Von Vielschichtigkeiten und Verschränkungen “Kulturen der Wissenschaft – Wissenschaften in der Kultur”

On Multiple Levels and Linkages: Introduction to the Symposium ‘Cultures of Sciences – the Sciences in Culture’. – The article presents briefly approaches to cultural history and cultural studies that seem potentially useful to or have recntly been applied in historical studies of the sciences. The first section discusses three such approaches: discourse analysis, symbolic artefacts (images and text), and cultures of scientific practice. Each of the three approaches raises issues of its own, and all of them share a common problem characteristic of cultural and social history in general: linking micro and macro levels of analysis. The second section presents three approaches to resolving this dilemma by focusing on specific linkages between cultures of science (or culture in the sciences) and general history: scientific thought and practice as norms for professional behavior, for example in fields of knowledge dominated by women; spaces of knowledge, for example the city; and linkages of cultural, media and economic history in fields such as radio and television.     

Mathematik und Religion in der frühen Neuzeit

Some protestant Mathematicians had a strong preoccupation with the Day of Judgement. Stifel, Faulhaber, Napier and Newton made calculations in order to determine the date of the end of the world. Craig gave mathematical rules for a decline in the reliability of Christian tradition; in order to prevent a reliability of nearly zero, the Day of Judgement must come before. Furthermore, some conflicts between theology and mathematics are discussed. The Council of Konstanz condemned Wyclif's theory of the continuum. It seems that the relation between part and whole was a crucial point between the Aristotelians and the “moderns”.     

Der Kampf gegen den „Schwarzen Tod”︁. Quarantäne und Epidemiebekämpfung der frühen Neuzeit im Mittelmeer aufgezeigt am Beispiel Maltas

During early modern period Mediterranean people feared epidemics far more than war and other destructive activities. Where epidemics, especially the plague, struck, all communications broke down and trade just withered away. With the coming of the Knights of St. John in 1530 the Maltese Islands became increasingly important as an international boarding place in the very center of the Mediterranean. Soon the maritime development of the Order's State was enhanced by the high regard in which the Maltese Quarantine System was held by European countries in the 17th and 18th century. The aetiology of plague was then unknown and the restrictive measures adopted by the Maltese Quarantine System too were in accordance with the approved epidemiological practices and theories of the time. This article tries to single out the importance of the Maltese Quarantine as a kind of medical “shield” for the southern European countries.     

Das Problem der “entscheidenden Experimente”

In this historical essay an attempt is made to discuss the problem of decisive experiments both from the point of view of History of Science and of Philosophy of Science. The first part deals with Francis Bacon's idea of instantiae crucis and with the use of the term experimentum crucis mainly in optics. With respect to the experimental confirmation of Maxwell's electrodynamics the Duhem-Quine Thesis is discussed. Duhem had argued that not a single hypothesis but only a complete theory is examined by experiment. So a single experiment neither can prove nor can disprove a single hypothesis. With regard to Bucherer's and Neumann's data concerning the velocity-dependence of the electron's mass the question of the certainty of conclusions arising from experimental tests is treated. In the last parts the really historical problem of the decisive experiments is considered, namely the gap between the context of design of an experiment and the context of evaluation of an experiment in retrospect. The examples here are the Michelson-Morley experiment, the Franck-Hertz experiment, and the Compton-Effect. In the conclusion parity violation is discussed. Perhaps due to the possibility of a single alternative in theory and an unambiguous result of the experiment this test really was crucial. In general, however, the experimentum crucis will prove to be a very seldom event.     

“Alles ist Blatt”. Über Reichweite und Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Sprache und Darstellungsmodelle Goethes

The essay will elaborate on the following aspects of the selected topic: 1) Goethe's scepticism of language: An apprehension of the almost unbridgeable gap between language and the world of objects constitutes the starting point in his approach to language. — 2) The paradoxical nature of the objective world: The paradoxical character of the realm of natural science is a second starting point: Goethe first attempts the logically ‘impossible’, namely to capture simultaneously that which at a higher level is identical and at the empirical level visibly distinct, that which is both static and changing, the uniformity of the kingdom of nature and its multiplicity; he proceeds to undertake a translation of this into a mode of representation accessible to the mind's eye. — 3) Goethe's scientific models of representation: Goethe's models, which graduate from variation of synonym through the exploitation of multifarious fields of imagery to the free juxtaposition of different text-forms each providing its own perspective, serve to resolve the problems outlined in 1 and 2. Form is cognition, its value being not principally aesthetic but heuristic. 4) The scope and influence of Goethe's language: The product of Goethe's scientific efforts is a standard transparent language, both vivid and explanatory, capable of concisely delineating exceedingly complex circumstances and interactions. Even in some spheres of science its influence extended to the beginning of the twentieth century, facilitating the dialogue between disciplines. — 5) The limitations of this language: One of the clear limitations of this language shows itself to be its close adhension to visual perception: its dread both of abstraction, with its disregard of objective fields of reference, and of the formalised language of mathematics. — 6) The shadow of abstraction: Since the eighteenth century the world has lived in the increasingly dark shadow of an abstraction, which has assumed new dimensions in the laboratory-like world of today. — 7) Distance to Goethe: From a present-day persepective Goethe's science appears as distant legend.     

“UNABLE TO RESIST”: ON THE “POSSIBILITY” OF “IMPOSSIBILITY” AND CHRISTOPHE BOUTON'S TIME AND FREEDOM

This essay reflects critically on Martin Heidegger's remarks about authenticity and death with the aid of Christophe Bouton's Temps et liberté (2002), translated by Christopher Macann as Time and Freedom (2014). It first raises general questions concerning the possible thematic relationship between human endeavoring (action) and the experiences of finitude and freedom. Heidegger's Being and Time is particularly useful for exploring this relationship, but certain problems emerge when using this text for accessing the essay's themes. To wit: there are good reasons for mistrusting readings of Being and Time as a “practical” guide for grounding action. Against the practical reading, the essay wishes to reclaim the ontological‐existential significance of Heidegger's text. Although Bouton's treatment of Being and Time excludes its ontological dimensions and is entirely practical, even to the point of disregarding certain theoretical risks inherent in this approach, Bouton's study is indispensable for situating Being and Time in a historical‐intellectual context, whereby the experiences of freedom and time are understood within certain metaphysical presuppositions rendering them difficult to establish together on reliable grounds. Following Bouton's lead, the essay shows that the hermeneutic differences between practical and ontological readings of Being and Time can be explored through reflections on what Heidegger might have meant by the term “Möglichkeit” (“possibility”), from which Bouton infers “freedom.” It is alleged that Bouton does not fully consider all of Heidegger's assertions regarding Möglichkeit, most problematically the claim that the human being's most essential “possibility” is its “impossibility,” that is to say, its death.