Descartes and the pineal gland in animals: a frequent misinterpretation

René Descartes presented a number of reasons for his choice of the pineal gland as a logical place for the soul to interact with the physical machinery of the body. It is often stated that one of his reasons was that he believed animals do not have pineal glands, whereas humans alone possess a soul and this small structure. This is a misinterpretation of Descartes. The philosopher knew that barnyard and other animals possess pineal glands, having seen this with his own eyes. His point was that the pineal is unique in humans only because of a special function - acting as the seat for the rational soul.     

The Originality of Descartes Theory about the Pineal Gland

René Descartes thought that the pineal gland is the part of the body with which the soul is most immediately associated. Several prominent historians (such as Soury, Thorndike and Sherrington) have claimed that this idea was not very original. We re-examine the evidence and conclude that their assessment was wrong. We pay special attention to the thesis about the pineal gland which Jean Cousin defended in January, 1641.     

Naked wax and necessary existence: modal voluntarism and Descartes’s motives

ABSTRACT

Descartes’s commitment to modal voluntarism was one of his most notorious and controversial doctrines. The reaction of contemporaries was hostility and incredulity; the reaction of modern scholars has been little different. Yet, though the issue has fomented considerable discussion and disagreement in the literature, the overwhelming majority of scholarly output has focused on questions of whether Descartes actually upheld the doctrine, or what he was committed too if he indeed did. Surprisingly, the underlying question of why Descartes would have upheld such a doctrine in the first place has gone almost entirely unnoticed and unasked. This paper proposes several possible answers to this question, each of which provides at least a partial explanation for Descartes’s attraction to modal voluntarism. The ultimate motive, however, was likely not one of positive attraction, but driven by Descartes’s anxieties over the thorny and deeply heretical implications of his conception of matter.     

Eighth annual meeting of the international society for the history of the neurosciences hosting the Ninth meeting of the european club for the history of neurology JULY 7–10, 2003

Damasio (1994) claims that Descartes imagined thinking as an activity separate from the body, and that the effort to understand the mind in general biological terms was retarded as a consequence of Descartes dualism. These claims do not hold; they are Damasios error. Descartes never considered what we today call thinking or cognition without taking the body into account. His new dualism required an embodied understanding of cognition. The article gives an historical overview of the development of Descartes radically new psychology from his account of algebraic reasoning in the early Regulae (1628) to his neurobiology of rationality in the late Passions of the soul (1649). The author argues that Descartes dualism opens the way for mechanistic and mathematical explanations of all kinds of physiological and psychological phenomena, including the kind of phenomena Damasio discusses in Descartes error. The models of understanding Damasio puts forward can be seen as advanced version of models which Descartes introduced in the 1640s. A far better title for his book would have been Descartes vision.     

Gall’s German enemies

ABSTRACT

Franz Joseph Gall’s (1758–1828) proposal for a new theory about how to represent the mental faculties is well known. He replaced the traditional perception-judgement-memory triad of abstract faculties with a set of 27 highly specific faculties, many of which humans share with animals. In addition, he argued that these faculties are dependent on specific cortical areas, these being his organs of mind. After several years of presenting his new views in Vienna, he was banned from lecturing for what he considered absurd reasons. The edict enticed him to make a scientific journey through the German states, both to present his ideas to targeted audiences and to collect more cases. This trip, started in 1805, was extended to include stops in Denmark, Holland, and Switzerland before finally ending in Paris in 1807. For the most part, Gall was received with great enthusiasm in what is now Germany, but there were some individuals who strongly opposed his anatomical discoveries and skull-based doctrine. In this article, we examine the concerns and arguments raised by Johann Gotlieb Walter in Berlin, Henrik Steffens in Halle, Jakob Fidelis Ackermann in Heidelberg, and Samuel Thomas Soemmerring in Munich, as well as how Gall responded to them.     

Descartes' embodied psychology: Descartes' or Damasio's error?

Damasio (1994) claims that Descartes imagined thinking as an activity separate from the body, and that the effort to understand the mind in general biological terms was retarded as a consequence of Descartes' dualism. These claims do not hold; they are "Damasio's error". Descartes never considered what we today call thinking or cognition without taking the body into account. His new dualism required an embodied understanding of cognition. The article gives an historical overview of the development of Descartes' radically new psychology from his account of algebraic reasoning in the early Regulae (1628) to his "neurobiology of rationality" in the late Passions of the soul (1649). The author argues that Descartes' dualism opens the way for mechanistic and mathematical explanations of all kinds of physiological and psychological phenomena, including the kind of phenomena Damasio discusses in Descartes' error. The models of understanding Damasio puts forward can be seen as advanced version of models which Descartes introduced in the 1640s. A far better title for his book would have been Descartes' vision.     

Politics and Public Policy

Abstract

In the figure of Judge Holden, Cormac McCarthy has crafted perhaps the most haunting character in all of American literature. The antagonist of McCarthy's Blood Meridian, Holden is a richly composed portrait of human evil responsible for a litany of wicked deeds. This essay attempts to expound the character of judge Holden, to the end of clarifying McCarthy's definition of evil. It argues that McCarthy, with the judge, lays bare the contours of soul of the evil man, focusing especially on the tension between his ambitious repudiation of justice, on the one hand, and his steadfast, if unwitting, adherence to it, on the other. It is the evil man's conception of the purpose of knowledge, together with his desire to acquire boundless knowledge, that is the key to this tension in his soul.     

Abstracts

René Descartes is at the root of the modern world. Stephen Gaukroger explains why. Descartes sought to found philosophy on an investigation of the natural world rather than on theology and ethics. His task was complicated by the trial and condemnation of Galileo. He wished, as he says, to do nothing of which the Church could disapprove. In spite of this caveat he constructed over his lifetime an account of the world, from cosmology to psychology, which was fundamentally naturalistic, replacing the teleological thought of previous centuries with an unremitting mechanism. At the heart of his thought is mathematical physics. This determined his treatment of psychophysiology and the mind-body problem. In spite of 350 years of subsequent research the general idea of his neuropsychology remains surprisingly modern. He was one of the first to see humans as part of nature and his account of the relation of mind to brain is remarkably comprehensive and clear. Gaukroger’s book, although in this reviewer’s opinion open to criticism in some respects, provides a fascinating and in-depth account of the structure of Descartes’ thought.     

The figural go-between in the Cartesian conception of science

ABSTRACT

The article addresses the early-modern conception of figuration, and more specifically the form in which it appears in Descartes’ early writings. There is textual evidence suggesting that Descartes was aware both of the mathematical and of the poetical characters of figures, contributing to the design of methodical processes. It is argued that figures play a central role in the Cartesian conception of method, in which figuration, leaning on the universal laws of geometry, is being used as carrier of data from reality to the observing mind and back, as well as from one domain of inquiry to another. It is therefore a central binder of the Cartesian ‘Unity of Science’, being responsible for the interconnectedness of various domains of inquiry.     

Ancient Greek Myth in Angelos Sikelianos

Abstract

In the introduction to Angelos Sikelianos: Selected Poems, the translators speak of Sikelianos's ‘mythological attitude … toward life’ and of his conception of myth not so much ‘as a rhetorical or metaphorical device but as a spontaneous creation of the human soul directed toward the revelation of a hidden spiritual life’, in short, of mythology as a kind of religion closely related to Schelling's perception of the function of myth. These remarks, written originally some years ago, may have their just proportion of truth, but in keeping with most introductory remarks, they strike me as rather too general, rather too undiscriminating when one brings them face to face with Sikelianos's practice at different moments of his career. I want to try to be more discriminating by considering the role of myth – specifically ancient Greek myth – in the poet's work both early and late in his career. I think it is a changing role, perhaps not in his fundamental association of gods with a contemporary landscape and his revelation of those mysteries that lie hidden in our everyday lives, but in the mode of this association and this revelation, and in the depth of their poetic significance.     

The Epilogue in the Book of Qohelet

Abstract

Various objective reasons have led to the development of a vast and elaborate literature on the Epilogue in the Book of Qohelet. This study presents a Sitz im Leben based approach to the Epilogue, which capitalizes on the known historical reality during the Hellenistic period in which Qohelet lived. It views the Epilogue as an expression of Qohelet’s deep apprehensions of the challenges that faced his people. From this perspective it is natural to consider Qohelet as being the author of the Epilogue. The Epilogue is not about what he says in the book but what he has to say to his people. As a wise man concerned with the welfare of his people he urges them: keep records, though it is wearisome; be aware that secrets would be leaked; fear God; and, obey His commandments. These are his essentials for survival.     

Le scepticisme et les hypothèses de la physique

The History of scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza is often called upon to support three theses: first, that Descartes had a dogmatic notion of systematic knowledge, and therefore of physics; second, that the hypothetical epistemology of physics which spread during the xviith century was the result of a general sceptical crisis; third, that this epistemology was more successful in England than in France. I reject these three theses: I point first to the tension in Descartes’ works between the ideal of a completely certain science and a physics replete with hypotheses; further, I argue that the use of hypotheses by mechanical philosophers cannot be separated from their conception of physics; finally I show that, at the end of the xviith century, physicists in France as well as in England spoke through hypotheses and I examine different ways of explaining this shared practice. Richard H. Popkin’s book serves therefore as a starting point for insights into the general problem: to what extent and for what reasons some propositions in physics have been presented as hypotheses in the xviith century?     

‘I beg you to tear up my letters …’ Nikos Skalkottas's last years in Berlin (1928–33)

Abstract

Nikos Skalkottas (1904–49), the Greek pupil of Schoenberg, was one of the greatest and most prolific atonal and twelve-note composers of the twentieth century, though unrecognised in Athens during his lifetime. The fifty-six letters that he wrote to his patron Manolis Benakis illuminate Skalkottas's life and his music, the financial and emotional difficulties leading to his enforced departure from Berlin, his aesthetic viewpoint, his opinions on Greece and its musical life, and his reasons for composing the popular ‘36 Greek Dances’. This is the first published account of this important documentary source.     

A “Calvinist” theory of matter? Burgersdijk and Descartes on res extensa

In the Dutch debates on Cartesianism of the 1640s, a minority believed that some Cartesian views were in fact Calvinist ones. The paper argues that, among others, a likely precursor of this position is the Aristotelian Franco Burgersdijk (1590-1635), who held a reductionist view of accidents and of the essential extension of matter on Calvinist grounds. It seems unlikely that Descartes was unaware of these views. The claim is that Descartes had two aims in his Replies to Arnauld: to show the compatibility of res extensa and the Catholic transubstantiation but also to differentiate the res extensa from some views of matter explicitly defended by some Calvinists. The association with Calvinism will be eventually used polemically against Cartesianism, for example in France. The paper finally suggests that, notwithstanding the points of conflict, the affinities between the theologically relevant theories of accidents, matter and extension ultimately facilitated the dissemination of Cartesianism among the Calvinists.     

Samuel Taylor Coleridge on ideas actualized in history

ABSTRACT

Situating Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s thought on historically actualized ideas with reference to a range of classical thinkers, this article examines his intriguing philosophical theory about how ideas become progressively actualized in history. This cultural growth can be understood as contemplation-in-action, although it occurs through mainly fumbling – or else overenthusiastic – human agents. I distinguish Coleridgean first-order, transcendent ideas (such as God, infinity, the good, the soul) from second-order, historical ones (such as church, state, the constitution). It has been argued that Coleridge’s theory of ideas develops from Bacon’s inductive method for discovering laws of nature through experiment and natural law through common law. I further claim that Coleridge upholds the reality of “Forms” in science, and of rights in ethics and politics; that his later political thought is inherently more progressive than is generally admitted; and that his account differs from Schelling’s and Hegel’s respective theories by maintaining the transcendence of ideas above the immanence of their evolving historical actualizations. Coleridge’s philosophy is therefore, whether political or metaphysical, ultimately an ontological defence of the transcendence of ideas above the immanence of their progressive but imperfect actualization.     

Clothing the Poor in Early-Nineteenth-Century England

Abstract

In a pioneering study in this journal, Steven King suggested that parish clothing provision was of fundamental importance in the eighteenth century both in terms of local social relations and the perceived standing of parish authorities. This article tests his thesis for the first decades of the nineteenth century, confirming that parish clothing was indeed pivotal in maintaining a sense of local social justice. However, it takes issue with King's reasons for the relatively high levels of clothing provision enjoyed by the poor, suggesting that they had as much to do with a set of shared values between giver and receiver as they did with considerations of parish prestige or social order.     

Leviathans Old and New: What Collingwood Saw in Hobbes

Summary

R. G. Collingwood presented his major work of political philosophy, The New Leviathan, as an updated version of Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan. However, his reasons for taking Hobbes's great work as his inspiration have puzzled and eluded many Collingwood scholars, while those interested in the reception of Hobbes's ideas have largely neglected the New Leviathan. In this essay I reveal what Collingwood saw in Hobbes's political philosophy and show how his reading of Hobbes both diverges from other prominent interpretations of the time and invites us to reassess Hobbes's complex association with the origins of liberalism. In doing so, I focus on Collingwood's science of mind, his ideas on society and authority, and his dialectical theory of politics, in each case showing how he engaged with Hobbes in order to elucidate his own vision of civilisation. That vision is based on the development of social consciousness, which involves people coming to understand the body politic as a joint enterprise whereby they confer authority upon those who rule.     

Al-Fārābī’s Cave: Aristotle’s Logic and the Ways of Socrates and Thrasymachus

In his commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric al-Fārābī harmonizes Plato and Aristotle in terms of philosophic education by ordering Aristotle’s eight logical works onto Plato’s famous image of the cave. He represents the way out of the cave with Aristotle’s four logical works of ascent (Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, and Posterior Analytics) and the return into the cave through Aristotle’s four logical works of the descent (Topics, Sophistical Refutations, Rhetoric, and Poetics). Al-Fārābī’s image of ascent and descent also alludes to Socrates’ conception of protreptic education in Book VII of the Republic. In essence, protreptic education consists in the Socratic art that freely turns the soul from the images and political interpretations of things to being itself. In this essay I argue that for al-Fārābī the four logical works of ascent guide the soul to free itself from its habituations so as to contemplate real beings, particularly the good of one’s own soul and the souls of one’s fellow citizens. Yet the ruler needs to use the arts of “descent,” as demonstrated by Thrasymachus, in order to rule the city well. The way of Socrates consists of the logical methods used to come to possess knowledge of being, while the way of Thrasymachus comprises the methods of persuasion to habituate citizens and protect the philosophic quest for the truth. Al-Fārābī, I conclude, combines the way of Socrates and the way of Thrasymachus in order to show that both ways are useful and necessary for good governance.