试论庄子《齐物论》中的“天下莫大于秋毫之末，而太山为小”一句

全文对比了陈鼓应、郭象、严北溟、章太炎、刘笑敢、曹础基等历代大家对于《齐物论》中“天下莫大于秋毫之末,而太山为小”一句的解释,并提出了作者自己的观点,即转换认识标准与视角的观点。     

论《庄子·齐物论》中的相对主义

《庄子》一书,历代注家设座立讼为之注解。其中《齐物论》因其地位之重要,而成为注家关注的焦点。庄子在《齐物论》中表达思想多使用“相对主义”。本文将以相对主义为切口,分析庄子如何将相对主义作为言道工具表达寄托:通过质疑“标准”,否定“成心”来去除事物间的差别,帮助我们跳出“以我观物”的局限,最后达到逍遥无待的“游世”境界。     

《庄子》内二篇文法抉微

《庄子》文章脉络断续隐约但讲究结构艺术,《齐物论》《养生主》是内篇中最长和最短的二篇,《齐物论》结构宏复,层次井然,局部问题的论述亦讲求逻辑。《养生主》小巧精致,每章各言一事而又相互勾连。以寓言阐发养生之道颇含巧思却能浑然天成。     

浅谈《庄子·齐物论》中的美学思想

庄子在中国古典美学史上有着重要作用,《庄子.齐物论》一篇比较集中地体现了庄子美学的内容,从庄子美学"法天贵真"的审美源头、"万物一齐"的审美标准、"身与物化"的审美境界三个方面,展示出了融美学与哲学为一体的庄子美学的魅力。     

《齐物论》、《中论》之比较

庄子的《齐物论》集中体现了道家思想的精华,龙树的《中论》开启了大乘之中观学派。对于"道"的体察,庄子继承了老子以无为本之说,表达了"道通为一"的观点,而龙树则立足于"空有不二",主张即体即用。两论都表现出了极强的解构性及趋向终极境域的态势,在体察"道境"、理解"道言"等问题上,也有很大的相似性。     

“易教之别传”——黄元炳阐释《庄子》的独特指向

民国时期,黄元炳全面继承王弼及宋明学人以《易》解《庄》的传统,在其所著《庄子新疏》中,将《庄子》视为"易教之别传",更以《易》"乾"卦疏解《逍遥游》篇,以《中庸》、《大学》结合《易》"乾"卦爻辞等比附《齐物论》,并在此基础上对《庄子》内七篇作出了独特的阐释,同时对于《庄子》外、杂篇也有所涉及,从而使《庄子新疏》成为了庄学史上易学化倾向最为显著的一部庄子学著作。     

历史的无意义与意义——论章太炎《易》学、《春秋》学中的历史观

章太炎在中国现代思想史上具有独特的地位。他不但大力破除中国"传统",而且对"现代性"也进行了深刻和透彻的批判。对"进化进步史观"的批判是章氏"反现代性"思想的核心。以往学者多关注其"俱分进化论",而作为"汉学"的嫡系传人,章太炎用《易》学和《春秋》学表述了一套与其"齐物论"相贯通的完整的历史观。他彻底批判了对历史的形而上学预设及其"起源"观念,否定了"进化进步"的历史及其意义;但他从未否定特殊、具体的历史连续性,并肯定一种自觉的历史连续性和对"传统"的创造,积极鼓励每一种文化追求价值自足和自立,从而促进现实秩序的批判性更新和创造。他的思想实践在当代中国的语境中富有启发意义。     

“齐物”世界中的学术、道德、风俗与政治——章太炎的“学术”观念及其对中国学术思想史的重释

在中国学术的现代转型过程中,章太炎是倡导求真求是之现代学术观念的重要人物。然而,他一方面自觉超越了兼知行而言之、以成德经世为旨趣的儒学式学术观念,另一方面又突破了现代学术以真理为职志而独立于致用的教义。章太炎以齐物论为理论根据,重新界定学术、政治、道德、社会之间的分界和关联,给出一套独特的关于社会领域分化的学说。章太炎的思想学说很难用现代与传统、激进或保守的现成框架来认知和解说,那将是对其人其学的极度简化。     

沉鱼落雁不是夸漂亮

"沉鱼落雁"这个成语一般用来形容女子美貌,但它的本意不是后人认为的意思。"沉鱼落雁"典出《庄子·齐物论》,原文如下:毛嫱、丽姬,人之所美也;鱼见之深入,鸟见之高飞,麋鹿见之决骤,四者孰     

沉鱼落雁不是夸漂亮

“沉鱼落雁”这个成语一般用来形容女子美貌,但它的本意不是后人认为的意思。 “沉鱼落雁”典出《庄子·齐物论》,原文如下：毛嫱、丽姬,人之所美也;鱼见之深入,鸟见之高飞,麋鹿见之决骤,四者孰知天下之正色哉？     

章太炎的甲骨文态度及其学术史意蕴

章太炎是20世纪中国现代学术的重要奠基人,他对甲骨文的态度引起学术界的关注和争论。本文以章氏晚年弟子的回忆、章氏晚年的讲演记录和书信为主要资料,认为章太炎晚年对甲骨文仍然持消极、怀疑态度,但已有转变的趋向;对他持这种态度的原因进行了剖析。章氏的甲骨文态度已成为一种文化现象,学界对他甲骨文态度的不同评论,一定意义上折射出现代学术史上的学派分野。     

以“一返方言”抵抗“汉字统一”与“万国新语”——章太炎关于语言文字问题的论争(1906—1911)

晚清的文字改革一直走着"步武日本"与"规仿泰西"两条路.章太炎1906年主持<民报>后,与日本的"汉字统一会"、法国巴黎的<新世纪>杂志,就语言文字问题展开论争,并创作出学术名著<新方言>.本文试图回到这两次论争的历史背景,梳理参与论争各方的思路与资源,探索学术史背后之思想史,阐明章太炎如何立足于方言,抵抗新时期仿日与崇欧的代表--"汉字统一"论和"万国新语"说.此过程中,他一方面展示了晚清以小学言国粹、言建国者的文化视野;另一方面阐述了以方言为根基、打通古今的"言文一致"观,以言语之"展转缘生"为依据,建立在文化地域亲缘性基础上的"语言统一"论.这两点都对现代中国的文化理想产生了深远影响.     

章太炎《春秋》学三变考论——兼论章氏“六经皆史”说的本意

经学消亡,其所述历史"神话"被否定,经学作为史料寄身于史学门下。按照中国学术"古今之变"的这一大线索来看,章太炎的"六经皆史"说对于中国学术、思想的现代转型具有里程碑式的地位和意义。自新文化运动以来,后世学者基本上按照这一线索将章太炎以"六经皆史"为要义的"古文经学"进行一分为二的评说:一方面肯定章太炎破除由经见道、通经致用的经学思维,将"六经"历史文献化,使儒家六经从神圣宝典下降到了古史资料地位。另一方面,又批评其"六经皆史"之说终未能脱离儒家经学的羁绊,仍为尊经崇圣的观念所困。这样一种以"传统/现代"为框架的二分法往往使我们忽略章太炎"古文经学"形成发展的内在轨迹和自身意图,从而造成对章太炎学术思想的割裂和简化。章太炎的《春秋》、《左传》学是其"古文经学"的主干,最能表现其"古文经学"形成发展的内在自身的思想轨迹。本文试图追迹章氏《春秋》学的变化发展,并以《春秋》学为中心,考察其"六经皆史"说的本意,提示其中值得重新审视的思想内涵。     

NIETZSCHE'S RELATION TO HISTORICAL METHODS AND NINETEENTH‐CENTURY GERMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

Nietzsche is generally regarded as a severe critic of historical method and scholarship; this view has influenced much of contemporary discussions about the role and nature of historical scholarship. In this article I argue that this view is seriously mistaken (to a large degree because of the somewhat misleading nature of Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben). I do so by examining what he actually says about understanding history and historical method, as well as his relation to the founders of modern German historiography (Wolf, Niebuhr, Ranke, and Mommsen). I show, contrary to most expectations, that Nietzsche knew these historians well and that he fundamentally affirmed their view of historical method. What he primarily objected to among his contemporaries was that historical scholarship was often regarded as a goal in itself, rather than as a means, and consequently that history was placed above philosophy. In fact, a historical approach was essential for Nietzsche's whole understanding of philosophy, and his own philosophical project.     

THE TEETH OF TIME: PIERRE HADOT ON MEANING AND MISUNDERSTANDING IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS1

The French philosopher and intellectual historian Pierre Hadot (1922–2010) is known primarily for his conception of philosophy as spiritual exercise, which was an essential reference for the later Foucault. An aspect of his work that has received less attention is a set of methodological reflections on intellectual history and on the relationship between philosophy and history. Hadot was trained initially as a philosopher and was interested in existentialism as well as in the convergence between philosophy and poetry. Yet he chose to become a historian of philosophy and produced extensive philological work on neo‐Platonism and ancient philosophy in general. He found a philosophical rationale for this shift in his encounter with Wittgenstein's philosophy in the mid‐1950s (Hadot was one of Wittgenstein's earliest French readers and interpreters). For Hadot, ancient philosophy must be understood as a series of language games, and each language game must be situated within the concrete conditions in which it happened. The reference to Wittgenstein therefore supports a strongly contextualist and historicist stance. It also supports its exact opposite: presentist appropriations of ancient texts are entirely legitimate, and they are the only way ancient philosophy can be existentially meaningful to us. Hadot addresses the contradiction by embracing it fully and claiming that his own practice aims at a coincidence of opposites (a concept borrowed from the Heraclitean tradition). For Hadot the fullest and truest way of doing philosophy is to be a philosopher and a historian at the same time.     

AFTERWORDS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ARTHUR DANTO'S PHILOSOPHIES OF HISTORY AND ART*

This essay is written as an introductory essay to celebrate the third edition of Arthur Danto's Analytical Philosophy of History, first printed in 1965. It raises questions about what it means to write an introduction and whether it is possible to write an introduction‐given Danto's own philosophical theses on history, the essay pays special attention to the connections between Danto's philosophy of history, philosophy of art, and the other areas of his philosophy that he regards to be all of a piece. It considers the nature of analytical philosophy and its heyday in America in the postwar period, when, to some degree, it was used as an antidote to an ideology of history that had perverted some of the most influential claims in a philosophy of history developed in Germany (mostly by Hegel) around 1800.     

Stewart,Kant, and the Reworking of Common Sense

Summary

Dugald Stewart was the first metaphysician of any significance in Britain who attempted to take account of Kantian philosophy, although his analysis appears generally dismissive. Traditionally this has been imputed to Stewart's poor understanding of Kant and to his efforts to defend the orthodoxy of common sense. This paper argues that, notwithstanding Stewart's reading, Kant's philosophy helped him in a reconsideration and reassessment of common sense philosophy. In his mature works—the Philosophical Essays (1810), the second volume of the Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1814), and the second part of his historical ‘Dissertation? (1815–1821)—Stewart's analysis of Kantian philosophy is far from being uniform. In the first two works, he takes a cautious approach to transcendentalism, showing some interest in the challenge it might represent for common sense; in the last, he turns to rash criticism. This change may appear confusing and inconsistent unless considered in the light of a precise ‘nationalistic’ strategy. In fact, once Stewart had taken from Kantian philosophy what he deemed useful for his own aims, he eventually dismissed it in order to show that his reworked version of common sense was the most original and most consistent outcome of the whole Anglo-Scottish philosophical tradition.     

Philosophy as a cultural resource and medium of reflection for Hermann Weyl

In a talk given at Zurich in the late 1940s, Hermann Weyl discussed Ferdinand Gonseth's dialectical epistemology and considered it as being restricted too strictly to aspects of historical change. His experiences with post-Kantian dialectical philosophy, in particular Johann Gottlieb Fichte's derivation of the concept of space and matter, had been a stronger dialectical background for his own 1918 studies in purely infinitesimal geometry and the early geometrically unified field theory of matter (extending the Mie-Hilbert program). Although now Weyl distantiated himself from the speculative features of his youthful philosophizing and in particular from his earlier enthusiasm for Fichte, he again had deep doubts as to the cultural foundations of modern mathematical sciences and its role in material culture of high modernity. For Weyl, philosophical «reflection» was a cultural necessity he now turned towards Karl Jaspers' and Martin Heidegger's existentialism to find deeper grounds, similar to his turn towards Fichte's philosophy after World War I. The discussion in the late 1940s can be read as a kind of post-World-War-II «Nachtrag» to Weyl's more widely known philosophical comments on mathematics and the natural sciences published in the middle of the 1920s.     

清末留日学生与地方督抚间的政治博弈——以留日陆军士官生为中心

甲午战争之后以张之洞为代表的地方督抚将强兵与教育当作富国图强的第一要务。基于人才匮乏,选择向日本派遣留学生,试图借助日本的教育资源作为解决瓶颈的捷径;事与愿违的是留日学生迅速觉醒,他们种种"反叛"行径使督抚们的名誉声望和辖区统治受到严重挑战。为此,张之洞等采用加强行政管理、严格选送学生、强化政治思想监控、参与制定留学生的考核办法和恩威并重等策略与留日学生展开政治博弈,但是,学生们的革命思想日渐成熟,在满、汉矛盾加剧的政治环境下,在辛亥革命前夕,这场政治博弈胜负已经底定。     

庄子“真人”思想考论

庄子《大宗师》集中出现了四则有关＂真人＂的论述。＂真人＂思想具有丰富的内涵。作为庄子自身理想人格的画像,＂真人＂等同于＂至人＂。真人一旦上升到＂道＂的层面,又等同于＂神人＂。真人思想的矛盾性源自《庄子》一书内容的复杂性。作为天道哲学的真人,其思想源自《道德经》、《山海经》等典籍;作为生命哲学的真人,源自《黄帝内经》、《周易》等。由后者形成一种＂葆真＂的生命哲学观,产生了积极而深远的影响。