Falling into line? Kosovo and the course of German foreign policy

Germany's role in Operation Allied Force has been described as a watershed in its foreign policy. It remains perhaps the pinnacle of Germany's security and defence policy transition after the Cold War. Germany's participation in Operation Allied Force was the first aggressive use of force by the Bundeswehr since the Second World War and, remarkably, was undertaken without a United Nations Security Council mandate. The deployment of German forces in 1999 suggested that German reluctance to burden-share in crisis management alongside NATO allies had been overcome. Yet Germany remains a cautious actor when it comes to the deployment of offensive military force. In this regard, Germany has maintained a considerable degree of continuity in its foreign and security policy after unification, a theme which this article will outline.     

CANADIAN NOVELS FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND HISTORIANS

Most discussions about the impact of Afghanistan on the future of NATO focus on transatlantic relations between the United States and the European Union. But for Canada, which is one of the few NATO allies that voluntarily deployed into the south, facing heavy resistance and fighting from Taliban insurgents, the Afghanistan operations have become the most salient dimension of its continued involvement in the Atlantic Alliance. While this may seem surprising, given the cutbacks in Canadian defense spending in the 1990s and the withdrawal of Canada's standing forces from Germany, it should not. For during that so-called dark decade, Canada continued to make major contributions to NATO and European security. This essay argues that Ottawa's multi-faceted military and political support of the “new” NATO of the post–Cold War era continued when the alliance undertook its involvement in Afghanistan. Indeed, in its efforts in support of NATO's mission in Afghanistan, Canada has demonstrated a dedication to the alliance that seems stronger than NATO's collective commitment to itself.     

“学生冷战”及其悖论——以国际学生大会为中心的探讨

第二次世界大战结束后,美苏两国在政治经济领域和地缘政治方面的矛盾和冲突频仍,冷战格局逐渐形成。在此过程中,以不同社会或文化属性为特征的跨国民众组织纷纷建立,并借助思想和文化的力量将裂痕延伸至民族国家内部,形成更为深度的东西方对峙样态。学生群体在这场冷战对抗中表现格外突出。以美国全国学联和国际学生大会为代表,跨国学生组织虽然参与到冷战政治对抗进程中,却并未完全遵循政府议事日程。学生组织的独立性和进步性使其始终与冷战政治保持距离,并成为促进冷战缓和乃至终结的重要力量。对“学生冷战”及其悖论展开探讨,有助于建立更加完整的冷战叙事,回应仍旧处于争议中的冷战史研究母课题。     

Long wars and long telegrams: containing Al-Qaeda

Can history help the ‘war on terror’? It is a cliché that 9/11 changed the world. But the idea that the war is exceptional lacks historical perspective. Assuming a radically new threat, the Bush administration proclaimed a theology rather than a coherent strategy. It articulated the ‘war on terror’ as a utopian and unbounded quest for absolute security. It did not effectively measure costs against risks or orchestrate ends, ways and means. This led the United States into exhausting wars of attrition. A more careful dialogue with the past can address this. Containment, America's core idea during the Cold War, supplies a logic that can inform a prudent strategy. Like Soviet communism with its fatal self‐contradictions, Al‐Qaeda and its terror network is ultimately self‐destructive without major military operations. America and its allies can contain it with more limited measures in the long term as it destroys itself. The US should show restraint, doing nothing to hinder the growing Islamic revolt against Al‐Qaeda. In other words, fight small and wait.     

NATO's evolving purposes and the next Strategic Concept

Is there a conflict between the Alliance's original and enduring purpose of collective defence and its post‐Cold War crisis management functions? This is an ill‐framed debate, because the home base must be secure in order to support expeditionary power projection. The allies have, moreover, moved away from a static, reactive, and territorial concept of collective defence towards a more ‘proactive’ and ‘anticipatory’ approach. Some experts have even referred to a ‘deterritorialization’ of collective defence. Other issues also illustrate the changing dimensions of collective defence—missile defence, cyber warfare, space operations, the risk of state‐sponsored terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, political–military dynamics in the Middle East and the Asia–Pacific region, and the risk of a non‐Article 5 operation becoming a collective defence contingency. Despite disagreements on how to pursue shared goals, the allies may yet demonstrate that they have the vision and political will to meet the new challenges. The question of the Alliance's ‘level of ambition’ in capabilities is inseparable from that of its agreed purposes and burden‐sharing to achieve them.     

‘A great list of potential mistakes’: NATO,Africa, and British efforts to limit the Global Cold War

The scholarly consensus on why NATO adopted a ‘non-policy’ towards the non-North Atlantic world rests on the logic of the Cold War. But British diplomats and officials did not see NATO’s policy towards Africa through a Cold War lens. NATO’s ‘non-policy’ towards the world beyond the North Atlantic was not the product of an allied Cold War consensus among the allies. Instead, it was the result of a determined British effort to channel growing pressure for NATO action into a bureaucratic dead-end in an effort to keep the Cold War out of Africa.     

Nixon's Coup: Establishing the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, 1969–70

In early 1969 the new US President, Richard Nixon, suggested the expansion of allied political consultation, as well as the setting up of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) committee which would deal with environmental problems. The Americans stressed that their proposal did not involve merely the technical aspects of environmental protection, but also the need for modern governance to evolve in order to safeguard the ‘quality of life’, a prime aspect affecting the legitimisation of the political and social systems. The US proposal was not received enthusiastically by the allies, who had little desire for radical changes, and did not regard this as a proper subject for the alliance; some even feared that a NATO role in environmental questions might mask a US disengagement from European security, especially during an era of détente. However, after making sure that the new committee would be fully under the control of the Council (in accordance with NATO's inter-governmental character), the allies finally agreed to its creation. The NATO discussions on the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) point to the emergence of a new, more complex international agenda, and raise interesting questions regarding transatlantic relations during an era of wider transitions.     

‘The Danger is Two-Fold’: Decolonisation and Cold War in Anti-Communist Asia, 1955–7

This article examines the intersection between the Cold War and decolonisation in anti-Communist Asia in the 1950s. Drawing on the papers of former South Korean President Syngman Rhee housed at Yonsei University, the article explores both the motivations behind as well as the constraints upon South Korea's efforts to cultivate a military alliance in what it called ‘Free Asia’. Articulating some of the concrete political differences between South Korea and its potential partners in Asia, the article argues that Rhee's hardline views of the Cold War were interwoven with his ambivalence about Japan's reintegration in the post-war world. As a result of this intersection between the Cold War and decolonisation, the South Korean President was unable to achieve consensus with the rest of anti-Communist Asia. In exploring this chapter of South Korean diplomacy, the article calls on Cold War diplomatic history to integrate non-Communist Asia and for the historiography of decolonisation to investigate the legacies of Japan's empire in post-war Asia. It also suggests that scholars ought to reflect more deeply on the interrelationship between the Cold War and decolonisation.     

More flexible,less coherent: NATO after Lisbon

At its 2010 Lisbon summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) took significant steps towards becoming a modern alliance. In the face of a changing security environment and divergent strategic interests among 28 members, NATO adapted its strategic concept and reformed its way of formulating strategy. The new strategic concept advances conflict management as a core task for the alliance. In combination with a greater emphasis on developing partnerships, NATO conceptually strengthened its profile as a global security actor. The summit also reflected a new approach to formulating NATO strategy by providing the Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen with a strong role in setting the strategic agenda. Indeed, he assumed a more supranational function rather than acting as a representative of all allies. But as the Libya operation demonstrates, NATO will struggle to maintain cohesion in an increasingly ‘polycentric’ alliance. While the focus on conflict management will make the alliance more flexible, it will also become a less coherent global security actor.     

Maintaining transatlantic strategic,operational and tactical interoperability in an era of austerity

With the end of major combat operations in Afghanistan, how will the North Atlantic alliance maintain the unprecedented levels of interoperability developed over the last decade? One of the most effective means of building and maintaining interoperability—the forward‐based presence of US military forces in Europe— has shrunk significantly over the last 25 years and is likely to shrink further in the coming years, meaning it will become increasingly difficult for American and European military forces to operate side by side. Nevertheless, the United States continues to look to its allies in NATO as the primary partners in maintaining and promoting common interests around the globe. Additionally, Washington seems more committed than ever to wielding force in a coalition context. In order to help remedy this seeming incongruity, Washington announced in early 2012 a plan to deploy rotationally several hundred troops from the United States to Germany for periodic exercises with European partners and allies. However, it remains unclear whether a rotational model will be sufficient to generate the level of interoperability necessary for US forces and those of its most capable European allies to work seamlessly across the range of military operations. The loss of tactical and operational interoperability threatens transatlantic strategic interoperability, and therefore risks decoupling European and American security policy. To mitigate these challenges, the article discusses several policy steps the United States should consider.     

State Failure and the Clash of Civilisations: An Examination of the Magnitude and Extent of Domestic Civilisational Conflict from 1950 to 1996

This study quantitatively examines Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' theory using data from the State Failure dataset which focuses on intense and violent internal conflicts between 1950 and 1996. The proportion of state failures which are civilisational has remained mostly constant since 1965. The absolute amount of civilisational conflict has dropped considerably since the end of the Cold War. There is no clear evidence that the overall intensity of civilisational state failures is increasing in proportion to non-civilisational state failures. Also, the predictions of Islam's 'bloody borders' and the Confucian/Sinic-Islamic alliance against the West have not yet occurred. In fact, Islamic groups 'clash' mostly with other Islamic groups. However, the majority of the West's civilisational conflicts, during the Cold War and to a lesser extent after it, are with the Islamic civilisation. Thus it is arguable that Huntington's prediction that the Islamic civilisation is a potential threat to the West is probably more due to the end of the relevance of the Cold War paradigm than any post-Cold War changes in the nature of conflict. This highlights the potential influence of paradigms on policy and should serve as a caution to academics and policy makers to be more aware of the assumptions they make based on any paradigm.     

Command Centre Bjorn: the conflict heritage of a Swedish Cold War military installation

This text presents the results of a contemporary archaeological investigation of an important Swedish Cold War installation, Command Centre Bjorn. This centre was connected to the Air Force Attack Squadron and together with the coastal artillery and the navy it constituted a crucial part of the Swedish defence efforts during the Cold War period. The text also discusses questions concerning heritage processes, and it stresses that a contemporary archaeology approach can contribute with new insights into the Cold War and its heritage in Sweden, as well as canalize and offer guidance to the huge public interest in the material remains from this period in Sweden.     

The anxious host: Czechoslovakia and Carlos the Jackal 1978–1986

The nature of engagement by communist states with international terrorism remains contested. Furthermore, it represents one of the most enigmatic aspects of the Cold War. This article challenges the notion that the Soviet Bloc provided uniform active support to late Cold War terrorists and suggests new categories of host. To demonstrate the complexities and paradoxes of state-terrorist relations we examine Communist Czechoslovakia's relations with Carlos the Jackal – the most notorious terrorist of the period. The historical consensus remains that Carlos was supported by the Eastern Bloc. However, as newly-released Eastern European secret service documents show, attitudes of Moscow's allies varied considerably. Czechoslovakia was, at best, a temporary and ‘anxious host’. The arrival of major terrorists in such ‘anxious’ states were in fact often unannounced, uninvited and undesired – yet the hosts fell short of arresting the terrorists either due to ideological affinity or fear of retribution. From his first visit to Prague, Carlos the Jackal was considered to be a threat and a reputational hazard by the Czechoslovak State Security (StB). Gradually, the StB adopted subtle measures aimed at deterring the return of Carlos and his Group. Finally, in the mid-1980s, they artfully ejected the Jackal and his accomplices from its territory, but without risking formal expulsion.     

Privatization of Security,Arms Proliferation and the Process of State Collapse in Africa

Most so–called ‘collapsed states’ in Africa are extreme cases of the complex and contradictory processes of state–making and unmaking which are unfolding in the continent. Beneath the veneer of sovereignty, virtually all these nations started their independent existence in the 1960s as shell states. Since then, they have either followed the path of self–destruction (state collapse) or have sought to fill the shell with institutional content (state–making). Private military intervention is one of the key external factors undermining the state–building project. Whether in its traditional ‘soldier of fortune’ form, or in its current corporate cloak, the privatization of security injects an inflammatory element into the governance process in weak states. Since independence, the populations of Africa have been subjected to structural violence that has highlighted force and de–emphasized human security as the cornerstone of governance. Civil society reactions to this have become more pronounced since the end of the Cold War, and have led to negative reconfiguration in weak states that are least equipped to manage the new challenges. The privatization of security impedes efforts to fashion accountable governance, and entrenches the culture of violence. Private military companies, their partner arms brokers and local warlords are the principal actors in illegitimate resource appropriation — a major cause of ongoing asymmetric warfare in Africa — and the proliferation of weapons — an incendiary element in these wars.     

Underplaying the ‘Okinawa card’: how Japan negotiates its alliance with the United States

The US military bases in the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa have long been a source of domestic political opposition to the US–Japan alliance. As an alliance management issue, the ongoing troubles surrounding the bases raise questions as to when and why states adopt particular bargaining strategies when dealing with allies. Why, for instance, has the Japanese government not made greater use of this ‘Okinawa card’ when negotiating alliance issues with the USA? Even though highlighting particular domestic problems as a part of a negotiating strategy (known as tying hands) should appeal to a weaker ally such as Japan, this article argues that in the Okinawan case the reverse has been true. Japan has generally, though not always, sought to minimise or downplay domestic opposition to its alliance agreements, essentially preferring a cutting-slack to a tying-hands approach. The Japanese experience suggests that when states which are directly dependent on an alliance for their security see their security environment as unstable, they view tying-hands strategies as too likely to undermine their bargaining credibility. Maintaining credibility is important in an alliance bargaining context because it is a way for such states to signal their commitment to an alliance and so guard against abandonment.     

Kennedy's international legacy,fifty years on

This article explores historical assessments of the foreign policy of President John F. Kennedy, who was assassinated fifty years ago. It traces the evolution of JFK historiography from the uncritical so‐called ‘Camelot’ school to harsh revisionist critiques in the 1980s and 1990s, and on to the current ‘third wave’ of scholarship. The article focuses in particular on new work concerning JFK's handling of the Berlin and Cuba superpower crises, his role in expanding the United States’ involvement in Vietnam (and whether blame for this war can be assigned to him) and larger questions about his approach to the danger of nuclear holocaust and the possibility of defusing Cold War tensions. The conclusion to the article examines his various peace‐seeking initiatives in the months following the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests that Kennedy may have been turning towards a more critical view of American Cold War politics when he was killed in Dallas in November 1963.     

Russia resurgent? Moscow's campaign to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’

Russia's military incursion into Georgia in August 2008 and formal recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia raise fundamental questions about Russian regional policy, strategic objectives and attitudes to the use of armed force. The spectacle of maneouvre warfare on the periphery of Europe could form a watershed in post‐Cold War Russian relations with its neighbourhood and the wider international community. The speed and scale with which Russia's initial ‘defensive’ intervention to ‘coerce Georgia to peace’ led to a broad occupation of many Georgian regions focuses attention on the motivations behind Russian military preparations for war and the political gains Moscow expected from such a broad offensive. Russia has failed to advance a convincing legal case for its operations and its ‘peace operations’ discourse has been essentially rhetorical. Some Russian goals may be inferred: the creation of military protectorates in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; inducing Georgian compliance, especially to block its path towards NATO; and creating a climate of uncertainty over energy routes in the South Caucasus. Moscow's warning that it will defend its ‘citizens’ (nationals) at all costs broadens the scope of concerns to Russia's other neighbour states, especially Ukraine. Yet an overreaction to alarmist scenarios of a new era of coercive diplomacy may only encourage Russian insistence that its status, that of an aspirant global power, be respected. This will continue to be fuelled by internal political and psychological considerations in Russia. Careful attention will need to be given to the role Russia attributes to military power in pursuing its revisionist stance in the international system.     

跨学科方法与冷战史研究

就研究方法而言,受兰克史学观念的影响,中国的冷战史研究长期以来以档案研究和传统叙事为主,急需跨学科理论与方法的引入。国际关系理论、文化研究方法和社会性别理论可以帮助冷战史学者提出新问题、发现新领域、挖掘新材料和建立新解释。跨学科理论和方法的引入不仅不会削弱冷战史的史学色彩,反而会加强冷战史的人文特性,并有助于建立起关于冷战史的新叙事。     

The European defence project and the Prague summit

This article reviews the state of the two security and defence institutions available to west Europeans: NATO and the EU's common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In each case, the authors assess the political maturity and stability of the institution, and then ask what it can contribute in terms of coordinated military capability to west European's strategic readiness. NATO's Prague summit in November 2002 will address the thorny issue of the next tranche of post–Cold War enlargement. But beyond the predictable debate about which candidates to admit, and what should be offered to those unsuccessful in their bid, there will be a far more urgent and important agenda to be discussed at Prague—the military capabilities of the European allies. Given that ESDP is still far from achieving its capability goals, the authors argue that the time is right for European allies to begin thinking in terms of generating a composite, joint strike force which could be configured to be interoperable with US forces and which could salvage something useful from the disheartening lack of progress in developing a European military capability.     

How Japan matters in the evolving East Asian security order

This article argues that Japan matters crucially in the evolving East Asian security order because it is embedded both in the structural transition and the ongoing regional strategies to manage it. The post‐Cold War East Asian order transition centres on the disintegration of the post‐Second World War Great Power bargain that saw Japan subjecting itself to extraordinary strategic constraint under the US alliance, leaving the conundrum of how to negotiate a new bargain that would keep the peace between Japan and China. To manage the uncertainties of this transition, East Asian states have adopted a three‐pronged strategy of: maintaining US military preponderance; socializing China as a responsible regional great power; and cultivating regionalism as the basis for a long‐term East Asian security community. Japan provides essential public goods for each of these three elements: it keeps the US anchored in East Asia with its security treaty; it is the one major regional power that can and has helped to constrain the potential excesses of growing Chinese power while at the same time crucially engaging with and helping to socialize China; and its economic and political participation is critical for meaningful regionalism and regional integration. It does not need to be a fully fledged, ‘normal’ Great Power in order to carry out these roles. As the region tries to mediate the growing security dilemma among the three great powers, Japan's importance to regional security will only grow.