On the identity of NATO

Although we may well be missing the point about NATO if we conceptualize it as just another military alliance, defining NATO as a community of liberal democratic values and norms is problematic. A distinction must be made between a community of values linked to particular experiences and a particular context and a community based on democratic principles. What has kept NATO together beyond the Cold War is a sense of shared history and fate. If such a 'value-hypothesis' about NATO is correct, the continued survival of the organization does not depend only on the marginal costs of maintaining it continuing to outweigh those of creating a new organization. The future of NATO will also depend on the extent to which it is possible to restore (or reestablish) a sense of shared fate and mutual confidence across the Atlantic.     

NATO: the practice and politics of transformation

The Iraq crisis caused a deep rift in US–European relations and within Europe. NATO seemed sure at least to be damaged, if not fatally undermined. But to the dismay of those who have been waiting for many years for NATO finally to unravel, the Atlantic alliance spent 2003 proudly showing off its transformation project, and looking forward to its next enlargement in 2004. Yet these necessary improvements to NATO's political and military structures, and to its deployable capability, cannot alone secure the alliance's future. This article argues that what is needed, as ever, is a shared determination among governments that NATO can continue to serve their needs. There has been no better opportunity since the end of the Cold War to place the US-European security relationship on a firm footing through NATO. There has also been no moment when the penalties of failure have been higher. If NATO's transformation agenda, together with the NATO–EU 'Berlin Plus' arrangement, are not exploited to the full, then US-European security relations are unlikely to recover from Iraq.     

The US Nuclear Posture Review and the NATO allies

The 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review called for reducing operationally deployed US strategic nuclear warheads by almost two-thirds over the decade ending in 2012; emphasizing the development and/or improvement of capabilities other than nuclear forces, including missile defences, non-nuclear strike forces, and a responsive infrastructure; and placing nuclear and other capabilities within the framework of new concepts such as dissuasion and capabilities-based planning. The reductions foreseen in the NPR furnished the basis for the May 2002 Moscow Treaty. Allied observers have welcomed this treaty as a political substitute for the ABM Treaty and START negotiations, but have found it disappointing as an arms control measure. While allied observers have expressed reservations about combining nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces in a single notional leg of the 'New Triad' and about increasing readiness for possible nuclear testing, they have endorsed unprecedented steps in the defensive area, notably with respect to ballistic missile defence. Some new US concepts have been relatively uncontroversial because they represent continuity, but others (such as dissuasion and deterrence by denial) have evoked scepticism.     

Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO

Historically the NATO allies have focused considerable attention on US 'extended deterrence'— that is, the extension by Washington of an umbrella of protection, sometimes called a 'nuclear guarantee'. A persisting requirement has been to provide the allies with assurance about the reliability and credibility of this protection. This article examines the definition of 'assurance' used by the US Department of Defense for most of the past decade and argues that it has drawn attention to long-standing policy challenges associated with US extended deterrence in NATO. The article considers the assurance roles of US nuclear forces in Europe, as well as elements of assurance in Washington's relations with its allies regarding extended nuclear deterrence. Whether the allies will retain the current requirements of extended deterrence and assurance in their new Strategic Concept or devise a new approach will be an issue of capital importance in the policy review launched at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit. Contrasting approaches to these questions are visible in the United States and Germany, among other allies. The main issues to be resolved include reconciling extended deterrence with arms control priorities; managing the divisions in public and expert opinion; and avoiding certain potential consequences of a rupture with established arrangements.     

British nuclear weapons and NATO in the Cold War and beyond

NATO has been a source of influence on British nuclear policy and strategy since the 1950s. The nature and extent of its influence has, however, been kept limited by successive British governments. This article considers how and why this has happened. It discusses evolving British attitudes towards NATO command and planning, and shows how these were reflected with regard to strategic nuclear issues from the late 1950s. The evolution of the key notion that the United Kingdom is a second centre of nuclear decision within NATO is traced, and both its utility and contradictions are examined. Overall it is argued that, both during and since the Cold War, NATO has neither been a central factor in shaping British nuclear strategy and policy, nor have British nuclear weapons been other than of limited importance and relevance for most NATO members.     

The future of NATO enlargement after the Ukraine crisis

Russian President Vladimir Putin claims that his country's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was partly in response to NATO enlargement. NATO leaders counter that eastern enlargement is not a cause of the Ukraine crisis, and they argue that enlargement does not threaten Russia, but rather it creates stability for all of Europe. This article examines the history of NATO–Russian tensions over enlargement, considers how NATO's enlargement policy factored into the Ukraine crisis, and reviews options for the future of enlargement. Drawing on diplomatic history and geopolitical theory, the article explains Russia's persistent hostility towards NATO's policy of eastward expansion and highlights NATO's failure to convert Russia to its liberal world‐view. The alliance's norm‐driven enlargement policy has hindered the creation of an enduring NATO–Russia cooperative relationship and helped fuel the outbreak of conflict in Georgia and Ukraine. In light of this, NATO should alter its current enlargement policy by infusing it with geopolitical rationales. This means downgrading the transformative and democratization elements of enlargement and, instead, focusing on how candidate countries add to NATO capabilities and impact overall alliance security. A geopolitically‐driven enlargement policy would prioritize countries in the Balkan and Scandinavian regions for membership and openly exclude Georgia and Ukraine from membership. Ultimately, this policy would have the effect of strengthening NATO while giving it more flexibility in dealing with Russia.     

美国与北约对苏联的输油钢管禁运

北大西洋公约组织是美国在军事领域遏制苏联的工具。然而北约亦曾被美国赋予经济冷战职能,于1962--1966年间对苏联实行了大口径输油钢管禁运。这一事实,长期以来没有受到我国学术界的重视。在国外,已有学对此进行研究并取得一定的成果,     

NATO, the Baltic states and Russia: a framework for sustainable enlargement

In this article the author discusses the projected enlargement of NATO, focusing on the candidacy of the three Baltic states. He examines the factors that have induced the Baltic governments to seek NATO membership, the steps the alliance has taken in the lead–up to the Prague summit in November 2002, the evolution of US policy with regard to the potential entry of the Baltic states into NATO, and the arguments that have sometimes been raised against Baltic membership. He argues that the admission of the Baltic states into NATO will be a step forward both for the alliance and for European security, but he believes that it should be accompanied by a restructuring of the alliance that would give much greater weight to its political dimension. One key objective of this restructuring would be to establish a closer relationship with Russia, moving beyond the NATO–Russia Council that was set up in May 2002. The way to do this is not by treating Russia as a special case, but by encouraging the Russian government to apply for NATO membership (as other countries have) and then helping Russia to carry out far–reaching political and military changes that would eventually qualify it to enter the alliance.     

Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic culture

The European Union and its member states have moved with considerable speed towards the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Whether what has been achieved so far adds up to a revolution remains a moot point. The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Maastricht Treaty has not always been noted for its binding character, and too often the debate over security and defence has degenerated into an artificial, zero-sum-type game between Atlanticists and Europeanists. What is required for the success of the ESDP is not simply continued commitment to achieving the Headline Goals set out at Helsinki in 1999, but also the development of what the authors call a 'strategic culture', i.e. an institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the effective range of legitimate policy instruments of the Union. The authors argue that political commitment at the highest levels has been underpinned by the institutionalization, within the Council Secretariat, of the 'military option' in the form of the Military Committee and a Directorate General for the EU's Military Staff (DGEUMS). Even more importantly, there are already signs, especially through such concepts as 'security sector reform' and 'structural stability', that the EU, through its development and humanitarian programmes, has already recognized the necessity of military solutions.     

北约与跨大西洋的空气污染治理(1969-1976)

北大西洋公约组织以1969年组建的现代社会挑战委员会为载体,积极介入社会领域尤其是环保领域的事务,这被视为北约除防卫协作和政治协商功能之外的“第三维”。北约现代社会挑战委员会把空气污染治理列为第一批试点研究之一,围绕空气污染评估、空气质量标准、污染控制技术、空气质量模型、低污染动力系统开发等重大问题,开展了一系列的研讨、研究和推广活动,切实推动了跨大西洋的空气污染治理工作。北约现代社会挑战委员会通过积极举办空气污染治理专家会议或推动国际环保会议的召开,加强了各国空气污染治理的信息传播和经验交流,增进了跨大西洋社会的团结。其间,北约盟国特别是美国以试点研究的相关成果为依托,尝试推动同苏联在环保领域的合作,在一定程度上成为东西方政治缓和的重要副产品。但是,美苏之间的双边合作并没有全面地实现东西方、南北方之间的环保合作,全球范围的环保运动仍然任重而道远。     

NATO contracting in Afghanistan: the problem of principal–agent networks

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) play a growing role in international military and peacekeeping operations. Very little is known, however, about the fact that not only the United States relies extensively on contractors, but so do international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This article examines NATO's collaboration with PMSCs during its leadership of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF, 2001–2014). It argues that NATO's use of international prime contractors and holding PMSCs responsible for their own security contributed to the creation of a complex network of contractors and subcontractors with detrimental effects for control and accountability. In particular, this article focuses on the proliferation of local Armed Private Security Companies (APSCs) which were accused of a wide range of humanitarian and human rights abuses. Drawing on principal–agent theory, this article seeks to explain why NATO appeared unable to stop the ‘culture of impunity’ among these firms. It shows that multiple principals and long principal–agent chains undermined NATO oversight over armed security guards. In addition, some principals and agents avoided accountability for APSC misconduct through three strategies: blame‐shifting, back‐scratching and morphing. NATO contracting practices, thus, had serious negative implications for the security of the civilian population and the ability of ISAF to establish lasting peace in Afghanistan.     

A bridge in times of confrontation: Italy and Russia in the context of EU and NATO enlargements

Abstract

How might the continuous changes in the standing orders of the Camera dei Deputati between 1861 and 1922 be explained? To answer this question, the text investigates the political events associated with standing order reforms. Two results are emphasized. On the one hand, and contrary to common views, the study shows that the reforms were not casual or episodic, but resulted from different sets of political pressure, internal or external to the parliamentary ambit. This fact, on the other hand, draws attention to the need to go deeper into the question of the institutional evolution of the liberal parliament, chiefly with regard to relations among institutional actors.     

The geography of the Atlantic peace: NATO 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall

This article examines NATO's transformation from the Cold War to the present and offers a framework of interpretation. Transformation has entailed a downgrading of territorial defence and an upgrading of out‐of‐area crisis management, as well as diplomatic engagement and partnership. NATO has thus become a more diversified and globalized alliance. The article traces the evolution post‐1989 of the principled policy areas for the alliance—defence, crisis management and partnership—and explains difficulties of development within each area. It also enters into the controversy of interpreting NATO. It explains NATO as an outcome of America's enduring need to engage in the management of Eurasia's rim and Europe's equally enduring need for outside assistance in organizing a concert of power inside Europe. NATO has historically been strong when Europe's and North America's power capabilities and concepts of order are in equilibrium and thus when NATO governments have defined the geography of the Atlantic peace in such a way that both pillars can contribute to it in substantial ways. The article puts this perspective in opposition to two mainstream frameworks of thinking—liberal idealism and retrenchment realism—and applies it in a critique of the diversified and globalized profile that the alliance has developed. The article finally offers a moderately positive assessment of NATO's September 2014 Wales summit as a contribution to renewed geopolitical equilibrium, and it suggests how this contribution could be further strengthened.     

Spain's and Poland's Road to NATO: the problem of continuity and change in the foreign policy of a democratising state

The aim of this article is to compare the Spanish and Polish road to NATO from the perspective of the shape of the foreign policy and its possible restructuring in states undergoing the process of democratic transformation. The study of both cases shows that the reorientation of the foreign policy of a democratising state results to a large extent from external conditions at the global and regional levels although the internal conditions may hinder or accelerate the reorientation. The example of Spain demonstrates that in a firm and stable international system (the bipolar system) it is extremely difficult to change the direction of foreign policy, even if there are internal premises such as democratisation, well-organised opposition supporting the change and social support. In the case of Poland, the flexible and unstable international system made it possible to radically change the direction of its foreign policy. The existing internal premises without the appropriate external context would not have been enough to generate the reorientation of foreign policy. The comparative study of Spanish and Polish cases should be treated as an introduction to the broader analysis on the subject of the restructuring of foreign policy in the democratising state. Democratic transformation processes which took place in Europe from the mid-1970s provide broad empirical material for further scientific work in this area.     

Cosmology,creation, and the force of history

Abstract

At first sight, any attempt to understand the cosmos may seem overambitious. Cosmologists would claim, nonetheless, to have transformed their subject into a genuine empirical science, especially in the last three decades. This progress has proved possible because the universe possesses a surprising degree of overall symmetry and uniformity. It is complexity, and not sheer size, that makes a phenomenon baffling. In the fierce heat of a star and (even more surely) in the early universe, everything is broken down into its simplest constituents. So cosmology need not be the most intractable science. Our biological colleagues – studying the intricate multilayered structures of trees, butterflies, and brains – face challenges that may be even tougher.     

Justifying the use of force in a post‐9/11 world: striving for hierarchy in international society

This article examines the justifications made for war by President Bush in Afghanistan and Iraq, cataloguing all the administration's statements that justify or support these wars. These discourses reveal a radical departure from the post‐1990 trend of United States presidents, with international law and human rights being almost absent. The justifications point to a hegemonic US attempting to establish itself as the guarantor and provider of freedom and peace, attempting to establish a hierarchically structured international society.     

NATO expansion: ‘a policy error of historic importance’

European security depends on the effective collaboration of the five major powers; it will be undermined by the extension of NATO, a policy driven by US domestic politics. The main threats to security are: the breakdown of political and economic stability; unintended nuclear proliferation and/or failure of the START process; Russia's evolving political and territorial aspirations. All three will remain marginal as long as Russia is constructively engaged with the West. NATO expansion threatens that engagement. It is seen by all strands of Russian opinion as violating the bargain struck in 1990 and will likely lead to the withdrawal of cooperation. Invitations to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic cannot be rescinded, but the consequences can be mitigated by refraining from integrating them into NATO's military structure, by ceasing to insist that NATO membership is open to all, and by perpetuating the de facto nuclear‐weapons‐free zone that presently exists in Central and Eastern Europe. Britain's stance could be pivotal.