而治"、制造"两个中国"的图谋,并在一定程度上与大陆形成一种默契,共同抵制美国的分裂活动;从60年代开始,借恢复中国政府在联合国的席位、美国企图在联合国内部造成"一中一台"的既成事实,针对这种情况,包括台湾蒋介石当局在内的海峡两岸中国人,取得一定共识,即在国际社会只能有一个代表中国主权的中央政府,台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分,并共同挫败美国以联合国名义分裂中国的图谋.     

FEATURE REVIEW

Feature reviews in this article
Gordon H. Chang. Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972 . Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990.
H. W. Brands. The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960 . New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.     

台美英围绕联合国中国代表权问题的交涉（1951-1955）

中国代表权问题不仅是美苏为首的两大阵营对抗的最重要的冷战问题之一,而且是美国阵营内部歧见纷呈的问题。朝鲜战争爆发后,维护台湾在联合国的中国代表权符合美国的战略利益,但是英国并不紧随美国的指挥棒合拍地起舞。台湾利用美苏阵营的尖锐对抗,以小搏大,竭力争取美国支持直接否决反对台湾在联合国的中国代表权的方案。台美英三方均有各自的立场与考量,有时限的“缓议案”是三方博弈后的产物。随着美苏阵营对抗的渐趋缓和,台湾当局所能做的必定越来越多的是妥协与退让。     

JFK and the future of global leadership

On 10 June 1963 President John F. Kennedy gave a speech that changed the world. His commencement speech at American University helped to spur the signing of a world‐changing agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States—the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This episode of peacemaking is remarkable for two reasons. First, it arguably helped to save the world, since the nuclear confrontation at that stage of the Cold War was not a ‘stable balance of terror’, as sometimes described, but rather a highly unstable situation that was prone to accidents, misjudgements and potential disasters. Second, this was an episode of statesmanship in which presidential leadership played a crucial role. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy understood that he bore sole responsibility on the US side to find a way back from the brink of nuclear war. He used the ‘peace speech’ to create a novel kind of peace diplomacy, and worked together with his counterpart, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, to pull the superpowers back from this precarious brink.     

UN transformation in an era of soft balancing

Between 2003 and 2006 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan pursued the most ambitious overhaul of the United Nations since its inception. This transformation effort aimed to make the UN more effective in addressing non‐traditional threats and to persuade the United States to re‐engage with the world body. Launched during a time that was unpropitious for achieving far‐reaching change, the effort nonetheless produced some surprising agreements. Several factors prevented greater achievement: the episodic attention of the Bush administration and the personal agenda of John Bolton, the US permanent representative to the UN; the failure of the UN Secretariat to pursue a capital based strategy that engaged heads of state and foreign ministers; and the decision by many member states that they would rather have an ineffective United Nations than an effective one that furthered the interests of the Bush administration. Whether future efforts to transform collective security will fall victim to the same fate depends in part on the actions and words of a new American president in 2009.