To Lobby or Not to Lobby? Examining the Determinants of Nonprofit Organizations Taking the IRS 501(h) Election

While public policy scholars are gaining a better understanding of the nonprofit sector's impact on the policy process, the sector's role in lobbying efforts has only been studied in a limited manner. Currently, nonprofit organizations' lobbying activities and expenditures are limited by federal regulations, which are often misunderstood by nonprofit leaders. This article uses 2003 IRS Form 990 data for all nonprofit organizations in the United States to examine the organizational determinants of 501(c)3 nonprofits taking the Internal Revenue Service's 501(h) election and whether organizations use h‐election in a manner consistent with patterns of strategic behavior. Results show that nonprofit organizations that are reliant on direct public support are more likely to take the h‐election, while those reliant on government grants are less likely to take the h‐election. Examining lobbying expenditures, we find nonprofits associate with 501(h) election in a pattern consistent with strategic behavior. The findings suggest that nonprofit organizations with certain revenue streams and in specific subsectors respond differently to this election decision, and that organizations may respond strategically to mechanisms regulating their political activity.     

NATO's 2012 Chicago summit: a chance to ignore the issues once again?

NATO and its members are beginning to gear themselves up for the summit in Chicago in May 2012. Such summits are always important, especially when they are held in the United States during an election year and in the aftermath of the French presidential elections. This article addresses the issues that are likely to be most prominent at the Chicago summit—NATO's wars; enlargement and Russia; burden‐sharing; and divergent agendas—before drawing some general conclusions. The outstanding question is whether these issues will lead to division within NATO and hence its possible demise—or will they be finessed?     

Somalia and Yemen: The Links between Terrorism and State Failure

The scope of this study is to demonstrate that the failed state scheme of Somalia has not been and is not a safe haven for the al‐Qaeda, an issue that has been already displayed in Ken Menkhaus's excellent study (2004 ). Within this context, the article will consider the Somali Islamist political landscape in contrast and in relation to the current situation in Yemen, and thus, it aims to support the premise that weak states, such as Yemen, rather than “collapsed” states, can be incubators of international terrorism. In addition, while studying the interactions between Somalia and Yemen, we will attempt to answer some other important questions arising from this relationship: (1) does the emergence of al‐Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al‐Shabaab have potential convergence; and (2) why is piracy a cross‐border phenomenon and how is it connected to radical Islamism?     

A Matter of Framing: Explaining the Failure of Post‐Islamist Social Movements in the Arab Spring

Shortly after the Arab Spring began in 2010, multiple scholars noted that the dominant discursive trend present within these protests was that of post‐Islamism. Post‐Islamism is broadly defined as an ideology seeking to establish a democratic state within a distinctly Islamic society. Despite the presence of post‐Islamist opportunity structures, social movements embodying post‐Islamist principles have had little success consolidating power. The theoretical argument presented here is that the failure of these movements is the result of inherent flaws within post‐Islamist frames. Specifically, this study posits that unlike traditional Islamist frames (i.e., frames emphasizing the creation of a state governed by Shari‘a) post‐Islamist frames limit the ability of movements’ to monopolize religion as a cultural asset. As such, when post‐Islamist movements face political challenges during contentious periods they cannot rely on nontemporal legitimacy to retain power. Additionally, the challenging task of integrating Islamic and democratic frames in contentious moments renders post‐Islamist movements susceptible to counterframing. The preceding claims will be tested through a comparative analysis of the Iranian Hierocracy (1977–1979), and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (2011–2014). Comparing the experiences of a post‐Islamist movement (Brotherhood) with that of an Islamist movement (Hierocracy) will explicate the flaws within post‐Islamist frames.     

The Occurrence and Consequences of Electoral Mandates in Historical Context

This study revisits the debate over electoral mandates by assessing the occurrence and consequences of landslide electoral victories since the 1860s. The study builds on Keeler's (1993) formulation of mandates in terms of the opportunities afforded by an election. Viewing elections as creating policy opportunities allows a more straightforward assessment of the relation between election outcomes and the legislative activity that follows. The idea of policy windows also avoids some of the criticisms directed at electoral mandates. Using public laws enacted from 1860 to 1998,1 find that landslide electoral victories precede less active Congresses almost as often as they precede surges of legislative activity. Using qualitative historical information, I further find that the legislative opportunities afforded by a landslide victory are conditional upon unity of the president's party.     

‘A Model of its Kind’: Representation and Performance in the Sudan Self-government Election of 1953

In December 1953 Sukumar Sen, an Indian civil servant, bid farewell to Sudan, having just overseen Sudan's ‘self-government’ election. ‘Your election’, he told the people of Sudan in a radio broadcast, ‘can legitimately claim to have been a model of its kind.’ The election had seen determined attempts at manipulation—by Sudanese and by Sudan's rival colonial masters, Egypt and Britain. Much of this manipulation revolved around the mechanics of the election, and there were bitter arguments within the Electoral Commission which oversaw the event. Yet all involved were driven by a concern over representation—over how the election would look, to outsiders and to those involved. This paper will examine the debates over how the election should be conducted, and will suggest that, for those who organised it, the election was concerned not so much with representation of the will of the people, but rather with the representation of process.     

Parties,Governments and Pollsters: A New Form of Patronage?

In its first term, the Howard government hired Australasian Research Strategies (ARS), headed by pollster Mark Textor, to conduct market research for several Commonwealth departments and agencies. This was, the Labor Opposition claimed, a case of the Liberals handing jobs to their 'mates'. Textor played a key role in the Liberals' 1996 and 1998 federal election campaigns. However, Labor's attack rings hollow since in the 1980s the Hawke government similarly contracted Rod Cameron's ANOP to conduct opinion research for Commonwealth departments and agencies. At the time Cameron was Labor's strategic pollster and centrally involved in planning Labor election campaigns. On both sides of Australian politics, governments have begun to channel patronage towards their party's pollsters. In this research note, we suggest that this development cannot be explained as 'jobs for the boys'. Instead, this new form of patronage has its roots in the vital role that pollsters now play in guiding election campaigns, and in the commercial reality that Australian politics provides too little work to sustain specialist political pollsters. Parties in government now appear to utilise incumbency to sustain an ongoing relationship with the commercial polling organisations like ANOP and ARS to whom they will entrust much of the planning of their campaign for re-election.     

Complex security and strategic latency: the UK Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015

Whichever party or parties form the next UK government, a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) is expected to begin soon after the general election in May. The review might be a ‘light touch’ exercise—little more than a reaffirmation of the SDSR produced by the coalition government in 2010. It seems more likely, however, that the review will be a lengthier, more deliberate exercise and one which might even last into 2016. For those most closely engaged in the process the challenge is more complex than that confronted by their predecessors in 2010. The international security context is more confused and contradictory; the UK's financial predicament is still grave; security threats and challenges will emerge that cannot be ignored; the population's appetite for foreign military engagement appears nevertheless to be restricted; and prevailing conditions suggest that the risk‐based approach to national strategy might be proving difficult to sustain. Two key questions should be asked of the review. First, in the light of recent military experiences, what is the purpose of the United Kingdom's armed forces? Second, will SDSR 2015–16 sustain the risk‐based approach to national strategy set out in 2010, and if so how convincingly? Beginning with a review of the background against which SDSR 2015–16 will be prepared, this article examines both enduring and immediate challenges to the national strategic process in the United Kingdom and concludes by arguing for strategic latency as a conceptual device which can complement, if not reinvigorate, the risk‐based approach to national strategy and defence.     

Localism and radicalization in North Africa: local factors and the development of political Islam in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya

Over the past three decades North Africa has experienced a wave of Islamic activism. From the emergence of groups such as Shabiba Islamiya in Morocco in the 1970s to the recent appearance of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the region has been home to a plethora of different Islamist movements, each with its own national characteristics. As such the region has displayed a general propensity to Islamist activism. However, certain areas within each North African state have proven particularly receptive to the ideology of political Islam. Although this trend is by no means universal, given the strong appeal of the Islamist ideology that has been able to transcend geographical boundaries, these areas have nonetheless been a key source of recruitment not only for the more moderate strands of the Islamist opposition, but also to the militant movements and networks that espouse violence. As such there would appear to be a correlation between localism and Islamist activism in North Africa. Focusing on Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, this article will examine some of these local issues and will argue that in order to understand better the causes of radicalization in the region, the rise of Islamism in North Africa should be considered within the broader historical context of political and cultural resistance by certain peripheral regional elements to a dele-gitimized and stagnated central authority.     

A COMPARATIVE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF THE EARLIEST KILN SITES OF KORYǑ CELADON*

Four of the Koryǒ dynasty's earliest kiln sites are studied for the macroscopic, compositional, and microstructural characteristics of their celadon products. Recent excavation of Sǒri and surface investigation of Kangjin sites provided new materials for closer examination of the origin and early developments of celadon technology in traditional Korea. Two other sites, Wǒnhǔngni and Osari, with archaeological characteristics in common with the oldest layer of Sǒri, are also examined. Principal component analysis of body composition shows thai Sǒri and Kangjin had better control in their choice of raw materials whereas Wǒnhǔngnt and Osari had much wider scatter, showing the more experimental nature of their operation. The early Kangjin grouped out separately primarily because of their higher Al₂O₃ content, while X-ray diffraction patterns indicate they might have been fired at a higher temperature than other groups. The Korean method of two-step firing, first at a lower temperature to bake imglazed bodies and then at a higher temperature after glazing, is evident from the earliest operations in Kangjin.     

The recovery of a non-violent identity for an Islamist pesantren in an age of terror

This article examines the ways in which one of Indonesia's largest local, non-violent fundamentalist Islamist groups, Hidayatullah, has worked towards recovering a non-violent identity in the aftermath of allegations of terrorism made by the international community at the height of the War on Terror. Significantly, in international circles post-September 11, Indonesia's pesantren (Islamic boarding school) network more generally became associated with terrorism as they were seen as potential breeding grounds for Islamist extremism. Subsequently, allegations emerged implicating Hidayatullah as part of an extremist organised network linked to Jemaah Islamiyah and, by extension, Al Qaeda. The article demonstrates how, in the aftermath of the allegations, the group negotiated with the wider society and the state's national security laws on terrorism as it worked to recover its non-violent identity. In doing so, it also raises further questions about methodological practices in distinguishing between the heterogeneity and subjectivities within wider Islamist movements, especially in terms of militant and non-violent forms of Islamism.     

The Right to a Nice Home: housing inspection in 1930s Stockholm

This article deals with how the authorities taught the Swedes to live and how Swedish citizens came to accept such an intimate encroachment in their private lives. Why did people accept these social experts of everyday life? The answer tells us something about modern society and modernity itself.

Around the turn of the 20th century, Stockholm had one of Europe's worst housing conditions, according to Swedish experts of the time. One-room apartments were the norm, even for large families. Not all buildings had running water and often several families shared one outhouse. At the same time, the idea that the home was the place in which the conscientious citizens of the future would be raised was introduced – in Sweden as elsewhere. Dwellings became part of the social question. Many people believed that a well-functioning home would improve other aspects of life as well: men would stay at home in the evening instead of going to pubs; women would do a better job of raising the children; and public health would improve. A neglected home was seen as a sign of the exact opposite; the right to a nice home turned into a duty to live well. As an extension of this idea, housing inspections became important processes in the effort to improve the lives of citizens. The inspections were carried out by municipal employees, who were expected to monitor people's everyday lives. They functioned as housing experts, but what did these social engineers actually do? How did they become housing experts? And was their encroachment into people's daily lives accepted by ordinary citizens?     

Toward a Received History of the Holocaust

In this article, I examine both the problem of so-called postmodern history as it relates to the Holocaust and suggest the ways that Saul Friedlander's recent work successfully mediates between the somewhat overly polemicized positions of “relativist” and “positivist” history. In this context, I find that in his search for an adequately self-reflexive historical narrative for the Holocaust, Hayden White's proposed notion of “middle-voicedness” may recommend itself more as a process for eyewitness writers than as a style for historians after the fact. From here, I look at the ways Saul Friedlander's reflections on the historian's voice not only mediate between White's notions of the ironic mode and middle-voicedness, but also suggest the basis for an uncanny history in its own right: an anti-redemptory narrative that works through, yet never actually bridges, the gap between a survivor's “deep memory” and historical narrative. For finally, it may be the very idea of “deep memory” and its incompatibility to narrative that constitutes one of the central challenges to Holocaust historiography. What can be done with what Friedlander has termed “deep memory” of the survivor, that which remains essentially unrepresentable? Is it possible to write a history that includes some oblique reference to such deep memory, but which leaves it essentially intact, untouched and thereby deep? In this section, I suggest, after Patrick Hutton, that “What is at issue here is not how history can recover memory, but, rather, what memory will bequeath to history.” That is, what shall we do with the living memory of survivors? How will it enter (or not enter) the historical record? Or to paraphrase Hutton again, “How will the past be remembered as it passes from living memory to history?” Will it always be regarded as so overly laden with pathos as to make it unreliable as documentary evidence? Or is there a place for the understanding of the witness, as subjective and skewed as it may be, for our larger historical understanding of events? In partial answer to these questions, I attempt to extend Friedlander's insights toward a narrow kind of history-telling I call “received history”—a double-stranded narrative that tells a survivor-historian's story and my own relationship to it. Such a narrative would chart not just the life of the survivor-historian itself but also the measurable effect of the tellings—both his telling and mine—on my own life's story. Together, they would compose a received history of the Holocaust and its afterlife in the author's mind—my “vicarious past.”     

Beverley,Inderauuda and St John: A Neglected Reference

Abstract

This article examines the 1852 Sunderland election campaign as an example of a borough election in the fluid political situation of the 1850s. It seeks to demonstrate the complex interaction of national and local issues, influence, personalities and personal interests in the context of the town's previous electoral history, and the influence that memories of incidents in previous campaigns exerted on the contest. It argues that it was, and was perceived by contemporaries to be, primarily a contest between interests within the Liberal party rather than one between Conservatives and Liberals. The article seeks to identify the problems this presented in the management of the election and the tactics and means employed in the presentation of the campaigns to the public, particularly in the use made of local newspapers. The bitterness of the contest and the volume of, at times contradictory, evidence that has survived allow for a more detailed examination than is possible for many elections of this period, enabling at least some insight to be gained into the complexity of the underlying manoeuvres and the shifting motives and loyalties of the participants. The article concludes by examining briefly the results of the election but acknowledges the difficulties of attempting to go beyond the contest and its result to reach any detailed understanding of voters' motivations.     

Continuity and change: prospects for civil—military relations in Turkey

Early indications suggest that the appointment of General Yaþar Büyükanýt as chief of the Turkish general staff (TGS) at the end of August 2006 marked a new era in civil‐military relations in the country. Yet it would be a mistake to see the military's more forthright attitude under Büyükanýt simply as a return to the past. Civil‐military relations in Turkey have always been characterized by a combination of continuity and change. Both the legal basis for and the TGS's own perceptions of the role and responsibilities of the military have remained unchanged for over 70 years. However, the extent and the manner in which the military has influenced politics have always varied. In recent years the TGS's ability to ensure that government policy remains within acceptable parameters has been primarily based on its public prestige rather than the prospect of a full‐blooded military coup. Although the TGS has always been the most respected institution in the country, the Turkish public's willingness to tolerate, or even to encourage, its assumption of a more active political role has traditionally varied according to changes in the prevailing domestic political circumstances: falling during times of stability and confidence and rising during times of uncertainty. In early 2007 both the country and the government of the moderately Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP) appeared to have lost momentum and direction. In such an environment, and in the continued absence of an eff ective political opposition, many Turks will once again look to the country's military to prevent the JDP from increasing its control over the apparatus of state, starting with the appointment of a new president in April 2007. To date the JDP has always backed down in the face of pressure from the TGS. However, whether it will continue to do so, and what the TGS can or will do if the JDP defies its warnings, currently all remain unclear.     

Turkish foreign policy since 2002: between a‘post‐Islamist’government and a Kemalist state

This article discusses Turkish foreign policy over the past four years, since the election of a ‘post‐Islamist’ administration. It argues that although this period has been ‘Huntingtonian’, in terms of the diff erent political values and origins of the government on the one hand and the largely Kemalist state on the other, in the realm of foreign policy at least the relationship has been more cooperative and complementary than confictual. By focusing on seven areas of Turkey's foreign relations, as diverse as the EU, Cyprus, Syria and the Israeli—Palestinian conflict, the article identifies four types of experience in the overall conduct of policy: convergence; contained disharmomy; managed ideological divergence; and neutrality. It concludes by arguing that, providing Turkey's political institutions remain robust, there is no reason why this surprisingly successful cohabitation should not continue into the next parliament after 2007.     

Managers and Agents: Conservative Party Organisation in the 1850s*

During the 1850s in the wake of the calamitous Peelite split, Britain's Conservative Party struggled to rebuild its numbers in the house of commons. The structure of the party's electoral organisation is well known‐parliamentary leaders, election managers such as Sir William Jolliffe and Philip Rose, plus local constituency based agents. Jolliffe's and Rose's 1859 election notebooks help understand this, but they also reveal serious gaps in the Conservatives' information networks. This article delineates the electoral activities of Sir John Yarde Buller (first Baron Churston) and his ally Samuel Triscott, who supplemented the spasmodic flow of information from small boroughs in at least two counties. Mid‐level or second‐tier managers, to whom no attention has previously been given, assisted the Conservatives in their gradual electoral recovery. Their roles also suggest that the party's organization may have been more complex than previously believed.     

‘Underhand Dealings with the Papal Authorities’: Disraeli and the Liberal Conspiracy to Disestablish the Irish Church

During the parliamentary election of 1868, Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli sent a ‘gentleman spy’ to Ireland to seek evidence showing that William Gladstone had agreed to disestablish the Church of Ireland in return for the Vatican's promise of Irish catholic votes. Proof of this conspiracy, Disraeli hoped, would prompt an anti‐catholic backlash and tip the election to the Conservatives. Disraeli's spy spent four weeks interviewing various Liberal politicians and Irish catholic prelates and claimed to have discovered not only a secret agreement between Gladstone and the bishops, but also a vast Vatican conspiracy to use Irish nationalist agitation to undermine the English constitution. Unfortunately, he never found written proof of any either scheme. The Liberals won the election by a large margin and soon passed an act disestablishing the Church of Ireland. Although out of office, Disraeli remained in contact with his secret agent, using him for further missions in England and on the continent. Despite its failure, the spy's mission offers fresh insight into Disraeli's character and policies. Disraeli combined opportunistic political scheming with a weakness for conspiracy theories. His agent's mission to Ireland was certainly an intrigue meant to turn the political tables on the Liberals but was based on Disraeli's belief that Rome actually had conspired with Gladstone. Recognition of Disraeli's faith in the existence of papal conspiracies helps to make his public statements about disestablishment more comprehensible and suggests a new explanation for his ongoing inflexibility in regard to Irish grievances and reforms.     

By‐Elections and Political Change in a Local Context: The Case of the 1973 Dundee East By‐Election and the SNP

With their unpredictability and occurrence in between nationwide elections, by‐elections have attracted a degree of scholarly interest. However, this has focused almost exclusively on how the contests have affected, or failed to affect, the direction of national politics. This article seeks to, instead, explore their influence upon the locality in which they are fought. It will achieve this through an analysis of the 1973 Dundee East by‐election and its consequences for the development of the local Scottish National Party (SNP). Prior to the by‐election, the party had not been particularly strong in Dundee. Yet the contest provided a setting in which it was able to transform itself into one of the most effective Nationalist organisations in Scotland, capable of cementing an SNP MP in the constituency from 1974 until 1987, holding firm against the collapse in the party's support across the country in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The article will examine the extent to which this resistance to the national swing was facilitated by the legacies of the by‐election and the extent to which its wider footprint contributed towards the development of an enduring party tradition that has persisted for decades.     

Scholarly Authority and Lay Mobilization: Yusuf al‐Qaradawi's vision of da‘wa, 1976‐1984

The late 1970s and early 1980s were a propitious yet challenging time for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as its elites sought to define the movement's priorities in the face of new opportunities to spread their call (da‘wa). The debate over preaching, while one of strategic assessment, also involved a negotiation of intellectual hierarchy: Should laymen lead Egypt's oldest Islamist organization, or should scholars? In contrast to previous studies that focus on how laymen led the Brotherhood's return to grassroots preaching, this article reintegrates scholars into the story of da‘wa by focusing on the organization's most prominent ‘ālim, Shaykh Yusuf al‐Qaradawi, and his vision of institution‐based preacher education and extra‐institutional activism. Drawing on three books written by Qaradawi on this topic between the mid‐1970s and early 1980s, this article casts lights not only on this Islamist scholar's claim to religious authority as he sought to mold the Brotherhood, but also on the ways in which projects of mass mobilization – whether grassroots preaching or the reform of state‐sponsored educational curricula – have transformed scholarly claims to authority more broadly.