War and city size: The asymmetric effects of the Spanish Civil War

Populations are affected by shocks of different kinds, and wars, a priori, may be among the most prominent. This article studies the effect of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) shock on the distribution of population, especially on cities. One of the main contributions of this study is that it underlines the importance of distinguishing between winning and losing sides, an aspect which until now has been largely overlooked. While previous research on war shocks has also tended to be concerned with inter-state wars, this paper concentrates on a civil war. We take advantage of a new, long-term, annual data set. Our results show that, overall, the Spanish Civil War did not have a significant effect on city growth. However, we also find a significant and negative effect in the growth of cities that aligned themselves with the losing side. These results are robust to heterogeneity in the effect of the war shock, measured as war severity and duration. Although short lived, the temporary effect on growth results in a permanent effect on the size of cities on the losing side.     

The Foreign Enlistment Act and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939

This article examines the official response to the policy problemsraised by the over two thousand Britons who went to fight forthe Republic during the Spanish Civil War, with particular referenceto the Foreign Enlistment Act (1870). Revived in January 1937as a means of reducing the flow of volunteers and curbing therecruiting efforts of the Communist Party of Great Britain,the act proved embarrassingly unenforceable. Ambiguity overits applicability to the situation in Spain, combined with problemsof evidence, meant that no charges were ever laid against volunteerscaught attempting to leave for Spain or members of the recruitingorganization of the CPGB. Though a complete failure as a legaltool, the Foreign Enlistment Act nevertheless symbolically underlinedthe British government's declared support for internationalnon-intervention in Spain, and was never rescinded.     

The Politics of Communist Biography: Alfred Kantorowicz and the Spanish Civil War

After the German communist author Alfred Kantorowicz's breakwith Communism in 1957, he was lionized by his supporters asan icon of humanism and antifascism, and vilified by his formerallies as a turncoat and traitor. In his autobiographical writings,Kantorowicz portrayed himself as a victim of Stalinism, whohad always been opposed to the authoritarian and repressiveaspects of Communism. Again and again he returned to his timein the International Brigades as a way of illustrating bothhis commitment to antifascism and the betrayal of grassrootsCommunism by the party leadership. But contemporary recordsreveal a more ambiguous picture: not only was Kantorowicz along-time functionary, he was also more involved in the repressiveaspects of Communism than he later cared to admit. This articleargues that, like many ex-Communist biographies of the ColdWar, Kantorowicz's memoirs are shot through with retrospectiveself-justification. Given his post-1957 loathing for Communism,he needed to explain why he had joined the party in the firstplace, and then remained an active member for twenty-five years.By organizing his life around the dichotomies of footsoldiersand functionaries, antifascism and Stalinism, and censorshipand truth, Kantorowicz was able to avoid discussing his ownculpability as a Communist functionary.     

Making things public: Archaeologies of the Spanish Civil War

Abstract

The archaeology of recent traumatic events, such as genocides, mass political killings and armed conflict, is inevitably controversial. This is also the case for the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), where the incipient archaeology of the confrontation is marked by bitter debates: Should this conflicting past be remembered or forgotten? Which version of the past is going to be remembered? What are the best politics of memory for a healthy democracy? The archaeologies of the war face manifold problems: the lack of interest in academia, which fosters amateurism; the great divide between public and scientific practice; the narrow perspectives of some undertakings; the lack of coordination among practitioners, and the threats to the material remains of the war. An integrated archaeology of the conflict, which helps to make things public, is defended here.