Histories of analytic political philosophy

This paper sets out an agenda for the study of the history of analytic and post-analytic political philosophy. It builds on a growing literature on the history of analytic philosophy to make three main suggestions. First, analytic philosophy arose as part of a wider shift from the developmental historicism of the nineteenth century to more modernist modes of knowledge. Second, analytic philosophy included a wide range of approaches to moral and political issues, many of which reflected distinctive concepts of analysis, logic, and science. Third, analytic philosophy only became widespread when the work of Quine and Wittgenstein moved it in a more post-analytic direction. Crucially, the move toward post-analytic philosophy inspired people to rediscover and reinvent other traditions, including liberal humanism, democratic republicanism, virtue ethics, and historicism. The resulting history provides a fluid and diverse understanding of arguably the most powerful philosophical movement of the twentieth century.     

The making of a monster: the historical image of William Rufus

Few writers, medieval or modern, have had much good to write about William Rufus, the second Norman king of England (1087–1100). Beginning in the twelfth century, chroniclers and historians have portrayed William as a cruel, grasping, and sacriligious ruler. This study traces the development of this unflattering historical image from the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries and notes that the religious convictions which encouraged medieval churchmen to condemn Rufus were offset in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by a more political and anti-catholic approach to his reign. Beginning in the eighteenth century, however, historians abandoned this more flattering portrayal and returned once again to the evil image concocted by the monastic chroniclers.     

The making of a monster: the historical image of William Rufus

Few writers, medieval or modern, have had much good to write about William Rufus, the second Norman king of England (1087–1100). Beginning in the twelfth century, chroniclers and historians have portrayed William as a cruel, grasping, and sacriligious ruler. This study traces the development of this unflattering historical image from the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries and notes that the religious convictions which encouraged medieval churchmen to condemn Rufus were offset in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by a more political and anti-catholic approach to his reign. Beginning in the eighteenth century, however, historians abandoned this more flattering portrayal and returned once again to the evil image concocted by the monastic chroniclers.     

The family as the foundation of political rule in western philosophy: a comparative analysis of Aristotle's politics and Hegel's philosophy of right

For both Aristotle and Hegel, the family is the foundation in which the universalized rule of law is validated according to the political structure of the 'Polis' or 'State' itself. This composite whole or structure of society (Ancient Polis/Modern State) is the political end of humanity for both philosophers, which in turn finds its primordial beginning in the family. For Aristotle, it is in the kingly rule of the household that the property-based distinction of citizenship is set for the rule of his ideal Polis. For Hegel, it is in the love affirmed through caring affection within the nuclear family that the dialectical framework for the freedom of civil society, and the rational unity of a congregational 'spirit' in the State, finds its foundation. For both thinkers, the family sets the base for a political theory that defines citizenship in a manner that transcends the particularities of kin bonds.     

承续与建构：近年来国内马克思主义政治哲学研究综述

近年来,马克思主义政治哲学研究的广度与深度都有了较大的发展,为这一分支学科的建立和发展提     

Missing links: W. V. Quine, the making of ‘Two Dogmas’, and the analytic roots of post-analytic philosophy

This essay argues that post-analytic philosophy finds its origins not only in an invented tradition—that of ‘analytic philosophy’—but also in an invented dilemma: namely, the response to the allegedly overweening dominance of ‘positivism’ in American philosophy. I begin by surveying the problems with the folk wisdom about positivism and analytic philosophy. This pervasive narrative locates the emergence of post-analytic philosophy after a period of hegemony for logical positivism and cognate philosophical subfields. Taking seriously evidence indicating a distinct overlap in the construction of the analytic and post-analytic traditions, I return to the founding moment of American analytic philosophy in the years immediately following World War II. What we see, I suggest, is not a reaction against a clearly defined and powerful logical positivist mainstream, but the careful, piecewise co-ordination of what would become characteristic ‘analytic’ modes of argument, problematics, and tool kits. Willard Van Orman Quine played a central role in this process, and for this reason I focus on the circumstances in which his field-defining 1951 article, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ was written and received. I conclude with the claim that both analytic and post-analytic philosophers relied on a peculiar image of the failure of logical positivism, and of the opportunities that failure presented.     

Property and personal development: An interpretation of T.H. Green's political philosophy

This paper considers T.H. Green's theory of property in relation to recent studies of late nineteenth and early twentieth century liberal democratic thought. It is argued that neither the ‘Marxist’ spectacles worn by C.B. Macpherson nor the ‘Whiggish’ ones of Melvin Richter, Peter Clarke and Stefan Collini produce very clear or accurate images of Green's political philosophy. Macpherson's Green appears on close examination as yet another possessive individualist, while the ‘Whigs’ take a turn of the century standpoint and describe Green as holding positions that are ambivalent and fit awkwardly into the categories of individualism/ collectivism. In the remainder of the paper it is argued Green's property theory is best understood by focussing on his interest in the relationship between social life and personal development. By drawing on Green's published and unpublished writings it can be shown that Green's idea of personal development could be expressed in other language than that of economic individualism and that it cut across the individualist/collectivist categories in terms of which it is often discussed.